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Abstract  
This thesis investigates the role and identity of manorial officers, individuals drawn from a 
lord’s tenants who were vital in administering his manor court and directly-farmed lands. It 
analyses officeholding from a social and political standpoint, examining the role of officers in 
governing village communities, and how this was affected by the decline of lordship and 
development of the state. The study deliberated bridges the medieval/early modern divide, 
analysing the period 1300-1600.   
The evidence base for this investigation relies on the reconstruction of officeholding from the 
court rolls of three case-study manors. These consist of Little Downham (Cambs.), Horstead 
(Norf.) and Worfield (Salop.). The first part of the thesis utilises quantitative methodologies to 
analyse the change in presentments made by officers (chapter one) and patterns in participation 
in office (chapter two). The second part adopts a qualitative approach to examine the role of 
officers in governing village communities (chapter three), attitudes to office among manorial 
tenants (chapter four), and the interaction of officeholding with the state and especially with the 
emergent civil parish (chapter five).  
Four central conclusions emerge from this work. Firstly, manorial officeholding remained an 
important institution in the English countryside across the period 1300-1600. Secondly, this was 
achieved via support from tenants who were invested in manorial office rather than pressure 
from lords or the crown. Thirdly, officeholding worked to create and reinforce social 
stratification, helping maintain the position of a village elite. Fourthly, the officeholding system 
was robust enough to survive the expansion of the state into local communities under successive 
English monarchs. 
These conclusions in turn have implications for the wider historical literature concerning late 
medieval and early modern England. They reinforce the revisionist argument that lord-tenant 
relations were not inevitability hostile and that many wealthier tenants benefitted from 
seignorial structures. More significantly, they add weight to the notion of a medieval equivalent 
to the early modern ‘middling sort’, suggesting that the emergence of a local elite was operative 
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Historical Approaches to Manorial Officeholding 
In 1596, the ‘chieffe inabitants’ of Swallowfield, Wiltshire, set down the celebrated 
‘Swallowfield articles’, a list of twenty-six resolutions designed to help the community 
‘better…lyve together in good love…to the praise of god and…better [serve] her Ma(jes)tie 
when wee meete together’.1 This document has been cited by a number of early modern social 
historians as ‘the merest glimpse of what might well have been an extremely sophisticated 
system of parish governance’ revealing ‘the extent to which middling groups had emerged as 
agents of social and political transformation even by the turn of the sixteenth century’.2 The 
articles make many references to quintessentially early modern governance structures, namely 
the quarter sessions and Justices of the Peace (JPs), which whilst operative since the fourteenth 
century saw increasingly dynamic usage under the Tudors and Stuarts.3 The geographical 
framework employed by the inhabitants is undoubtedly the parish, which whilst again an 
ancient administrative unit, was increasingly put to secular use in the sixteenth century.4  
However, alongside these references to more novel governing apparatuses, the articles are also 
replete with references to what could be considered a quintessentially medieval institution, 
namely that of the court leet and its officers. Article 12 orders that the inhabitants ‘ioyne 
together in purse, travel and credett’ for any suit that ‘touchethe the whole Tythinges or in any 
of them’.5 Explicit references to the leet’s officers are made in articles 10 and 16, in the former 
that ‘all…offycers for the publique affayers of the Tythyngs…shalbe countenanced and borne 
                                                          
1 S. Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community in the Elizabethan Parish: the Swallowfield Articles of 1596’, 
The Historical Journal, 42, 1999, 835-51, 848.  
2 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 836, 843-4, 848; P. Collinson, ‘De Republica Anglorum: or 
History with the Politics Put Back’ in P. Collinson, Elizabethan Essays, (London: Hambledon, 1994), 1-
30, 23-5; M.J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 75; S. Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550-1640, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 27-8; E.H. Shagan, ‘The Two Republics: Conflicting Views of 
Participatory Local Government in Early Tudor England’ in J.F. McDiarmid (ed.), The Monarchical 
Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 
19-36, 19; M. Gaskill, ‘Little Commonwealths II: Communities’ in K. Wrightson (ed.), A Social History 
of England, 1500-1700, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 84-104, 92. 
3 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 848, 849 [9], 850 [15], [21], 851 [25]; J.A. Sharpe, Crime in Early 
Modern England, 1550-1750, (London: Longman, 1984), 28-30; J.G. Bellamy, Crime and Public Order 
in England in the Later Middle Ages, (London: Routledge, 1973), 95-6.   
4 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 848, 849 [8], 850 [13], [20].  
5 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 849 [12]. 
2 
 
out of us all’ and the latter ‘that the offycers shall not be dislyked…in fyrtherynge…any other 
busyness of the Tythynges’.6 Article 25 addresses the specific apparatus of the manor court, 
stating that ‘tow of us shall be present at Sessions leete & Law days for to use the best means 
for to keepe dowen Synne’.7 Such language speaks to the persistence of manorial officeholding 
as a governing structure in early modern village life, but also suggests a longer continuity. Even 
in 1596, as the inhabitants of Swallowfield attempted to formulate a solution to new problems, 
in a meeting that involved participants from across the boundaries of several manors, the 
participants still operated, at least partially, within a system of local governance rooted in the 
manor. 
The example of Swallowfield encapsulates, in a rare source generated by village elites, the 
fundamental subject at the heart of this thesis. This is the long history of the manor as an 
institution of local governance, and how this was administered through a set of individuals 
acting in various manorial offices. Whilst little has been written about manorial officeholding as 
a topic in itself, officers’ prominence in the surviving documentation of the manor means that 
they have been studied in order to analyse other aspects of medieval social and economic 
history. The following surveys some of these historiographical trends, although much more 
detail is given in the main body of the thesis, where relevant points in the literature are 
discussed in detail.  
The earliest approaches focused on manorial officials as seignorial servants and particularly 
their role in managing their lord’s demesne. H.S. Bennett and Paul Vinogradoff examined 
manorial accounts and estate literature, using these to investigate the expectations lords had of 
their servants, and the agricultural practices these individuals used to meet these expectations.8 
In more recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in officials as estate managers, but 
utilising more systematic and quantitative approaches. Partially, this stems from an interest in 
the management practices of lords, but is part of a more general inquiry into the ability of 
peasant cultivators to be rational economic agents.9 David Stone’s study of Wisbech revealed 
                                                          
6 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 849 [10], 850 [16]. 
7 Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 851 [25].  
8 P. Vinogradoff, Villainage in England, (Oxford, 1892), 317-9; H.S.A. Bennett, Life on the English 
Manor: a Study of Peasant Conditions, 1150-1400, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 155-
92. 
9 D. Stone, Decision-Making in Medieval Agriculture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 13-4, 




that peasant reeves could be effective managers capable of responding to price trends, and who 
were able to exploit the opportunities for their skills following depopulation after the Black 
Death, although this positive view of price-responsiveness has recently been challenged.10 
Whilst these approaches have shed light on previously unappreciated aspects of the medieval 
economy and management, their main drawback is a lack of attention to the social context of 
officeholding. This is largely guided by the source type; manorial accounts provide minimal 
opportunities to explore social relations. In some of the older management literature 
officeholding is seen as having no social value at all, as seen in Bennett’s claim that ‘once the 
reeve had received [an] acquittance he could…safely return into his humble obscurity, from 
whence he had been drawn to play so important a part in the affairs of his rural community’.11  
A second strand in the historiography takes a completely converse approach, using 
officeholding to study the social structure of medieval village communities. This approach is 
associated with the so-called ‘Toronto School’ of medieval historians, a group of North-
American scholars led by J.A. Raftis active in the second half of the twentieth century.12 These 
scholars attempted to reconstitute the structure of villages which were part of the estates of the 
Abbot of Ramsey in Huntingdonshire through a statistical approach.13 The school developed a 
typology for families based on their prominence in certain activities in court rolls, with 
officeholding being seen as crucial. This statistical approach drew out particular families as 
having ‘A’ status, meaning that their members disproportionately held more offices more 
frequently.14  
                                                          
10 Stone, Decision-Making, 105, 168, 224; D. Stone, ‘The Reeve’, in S.H. Rigby (ed.) with the assistance 
of A. Minnis, Historians on Chaucer: The “General Prologue” to the Canterbury Tales, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 399-420., 413-6; E.B. Schneider, ‘Prices and Production: Agricultural Supply 
Response in Fourteenth-Century England’, EcHR, 67:1, (2014), 66-91, 84-5.  
11 Bennett, Life on the English Manor, 192. 
12 It should be noted that the grouping ‘Toronto School’ is rejected by some of the members of this group, 
for example see: E.B. DeWindt, ‘Introduction’, in E.B. DeWindt (ed.), The Salt of Common Life: 
Individuality and Choice in the Medieval Town, Countryside and Church: Essays Presented to J. 
Ambrose Raftis, (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1995), xi-xvii, xii-xiv.  
13 DeWindt, ‘Introduction’, xiv; R.M. Smith, ‘“Modernization” and the Corporate Village Community in 
England: Some Sceptical Reflections’ in A.R.H. Baker and D. Gregory (eds.), Explorations in Historical 
Geography: Interpretive Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 140-79, 155-7.  
14 J.A. Raftis, ‘The Concentration of Responsibility in Five Villages,’ Mediaeval Studies, 28, (1966), 92-
118; E.B. DeWindt, Land and People in Holywell-cum-Needingworth: Structures of Tenure and Patterns 
of Social Organization in an East Midlands Village, 1251-1457, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1972), 206-33; A.R. DeWindt, ‘Peasant Power Structures in Fourteenth-Century 
King’s Ripton’, Mediaeval Studies, 38, (1976), 236-67, 244-58; E. Britton, The Community of the Vill: a 
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Officeholding was further used to advance an argument concerning the breakdown of the 
medieval village community after the Black Death. The School emphasised several indicators 
such as the rise of trespass and violence, the breakdown of the pledging system, and changes to 
officeholding as showing a shift from the previously harmonious and communal village to a rise 
of individualism along more acquisitive lines.15 Using the Toronto method, Ian Blanchard 
emphasised that by 1525 bonds between different groups of villagers had changed, with lower 
groups forming patron-client relationships with elites, whilst elites themselves increasingly 
looked beyond the village to create regional powerbases driven by individualistic ambitions.16 
Anne Dewindt suggested that this breakdown of community may in part have been caused by 
new post-plague officers being less experienced.17 Sherri Olson modifies this view, claiming 
that changes the plague wrought meant officeholding increasingly became a way for immigrants 
to establish status in the community through multiple officeholding rather than individuals 
being chosen for an official role due to pre-existing social standing.18 Offices were now being 
used for ‘schooling the individual’ to become a better villager as part of a response by the 
village community to the social pressures brought on by demographic decline and the 
concomitant rise of violence and decline of personal responsibility.19 Thus her view is more 
positive as officeholding was a way to help preserve the community during a period of crisis. 
Whilst the detailed statistical work performed by members of the Toronto School is impressive, 
this work is problematic for reasons both of interpretation and evidence. On a methodological 
                                                          
Study in the History of the Family and Village Life in Fourteenth-Century England, (Toronto: Macmillan 
of Canada, 1977), 98-102; S. Olson, ‘Jurors of the Village Court: Local Leadership Before and After the 
Plague in Ellington, Huntingdonshire’, JBS, 30:3, (1991), 237-56, 238-42; S. Olson, ‘Families Have Their 
Fate and Periods: Varieties of Family Experience in the Preindustrial Village’, in E.B. DeWindt (ed.), The 
Salt of Common Life: Individuality and Choice in the Medieval Town, Countryside and Church: Essays 
Presented to J. Ambrose Raftis,  (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1995), 409–48, 410-28; S. 
Olson, A Chronicle of All that Happens: Voices from the Village Court in Medieval England, (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1996), 104-61 
15 J.A. Raftis, ‘Changes in an English Village after the Black Death’, Mediaeval Studies, 29, (1967), 158-
77, 163-5, 177; DeWindt, Land and People, 263-74.; DeWindt, ‘Peasant Power Structures’, 249; Olson, 
‘Jurors of the Village Court’, 240-2; Olson, Chronicle of All That Happens, 229; P.R. Schofield, Peasants 
and Historians: Debating the Medieval English Peasantry, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2016), 208. 
16 I. Blanchard, ‘Social Structure and Social Organization in an English Village at the Close of the Middle 
Ages: Chewton, 1526’, in E.B. DeWindt (ed.), The Salt of Common Life: Individuality and Choice in the 
Medieval Town, Countryside and Church: Essays Presented to J. Ambrose Raftis, (Kalamazoo: Medieval 
Institute Publications, 1995), 307-39. 
17 DeWindt, ‘Peasant Power Structures’, 249. 
18 Olson, ‘Jurors of the Village Court’, 251-6; Olson, ‘Families Have Their Fate and Periods’, 446-8. 
19 Olson, Chronicle of All That Happens, 195-203. 
5 
 
level, the School’s work has been criticised for relying on unstable identifications of families by 
surname; using an individual’s officeholding career as a status marker for their whole family; 
assuming that court rolls record verbatim the activity of manor courts; and applying statistical 
techniques to extremely fragmentary court-roll series.20 The contention that the village 
community declined after the Black Death has come in for specific criticism.21 On the one hand, 
the School presented too positive a view of pre-plague harmony, which cannot account for 
bylaws restricting gleaning or the apportionment of common amercements without regard for 
the ability of villagers to pay.22 The indicators used to show post-plague tensions are 
questionable; the decline of personal pledging may simply represent procedural change in the 
court rather than the collapse of mutual bonds, whilst the increasing number of trespass cases 
were often linked to stray animals, so could be an artefact of more livestock breeding in the 
land-abundant post-Plague period.23 Beyond manorial evidence, efforts at community cohesion 
are seen in religious institutions such as the growth of gilds and reconstructing of parish 
churches, which Christopher Dyer interprets as a policy of the ‘deliberate promotion by the 
village elite…to foster a community spirit in danger of being eroded by economic realities.’24  
A third approach also focuses on intra-village dynamics but draws heavily on insights from the 
post-medieval era. Early modernists have increasingly identified a vibrant ‘political’ culture in 
the villages of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England.25 This is seen to have been 
                                                          
20 K. Wrightson, ‘Medieval Villagers in Perspective’, Peasant Studies, 7:4, (1978), 203-16; 211-3; Smith, 
“Modernization”, 156; Z. Razi, ‘The Toronto School’s Reconstitution of Medieval Peasant Society: a 
Critical View’, P&P, 85:1, (1979), 141-57; Z. Razi, ‘Family, Land and Village Community in Later 
Medieval England, P&P, 93, (1981), 3-36, 29; J.M. Bennett, Women in the Medieval English 
Countryside: Gender and Household in Brigstock Before the Plague, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 212-3; C.C. Dyer, ‘Review of A Chronicle of All the Happens: Voices from the Village 
Court in Medieval England, by Sherri Olson’, The American Historical Review, 103:1, (1998), 157-8, 
158; P.L. Larson, ‘Village Voice or Village Oligarchy?: the Jurors of the Durham Halmote Court, 1349 to 
1424’, Law and History Review, 28:3, (2010), 675-709, 678 n.10; Schofield, Peasants and Historians, 
208. 
21 K. Wrightson, ‘The “Decline of Neighbourliness” Revisited’ in D.R. Woolf and N.L. Jones (eds.), 
Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
19-49, 20. 
22 C.C. Dyer, ‘The English Medieval Village Community and its Decline’, JBS, 33:4, (1994), 407-29, 
421-4. 
23 Razi, ‘Toronto School’s Reconstitution’, 149-52. 
24 Dyer, ‘Village Community’, 428-9. 
25 Collinson, ‘De Republica’, 23-5; K. Wrightson, ‘The Politics of the Parish in Early Modern England’, 
in P. Griffiths, A. Fox and S. Hindle (eds.), The Experience of Authority in Early Modern England, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 10-46, 10-12, 35-7; S. Hindle, A Shepard and J. Walter, ‘The Making 
and Remaking of Early Modern English Social History’ in S. Hindle, A Shepard and J. Walter (eds.), 
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facilitated by an increased interaction with the state, as local communities were made 
responsible for maintaining roads, outfitting soldiers, enforcing religious policy, and raising and 
distributing poor relief to their fellow villagers. This both gave new roles to pre-existing 
officials such as churchwardens and constables and also created new offices such as that of 
overseer of the poor.26 Keith Wrightson has suggested these changes led to the emergence of an 
upper stratum of village society he termed ‘the middling sort’, a set of local elites who used 
state power to govern their local communities, and in doing so increasingly gained a level of 
political consciousness setting them apart from their more plebeian fellow villagers.27 
Medievalists have recently sought to find parallels in the village communities of fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century England, and have explored manorial officeholding as a similar institution.28 In 
                                                          
Remaking English Society: Social Relations and Social Change in Early Modern England, (Woodbridge: 
Boydell, 2013), 1-40, 25-6, 31; J. Healey, ‘The Political Culture of the English Commons, c.1550-1650’, 
AgHR, 60, (2012), 266-87, 267-8; M.J. Braddick and J. Walter, ‘Introduction. Grids of Power: Order, 
Hierarchy and Subordination in Early Modern Society’ in M.J. Braddick and J. Walter (eds.), Negotiating 
Power in Early Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-42, 2-4.  
26 K. Wrightson, ‘Aspects of Social Differentiation in Rural England, c.1580-1660’, Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 5:1, (1977), 33-47, 40; Hindle, State and Social Change, 215-6; J. Kent, The English Village 
Constable 1580-1642: a Social and Administrative Study, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 16-19, 28-56; R.A. 
Houston, ‘People, Space and Law in Late Medieval and Early Modern Britain and Ireland’, P&P, 230, 
(2016), 47-89, 56-7, 68; Sharpe, Crime, 85-7; R. Hutton, The Rise and Fall of Merry England: the Ritual 
Year, 1400-1700, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 73; K. Wrightson and D. Levine, Poverty and 
Piety in an English Village: Terling, 1525-1700, revised edition, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 155-7; 
Braddick, State Formation, 59; E.J. Carlson, ‘The Origins, Function, and Status of the Office of 
Churchwarden, with Particular Reference to the Diocese of Ely’ in M. Spufford (ed.), The World of Rural 
Dissenters, 1520-1725, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 164-207, 170-80; B. Kümin, 
The Shaping of a Community: the Rise and Reformation of the English Parish, c.1400-1560, (Aldershot: 
Scolar Press, 1996), 243-58; M.K. McIntosh, Poor Relief in England, 1350-1600, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 232-52, 280-3; S. Hindle, On the Parish?: the Micro-Politics of Poor 
Relief in Rural England, c.1550-1750, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 10-13; S. Webb and B. Webb, English 
Local Government: Volume 1 the Parish and the County, (London: Longman, 1906), 21; P. Slack, 
Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England, (London: Longman, 1988), 131; Wrightson, ‘Politics of 
the Parish’, 25-8; B. Kümin,‘The Secular Legacy of the Late Medieval English Parish’, in E. Duffy and 
C. Burgess (eds.), The Parish in Late Medieval England, (Donington: Shaun Tyas, 2006), 95-111, 105; 
V.R. Bainbridge, Gilds in the Medieval Countryside: Social and Religious Change in Cambridgeshire, 
c.1350-1558, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1996), 125, 150; S. Hindle, ‘The Political Culture of the Middling 
Sort in English Rural Communities, c.1550-1700’ in T. Harris (ed.), The Politics of the Excluded, c.1550-
1850, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 125-52, 136-7; S. Gunn, The English People at War in the Age of 
Henry VIII, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 32-3, 51-2.  
27 Wrightson, ‘Social Differentiation’, 34-45; Wrightson and Levine, ‘Poverty and Piety’, 174-84; K. 
Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth-Century England’, 
J. Brewer and J. Styles (eds.), An Ungovernable People?: the English and their Law in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 21-46, 45-6; K. Wrightson, English Society, 
1580-1680, (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 222-7; Wrightson, ‘“Decline of Neighbourliness”’, 38-9.  
28 C.C. Dyer, ‘The Political Life of the Fifteenth-Century English Village’ in L. Clark and C. Carpenter 
(eds.), Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), 135-58, 135-7.  
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comparing responses to dearth c.1280-1322 and c.1580-1640, Richard Smith has recently 
argued for an early fourteenth-century ‘veritable middling sort’ existing through manorial 
officeholding, emphasising that officers acted ‘as potential intermediaries between the local 
community and the higher tiers of the administrative order’.29 However, such examinations have 
not yet moved beyond comment, with little analysis of how far manorial officeholding worked 
similarly or differently to later officeholding structures.  
It is this final strand in the literature which acts as a springboard for the following thesis. 
Manorial officeholding is examined over the long term, across a three-hundred-year time frame, 
in the same three locales. This stretches from c.1300, a period of high demographic pressure, in 
which high prices and low wages are generally seen to have advantaged landlords who 
maintained at least the potential to exercise significant authority over their unfree tenants, to 
c.1600, where again population was high, but the position of landlords was far weaker, with the 
rise of engrossing peasants as a new class of yeoman farmers.30 Between these two periods can 
be placed the challenging conditions of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which saw 
demographic and economic stagnation, along with the decline of serfdom, and also, across the 
period as a whole, the growth of the state via institutions such as the commissions of the peace 
and the development of the civil parish.31  
                                                          
29 R.M. Smith, ‘Contrasting Susceptibility to Famine in Early Fourteenth- and Late Sixteenth-Century 
England: the Significance of Late Medieval Rural Social Structural and Village Governmental Changes’ 
in M.J. Braddick and P. Withington (eds.), Popular Culture and Political Agency in Early Modern 
England and Ireland: Essays in Honour of John Walter, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2017), 35-54, 44.  
30 B.M.S. Campbell, English Seigniorial Agriculture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3-
10; B.M.S. Campbell, ‘The Land’, in R. Horrox and W.M. Ormrod (eds.), A Social History of England, 
1200-1500, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 179-237, 233-7; J. Whittle, ‘Tenure and 
Landholding in England, 1440-1580: a Crucial Period for the Development of Agrarian Capitalism?’ in 
B.J.P. van Bavel and P. Hoppenbrouwers (eds.), Landholding and Land Transfer in the North Sea Area 
(late Middle Ages – 19th century), (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 237-49, 237-46; J. Whittle, The 
Development of Agrarian Capitalism: Land and Labour in Norfolk, 1440-1580, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
2000), 168-171, 305-10; R.H. Britnell, Britain and Ireland 1050-1530: Economy and Society, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 444-5; K. Wrightson, Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early 
Modern Britain, (New Haven, CT. and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 132-41; B.M.S. Campbell, 
‘England: Land and People’, in S.H. Rigby (ed.), A Companion to Britain in the Late Middle Ages, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 3-25, 16-9.  
31 J. Hatcher, ‘The Great Slump of the Mid-Fifteenth Century’ in R.H. Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), 
Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 237-72, 270-2; Britnell, Britain and Ireland, 496-501; M. Bailey, The 
Decline of Serfdom in Late Medieval England: from Bondage to Freedom, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2014), 




The long time frame, which works across the medieval/early modern divide, allows one to 
explore the relationship between these political, economic and social changes and manorial 
officeholding. On the one hand, the aim is to examine how far officeholding structures adapted 
or were made obsolete by these wider changes, yet equally important is to examine how these 
changes were themselves mediated in their effects on local communities via manorial 
officeholding. The manor was undoubtedly the most immediate organ of governance for the 
majority of English rural people even in the late middle ages, providing a structure that enforced 
lordship, regulated agriculture, acted as a forum for interpersonal litigation, policed petty crime 
and regulated the tenure of landholdings.32 Some early modernists have argued for an extension 
of this principle into the period beyond 1500, arguing that the manor remained vital until the 
Civil War at the earliest, providing a cheap and local forum for dealing with village problems.33  
Therefore, the following thesis aims to investigate the changing functions and identity of 
manorial officers across the period 1300-1600. It does this in order to explore what manorial 
officeholding can reveal about the relationship between lord, crown and community, the internal 
governance of villages and the growth of the early modern state. To achieve these aims, the 
scope of the study excludes aspects of manorial officeholding, which whilst worthy of study, do 
not speak directly to these wider themes. The most obvious omission are manorial officers who 
were not selected from among the tenants but instead salaried appointees, including stewards 
and bailiffs. Such positions, which were externally appointed by lords, have less potential to 
reveal the social importance of officeholding, which is best revealed through examining those 
officers who were drawn from medieval village communities. A second aspect which is 
                                                          
32 S.H. Rigby, English Society in the Later Middle Ages: Class, Status and Gender, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1995), 26-7; C.D. Briggs, Credit and Village Society in Fourteenth-Century England, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Academy, 2009), 12-3; P.R. Schofield, 
‘Peasants and the Manor Court: Gossip and Litigation in a Suffolk Village at the Close of the Thirteenth 
Century’, P&P, 159, (1998), 3-42, 17; M. Bailey, The English Manor, c.1200-c.1500, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 168-9; S. Walker, ‘Order and Law’, in R. Horrox and W.M. Ormrod 
(eds.), A Social History of England, 1200-1500, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 91-112, 
97-8.  
33 W.J. King, ‘Untapped Resources for Social Historians: Court Leet Records’, Journal of Social History, 
51:4, (1982), 699-705, 699; W.J. King, ‘Early Stuart Courts Leet: Still Needful and Useful’, Histoire 
Sociale/Social History, 23:46, (1990), 271-99, 298-9; M.K. McIntosh, ‘Social Change and Tudor 
Manorial Leets’ in H.G. Beale and J.A. Guy (eds.), Law and Social Change in British History: Papers 
Presented to the Bristol Legal History Conference, 14-17 July 1981, (London: Royal Historical Society, 
1984), 73-85, 75-85; C. Harrison, ‘Manor Courts and the Governance of Tudor England’, in C. Wilson 
Brooks and M. Lobban (eds.), Communities and Courts in Britain, 1150-1900, (London: Hambledon, 
1997), 43–60, 43, 59; Sharpe, Crime, 84-5. 
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considered in passing but not in particular detail, is the role of officials as demesne managers. 
This is largely driven by the fact that the key sources for the study are court rolls, rather than 
manorial accounts, which provide the information necessary to assess management techniques. 
The scope of the project also does not allow for much investigation of the direct evidence of the 
status of officeholders outside of their official roles, such as their wealth, landholding or kinship 
ties.  
Finally, the thesis focuses on the ‘public’ work of officers, as it aims to consider the role of 
manorial structures in governing village communities. This means that officers’ work in 
interpersonal litigation is only discussed occasionally, and that officials who dealt solely with 
civil cases, like trial jurors, are not examined. However, the ‘public’ focus means that the work 
of both courts leet and baron is analysed. Whilst in legal terms barons and leets had different 
purposes in meeting strictly seigniorial and royal requirements respectively, both types of court 
were part of the same manorial structure as the right to hold a leet was a franchise granted to 
lords. This led them to be directed by the same seigniorial steward, occur at the same place and 
often time, and be recorded in the same set of records. The legal distinction was blurred on the 
ground with business strictly belonging to one type of court seen in the other. From the point of 
view of officers, both types of courts involved meeting obligations to external authorities, whilst 
also being part of the same structure governing local political, economic and social life.   
Case studies 
The evidentiary basis for this thesis rests on three manorial case studies, representing a 
compromise between the depth offered by an intensive reconstitution of one manor and the 
breadth offered by an extensive trawl of multiple court-roll series. It marries a comprehensive 
examination of typical rather than ‘cherry-picked’ aspects of officeholding, with a comparative 
approach revealing both local variations and commonalities. The manors are Little Downham 
(Cambridgeshire), Horstead (Norfolk), and Worfield (Shropshire) (see figure 0.1). These were 
chosen primarily for record survival, with an effort made to find manors that had relatively 
complete sets of surviving court rolls over the 300-year time frame. However, beyond this 
necessary requirement, the case studies were deliberately selected to encompass a range of 





Figure 0.1 – Locations of three case-study manors 
 
Boundary data = 1851 counties. 
 
Little Downham was located in the Cambridgeshire fenland, 2½ miles north-west of Ely.34 The 
manor was held by the bishop of Ely throughout the study period, as part of the bishop’s 
powerful liberty within the Isle of Ely. This placed the manor within a larger framework of the 
bishop’s jurisdiction, with the prelate controlling aspects of governance that elsewhere would be 
performed by crown officials, and bolstered his authority as a manorial lord.35 The inhabitants 
                                                          
34 M.C. Coleman, Downham-in-the-Isle: a Study of an Ecclesiastical Manor in the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth centuries, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1984), 1, 4.  
35 VCH Cambs., 8-27.  
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lived in a nucleated settlement, with the smaller hamlet of Downhamhythe to the west providing 
access to navigable waterways.36 The village lay within three open fields, following a three-field 
system of cultivation, but was bounded on the northern side by the bishop’s residential palace 
and 250a deer park.37 In 1251, 444½a consisted of demesne, 294a were held by 33 customary 
tenants, 158½a by four free tenants and 24a by 24 cottars.38 Beyond cultivated land, tenants had 
access to large fen commons which provided pasture lands for livestock, but also important 
resources such as turves and sedge.39 The prosperity of the manor changed with the Black 
Death; whilst in the years 1286-1345 its value ranged from £10 18s 11d to £21 9s 1d, by 1356 a 
survey reveals the demesne had shrunk, being worth £2 13s 4d and rents only £2.40 However, 
Clare Coleman suggests recovery by the 1360s, with seigniorial policies increasing the amount 
of demesne under plough and attempting to let holdings on old terms.41 Conservatism in land 
tenures continued, with the language of villeinage and bondage dropped after the 1360s in 
favour of ‘at the will of the lord’, but experiments in leasing were largely confined to the late 
fourteenth century and ultimately disappeared in favour of heritable tenure, thus conforming to 
the second of Mark Bailey’s four categories of tenurial change.42 Even in the second half of the 
fifteenth century, lands continued to owe labour services along with rents and heriots, a reversal 
of an earlier trend towards commutation into cash payments.43  
The manor was leased from 1430-1 until 1478-9, after which it came back under direct 
management.44 The manor was apparently leased again by the 1540s, when it was valued at £27 
17s 9½d to £37 7s excluding arrears.45 Population reconstructions can be made from various 
taxation sources.46 At Downham, population followed national trends, halving between 1327 
                                                          
36 Coleman, Downham, 4-5.  
37 Coleman, Downham, 4; C. Taylor, ‘‘A Place there is where Liquid Honey Drops like Dew’: the 
Landscape of Little Downham, Cambridgeshire, in the Twelfth Century’, Landscape History, 31:2, 
(2010), 5-23, 12.  
38 Coleman, Downham, 13.  
39 Coleman, Downham, 20-1.  
40 VCH Cambs.  
41 Coleman, Downham, 95-6.  
42 See, for example, CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.11, 16 Mar 1362; C11/1/2, m.21, 4 Mar 1370; C/11/2/4, m.1, 
23 Mar 1400; C11/2/4, m.2, 7 Jul 1400; M. Bailey, ‘The Transformation of Customary Tenures in 
Southern England, c.1350 to c.1500’, AgHR, 62:2, (2014), 210-30, 216.  
43 See, for example, CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.4, 16 May 1464; C11/3/7, m.17, 24 Sep 1473; C11/3/10, 
unfoliated, 24 Feb 1487.  
44 CUL, EDR, D10/3, m.9, 1430-1; D10/3, m.46, 1478-9.  
45 VCH Cambs., 90-5.  
46 For methodology see appendix 2.  
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and 1377 due to plague mortality (table 0.1). Substantial recovery had occurred by 1524, a 
pattern that fits with the general buoyancy of fen edge settlements in Cambridgeshire over the 
fifteenth century.47 However the population remained static or perhaps even decreased by 1563 
probably due to the poor harvests and epidemics of the mid-Tudor population crisis.48 
 
Table 0.1 – Population Estimates  
 Little Downham Horstead Worfield 
Date Population Estimate Population Estimate Population Estimate 
1327 442-589 N/A 855-1140 
1377-9 185-204 127-140 N/A 
1524 350-472 94-125 384-518 
1563 380-400 N/A 637-670 
1603 N/A 154-200 N/A 
 
See appendix 2 for methodology and sources 
 
The court rolls for the manor survive for 1310-1582 but contain significant gaps of more than 
three years for 1317-22, 1336-61, 1475-83 and 1509-51 (figure 0.2). The trend in sessions per 
year was downwards, from 2-8 for the 1320s-60s, to 2-4 for the 1370s-1430s, and a final fall to 
generally 2 until the 1580s. The manor’s accounts also survive for much of the periods 1319-75 
and 1411-1509. As table 0.2 displays, Downham had by far the largest set of officials of the 
three case studies, including bylawmen and fenreeves not seen at the other two manors. The 
period of leasing changed the officeholding structure, with the reeveship and messorship 





                                                          
47 J.S. Lee, ‘Tracing Regional and Local Changes in Population and Wealth during the Later Middle Ages 
using Taxation Records: Cambridgeshire, 1334-1563’, Local Population Studies, 69, (2002), 32-50, 48. 
48 E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871: a Reconstruction, 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1981), 332-6.  
49 CUL, EDR, D10/3, m.19, 1444-5; D10/3, m.26, 1455-6; D10/3, m.38, 1470-1.  
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Table 0.2 – Officers found on each case-study manor with periods of appearance in court 
rolls 
Office Little Downham Horstead Worfield 
Capital Pledge/ 
Jury Leet 
1310-1579 1395-1599 1327-1598 
Jury Baron 1310-1582 1392-1599 1350-1600 





Messor/beadle 1316-1439,  
1472-1503 
N/A 1327-1598 
Taster 1311-1579 1395-1492 1327-1597 
Bylawman 1311-1414 N/A N/A 
Fenreeve 1326-1579 N/A N/A 
Constable 1329-1579 1439-1599 1384-1597 
Vills N/A N/A 1327-1589 
 
N/A refers to officers that do not appear on the relevant manor. Nominal refers to the fact that whilst candidates for 
the reeveship were selected for Horstead, these individuals did not serve in the office. These dates do not necessarily 
imply the officer was not present outside these time periods, but only indicate when such officers can be found in the 
documentary record. Sources, CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11; KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-















Figure 0.2 – Sessions surviving and analysed for Little Downham 
 
N leet sessions = 169; N baron sessions = 300. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11. 
 
Horstead, situated around 7 miles from Norwich, was a different type of community. The manor 
was located in an area of complex boundaries, which were typical of medieval Norfolk.50 The 
vill of Horstead-with-Stanninghall was divided between two lordships in 1316, corresponding to 
the separate manors of Horstead and Stanninghall, and also seems to have contained a separate 
fee called Cattes manor.51 By the sixteenth century, the civil parish contained both Horstead and 
Stanninghall whilst the ecclesiastical parish just included Horstead.52 Moreover, Horstead 
manor had a separate portion within the neighbouring area of Coltishall, this vill being split 
between four lords.53 The two different portions led to a mismatch between manorial and leet 
boundaries. Horstead’s leet authority, which included Stanninghall, was confined to the 
                                                          
50 B.M.S. Campbell, ‘The Complexity of Manorial Structure in Medieval Norfolk: a Case Study’, Norfolk 
Archaeology, 39, (1986), 225-61, 227-42; M. Bailey, A Marginal Economy?: East Anglian Breckland in 
the Later Middle Ages, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45-6.  
51 W.J. Blake, ‘Norfolk Manorial Lords in 1316: Part II’¸ Norfolk Archaeology, 30:4, (1952), 263-86, 
280; P. Millican, A History of Horstead and Stanninghall, Norfolk, (Norwich, 1937), 89-92.  
52 A. Dyer and D.M. Palliser (eds.), The Diocesan Population Returns for 1563 and 1603, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2005), 441 n.111.  
53 W.J. Blake, ‘Manorial Lords’, 274.  
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Hundred of Taverham, whilst its Coltishall portion lay within the Hundred of South Erpingham, 
bounded by the river Bure, and was therefore subject to leet authority by the Hundred court 
since the crown retained the View of Frankpledge in this locality (figure 0.3).54 The manor was 
valued at £20 in 1428.55 Horstead’s population was significantly smaller than Downham’s, but it 
is vital to remember that this only covers the vill, not the detached portion in Coltishall or other 
tenants who may have lived in neighbouring townships. The population appears to have been 
static in the fifteenth century, before rising over the sixteenth century by about a third (figure 
0.1). Unfree heritable tenure mutated into copyhold-by-inheritance, typical of the secure 














                                                          
54 See appendix III, Millican, Horstead and Stanninghall, 201-3; F. Blomefield, An Essay Towards a 
Topographical History of the County of Norfolk, vol.6, 2nd edition, (London, 1807), 303-10.   
55 C. Noble, CIPM, vol. XXIII, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), 46-7, [96].  
56 J. Whittle and M. Yates, ‘“Pays Réel or Pays Légal”? Contrasting Patterns of Land Tenure and Social 
Structure in Eastern Norfolk and Western Berkshire, 1450-1600’, AgHR, 48:1, (2000), 1-26, 8; Whittle, 
Agrarian Capitalism, 82. See p. 39. 
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Figure 0.3 – Map of Norfolk hundreds with location of villages 
 
Boundary data = 1831 hundreds. 
 
Horstead’s lords changed in the period under investigation. The manor had been confiscated by 
the crown from the Abbey of Caen in 1339 and was held in 1392 by Thomas of Woodstock.57 
After seizure, presumably on Woodstock’s attaint, the manor was granted to various Plantagenet 
and then Lancastrian allies in the county, before being granted in perpetuity to King’s College 
by Edward IV in 1462, in whose hands it remained until the twentieth century.58 The manor was 
subject to drastic enclosure of its commonfields in the post-Black Death period, but maintained 
                                                          
57 Millican, Horstead and Stanninghall, 80; KCA, HOR/27, unfoliated, 28 Oct 1392.  
58 Millican, Horstead and Stanninghall, 80-2; H. Castor, The King, the Crown and the Duchy of 




common pastures down to 1599, when these were abolished and enclosed by petition of the 
tenants.59 In 1586 the manor contained about 1600a of farmland, of which only 230a were 
demesne, which was leased through most of the study period.60 
The court rolls for Horstead survive for 1392-1600, and only contain significant gaps of more 
than three years for 1494-1510 and 1562-5. As at Downham, there was a downward trend in 
sessions per year, from 3-4 for the 1390s-1490s, to 2-3 for the 1510s-1590s, with courts baron 
generally falling whilst leets continued to be held (figure 0.4). Horstead had the fewest officials 
of the case studies, with the ‘reeveship’ being nominal, in that whilst men were selected they 
always paid a fine not to serve (table 0.2). The split fees at Horstead, however, did create two 
separate juries baron, with a general jury covering the main manor, and a separate, often smaller 
jury, for the Coltishall fee. 
 
Figure 0.4 – Sessions surviving and analysed for Horstead 
 
N leet sessions = 264; N baron sessions = 253. Sources: KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54, COL/376. 
                                                          
59 B.M.S. Campbell, ‘The Extent and Layout of Commonfields in Eastern Norfolk’, Norfolk Archaeology, 
38, (1981), 5-31, 10-11.  
60 Millican, Horstead and Stanninghall, 83. 
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Worfield was situated 3½ miles from Bridgnorth, and the coterminous parish and manor 
extended over 10,000a. The manor had a different structure to the others studied, in that it 
consisted of a dispersed settlement pattern, with around 25 hamlets all part of the same lordship 
(figure 0.5). This created a leet which was structured differently to the other two case studies. 
Each of these vills presented separately, or in smaller combinations, with the jury leet then 
presenting more serious business as well as affirming the presentments of the townships, 
meaning that the jurors were one-step removed from presentment unlike at the other two manors 
examined. The manor was originally held by the crown, giving it Ancient Demesne status, 
before being held by a succession of aristocratic lords from 1238.61 These consisted of the 
Hastings family up to 1389, the Beauchamps up to 1436, and then the Neville family for the 
later period under investigation.62 The lords enjoyed extensive powers on the manor as a liberty, 
including rights to the goods of felons and judicial immunity for their tenants, although the 
south part of the manor lay within royal forest, and thus was subject to some crown control.63 
The vill of Ackleton also formed a separate submanor, but was subject to the leet’s 
jurisdiction.64 In 1436, the manor contained 100a of arable demesne, a 40a wood, and 6a of 
pasture in the lady’s hand.65 Commons existed on the manor, with at least 100a of pasture 
subject to common rights in 1436, although these were regulated by individual hamlets, with 
seven having access to common within the forest of Morfe.66  
The manor’s value did not fall drastically after the Black Death, being assessed at £44 9s 10d 
annually in 1283, £51 10s 9d in the early fourteenth century and £40 in 1375.67 However, by the 
                                                          
61 J. Randall, Worfield and its Townships: being a History of the Parish from Saxon to Norman times, 
(Madeley, 1887), 7. 
62 J. Smith, Worfield: the History of a Shropshire Parish from earliest times, (Perton, 2017), 38; W.M. 
Ormrod, ‘Leybourne, Juliana, countess of Huntingdon (1303/4–1367)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com>, accessed 4 March 
2018; R.I. Jack, ‘Hastings, John, thirteenth earl of Pembroke (1347–1375)’, ODNB; R.I. Jack, ‘Grey, 
Reynold, third Baron Grey of Ruthin (c.1362–1440)’, ODNB; C. Carpenter, ‘Beauchamp, William (V), 
first Baron Bergavenny (c.1343–1411)’, ODNB; T.B. Pugh, ‘Neville, Edward, first Baron Bergavenny 
(d. 1476)’, ODNB; A. Hawkyard, ‘Neville, George, third Baron Bergavenny (c.1469–1535)’, ODNB; A. 
Hawkyard, ‘Neville, Sir Edward (b. in or before 1482, d. 1538)’, ODNB. 
63 Smith, Worfield, 22-3, 29; S. Gibbs, ‘Felony Forfeiture at the Manor of Worfield, C.1370-C.1600’, The 
Journal of Legal History, forthcoming.  
64 Smith, Worfield, 18; J.L. Kirby (ed.), CIPM, vol. XVIII, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1987), 326 [958].  
65 M. Holford et al., (eds.), CIPM, vol. XXIV, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2010), 363-4 [514].  
66 Smith, Worfield, 195 map 2b.   
67 Eyton, R.W., Antiquities of Shropshire, vol. III, (London, 1856), 110; TNA, SC 12/14/24; A.E. Stamp 
et al., (eds.), CIPM, vol. XIV, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1952), 149 [148].  
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early fifteenth century a severe decline had taken place, with the manor worth only £26 13s 4d 
in 1411 and £20 13s 4d in 1436.68 Customary tenures remained heritable after the plague, and 
had transformed into copyholds-by-inheritance by 1602, following Bailey’s first categorisation 
of this shift, a preference over leasehold and copyhold-by-lives unusual for the Midland 
region.69 Tenants, however, used fixed-term subleases, and a market for reversions of lands after 
failures of patrilineal lines is visible, while widows had the right of ‘free bench’.70 In terms of 
population, the lack of poll-tax data obscures the trend, but the effect of demographic decline 
seems to have been prolonged, with the inhabitants in 1524 numbering less than half those of 
1327. However, the sixteenth century saw recovery, with population increasing by perhaps a 
third between 1524 and 1563 despite the severe effects of the mid-Tudor population crisis on 











                                                          
68 J.L. Kirby, ed., CIPM, vol. XIX, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1992), 304 [853]; Holford 
et al., CIPM, vol. XXIV, 363-4 [514].  
69 See, for example, SAC, P314/W/1/1/33, 11 May 1351; P314/W/1/1/78, 4 Jul 1370; P314/W/1/1/215, 22 
Mar 1400; P314/W/1/1/469 10 Aug 1487; P314/W/1/1/526, 11 Dec 1515; P314/W/1/1/775, 28 Feb 1572; 
2028/1/5/8; Bailey, ‘Customary Tenures’, 216-8. 
70 See, for example, SAC, P314/W/1/1/298, 15 Nov 1446; P314/W/1/1/688, 12 Apr 1553; 5586/2/1/42; 
2028/1/5/8.  
71 J.S. Moore, ‘The Mid-Tudor Population Crisis in Midland England’, Midland History, 34:1, (2009), 44-
57, Tables 3 and 4, 54.  
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Figure 0.5 – Map of townships making up Worfield manor 
 
Boundary data = 1851 parishes. 
 
Worfield’s court rolls survive for 1327-1600, but with significant gaps of greater than three 
years for 1467-71 and 1542-7 as well as very patchy survival pre-Black Death. The trend in 
sessions a year is the inverse of the other manors, with an increase from typically 3-7 for the 
1320s-1540s, to frequently over 10 for the 1550s-1590s, although many of these sessions simply 
record a single land transfer (figure 0.6). The parish’s churchwardens’ accounts survive for most 
of the sixteenth century, as do the constables’ accounts for the 1590s. Worfield had a substantial 
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set of officials, although a crucial contrast with the other case studies is that it had jurors leet 
rather than capital pledges.72  
 
Figure 0.6 – Sessions surviving and analysed for Worfield 
 
N leet sessions = 423; N baron sessions = 908. Sources: SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-838. 
 
Plan of the Study 
By paraphrasing Ralph Evans, the aim of this thesis can be boiled down to a simply-stated 
research question: whose was manorial officeholding, and did this change over time?73  The 
main body of the thesis is split into two parts adopting different approaches to answer this 
question. Part I, encompassing the first two chapters, is a ‘total’ approach to the history of 
manorial officeholding, utilising all available data for the three case studies. The first chapter 
analyses the changing functions of officers, seeing how far their work was driven by the relative 
needs of the lord, crown and community. The second examines participation in officeholding, 
                                                          
72 The term ‘jurors leet’ is a modern term used by the author to distinguish these officials who were often 
simply called the ‘twelve sworn’ in the language of the court rolls. However, they were clearly distinct 
from the typical ‘jurors baron’ seen at Worfield who were listed separately.  
73 R. Evans, ‘Whose was the Manorial Court?’ in R. Evans (ed.), Lordship and Learning: Studies in 
Memory of Trevor Aston, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), 155-68.  
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seeing how far offices were dispersed among village inhabitants or concentrated in the hands of 
a few. A quantitative approach allows for the ‘what’ and ‘who’ of officeholding to be precisely 
measured, and aspects of similarity and dissimilarity across regions and time to be analysed.  
Part I provides context for the investigation of key issues in Part II. This consists of a further 
three chapters which make greater use of illuminating qualitative evidence in order to examine 
the preferences and objectives of those serving in office and how these changed according to 
differing circumstances. Chapter three examines the issue of village governance, asking how far 
manorial officeholding was used to manage local communities, and what this reveals about 
community dynamics and the existence of a local elite. The following chapter uses a qualitative 
approach to consider attitudes to office, and how lord and tenants related to manorial 
officeholding as an institution. The fifth chapter considers, through a comparison with parochial 
structures, how manorial officeholding was affected by, and impacted on, the development of 







Chapter 1: The Function of Officers 
Two Views of Manorial Officeholding 
This first chapter examines the analyses of manor courts by two separate camps of medieval and 
early modern historians. These interpretations have remained disconnected leading to two very 
different pictures of the functions of manor courts, and the officers that ran them. 
For most medievalists, focused on the period before the Black Death, manor courts were primarily 
an instrument for the lord to control his tenants and extract rents and services from them, in an era 
when lords dramatically increased their profits over the thirteenth century.1 This is particularly true 
of manorial officers; whilst tenants did use courts for their own non-seigniorial functions in terms of 
interpersonal business, the role of officials is seen as having been mainly to the benefit of the lord.2 
In fact, it has been argued that the device of presentment was introduced by lords to provide a more 
effective way to manage their rights, although presentments were used for public business in leets 
before being introduced by seigniorial administrators.3 Whilst acknowledging some successful 
                                                          
1 R.H. Hilton, ‘Peasant Movements in England before 1381’, EcHR, 2, (1949), 117-36, 121; R.H. Hilton, The 
English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages: the Ford Lectures for 1937 and Related Studies, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1975), 231-4; R.H. Hilton, The Decline of Serfdom in Medieval England, 2nd ed., (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), 18-9; C.C. Dyer, An Age of Transition?: Economy and Society in England in the Later 
Middle Ages, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 86-9, C.C. Dyer Lords and Peasants in a Changing Society: the 
Estates of the Bishopric of Worcester, 680-1540, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 52, 265; R. 
Faith, The English Peasantry and the Growth of Lordship, (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 256; 
J.S. Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in Medieval English Manorial Courts’, Law 
and History Review, 10:2, (1992), 197-252, 199-200; Evans, ‘Whose was the manorial court?’, 155-8; J.L. 
Bolton, The Medieval English Economy, 1150-1500, (London: Dent, 1980), 20, 112-3; Rigby, English 
Society, 25-8; C.D. Briggs, ‘The Availability of Credit in the English Countryside, 1400-1480’, AgHR, 56, 
(2008), 1-24, 14; Briggs, Credit, 13; J. Whittle and S.H. Rigby, ‘England: Popular Politics and Social 
Conflict’, in S.H. Rigby (ed.), A Companion to Britain in the Late Middle Ages, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 
65-86, 75; M. Bailey, ‘Peasant Welfare in England, 1290-1348’ EcHR, 51, (1998), 223-51, 224; P.V. 
Hargreaves, ‘Seigniorial Reaction and Peasant Responses: Worcester Priory and its Peasants after the Black 
Death’, Midland History, 24:1, (1999), 53-78, 54.  
2 Bailey, English Manor, 169-174; P.R. Schofield, Peasants and Community in Medieval England, 1200-
1500, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 48; Z. Razi, ‘Serfdom and Freedom in Medieval England: a 
reply to the revisionists’ in P.R. Coss and C. Wickham (eds.), Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages: an Exploration 
of Historical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford Journals, 2007), 182-7, 186.  
3 Z. Ravi and R.M. Smith, ‘The Origins of the English Manorial Courts as a Written Record: a puzzle’ in Z. 




resistance, Ralph Evans notes that at Thorncroft ‘the manorial court…consistently secured eventual 
compliance’ to the desires of the lord.4 Officers acting in the court were used to monitor lord’s 
rights over unfree tenants, protect seigniorial property, manage customary land and ensure suitors 
attended the court. Although nearly all modern scholars note the flexibility in application of these 
obligations occasioned by the fact that officers were drawn from the tenants and so could protect 
their interests, this does not detract from the fact that their role was in essence to enforce the lord’s 
rights.5  
This view of courts as largely seignorial institutions has been questioned and modified by various 
arguments but never overthrown. The Toronto School provides the most comprehensive challenge. 
Drawing on the work of George Homans, who focused on the reciprocity of lord-tenant relations, 
this group suggested that the lord had little incentive or even ability to exercise power over his 
tenants, a conception which reaches its apogee in Olson’s statement that the Abbot of Ramsey as 
lord of Ellington and Upwood ‘might be said to appear in the court rolls…as a very powerful 
equal’.6 This led them to see the manor court and its officers as primarily working to regulate the 
village community in a quasi-democratic way. However, later work has challenged the Toronto 
view due to both issues of evidence and intellectual underpinnings, meaning that this community 
                                                          
Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’, 227; M. Mulholland, ‘The Jury in English Manorial Courts’ in J.W. 
Cairns and G. McLeod (eds.), ‘The Dearest Birth Right of the People’: the Jury in the History of the Common 
LAw, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 63-73, 71-2. 
4 R. Evans, ‘Merton College’s Control of its Tenants at Thorncroft, 1270-1349’, in Z. Razi and R.M. Smith 
(eds.), Medieval Society and the Manor Court, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 199-259, 254.  
5 Schofield, ‘Peasant and Community’, 42-4, 168; Evans, ‘Merton College’s Control of Its Tenants’; C.D. 
Briggs, ‘Monitoring Demesne Managers through the Manor Court before and after the Black Death’, in J. 
Langdon, R. Goddard and M. Müller (eds.), Survival and Discord in Medieval Society: Essays in Honour of 
Christopher Dyer, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 179-95, 180; C.C. Dyer, ‘The Ineffectiveness of Lordship in 
England, 1200-1400’, in P.R. Coss and C. Wickham (eds.), Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages: an Exploration of 
Historical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford Journals, 2007), 69-86, 77.  
6 G.C. Homans, English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1941), 339-48; J.A. Raftis, Tenure and Mobility: Studies in the Social History of the Mediaeval English 
Village, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1964), 207; J.A. Raftis, Peasant Economic 
Development within the English Manorial System, (Montreal: Queen’s University Press, 1997), 11; J.A. 
Raftis, ‘Social Structures in Five East Midland Villages: a Study of Possibilities in the use of Court Roll 
Data’, EcHR, 18, (1965), 83-100, 98; DeWindt, ‘Peasant Power Structures’, 252-8; Olson, Chronicle of All 
That Happens, 21-6, 232; J. Hatcher and M. Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages: the History and Theory of 





focused view of manorial courts has had limited traction within more recent scholarship of the 
manor court.7 Revisionism in the understanding of medieval serfdom has similarly questioned the 
rapaciousness of lords, emphasising that their power over their tenants was bounded by custom, and 
that prevailing economic conditions led to lords commuting labour services in favour of waged 
labour.8 Yet even if lords were not incentivised to squeeze tenants, their courts and officers were 
still utilised to meet seignorial interests, and were fundamentally structured around the relationship 
between lord and tenants.9  
A second part to the medieval model is that a change occurred after the demographic collapse of the 
Black Death and further resurgences of plague. This led, after an ‘Indian Summer’ of high prices, to 
the increasing unprofitability of demesne farming, triggering a shift in seigniorial policy from direct 
management to the leasing of agricultural land, meaning that lords sought less control over their 
tenants through courts and officers.10 Simultaneously, serfdom, in some places through active 
resistance, but largely via a more passive concern to keep tenants, declined and then disappeared 
across England, meaning that manor courts were no longer required to monitor personal 
unfreedom.11 These changes have led many medievalists to suggest that manor courts, and thus 
                                                          
7 Smith, “Modernization”, 156-7; Wrightson, ‘Medieval Villagers in Perspective’, 205-10; Razi, ‘The Toronto 
School’s Reconstitution’, 141-157; Razi, ‘Family, Land and the Village Community’, 15-6, 31-4; Z. Razi, 
‘The Struggles between the Abbots of Halesowen and their Tenants in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Centuries’ in J. Thirsk, T.H. Aston, C.C. Dyer and P.R. Coss (eds.), Social Relations and Ideas: Essays in 
Honour of R.H. Hilton, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 151-67, 151-3, 166.  
8 J.Z. Titow, English Rural Society, 1200-1350, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 58-60; J. Hatcher, ‘English 
Serfdom and Villeinage: Towards a Reassessment’, P&P, 90, (1981), 3-39, 7-14; M. Bailey, ‘Villeinage in 
England: a Regional Case Study, c.1250-c.1349, EcHR, 62:2, (2009), 430-57, 451-4; Britnell, Britain and 
Ireland, 235-6; Campbell, ‘The Land’, 210-2; Campbell, ‘Land and People’, 17.  
9 Evans, ‘Whose was the Manorial Court?’, 168. 
10 B.F. Harvey, Westminster Abbey and its Estates in the Middle Ages, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 148-151; 
M. Bailey, ‘Rural Society’, in R. Horrox (ed.), Fifteenth-century Attitudes: Perceptions of Society in Late 
Medieval England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 150-68, 152-4; Hilton, Serfdom in 
Medieval England, 33; Bolton, English Economy, 214; Dyer, Age of Transition, 96-7; Dyer, ‘Political Life’, 
144-6; Dyer, Lords and Peasants, 113; Rigby, English Society, 84-5; Campbell, ‘Land and People’, 17.  
11 P.L. Larson, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Medieval Countryside: Lords and Peasants in Durham, 
1349-1400, (London: Routledge, 2006), 235-30; Bailey, Decline of Serfdom, 326-9; Briggs, ‘Availability of 




manorial officeholding, were in terminal decline by the sixteenth century.12 In Bailey’s summary 
this began in the fifteenth century, with court rolls becoming ‘shorter, less frequent and less 
informative’ and then continued into the sixteenth century with courts being almost entirely focused 
on land transactions from 1600 onwards.13 On the other hand, medieval historians have noted that 
courts did continue to serve some functions, particularly through the increased use of bylaws to 
monitor behaviour, although some have seen this as an attempt to prop up weakening manorial 
authority rather than a true innovation.14 This has been interpreted as part of an attempt by the 
village elite to fill the gap left by an increasingly distant lordship, and maintain communal bonds in 
a period of greater social stratification, although how far manorial courts and officeholding fulfilled 
this need has been disputed.15  
The early modern reinterpretation of the vitality of manorial courts provides a very different picture. 
The earliest revisionists began by showing the continued use of courts leet in policing crime due to 
their provision of a cheap and local form of justice in a period where there were simply not enough 
magistrates to control disorder heightened by socio-economic problems.16 Marjorie McIntosh, in 
one of the few studies to cross the medieval/early modern divide, showed how manor courts in 
much of England gained in importance as a space to control misbehaviour from the fifteenth 
century onwards.17 This has been expanded to consider their role in dealing with village problems 
more generally. Studies have noted that manor courts remained important for commons’ 
management as a forum to make and enforce bylaws.18 Brodie Waddell has taken a long view of 
                                                          
12 C.C. Dyer and R.W. Hoyle, ‘Britain 1000-1750’ in B.J.P. van Bavel and R.W. Hoyle (eds.), Social 
Relations: property and power, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 51-80, 67; Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’, 
200.  
13 Bailey, English Manor, 186-7.  
14 Bailey, English Manor, 186-7; Dyer, Changing Society, 368-9; Smith ‘Contrasting Susceptibility’, 49-50.  
15 Bailey, ‘Rural Society’, 161; Dyer, ‘Village Community’, 428; Dyer, ‘Political Life, 146-7.  
16 King, ‘Untapped Resources’, 699; King, ‘Early Stuart Courts Leet’, 298-9; McIntosh, ‘Tudor Manorial 
Leets’, 75-85; Harrison ‘Governance of Tudor England’, 43, 59; Sharpe, Crime , 84-5. 
17 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 43-5.  
18 King, ‘Early Stuart Courts Leet’, 278-9; L. Shaw-Taylor, ‘The Management of Common Land in the 
Lowlands of Southern England, C.1500-C.1850’ in P. Warde, L. Shaw-Taylor and M. de Moor (eds.), The 
Management of Common Land in North West Europe, C.1500-1850, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 59-85, 63-8; 
A.J.L. Winchester, ‘Upland Commons in Northern England’, in P. Warde, L. Shaw-Taylor and M. de Moor 
(eds.), The Management of Common Land in North West Europe, C.1500-1850, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 




manor courts, arguing that they remained important up to the mid-nineteenth century. He has 
emphasised that the flexibility of the courts made this possible, through a shift from policing crime 
and disorder to maintaining the fabric of the manor through bylaws and orders to repair hedges and 
ditches.19 These larger arguments about the continued importance of manor courts have been 
reinforced by several local case studies with a wide geographical range.20 The role of manorial lords 
is almost entirely absent in these accounts, and the picture edges towards a view of courts similar to 
that of the Toronto School.21 So, the early modern interpretation differs to that typical of the 
medieval, in that courts appear as a ‘little commonwealth’, with officers acting to govern the local 
community, rather than a tool largely for enforcing the rights of a powerful lord over their tenantry. 
They describe the success of the development of manorial courts as public bodies seen in studies of 
the fifteenth century, but without the perspective of decline from a fourteenth-century, seigniorially-
focused high-point.  
Therefore, clearly a change occurred at some point between 1270-1350 and 1600-1850, with a shift 
from manorial officers being focused on seigniorial concerns, to a new focus on community 
concerns. However, few works have explored this intermediate period beyond general surveys, 
partially due to the decreasing detail in fifteenth-century court rolls.22 Even in the better-explored 
periods, works have focused on different regions. Whilst medievalists tend to examine the better 
surviving rolls for southern and eastern England, early modernists have often focused on northern 
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19 B. Waddell, ‘Governing England through the Manor Courts, 1550-1850’, The Historical Journal, 55:2, 
(2012), 279-315, 280, 301-7. 
20 M. Griffiths, ‘Kirtlington Manor Court’, 1500-1650’, Oxoniensia, 45, (1980), 260-83; Whittle, Agrarian 
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manors. Understanding the changing function of officers is vital in establishing how far their role 
continued to be important in governing the late medieval and early modern English countryside 
over time, as well as to consider who officers primarily served, providing a context for the rest of 
the thesis in thinking about the longer-term history of manorial officeholding. Therefore, this 
chapter will attempt to trace the chronology of the changing role of officers over the 300 years 
examined, looking for points of discontinuity between medieval and early modern.  
Overall Pattern 
A quantitative methodology is adopted to examine this change, utilising the presentments made by 
the full complement of officers which are recorded in the court rolls of each manor. Presentments 
were made by several different types of officers, but overwhelmingly came from the two types of 
jury for the courts leet and baron seen at all three manors along with individual townships at 
Worfield. At Downham and Worfield, presentments were also made by a range of other officials, 
including the reeve, messor and beadle, although these all but disappeared after 1400. Thus, the 
presentment is better at tracking the role of juries than other officials, presumably capturing the 
totality of their role within the manorial system, as the office expressly existed to meet the need of 
presenting infractions. Even though the work of some other officials is not necessarily perfectly 
recorded in presentments, counting them remains the best way of tracking change in officials’ 
function over time. This is partially due to their consistency, but also because they were exactly the 
type of officer’s business that the surviving records of court rolls were designed to capture. 
Whilst presentment jurors are the officers whose function is best recorded in court rolls, the way 
they performed their role, conversely, is the least well documented. The presentment procedure was 
driven by lists of articles that would be delivered to the jury by the steward at the court session 
preceding that at which the presentments would be made.23 The jury would then investigate and 
                                                          
23 Lists of articles survive in guidance literature on how to hold a court: P.D.A. Harvey, Manorial Records, 
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present all breaches of the articles at the following session, where they are recorded in the surviving 
rolls.24 Aspects of this process are occasionally glimpsed in the records of the case-study manors. At 
Downham, in 1410, John Deye and Simon Cok as jurors were amerced for ‘not coming at the 
appointed time to receive their charge’, presumably an order to respond to the articles, as was a 
capital pledge in 1411.25 In 1412, John Barndeley was similarly punished at Worfield as he ‘did not 
come to affirm the charge of the oath for [the jury]’, all references to the first stage of this process.26 
Worfield’s jury in 1430 was described as having been ‘charged and sworn to examine and return’.27 
In 1502 the jury of the same manor asked for a delay until the next session ‘of all matters touching 
or pertaining to the lord’, making no presentments.28  
The method by which jurors gathered information to answer the charges is largely invisible in the 
records. For aspects involving the physical environment, jurors are recorded as going to view in 
order to make their judgement. For instance, at Downham in 1503 an ordinance was made that each 
capital pledge would view a common drain on St Blaise’s day, with each in default surrendering 
12d.29 At Horstead in the 1420s the capital pledges were ordered to measure the depth of the water 
in the common river to see if it was at the customary level.30 The pains system, by which offenders 
were ordered to correct faults by a certain date or face an amercement, must have also guided 
information gathering, with jurors presumably either going to view the fault or inquiring about it on 
the deadline set by the court when the pain was given. Other information was clearly given by the 
victims of the wrongs presented, although how jurors evaluated the veracity of this is unclear.31  
How jurors themselves retained the articles they received and the information they gathered and 
then organised this into presentments is also mysterious. Presumably the list of articles to which 
officials responded at any court were familiar to at least some of the jurors in any panel, who may 
                                                          
24 Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’, 228-250; Evans, ‘Whose was the Manorial Court?’, 164.  
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26 SAC, P314/W/1/1/241, 25 Oct 1412.  
27 SAC, P314/W/1/1/275, 25 Jan 1430. 
28 SAC, P314/W/1/1/501, 7 Nov 1502.  
29 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, m.20, 31 Jan 1503. 
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have heard them many times as they served at multiple sessions.32 The slim evidence of the 
commonplace book of Robert Reynes suggests that by the later fifteenth century, prominent jurors 
may have possessed written copies of articles which they could perhaps consult and share with their 
fellows.33 Amercements of jurors for failure to keep deliberations secret show that presentment 
juries clearly met at some point either before or during the court session, presumably to discuss the 
information they had gathered and turn this into a set of presentments.34 Writing may have had a 
role in this process. Michael Clanchy has emphasised that many medieval villagers even by 1300 
were ‘pragmatically literate’.35 In the St Albans Modus Tenendi Curias, the capital pledges are 
specifically directed ‘to inquire among yourselves [about the articles] and if you wish for a clerk 
you shall have one’ suggesting the possibility to make notes of offences, or combine information 
from various jurors into a common set of presentments.36 The survival of a written set of 
presentments in English along with a Latin fair copy for the court leet at Peterborough may be an 
example of this process.37 
One illuminating case is seen at Horstead in 1492, where the jury asked to change their presentment 
of a deathbed land transfer, showing how the information used to create a presentment could be 
later deemed incorrect. They had presented in a June court of the previous year that Katherine 
Dalgate had surrendered her land in favour of two executors from Beeston and Norwich, who did 
not come to take the land meaning it was seized into the lord’s hand. However, they now said that 
the truth ‘without fraud or evil contrivance’ was that Katherine had surrendered the land in favour 
of Nicholas Kempe, who proceeded to take on the land.38 Why the jury received imperfect 
information in the first place is unclear, although in the case of a deathbed transfer, the jurors were 
entirely dependent on the account of the witnesses at the tenant’s demise, whilst in other instances it 
                                                          
32 For multiple service see pp. 90-1. 
33 C. Louis (ed.), The Commonplace Book of Robert Reynes of Acle: an Edition of Tanner MS407, (London: 
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34 For punishments of jurors see p. 177. 
35 M. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066-1307, 3rd edition, (Chichester: Wiley-
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36 Bailey, English Manor, 226.  
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was presumably easier to gather other accounts or see offences in person. A similar case of 
incorrect information occurred at the manor in 1526. At the previous leet the capital pledges had 
presented Thomas Rede, a mercer of Norwich, and therefore likely not present at the session, for 
obstructing a common path with a new watercourse. However, Thomas appeared in the court with 
charters, which, being read to the capital pledges and homage, proved the path lay on his land. This 
led to the previous presentment being nullified, although this was explicitly done with the consent 
of the capital pledges, suggesting that written evidence alone was not sufficient to overturn the 
jury’s decision, and that the officers had to confirm what the written evidence claimed.39 Generally, 
however, a presentment acted as a summary judgement, and the information occasioning it was 
undisputed, a process which unfortunately obscures how jurors operated.40 
The structure of the presentment system meant that juries were bounded in what they could present, 
an important consideration when using presentments to trace changing functions (figure 1.1). The 
first bound is that created by ‘reality’, the actual activity occurring within the manor. Whilst jurors’ 
judgements were sometimes challenged and called false, it is unlikely that officials completely 
fabricated presentments on a regular basis, and their presentments likely accorded with the real 
actions of the individuals they presented.41 A second, concentric bound, was placed by the articles 
to which jurors responded, which were most likely set by the steward. Occasionally, specific areas 
of inquiry related to particular cases are recorded, typical examples include viewing seigniorial 
property, inquiring into heirs of dead tenants and whether they died seised, establishing boundaries, 
and, occasionally, establishing matters of custom in response to particular disputes.42 However, no 
record of the general articles, which guided the vast majority of presentments, are available for the 
three case-study manors. Within these articles, jurors were able to exercise some discretion over 
what business they focused on. Evidence of amercements for concealment display that jurors did 
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not automatically present all offences against the articles they were given.43 At the same time, 
however, they reveal these men did not have free rein, with the fear of punishment by stewards 
again influencing their choice over what to present.44  
 
Figure 1.1 – Model of presentment system 
 
 
Changes in presentments as a subset of ‘real’ activities could therefore be affected by both the 
lord’s representative and manorial officers. The former could choose to formally add or remove 
articles, or perhaps informally stress or relax which articles he directed juries to respond about. 
Officials could exercise a constrained choice in which real incidents to report according to the 
articles, as well as perhaps interpret articles either narrowly or broadly. This makes interpretation 
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difficult. For instance, the disappearance of a form of presentment may have been driven by the 
ceasing of that activity on the manor, the steward choosing to remove a specific article of inquiry, 
or the jurors illicitly choosing not to respond to an article. However, even if it is impossible to 
assign agency for the appearance and disappearance of specific presentment types, the element of 
agency of both lord and officials means changing patterns can be used both as an index of how far 
the lord was using manorial structures and of the priorities of the tenants who filled manorial office. 
The methodology used to examine presentments is as follows. For each manor all surviving 
presentments made by all types of officer were collected together. These include presentments of 
ale tasters, jurors baron for Horstead, jurors baron for the Coltishall fee and capital pledges at 
Horstead; reeves, messors, bylawmen, fenreeves, jurors baron and capital pledges at Downham; and 
reeves, beadles, ale tasters, jurors baron, jurors leet and, most significantly, townships at Worfield. 
These were then divided into five categories consistent across all manors, with a few extra 
categories utilised for types of presentments unique to one or two manors, and then grouped by 
decade.  
The first category, ‘lord’, contains all business directly pertinent to the lord and his authority on the 
manor. It includes the monitoring of servile incidents, trespasses in seigniorial property, illicit land 
transactions outside the court, the lord’s rights to various types of forfeit property, collective 
payments made by tenants and individual payments concerning rent and non-attendance of court. 
The second category, ‘land’, contains all presentments relating to tenants’ management of land 
including cases of inheritance and intervivos transfers. The third category, ‘royal’, contains all 
business related to the leet functions of the court that met the needs of the crown. It encompasses 
peacekeeping, enforcing legislation such as the assize of bread and ale, maintaining royal roads and 
the tithing system, as well as collective payments to the monarch. The fourth category, 
‘community’, contains all presentments concerned with the maintenance and protection of 
communal infrastructure. It includes the management of commons, maintenance of roads, fences 
and bridges, trespasses on tenants’ crops and the monitoring of bylaws. The final, smaller category, 




Of the smaller categories, ‘monitor’, seen exclusively at Worfield, is the largest. Due to its leet 
structure, a substantial role for Worfield’s jury leet was to confirm the presentments made by the 
smaller vills, creating a particular form of presentment. At Worfield and Horstead, on several 
occasions juries said they had nothing to present, which again is included as its own category. Very 
rarely at all three manors a jury presented some strictly interpersonal business. This has been 
ignored because it lies outside the scope of this project and is recorded so inconsistently.  
A strict definition based on the phrasing within the rolls has been applied in identifying 
presentments as opposed to other ways business could be introduced to the court. Only entries 
which begin with the statement ‘the [officer(s)] present that…’ or ‘it is accounted by the [officer(s)] 
that…’ followed by ‘and that…’ have been counted. Crucially, this means the measure only charts 
the changing functions of presenting officials and not changes in the underlying business transacted 
in the court. This is particularly significant for land business, as transfers could be made without 
recourse to presentment by surrender and admission in court. Therefore, presentment only reveals a 
proportion of all land business. For example, at Downham in a session of January 1503, whilst 
Thomas Hall’s pre-mortem surrender in favour of his son John Hall was presented by the jury, and 
so counted as a presentment, Thomas Whitby’s surrender in favour of Thomas Wetherfield, which 
he made whilst present at court, was not counted.45  
There are two important limitations to the categorisation approach. On a practical level, the issue of 
record survival is paramount as it can radically change the number of presentments in any given 
decade. This is matched by changing numbers of sessions per decade caused by either increasing 
frequency or infrequency in the calling of courts. Here, all decades with any surviving courts are 
included, although discussion in the text indicates where changing numbers of sessions may be 
exerting an influence over the pattern displayed. Consequently, changes in the number of 
presentments between decades should be treated carefully. On the other hand, there is no reason that 
changes in numbers of presentments surviving should have affected any category of business 
differently to the others, as presentment lists contained all of the different categories intermingled. 
Attention should be focused on the changing quantitative relationship between the categories within 
                                                          




the various decades rather than necessarily raw totals, with broad trends rather than precise 
statistical change being a more valuable measure of the role of presenting officers.  
The second, more knotty problem, is that of deciding what business fits into each category, and 
even how to delineate the categories at all. This is due to the lord’s interest in all types of 
presentment. Manorial courts, including leets, were seigniorial jurisdictions, and existed to enforce 
the lord’s authority over his tenants. Therefore, to some extent lords were the beneficiaries of all 
presentments made in these courts; lords accrued the profits of amercements and the forfeited pains 
which resulted from punishments for presentment. Stewards, as the lord’s representative, had 
considerable influence over the presentment process. However, a crude division can be established 
between business where the lord was a direct beneficiary, for example in amercing tenants for 
failing to perform a labour service, and where he was an indirect beneficiary of the punishment, 
such as when an offender was presented for overstocking common land, where those affected by the 
offence were clearly the commoners rather than the lord.  
Presentments concerning land prove the most difficult to fit into one category. For example, when it 
is presented that a tenant has died and that his heir must pay a heriot and entry fine to inherit the 
land, one could argue that the lord is the beneficiary, the jury ensuring he gets the profits owed to 
him via the inheritance. However, at the same time, the jury is ensuring the correct inheritance of 
the land, allowing the heir his claim according to custom. Thus, even though inheritance 
presentments are enforcing a seigniorial right, the fact that they were effectively allowing tenants to 
transfer their land to their heirs means that they have been treated in the separate ‘land’ category. In 
the case of intervivos transfers, these have been included if they were made legitimately in the 
court, even if on some occasions the beneficiary is presented as not coming to pay the entry fine and 
consequently it is ordered to seize the land. This is because whilst this was ensuring the seigniorial 
right to profit from transfers, there was still at least an attempt by one party to make a legitimate 
transfer. In cases of alienation without any licence by the court, transfers have been categorised in 






Figure 1.2 – All presentments by categories for Horstead 
 





Figure 1.3 – All presentments by categories for Little Downham 
 
 




Figure 1.4 – All presentments by categories for Worfield 
 




The results of this analysis are seen in figures 1.1-1.3. The three graphs of presentments show 
significant diversity between manors. One obvious contrast is between Downham and Horstead 
on the one hand, and Worfield on the other, in terms of the number of ‘community’ 
presentments. These always constituted a significant category at the former two manors, usually 
being either the largest or second-largest category, whilst at Worfield the category was a lot 
smaller, and only rivalled seignorial and ‘royal’ presentments for a short period between the 
1550s and 1570s. Another obvious difference is the ‘land’ category. This type of business was 
virtually not presented at pre-Plague Downham and Worfield, even though land transfers were 
made and recorded by other means. However, ‘land’ grew at Worfield to account for a regular 
amount of business from the 1380s, but remained a relatively minor category. Similarly, at 
fifteenth-century Downham, whilst the number of ‘land’ presentments had grown, they were a 
relatively small proportion in comparison with other types of business. At Horstead, by contrast, 
‘land’ business accounted for a substantial part of the total presentments throughout the period, 
driven by Norfolk’s developed market in customary land.46  
Consideration of ‘land’ presentments, however, highlights some of the broad trends in 
presentments seen across all three courts. After the gap in records for the early sixteenth century, 
Downham’s presentments for the 1550s-1570s show ‘land’ presentments, whilst still the 
smallest category excepting nuisance, accounting for a higher proportion of total presentments. 
In the 1580s they accounted for all presentments, although this draws from only seven sessions 
meaning it may be relatively unreliable. This brings Downham closer to the situation seen at 
Worfield and Horstead. At the former manor, ‘land’ presentments by the 1580s were accounting 
for the majority of business, whilst at Horstead ‘land’ was the second-highest category for nearly 
all decades of the sixteenth century, although it did decline proportionally from the 1560s to 
1590s. This suggests the work of manorial officers was converging towards being focused on 
land transfer, a picture that would accord well with the view that copyhold was the main vestige 
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of the manorial system that survived into the early modern period.47 However, it cannot be 
argued that this had occurred before the beginning of the seventeenth century, suggesting 
manorial officeholding had not simply become about monitoring landholding by 1600. 
Another pattern seen across all manors is the sustained importance of seigniorial presentments 
throughout the fifteenth, and for Worfield and Horstead, early sixteenth centuries, with these 
remaining in the top two categories of business. The ultimate decline in the proportion of 
seigniorial presentments only occurred by the late sixteenth century, with presentments at a far 
smaller proportion from the 1560s at Horstead, 1580s at Worfield, and by the 1550s onwards at 
Downham. ‘Royal’ presentments also declined proportionally at both Horstead and Worfield, at 
the former from the 1510s onwards, and at the latter from the 1550s, as in this second case they 
were overtaken by ‘community’ presentments. At Downham there was also some decline, 
although ‘royal’ presentments were still high in the 1570s. Finally, the lack of presentments of 
nothing, or ‘omne bene’ is testament to the sustained importance of manorial officers. Whilst 
these presentments did rise at Worfield and Horstead around the turn of the sixteenth century, 
both manors saw these decline from this point onwards. Moreover at the former manor, this 
pattern is slightly misleading as it includes vills that presented nothing, within sessions where 
other townships presented. Therefore, a straight line cannot be drawn between ‘omne bene’ and 
official irrelevance. Officers may have seen periods where they presented less, but this was not a 
one-way process towards redundancy.  
The overall analysis of officer presentments demonstrates that manorial officers’ functions 
remained relatively static for much of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The pattern of 
presentments focused on ‘lord’, ‘community’ and ‘royal’ at Downham was established from the 
surviving rolls of the first half of the fourteenth century, with the addition of ‘land’ focused 
presentments at a relatively low level from the 1370s onwards. At Worfield the pattern became 
established from around the 1350s although there was a small growth in the number of ‘land’ 
presentments, a trend that largely reflects the formal recording of jury baron presentments from 
the 1370s. This pattern consisted of a mix of largely ‘royal’ and seigniorial presentments. At 
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Horstead, a relationship of relatively similar levels of ‘lord’, ‘community’ and ‘royal’ 
presentments, followed by a slightly smaller number of ‘land’ presentments, was in existence 
from the first surviving rolls of the 1390s onwards. Changes begin to occur in the sixteenth 
century, with officers being divested of presentments in the ‘lord’ and ‘royal’ categories. At 
Horstead this involved a terminal decline in ‘royal’ presentments from the 1510s onwards 
followed by lord presentments from the 1560s, leaving officers focused on ‘community’ and 
‘land’ presentments. At Worfield, ‘royal’ presentments fell from the 1550s and seigniorial 
presentments from the 1570s, whilst ‘community’ presentments grew proportionally from the 
1550s but then all but disappeared in the 1580s. This left a court focused on ‘land’ presentments, 
a trend linked to the end of the recording of presentments made by vills. At Downham, the least 
change occurred, although the picture is obscured by the loss of rolls for much of the sixteenth 
century. However, even here seigniorial presentments and ‘royal’ presentments were less 
important, with ‘community’ presentments now unmatched as a category. Yet, this analysis can 
only describe, and now it is necessary to go beyond the macro-categories, to explain the changes 
being observed. For the following sections, only the presentments of capital pledges, jurors leet 
and baron, and vills have been examined, with other officers’ presentments considered 
collectively afterwards. 
Seigniorial Presentments  
Quantitative analysis reveals that seigniorial concerns were still drivers of manorial jurors’ 
presentments up until the last decades of the sixteenth century. However, the category of ‘lord’ 
contains a large variety of different types of business. Breaking this down is essential, not only 
to consider the different functions to which lords put officers across different manors, but also 
changes over time. Especially important is consideration of which seigniorially-directed 
functions would set officers against the interests of the community of tenants at large, and which 
functions would be less divisive. Methodological problems mean that this evidence must be 
treated carefully. Officers could only present an infraction if it had been made by an offender. 
Therefore periods of relatively few presentments can represent either lack of seigniorial pressure 
on officers to present infractions, or alternatively a high level of conformity by the tenant body 




Downham appears as a manor where jurors acted to enforce seigniorial rights prejudicial to the 
tenants in a way different to that seen at Worfield and Horstead. Two areas stand out. One is the 
role jurors had in presenting the collective payment of 6s paid by capital pledges at the annual 
leet to the lord, along with recognitions levied on tenants on the establishment of a new bishop 
as lord, payments that did not exist at Worfield and for the leet were paid directly to the crown at 
Horstead.48 More significant is the second aspect, the regular presentment of customary tenants 
for having dilapidated tenements, and the frequent imposition of pains or even orders to seize 
which accompanied these, generally accounting for c.10-22% of seigniorial presentments from 
the 1380s to 1500s, and which were still presented in the 1560s and 1570s at 26% and 12% 
respectively.49 The frequency of these presentments is testament to their ineffectiveness, yet they 
also show jurors acting to at least attempt to control landholding and presumably prevent 
engrossment, therefore acting directly against the desires of elite tenants, in a way not seen at the 
other two manors.50  
Another clear local difference is at Horstead, where the active land market led to a large 
proportion of seigniorial presentments being focused on the illicit alienation, demising and 
occupation of land without the court’s licence, accounting for a mean of 37% of seigniorial 
presentments per decade.51 In comparison, at Worfield only ten cases were recorded, whilst at 
Downham the proportion grew from c.0-4% from the 1370s to 1450s (1-4 presentments) to c.12-
18% (4-11 presentments) in the 1460s to 1500s, and was at c.10% in the 1550s and 1560s (1-2 
presentments).52 The initial increase in presentments of illicit transfers does correspond with a 
slight decline in all licit land presentments at Downham for the 1460s to 1500s (a range of 3-9 
presentments as opposed to 4-17 for the 1370s to 1450s), potentially suggesting an attempt to 
circumvent seigniorial payments for land transfers in this period. This differs from Horstead 
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when presentments for licit and illicit transfers mainly moved in tandem. Significantly, 
presentments concerning illicit transfers fell to zero for the 1570s-1580s at Downham and 0-1 
for the 1580s-1590s at Horstead, occurring at both manors in periods of relatively high numbers 
of general ‘land’ presentments. This may suggest a withdrawal of seigniorial interest in using 
jurors to monitor illicit transfers in the late sixteenth century but also a general acceptance by 
tenants of using the manor court to exchange land. 
Other trends were more universal. One clear pattern seen at both Downham and Horstead was 
the reduction in presentments for damaging and trespassing in the lord’s crops, falling from c.6-
12% at Horstead for the 1390s to 1400s to only being presented once, in 1439, and at Downham 
falling from c.9-15% for the 1360s to 1390s, to c.1-4% for the 1400s to 1420s before 
disappearing completely.53 This does not include presentments discussing damage to both 
seigniorial and tenant crops, which have been categorised in ‘community’. The trend reflects the 
move away from direct management to leasing, which at Downham occurred from the 
accounting year 1430-31.54 However, this did not entirely remove the role of juries in monitoring 
seigniorial property, due to the existence of non-agricultural seigniorial resources at every 
manor. At Worfield, throughout the rolls, juries monitored trespasses and foraging in the lord’s 
woodland, waste and fishing places.55 These accounted for a substantial c.41-48% per decade of 
the admittedly few recorded pre-Plague seigniorial presentments, before dropping to a modest 
but consistent c.1-12% of presentments down to the 1570s, although rising slightly in the 1580s 
to 1590s. At Horstead, the existence of a rabbit warren and private fishing places accounted for 
some ‘lord’ presentments, but at the relatively low level of 0-8% from the 1420s onwards. 
Downham’s function as an hunting estate with a 250-acre deer park drove the 1-16% of property 
presentments for the 1430s onwards, with offenders presented for hedgebreaking and poaching, 
along with trespasses in the lord’s fen and fishing places.56 Whilst such presentments do 
represent the lord using officers to guard resources from local inhabitants, these presentments do 
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differ from those of collective fines, ruined tenements and illicit land transfers. The latter were 
directly linked to the status of inhabitants as tenants, requiring them to pay fines and controlling 
their ability to accumulate and dispose of their land freely, whereas resource presentments 
focused on the lord’s separately-held property.  
Even less disadvantageous was jurors’ continued role in monitoring the lord’s rights to stray 
animals, found items and goods forfeited by felons due to all three manors’ leet jurisdictions. 
These generally accounted for 1-20% of seigniorial presentments at Horstead and Downham, but 
were significantly more important at Worfield, accounting for a mean 57% of all seigniorial 
presentments from the 1350s to 1590s. 57  This was a result of the large size of the manor, giving 
the lord extensive rights to strays, along with the decentralised leet structure which led to every 
hamlet presenting stray animals and found items separately. This in turn led to this type of 
presentment being the core driver of seigniorial presentments at Worfield, with low numbers 
leading to low numbers of seigniorial presentments overall.  
At Downham and Horstead, jurors had a further role in monitoring seigniorial livestock, with 
jurors at Horstead for 1412-1440 and Downham from the 1360s to 1420s, routinely presenting if 
animals had died due to defect of custody of officials.58 However on no occasion did either jury 
actually present an offender, even though at Horstead presentments were very detailed, 
describing deaths by common murrain, dogs and even a storm of 22 June 1412.59 At Downham 
jurors also presented the names of those who owed agistment for pasturing their animals on 
seignorial land.60 At Horstead, the monitoring role of jurors was sometimes even more 
significant, with jurors providing detailed reports of farmers of the manor on two occasions. The 
first of these, including both the ordinary jury and the Coltishall jury, was a report of 1393 whilst 
the manor was in crown hands, which claimed the former farmer, Lord Morley, had made waste 
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to the value of 200s in the manor house, wood and mill.61 The second presentment of 1465, 
accused a former farmer, Peter Clerk, of entering the manor after the end of his farm and taking 
a door, windows and a gate from properties of the manor, which Peter then came and returned 
after being placed under pain.62 These monitoring roles show manorial officers still serving the 
lord, but in a way unlikely to directly conflict with the tenants’ interests. 
Presentments of non-attendance at court and licence for freedom from suit of court were 
consistently made, with virtually all decades seeing at least one presentment on each manor. 
Suit-related presentments are difficult to interpret. Whilst theoretically suit of court could be a 
liability for tenants, the fact that licences could be purchased to avoid amercements presumably 
lessened any disability, whilst sometimes presentments for non-attendance look more like 
regular fines rather than actual efforts to enforce suit.63 For example, at Downham the fact that 
both the Prior of Ely and the Master of St John’s hospital held land meant that they frequently 
appeared in default of suit.64 The proportion of suit-related presentments rose as the diversity of 
seigniorially-driven business declined. At Downham, this proportion remained within a range of 
around 3-30%, with no obvious trend towards a greater proportion of suit presentments.65 At 
Worfield, the proportion of suit presentments grew across the period, from a mean of 16% for 
the 1370s to 1490s, to 37% for the 1500s to 1570s.66 Interestingly, the last twenty years of the 
sixteenth century saw no suit presentments on the manor, possibly showing an abandonment 
even of this relatively light imposition on tenants. Horstead followed a very similar trend to 
Worfield transitioning from suit presentments averaging 13% for the 1390s to 1490s, to 41% in 
the sixteenth century. By the 1580s and 1590s suit presentments were the crucial driver of 
seigniorial presentments at the Norfolk manor with proportions reaching 80% and 85% 
respectively.67  
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A subset of seigniorial presentments worth special attention are those concerned with enforcing 
personal servility. Quantitatively this was a relatively small category even of seigniorial business 
across all three manors, with presentments per decade rarely rising above ten. On the other hand, 
the enforcement of serfdom is of particular interest as it represents an area of potential conflict 
between the function lords desired of manorial officers, and what the larger community of 
tenants and even the officers themselves wanted to present. By tracking the number and types of 
servile presentments made by officers, it is possible to judge how far lords still controlled their 
functions, and thus to what extent officers were the lord’s servants. Each manor must be treated 
carefully, as customs of servility were highly localised.68 Unfortunately, much of the available 
evidence to build up a picture of servility on a given manor is based on presentments, leading to 
a certain circularity to arguments. However, the survival of some customary information for 
Worfield, and to a lesser extent Downham, can mitigate against these problems. 
These concerns aside, the broad picture seen in the servile presentments is of relatively 
consistent enforcement in the fifteenth century, followed by disappearance by the middle of the 
sixteenth century at all manors except Downham. Some aspects disappeared almost immediately 
after the Black Death. For example leyrwite, which was presented eight times at Downham 
1310-35, was not presented in the surviving rolls from 1362 onwards, despite the fact that in a 
1380 inquiry into marriage fines using a terrier it was presented as customary for bond tenants to 
pay leyrwite for their daughters.69 Leyrwite may have been presented more frequently at 
fourteenth-century Horstead, however its only appearance in the surviving rolls in 1402 suggests 
it was abandoned by the beginning of the fifteenth century, a pattern that fits the national picture 
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of this servile incident.70 At Worfield, leyrwite was only reported once, in 1327, suggesting it 
was not even effectively monitored before the plague.71 Similarly, restrictions of sales of 
livestock by customary tenants at Downham were enforced three times 1363-4 and then 
completely disappeared excepting one presentment in 1412.72 
Labour services constituted a more serious disability than leyrwite, and are visible at all three 
case study manors, although the types and chronologies are quite different (table 1.1). They 
remained relatively persistently presented at Worfield, with the last presentment occurring in 
1521.73 However, these failures to perform labour services took place in a context of sustained 
but limited requirements as seen in the 1602 customs for Worfield, which ordered the 
copyholders collectively to repair the lord’s two mills, as well as to mow the lord’s meadow in 
exchange for payment of 16d.74  This repeated a schema of labour obligations enshrined in the 
1403 custumal.75 These limited labour services were likely linked to the privileged status 
afforded customary tenants at Worfield due to the manor’s status as Ancient Demesne.76 
Recorded presentments for failure to perform services reflect these slight requirements. In 1475, 
1477, 1481 1521, 1523 the mill was reported to be in disrepair and therefore the suitors of the 
mill were ordered to repair it under pain, with no amercement levied, whilst in 1512, 1534, 1535 
and 1570 individuals and vills were amerced for failing to repair the mill.77 This service, whilst 
potentially onerous, was infrequent, only being required when the mill was damaged, and at least 
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had some benefit to the tenants who utilised the mill.78 The only labour presentment concerning 
the lord’s meadow was made in 1491, and was a matter of custom rather than offence, 
confirming that the tenants of the vill of Sonde owed service with the other tenants at the 
meadow.79 Thus whilst labour service presentments do reveal jurors working for the lord at 
Worfield, the fact services were slight and presentments generally do not reveal conflict, 
suggests that they were not particularly working against the tenants.  
This picture is in marked contrast to that for Horstead. Here presentments for poor performance 
of labour services peaked to 16 in the 1400s before declining to low numbers down to the 1430s 
and then disappearing entirely. This pattern is far more consistent with resistance to services and 
eventual success in having them commuted and abandoned, a pattern seen in the fact that 
presentments involved multiple tenants presumably acting collectively.80 The services were boon 
works geared towards demesne agriculture, involving Autumn and Summer works, including 
carrying, weeding and ploughing, so were presumably perceived as a significant disability.81 No 
formal record of commutation is recorded in the rolls, but the lack of any presentments beyond 
the 1430s support this conclusion, therefore providing an example of changing circumstances 
refocusing manorial officers’ role away from seigniorial exaction.  
Downham is again different, providing an example of a far longer enforcement of labour 
services, as revealed by infrequent but persistent presentments down to the 1570s, well into the 
early modern period. Whilst in absolute terms the number of presentments is small, the pattern 
suggests that most tenants continued to perform their expected services, and thus were not 
presented due to conformity rather than a lack of seignorial expectations. The Ely Coucher Book 
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of 1249-50 gives some idea of the extent of labour services at Downham revealing extensive 
week and boon works for both yardlanders and cottars, although significant commutations could 
have occurred in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.82 The nature of the works 
presented may have changed over time, with earlier entries stating that tenants did not come to 
work when summoned, whilst in the fifteenth century, apart from ploughing in 1412, 
presentments mainly concerned carrying services, common drives and collections from fens, 
rather than agricultural work.83 Two presentments of the 1570s also concerned common 
carrying, usually seen as a less onerous obligation, although they show remarkable harshness 
with the 1571 example complaining about tenants carrying too little. The 1579 example is even 
more extreme with the reeve being ordered to seize all the customary lands held both directly 
and through his wife by the offender, Edward North, for failure to carry from Doddington to 
Downham, although as it states North committed diverse other offences this may be the result of 
a longer history of troublemaking.84 Yet, however, one mitigates this seigniorial action, the fact 
that jurors were still presenting offences against labour services in the 1570s shows a far more 
seignorially-orientated function for officers at Downham.  
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N/A refers to decades for which no court rolls survive. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10; KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-840.
Decade Labour Services Marriage Chevage/Fled Serfs 
 Little 
Downham 
Horstead Worfield Little 
Downham 
Horstead Worfield Little 
Downham 
Horstead Worfield 
1310s 1 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 
1320s 0 N/A 0 4 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 
1330s 3 N/A 1 5 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 
1340s N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 
1350s N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 2 N/A N/A 1 
1360s 6 N/A 0 1 N/A 2 1 N/A 0 
1370s 1 N/A 0 1 N/A 2 1 N/A 0 
1380s 2 N/A 0 1 N/A 2 0 N/A 0 
1390s 0 4 0 3 0 6 1 4 0 
1400s 3 16 0 0 1 7 0 1 0 
1410s 2 1 0 3 3 2 1 1 0 
1420s 1 1 0 0 1 7 0 8 0 
1430s 0 2 0 0 4 7 3 8 0 
1440s 0 0 0 1 2 7 2 6 0 
1450s 2 0 0 0 0 10 2 7 0 
1460s 1 0 0 0 1 3 12 8 0 
1470s 0 0 2 0 0 1 6 9 0 
1480s 0 0 1 0 0 1 15 9 0 
1490s 1 0 1 1 0 0 9 5 0 
1500s 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 6 N/A 0 
1510s N/A 0 1 N/A 0 1 N/A 6 0 
1520s N/A 0 2 N/A 0 0 N/A 1 0 
1530s N/A 0 2 N/A 0 0 N/A 7 0 
1540s N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 
1550s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1560s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1570s 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1580s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1590s N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 




Marriage fines, the second incident investigated, follows a different pattern (table 1.1). Marriage 
fines were levied across England and could act as a legal test of villeinage.85 Downham and 
Horstead saw relatively similar patterns in levying this fine and presenting non-payers, with low 
but consistent levels of presentment through the fifteenth century down to a 1466 license at 
Horstead and a 1494 order to seize for marrying a daughter without license at Downham, after a 
55-year gap since the last presentment.86 Worfield’s chronology is similar, although the last 
presentment was significantly later in 1519 for a widow’s remarriage without license, yet the 
lack of amercement suggests that the license was paid afterwards amicably, and followed two 
decades of no presentments. However, the attention to marriage in the fifteenth century at 
Worfield is significantly greater with presentments ranging from 2-10 between the 1390s and 
1450s, for a mean of 6.6 per decade, only dropping to a 1-3 range similar to Horstead and 
Downham in the 1460s onwards. Special attention to marriages is also seen in two presentments 
of the custom of marriage at Worfield made in 1396 and 1473.87 These both confirmed that all 
customary tenants had to pay marriage fines, the latter specifying that those marrying their 
daughters inside the manor paid a minor fee and those outside the manor a major fee at the 
discretion of the steward.  
This suggests a special seigniorial attention towards controlling marriage, striking as at 
Worfield virtually no other servile incidents were routinely enforced, showing that even in a 
manor with seemingly low seigniorial exaction officers could still act decisively for the lord. 
This was not inconsistent with the manor’s ancient demesne status; custom varied between 
ancient demesne manors and could combine lighter and harsher elements of serfdom.88 This 
picture must also be tempered by the fact that many of the women presented were remarrying 
widows, enlarging the category liable to pay marriage fines, and perhaps shows an element of 
control over land as well as personal servility lay behind the stronger regulation of nuptiality.  
The third category of servile incident is that of controlling movement of serfs, either though the 
payment of chevage or listing fled serfs.89 Examining this incident draws a sharp divide between 
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Worfield, where only one presentment was made about two customary tenants remaining 
outside the manor in 1358, and the other two manors where control of movement became a 
significant category of presentment in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (table 1.1).90 
This kind of control would seem to put jurors directly into the lord’s servant category, as they 
were defending an oppressive seigniorial right. Certainly, at Downham the upsurge in 
presenting fled villeins in the 1460s to 1500s appears conflictual, with the regular presentments 
of serfs for being outside the manor and not paying chevage being combined with orders to 
reeves and bailiffs to attach them by their bodies to appear at the next court.91 In 1440, this was 
supplemented by an order to distrain their nearest relation on the manor, and from the 1480s 
with lists of serfs and their issue outside the manor, providing details of both ages and place of 
residence.92 Yet, it is important to consider this presentment in context. Whilst certainly an 
example of persistent work for the lord, the regularity of presentment is largely due to the 
ineffectiveness of orders to seize serfs, suggesting that whilst officers were being pressured by 
the lord, in reality their frequent presentments had little impact. Bailey has emphasised that this 
growth of interest in serfs’ movement is a national picture, but that only one case has been 
found of a serf potentially being returned to the manor, a fact unsurprising as manorial courts 
had no obvious way of compelling individuals living beyond a manor’s bounds.93  
Horstead reinforces this view even more strongly. Whilst in the 1390s and even in 1414, fled 
serfs were named so they could be attached by their bodies, from the 1420s onwards the vast 
majority of presentments were simply the profits of chevage payments.94 Horstead’s lords did 
mine these efficiently, with jurors increasing the number of payers from a range of 2-8 in 1420-
1457 to 5-15 in 1462-78, although from this point numbers began to decrease, even though 
detail including residence, occupation, apprenticeship and entrance to holy orders was 
recorded.95 In 1515 and 1530 orders were made to arrest fled serfs again, presumably due to the 
decline in chevage payments, and in 1532 the report of the death of William Spark in London 
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led to an order to arrest his brother by his body and goods as William’s executor.96 However, 
these policies, along with increased reports of the issue of serfs remaining inside the manor, 
even including a quarter-year-old baby, could not reverse the decline with the last chevage 
payment being presented in 1537.97 At Horstead, control of serfs’ movement relatively quickly 
transformed into the exaction of a potentially disabling, but at least regular payment, and 
attempts to seize serfs in the sixteenth century, despite the quality of information gathered, were 
ineffective. This trend is seen on other manors where increased information concerning serfs 
was not easily transferred into instruments to control, or at least profit from, their movement.98 
Thus whilst manorial officers were acting for their lord in this regard, it cannot be described as 
particularly in conflict with other tenants.  
At all three manors, jurors were involved in enforcing at least one aspect of servility for most of 
the fifteenth century and for Downham and Horstead into the sixteenth century. This confirms 
the overall pattern of presentments; lords remained invested in manorial officeholding and the 
functions of officers long after the Black Death. The patterns in presentments concerning 
servility also mirror the picture given by general seigniorial presentments, revealing differences 
between manors in the kind of role officers had in relation to lords. Downham appears as the 
manor where seignorial demands most strongly guided officers’ presentments. Officials 
continued to levy common fines, help maintain holdings and even enforce labour services. 
Worfield, conversely, largely saw the presentment of unobtrusive seigniorial demands, with 
cases of default of suit and property cases, although the late and consistent monitoring of 
marriage fines warns against too generous an interpretation. Horstead looks to be somewhere 
between these opposites. Seigniorial presentments largely focused on ensuring the lord profited 
from the land market; labour services and marriage fines were abandoned relatively quickly. 
Two commonalities saw both Downham and Horstead move closer to Worfield by the end of 
the sixteenth century, with the disappearance of presentments concerning seigniorial agriculture 
due to the end of direct management by c.1440 and the abandonment of the tracking of serfs by 
c.1540. However, officers still remained important in presenting more passive profits of manors 
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for lords; monitoring rights to strays and forfeited goods, as well as protecting seigniorial non-
agriculture property. It is this gradual winnowing of the variety of seigniorial presentments that 
explains the decline seen at the macro-category level.  
Community Presentments  
The contrast in the number of ‘community’ presentments between Worfield on the one hand, 
where these remained comparatively low until an increase from the 1550s to 1570s, and 
Horstead and Downham, where these were always a significant category of business, can be 
explained by changes in the internal makeup of this category. At Horstead and Downham, the 
broad contours of ‘community’ presentments remained similar over time, although they did 
differ from one another. Horstead’s officers presented a large number of cases concerning 
infrastructure in the fifteenth century, with this representing between c.49% and 71% of 
‘community’ presentments from the 1390s to 1490s.99 This proportion dipped in the sixteenth 
century, especially between the 1530s and 1560s, a trend occasioned by an absolute fall in 
infrastructure presentments, which explains the dip seen in ‘community’ presentments generally 
at mid-sixteenth century Horstead.100 However, infrastructure presentments grew in the 1570s to 
1590s, both absolutely and as a proportion of ‘community’ presentments, explaining the 
recovery of this macro-category of presentment, and suggesting that officers were still important 
in maintaining communal structures.101 Typical concerns included the scouring of ditches, the 
maintenance of fences and the upkeep of common paths. The other large category of 
‘community’ presentments at Horstead concerned the management of common rights. These 
presentments varied in number between decades but overall remained relatively similar, though 
increased proportionally in the mid-sixteenth century with the fall of infrastructure 
presentments.102  
Downham’s ‘community’ presentments remained relatively static over time, with infrastructure 
accounting for a smaller proportion of presentments at a range of c.13-46% across all recorded 
decades studied.103 Presentments concerning common rights grew proportionally but not 
absolutely from the 1450s onwards, from a range of c.19-35% (mean 23.9%) to a range of c.20-
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46% (mean 36.1%). This continued into the late sixteenth century, although always within a 
context of wide decade-on-decade variation.104 Proportional growth is explained by a real fall of 
presentments monitoring the sale of fenland resources outside the manor in the same timeframe. 
Both manors also saw a continued use of presentment to identify and punish trespasses in the 
crops and pastures of the tenants and vill as a collective. 
At Worfield, however, a more complex pattern emerges, with periods of increase in the absolute 
numbers in the ‘community’ category from the 1350s to 1430s and 1530s to 1570s. These two 
periods of increase were driven by different causes. In the earlier decades, a significant range of 
c.3-12 presentments per annum were concerned with the breaking of the pounds of individual 
tenants or vills to free animals impounded for trespass in the commons and fields of individual 
vills. However, from the 1440s this fell to a range of 0-2 per annum, explaining the overall fall 
of ‘community’ presentments. In the second period, the rise was triggered in part by a growth in 
the number of presentments for animals trespassing in tenants’ parks or being allowed to graze 
in sown fields, this subcategory increasing from a range of 0-7 for the 1320s to 1420s, to 3-13 
for the 1530s to 1570s. This was matched by an absolute increase in the numbers of 
presentments concerning common rights and infrastructure, although proportionally these 
remained relatively static. This second increase was driven by a greater use of presentment by 
individual vills to police their own concerns over access to commons and pasture rights, which 
unlike at Downham and Horstead, were organised at the sublevel of the individual hamlet rather 
than the manor.105 Whilst the jury leet did make some presentments concerning infrastructure, 
these focused on tasks that required significant coordination such as the repair of bridges which 
crossed the river Worfe.106 These were orders made to entire vills rather than individual tenants, 
and were quantitatively few in number. The growth in vill ‘community’ presentments is partly 
linked to an increased use of bylaws, which is further discussed in chapter three, but had the 
effect of bringing Worfield’s ‘community’ presentments more in line with those of the other 
two manors.  
The makeup of ‘community’ presentments at Downham and Horstead remained broadly similar 
over time. Thus, the continued importance of ‘community’ presentments at the close of the 
sixteenth century was due to a continuation of concerns about infrastructure, commons and 
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protecting crops seen at both manors from their earliest surviving court rolls. These were 
maintained during a decline in other categories of business, which explains the dominance of 
community concerns c.1600 for these two locales. Worfield, in contrast, saw a growth of 
‘community’ presentments in the 1530s-70s due to an innovation in the use of presentments, 
with vills increasingly using them to police local community concerns, making the overall level 
and subcategories of ‘community’ presentments more similar to the other two manors which did 
not have dispersed leet structures. However, when the numbers of vill presentments fell in the 
1580s and 1590s, this in turn caused this category to largely disappear.  
Royal Presentments  
Much as the proportion of ‘royal’ business was relatively uniform between manors, the 
subdivisions within this category show surprising similarity. However, it is still worth picking 
apart the types of ‘royal’ business presented and the differences that did exist between manors, 
especially as this provides a context for considering how manorial officeholding was affected by 
the rise of the state. In this section, attention is focused on more consistent categories of ‘royal’ 
presentment, rather than more innovative presentments responding to new statutory legislation, 
which are analysed in chapter five due to their importance in establishing the responsiveness of 
manorial officers to new impulses from above.107 Attention is focused on more ‘medieval’ 
presentments that accompanied leet jurisdiction, particularly considering how they declined in 
the three centuries examined.  
One key difference between the manors was the direct payment of leet-cert at Horstead to the 
crown, leading this to be categorised as a ‘royal’ presentment, rather than a seigniorial 
presentment as at Downham.108 Leet-cert of 4s, a fixed sum representing the tithing penny, was 
paid annually at Horstead between 1395 and 1444 accounting for c.6-17% of ‘royal’ 
presentments by the capital pledges.109 The fine was then not presented between 1445 and 1467 
before being annually surrendered down to the break in the rolls at 1494, after which it 
disappears.110 The repayment after the gap is intriguing. Whilst the earlier presentments make 
no mention that the fine is going to the crown, from 1468 onwards the manorial bailiff is 
described as surrendering the fine to the bailiff of the Hundred of Taverham to the use of the 
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King.111 Moreover, justification is given to the payment as being ‘out of antiquity at the time of 
the lord Bardolf’, creating the impression that this was a reassertion of an ancient right. Most 
likely, this pattern represents a royal reaction against seigniorial laxness. 
Peacekeeping, incorporating presentments about petty theft, using the hue and cry, 
housebreaking and nuisances, but overwhelmingly concerning interpersonal violence, was a 
mainstay of ‘royal’ presentments at both Horstead and Downham throughout the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, accounting for c.15-43% of presentments at Horstead and c.20-60% at 
Downham.112 At both manors there was an absolute decline in peace-breaking presentments in 
the sixteenth century, although at Downham this was less drastic, with 6-9 presentments per 
decade for the 1550s-1580s suggesting officers still had an important role in keeping order.113 
At Horstead this was more decisive, with only one presentment for peace-breaking in the 1560s, 
1570s and 1590s, and none for the 1580s, which in part explains the overall decline in ‘royal’ 
presentments seen there.114 Peacekeeping accounted for an even greater proportion of ‘royal’ 
presentments at Worfield, making up 57-90% of this category between the 1320 and 1570s. 
This largely consisted of the typical petty offences which were reported by individual townships 
in this manor’s court. Generally, the peace-breaking presentments that were made by Worfield’s 
jury leet were for property crimes. On a number of occasions these included detailed accounts of 
actual felonies, although the last of these, an armed housebreaking and theft of 22d from a 
cleric, was recorded in 1499.115 The decline in ‘royal’ presentments overall is similarly 
explained by a decline in the number of peace-breaking presentments, which fell from a mean of 
104 per decade for the 1350s-1520s to 34 for the 1530s-80s.   
Enforcing the assize of bread and ale was the other dominant driver of ‘royal’ presentments at 
all manors. At Horstead and Downham, presentments concerning the assize which included 
naming brewers, bakers and regrators who broke the assize, fining tasters for not performing 
their office and, at Downham, monitoring measures, accounted for c.33-70% of presentments in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, showing persistent enforcement of this aspect of royal 
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legislation.116 However, again in the sixteenth century the manors diverge. At Downham, 
presentments concerning the assize were maintained, with 12 recorded for the 1570s.117 At 
Horstead, however, presentments fell to 3-7 a decade for the 1510s to 1540s, and then 
disappeared entirely after the last presentment in 1545.118 The beginning of this decline was 
justified by a lack of necessity. In 1492 the capital pledges presented that there were no brewers 
inside the precincts of the leet who brewed ale to sell and consequently did not elect ale tasters 
to enforce the assize.119 They repeated this presentment in 1493 and 1494 before ending regular 
presentments about ale selling entirely, with only one more presentment about selling ale 
against the assize in 1515, although they continued regularly to present bakers for breaking the 
assize down to 1545.120 However, this was not the end of capital pledges’ presentments 
concerning ale selling; in 1533 Robert Pytelyng was formally allowed to sell ale and bread 
inside his houses and outside the lordship, whilst in 1543 a tapster was presented for selling by 
illicit measures to the liegemen of the king, and placed under pain of 3s 4d not to do so again.121 
This may represent a more interventionist enforcement in monitoring the sale of ale rather than 
the annual licensing offered by the assize, although the lack of any presentments concerning the 
sale of alcohol after 1543 suggests this was short lived. 
Worfield’s enforcement of the assize differed in that ale tasters presented directly in court rather 
than through other officials, although the vills and jury leet did present a significant number of 
offenders alongside the tasters in the late fourteenth century. Moreover from 1457 onwards the 
tasters also began to monitor the pricing of meat and fish, an innovation not seen at Horstead 
and Downham.122 This seems likely to have been due to local impetus, mirroring policies seen 
in the leets of small market towns.123 However, no new bylaw occasioning these presentments is 
recorded, and on several occasions butchers are presented simply for breaking the assize.124 For 
this reason, these presentments are subsumed into the ‘royal’ category, as they appear to have 
been considered by officers as part of their presentments according to the assize. Quantitatively, 
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Worfield’s assize presentments as made by its tasters follow the same pattern as Horstead, 
declining from a range of 13-29 per decade for the 1350s-1500s, to a range of 3-9 for the 1510s-
1560s before disappearing, with the last presentment made in 1568.125 The vills and jury leet 
continued to present slightly later, with common brewers and a butcher amerced in 1571, 
although after this point such presentments disappear entirely.126  
Other types of ‘royal’ presentment were far less significant across all manors. In all cases, 
presentments concerning royal roads made up c.1-20% of ‘royal’ presentments in the late 
fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth century, disappearing at Worfield in 1419, Downham 
after 1455 and Horstead in 1470.127 At this point the manors diverge, Worfield saw an earlier re-
emergence of presentments with eight in the 1470s-1520s before complete disappearance. Both 
Downham and Horstead saw presentments re-emerge at the tail end of the sixteenth century, 
with eight presentments in the 1550s-1570s at Downham and three presentments in the 1560s-
1590s at Horstead.128 This resurgence may have been driven by new attention to highways in 
statute legislation.129 These patterns should be treated with caution, however. Presentments 
concerning roads or ‘common’ roads were made throughout this period, and whilst the 
distinction is made in courts between these different categories of road, it is possible that it was 
dropped in periods of few presentments. 
The tithing system generated ‘royal’ presentments at all three manors. Men over twelve were 
either presented as being sworn in a tithing or being amerced for remaining in the lordship 
without being sworn for over a year, as sometimes were their employers or capital pledges. At 
Horstead and Downham, officers may have been incentivised to maintain the system even after 
its peacekeeping role had diminished as capital pledges paid collective but fixed fines with their 
tithings. The larger the tithing, the further the burden could be spread. Indeed, at Horstead in 
1404 and 1426, capital pledges amerced men for refusing to surrender their tithing penny.130 At 
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Downham this requirement continued down to the end of the sixteenth century, explaining the 
continued, if irregular, presentments concerning tithings.131 The fact that at sixteenth-century 
Horstead capital pledges continued to making tithing presentments, including eight in the 1510s 
and five in the 1550s, whilst paying no leet-cert is harder to explain, unless as perhaps a method 
to control a mobile population.132 A similar concern perhaps explains the occasional 
presentments concerning the maintenance of tithings at Worfield, where a lack of tithing 
payments means there was never a financial incentive behind this monitoring.  
Overall, it is the sharp decline and then disappearance in assize presentments which explains the 
general fall in ‘royal’ presentments observed at Worfield and Horstead. At the Norfolk manor, 
this was compounded by a decline in peacekeeping presentments and the ending of leet-cert. At 
Downham peacekeeping presentments also fell, but not as drastically, whilst assize 
presentments recovered in the 1570s. Thus much like with seigniorial presentments, a loss of 
functions explains the changes seen in the late sixteenth century in this class of presentment.  
Land Presentments  
The majority of presentments concerning land fall into three categories, namely those recording 
grants of land by the lord to tenants, those detailing the death of tenants and the inheritance of 
their land, and those focusing on intervivos transfers between living tenants made outside the 
court, remembering that intervivos transfers made inside court did not require presentment to be 
valid so were not in the jury’s remit. The extra-curial category includes both transfers made by 
tenants as part of the land market, and those made on deathbeds as part of inheritance 
strategies.133 However, these categories were not presented in the same way on different manors 
or over time. For example, at both Downham and Worfield no inheritances were presented 
before the Black Death, with entries concerning inheritance providing no information about how 
the transfer to an heir was reported to the court. At both manors, inheritances appear to have 
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only been systematically recorded via the procedure of presentment from the 1380s onwards. 
Similarly, whilst jurors routinely, but in the case of Downham, not exclusively, presented extra-
curial intervivos transfers, at Worfield these were virtually never recorded by the jury, but 
instead involved the reeve and the beadle as seigniorial agents. The special role of the reeve was 
recorded in an inquiry of 1405, when it was stated that only transfers made through him were 
valid.134 Therefore, any treatment of these presentments must be very careful, remembering that 
they were taking place in a context of other procedures to transfer and inherit land. 
This concern aside, a pattern does emerge, which is that extra-curial intervivos transfers drove 
increasing ‘land’ presentments in this period. This is visible at Horstead from the 1410s 
onwards, when transfers grew from c.1 a decade to 10, and then became the most dominant type 
of presentment from 1430s until the end of the period.135 A high number of deathbed transfers 
partially drove this trend. These allowed tenants to circumvent customary inheritance in favour 
of greater personal discretion in settling their land on heirs.136 The decrease in the 1560s-1580s 
was caused by a relative fall in transfers, which may reflect a general slowdown in the land 
market due to the increasing value of land in this period.137 An increase in extra-curial transfers 
also accounts for the increase in ‘land’ presentments seen for the 1550s-1580s at Downham, 
suggesting a greater openness in the land market.138 Certainly, in earlier periods tenants may 
have been dis-incentivised to make transfers; in 1328 the jury presented that custom dictated 
that not only should the lord collect a heriot in cases of inheritance but also in intervivos 
transfers.139 However, this pattern was also due to the less regular presentment of transfers by 
officers on this manor, meaning patterns seem more erratic. 
At Worfield, the fact that intervivos transfers were generally not made via the presentment 
procedure but instead passed through officials’ hands, means that the vast majority of ‘land’ 
presentments were for inheritance. The fact that they were the dominant type of presentment in 
the 1580s and 1590s is as much due to the small numbers of presentments in other categories, as 
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well as the relative size of the manor, which simply meant there was more land to be inherited, 
rather than a special land focus to Worfield’s jury.  
‘Land’ presentments reveal that officials had an important role in allowing increasing flexibility 
by tenants to manage their land, especially outside the court.140 This can be seen in more 
unusual presentments showing officials monitoring deathbed transfers and inheritances to 
ensure the rights of land-holders and those making bequests. For instance in 1474, the Coltishall 
jury presented that Idonna Smyth’s deathbed request to her executors to sell her land for the 
betterment of her soul had not been followed. The executors then explained that this was 
because the land had been unjustly occupied by John Selot for two years, who claimed he had 
acquired the land of Idonna in her lifetime and held the land through his manor of Hakeford in 
Coltishall. The jury then replied that this was untrue and so ordered the land to be seized into 
the lord’s hand.141 Whilst it is unclear if the lord would then grant the land so it could be sold, 
fulfilling Idonna’s desires, the presentment at least shows the jurors had a role in monitoring the 
later status of deathbed transfers. 
Other Officials  
Apart from ale tasters at Worfield, who were discussed along with the jury presentments above, 
so far no attention has been paid to the small number of presentments made by other officials at 
Worfield and Downham.142 The types of presentments made by reeves, beadles and messors at 
these manors suggest these officers primarily worked for the lord. Of the 14 presentments made 
by Worfield’s beadle for 1327-1477 all but two concerned seigniorial business, as did all six by 
the reeve made for 1331-1398.143 For the beadle, few of these were directly conflictual with the 
tenants’ interests, with three concerning strays and the other nine concerning trespasses on 
seigniorial property. The pattern for the reeve is slightly different, with two concerning 
nonperformance of labour services in the lord’s meadow, whilst the other four monitored the 
management of strays.  
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For the reeve at Downham, 56 presentments are recorded stretching from 1330, across the gap 
in the records to 1412.144 Again the emphasis is seigniorial with all bar two presentments being 
placed in this category. Again, however, most business is non-conflictual, concerning damage to 
crops and property and managing strays, with only one presentment for the poor performance of 
a harvesting labour service in 1363.145 Similarly, of the 60 presentments made by the messor for 
1312-1410, all except five concerned seigniorial business.146 Of these 55, five were about either 
non-performance or poor-performance of labour services, whilst the rest concentrated on 
damage to the lord’s crops and property. Overall, these officials at both manors were 
seigniorially-focused, but they only performed this role for the fourteenth and early fifteenth 
centuries, after which seigniorial business was presented by jurors and capital pledges alone.  
Conclusion  
An examination of the presentments made by manorial officers displays the transition from a 
seigniorially-focused manorial court, with officers primarily as the lord’s servants, to a 
community-focused ‘little commonwealth’ with officers acting as community elites to maintain 
structures and keep order. This process was occasioned by a reduction in ‘lord’ presentments 
from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, accompanied by a fall in ‘royal’ presentments from a 
slightly earlier date. Presentments declined as the variety of business presented under these 
categories fell. With the decline of presentments about serfdom and agricultural resources, 
officers became focused on a set of less conflictual seigniorial rights such as suit, common 
fines, protection of property and rights to strays. For ‘royal’ presentments, a reduction, and in 
some cases disappearance of the assize of ale was significant. This process occurred according 
to different chronologies and to different extremes at the three case studies; the role of officers 
at Downham in the 1570s was much closer to that of the 1310s, than were the roles of late 
sixteenth-century officers at Horstead and Worfield to the 1390s and 1360s respectively. Yet a 
process of winnowing led to the categories of ‘lord’ and ‘royal’ becoming smaller across the 
board, whilst those presentments focused on ‘community’ and ‘land’ were maintained at levels 
similar to that of the late fourteenth century.  
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To some extent, therefore, the pessimistic medievalists are right, the work of manorial officers, 
and the courts that gave them authority, did decline from the heights of c.1300. Whilst the 
picture provided by counting presentments from fragmentary rolls and changing numbers of 
sessions can only be partial, in absolute terms there was undeniably a decline in the number of 
presentments at all manors from c.1400 to c.1600, for a period where the presentment system at 
all manors was fully developed (figures 1.1-1.3). This occurred, moreover, in the context of 
later fifteenth and sixteenth century population growth at all manors, meaning that one would 
expect there to be simply more infractions to monitor (table 0.1). For seignorial business, 
officers were likely presenting less due to an actual withdrawal of direct lordship by c.1550 
onwards, which meant categories of offence linked to serfdom and directly-managed land 
simply ceased to exist. For ‘royal’ presentments, however, the lack of presentments linked to the 
assize of ale and peace-keeping likely represents a change in the jurisdictions used to monitor 
the sale of alcohol and violence towards the increasingly dominant quarter session, rather than 
an actual decline in these sorts of offences, meaning that a substantial part of manorial officers’ 
work had likely been lost.147 However, this view of diminishment does not give enough 
credence to the sustained role of officers in policing communities seen at Horstead and 
Downham, and this novel, if very short-lived, use at Worfield, which has been emphasised by 
the early modern revisionists. The ‘community’ category remained remarkably stable, with 
officers fulfilling the same role in 1600 as they had in the fourteenth century. Only Worfield 
looks like the stereotypical land transfer-focused seventeenth-century manor, and even this was 
a new development of the 1580s and 1590s.  
These changes must have drastically changed the position of officers, and especially jurors. 
Whilst the fourteenth-century juror at all three manors can be seen as fulfilling, whether 
willingly or unwilling, a position serving his lord, and even his King, the juror of the late 
sixteenth century cannot be seen as primarily a seigniorial servant. Yet, men still filled this 
office, and continued to present a variety of offences linked to their own community, much as 
their predecessors had in previous centuries. Thus, understanding the identity of these men is 
vital, and this is the aim of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: The Selection of Officers 
Oligarchy and Community  
Chapter one began by examining the changing role of officers, finding that officials continued to 
serve crown and lord into the sixteenth century, but ultimately shifted to serving community and 
facilitating the transfer of land. This chapter explores changing participation in officeholding, 
examining how many individuals were involved in officeholding across time. Such analysis 
inevitably takes place in a wider context of the debates over ‘oligarchy’ in the village communities 
of medieval and early modern England.  
Early modernists have frequently argued that local institutions of government were concentrated in 
the hands of a set of ‘chief inhabitants’ in the villages of their period. They have argued this on two 
levels. Firstly, studies using tax, land-holding and rate-paying records have demonstrated that 
officeholding was concentrated in the hands of the wealthy.1 Secondly, and more pertinent for this 
study, several historians have established that parochial officeholding and vestry attendance in 
many early modern communities was monopolised by select groups.2 For example, Wrightson and 
David Levine demonstrated through a quantitative study that parochial office, quarter-session jury 
service and manorial jury service at Terling were dominated by 10-15 men in any quinquennium, 
and in turn five of these were especially prominent.3 Similarly, Steve Hindle shows ‘oligarchy’ with 
an institutional approach, highlighting the spread of the ‘select’ or ‘close’ vestry that formally 
restricted membership to a small number, along with the more informal oligarchic tendencies of the 
so-called ‘open’ vestry.4 Studies of early modern manor courts have similarly argued that jury 
service was likely concentrated in the hands of wealthier tenants.5 Other early modernists have been 
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more sceptical however, arguing either that officers were not the wealthiest men of the parish, 
especially before the Restoration, or highlighting local traditions of inclusion which could work 
against oligarchic tendencies.6 Mark Goldie has stressed that officeholding was ‘remarkably 
socially extensive’ although such an assessment is made as part of a contrast of this ‘republicanism’ 
with monarchical authority, rather than in terms of the communities themselves.7 Thus, a general 
consensus suggests concentration of officeholding in the hands of select groups of wealthier 
residents, but that this was regionally varied and far from absolute. 
Medievalists of all stripes have also noted a degree of concentration in manorial officeholding, 
although the extent of this, and its significance, is debated. Homans observed that officeholding was 
largely the preserve of certain families of elite tenants, which he referred to as the ‘aristocracy of 
jurymen’.8 The Toronto School demonstrated this quantitatively, using multiple officeholding as 
one of their markers to categorise village families as belonging to an elite stratum.9 However, they 
did not see this as conflicting with the essentially communal role of these officials, arguing that 
office and particularly jurorship saw enough turnover and participation to prevent it being 
controlled by an oligarchy.10 Individuals from these families were chosen for their suitability and 
experience by the community at large, often developing a skill-set through serving in a series of 
positions, and bloodline alone was not a sufficient criterion for office.11 Whilst a degree of 
concentration is acknowledged, this is not interpreted as oligarchy.  
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However, in this regard Edward Britton is the black sheep of the Toronto family. He interpreted a 
similar statistical trend at Broughton as evidence for the development of an oligarchy with a ‘class 
consciousness’, noting a pattern of the passing of office from father to son, and suggested this could 
be true for other studies made by the School.12 The conception of a manorial-officeholding village 
oligarchy can also be found in a wide range of other studies by medievalists.13 Dyer notes that there 
was an element of oligarchy in the selection of officers, but that the number of positions meant this 
oligarchy was ‘necessarily broad’.14 Views of a more oppressive dominant group are informed by 
direct comparison with the early modern era, noting the similarity of concentration in office 
between the two periods.15 Quantitative studies of the manors of Halesowen, Norton and Billingham 
have reinforced this view.16 Therefore, the scholarship has edged towards the position that 
concentration in manorial office was typical in the Middle Ages, and so similar to that of the early 
modern village.  
Much like the examination of the work of manorial officers in chapter one, the main drawback of 
this literature is the lack of cross-period studies.17 Whilst many writers have looked for parallels 
between medieval and early modern, none have examined change across these periodisations for the 
same places, to see whether there were changes in participation and concentration over time. Here, 
evidence from the three case-study manors is analysed quantitatively, by identifying each individual 
who held any office, and then examining patterns of service to see trends in officeholding 1300-
1600.18 Admittedly, this approach is focused on the internal evidence of officeholding and does not 
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attempt to evaluate officeholding individuals by wealth or landholding using other sources of 
information. However, it provides a vital context for considering manorial officeholding 
comparatively, and so creates a framework by which periods of increased or decreased ‘oligarchy’ 
can be evaluated.  
Selected Officials  
For the sake of analysis, manorial officeholders can be divided into two types. The first type are 
empanelled officials, namely capital pledges, jurors leet and jurors baron, who are listed 
independently at the head of every court session. The second type, discussed in this section, are 
selected officials, meaning that their selection and swearing-in are explicitly recorded in the rolls, 
and that they served for terms of a year or longer and thus across multiple sessions. These officials 
include reeves, messors, beadles and tasters. Such officials could be selected by three processes, 
namely selection by the lord or his representative alone; selection by the community of tenants, 
either via a discrete jury or collectively; or selection by a system of rotation, with tenants serving in 
turn for their landholdings.19 These processes could be combined, and frequently the lord chose 
from certain candidates put forward by the tenants.20  
For the three case studies, the beadleship at Worfield is the only example of an office which was 
selected by rotation. The beadle’s major duties were to facilitate the running of the manor court at 
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Worfield through summoning and distraining defendants and empanelling trial juries.21 Providing 
the officer was incumbent on Hallon, one of the townships that made up the manor.22 Within the 
township, the beadleship was allotted via landholding, and in 1380 an inquisition declared that 
Roger Aldith would have to serve for land he held in Hallon.23 More information is provided by a 
note made in 1557 detailing ‘the appoytin\g/ & true cessyng of the byddell of halon by the consent 
of the township for ev(er) aft(u)r’.24 This describes a rotational system with 12 different lands being 
responsible for providing the beadleship (table 2.1). The tenant, or in two cases tenants, of each land 
unit was to serve for one year each except for John Wannerton and his wife Alice who were to serve 
for three years, meaning that the rotation period lasted fourteen years before returning to the first 
tenant. Yet, whilst twelve different lands served, the number of individuals was far smaller, with 
only seven (including Alice Wannerton who was unlikely to serve whilst her husband was alive) 
serving across the fourteen years. This potential to serve was not equally distributed, with 
John/Alice Wannerton and John Walker only serving once, Alice Warter and Richard Prests serving 
twice, Richard Rowley serving three times (including joint service), and William Billingsley 
(including joint service) topping the list at four times. As of 1557, the effects of the beadleship 
being confined to one township with individuals holding multiple lands within a fixed rotation was 








                                                          
21 See, for example, SAC, P314/W/1/1/123, 24 Jan 1381; P314/W/1/1/268, 30 Sep 1426; P314/W/1/1/393, 16 
Apr 1478; P314/W/1/1/486, 6 Apr 1491; P314/W/1/1/514, 22 Nov 1514; P314/W/1/1/642, 12 Dec 1532; 
P314/W/1/1/794, 19 Feb 1579.  
22 SAC, 2028/1/5/8; P314/W/1/1/246, 2 Nov 1417; P314/W/1/1/289, 3 Oct 1438; P314/W/1/1/292, 1 Oct 
1440. 
23 SAC, P314/W/1/1/121, 2 May 1380. 
24 SAC, 2028/1/5/4. 
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 Table 2.1 - Rotation of beadleship as recorded in 1557 memorandum at Worfield 
 
N/A indicates when no second individual is recorded. Source: SAC, 2028/1/5/4. 
Individual 1 Individual 2 Description of Land Time 
Richard Prests N/A Messuage and half yard land at ‘Symeyate’ 1 year 
Alice Wartor N/A 
Messuage and half yard land late of Roger 





Messuage and half yard land of his one other 





Nook of land of William Billingsley and 
nook of land of Richard Rowley jointly 
together 
1 year 
Richard Rowley N/A 
Messuage and other his land now in his own 
occupation 
1 year 
Richard Rowley N/A 
Toft and half yard land called the ‘mersshe 
ground’ 
1 year 
John Walker N/A Messuage and other land late of one Bullock 1 year 
Alice Wartor N/A 
Messuage and half yard land late of Roger 
Barkare land called Butter yard 
1 year 
John Wannerton Alice Wannerton His land late of George Barkare 3 years 
Richard Prests N/A 
Messuage and nook of land now in the tenure 





2 nooks of land whereof the one is of late 
George Byllingsley and one Wood So that 










The longevity of such a pattern is evident in three periods in the rolls when beadle selections are 
well recorded, namely 1326-9, 1429-54 and 1506-20.25 These reveal relative concentration in earlier 
periods, in line with that of 1557, with at least one individual serving twice in each of the time-
frames. This was seemingly due to engrossment of the holdings which provided beadles, with 
Thomas Wynter serving in 1327 and 1329, John Dene in 1440 and 1443, John Holygreve in 1445 
and 1448, and George Barker in 1506 and 1508, the short intervals consistent with holding multiple 
lands in the rotation.26 By contrast, William Wermod served twice through being selected in 1429 
and 1442, a 13-year gap which corresponds to the twelve land cycle seen in the 1557 document, 
suggesting he may have served twice due to a full rotation.27 Thus, clearly some degree of 
concentration in holding the beadleship, despite a rotational system, had a long heritage. 
Analysis of a final set of 25 selections for 1571-97 reveals that this system remained robust until the 
end of the period under study and roughly conformed to the 1557 document.28 Fourteen persons 
were selected across the 25 selections, with 7 serving once, 6 serving twice and one person serving 
6 times. The pattern of multiple selection is also broadly similar. For example Richard Rowley was 
selected annually 1577-78, once in 1581, and then annually 1592-94, suggesting a pattern of 
multiple service due to holding multiple lands within the cycle, and also a large gap suggesting a 
repeat of the cycle.29 The types of land described match the 1557 document, with the same 
combination of half virgates, jointly held pairs of nooks and even the two named lands of the 
‘Symeyate’ and ‘mersshe ground’ appearing.30  
However, this pattern belies a more complex picture, and further concentration, as it only accounts 
for those who were presented to serve in office due to their landholding, rather than those who 
actually performed the office of beadle. In fact, of the 25 selections, six saw a deputy sworn instead 
                                                          
25 SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-8, 275-309, 502-659.  
26 SAC, P314/W/1/1/1, 19 Jun 1327; P314/W/1/1/8, 18 Apr 1329; P314/W/1/1/292, 1 Oct 1440; 
P314/W/1/1/295, 30 Oct 1443; P314/W/1/1/297, 9 Oct 1445; P314/W/1/1/299, 15 Oct 1448; P314/W/1/1/502 
21 Oct 1506; P314/W/1/1/503, 19 Oct 1508. 
27 SAC, P314/W/1/1/275, 4 Oct 1429; P314/W/1/1/294, 11 Oct 1442. 
28 SAC, P314/W/1/1/774-834. 
29 SAC, P314/W/1/1/790, 7 Oct 1577; P314/W/1/1/794, 9 Oct 1578; P314/W/1/1/801, 5 Oct 1581; 
P314/W/1/1/822, 5 Oct 1592; P314/W/1/1/824, 4 Oct 1593; P314/W/1/1/827, 26 Sep 1594.  
30 SAC, P314/W/1/1/786-834. 
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of the tenant.31 In 1579, this was due to physical unsuitability, with John Walker being affirmed as 
deaf by the vill of Hallon.32 However, on the other five occasions, the status of the landholder 
precluded him from serving as beadle. Lammetous Rydley, who appointed a deputy in 1576 and 
1577, is described as a gentleman, whilst male members of the Bromley family, who were chosen in 
1582, 1583, 1584 and 1590, served in offices at the county level, and saw themselves, and were 
presumably seen, as being above holding manorial office.33 However, their role as customary 
landholders who were theoretically obligated to serve reveals an important tension between a 
method of selecting office and changes to how land was held in manors in the early modern period. 
Much as these individuals held land but did not serve in the offices associated with it, it is likely 
they sublet their land rather than cultivating it themselves, acting as investors in customary land. 
Whilst subletting was likely a phenomenon in earlier periods at Worfield, the difference in status 
between tenant and occupier was probably far smaller, with customary land only opening up as an 
investment opportunity with the move from villein to copyhold tenure.34 Thus it is only at this point 
that it began to affect how rotational offices were apportioned.  
That deputisation led to further concentration in officeholding is demonstrated by looking at the 
identities of these stand-ins. In the 25 selections, 12 men actually served, as opposed to 14 who held 
the obligation to serve, a difference caused by the fact that all bar two of the men chosen as deputies 
also served separately due to holding land with the beadleship attached. This could lead to single 
                                                          
31 SAC, P314/W/1/1/786, 1 Oct 1576; P314/W/1/1/797, 14 Oct 1579; P314/W/1/1/804, 27 Sep 1582; 
P314/W/1/1/806, 3 Oct 1583; P314/W/1/1/805, 24 Sep 1584; P314/W/1/1/818, 14 Oct 1590. 
32 SAC, P314/W/1/1/797, 14 Oct 1579. 
33 SAC, P314/W/1/1/786, 1 Oct 1576; P314/W/1/1/790, 7 Oct 1577; P314/W/1/1/804, 27 Sep 1582; 
P314/W/1/1/806, 3 Oct 1583; P314/W/1/1/805, 24 Sep 1584; P314/W/1/1/818, 14 Oct 1590; W.J. Jones, 
‘Bromley, Francis (c.1556-91), of Hodnet, Salop’, in P.W. Halsler (ed.), The History of Parliament: the 
House of Commons 1558-1603, vol. I, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office for the History of Parliament 
Trust, 1981), 489-90; N. M. Fuidge, ‘Bromley, George (c.1526-89), of Hallon in Worfield, Salop and the 
Inner Temple, London’ in Halser, History of Parliament, 490-1; Smith, Worfield, 61-2. In 1577, Lammetous 
Ridley put forward a deputy but he was not sworn.  
34 J. Whittle, ‘Conclusions’, in J. Whittle (ed.), Landlords and Tenants in Britain, 1440-1660: Tawney’s 
Agrarian Problem Revisited, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013), 216-221, 216-7; P.R. Schofield, ‘Extranei and the 
Market for Customary Land on a Westminster Abbey Manor in the Fifteenth Century’, AgHR, 49:1, (2001), 
1-16, 16; P.D.A. Harvey, ‘Conclusion’, in P.D.A. Harvey (ed.), The Peasant Land Market in Medieval 
England, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 328-56, 328-9; J. Whittle, ‘Land and People’, in K. Wrightson (ed.), A 
Social History of England, 1500-1700, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 152-73, 167-8 . 
73 
 
individuals serving frequently over short periods of time. For example, William Warter was 
selected twice due to his own half virgate in 1580 and 1596, presumably due to one complete cycle 
of the beadleship rotation.35 However, he also served as deputy in 1582, 1583 and 1590, holding the 
office three times more in the rotation.36 It seems likely that deputies were generally subtenants of 
leased lands, creating engrossed holdings through a combination of direct tenancy and subtenancy.37 
This can be seen in 1576, when Rydley’s messuage and half virgate is explicitly described as in the 
occupation of Richard Wever, who, consequently, was sworn as Rydley’s deputy.38 However this 
was not automatic; of two surviving leases of tenant lands mentioning the beadleship, one included 
filling the office in the lease whilst a second excluded this right, as did an intervivos transfer of 
1575, the latter effectively severing the obligation to fill the beadleship from the land.39  
At Worfield, a rotational method of selection, confined to one township, led to a small group of 
individuals serving as beadle. This group was further decreased by a long history of engrossment, 
leading to the same tenants serving multiple times due to holding multiple pieces of land within a 
rotation, combined with a later practice of deputisation which favoured subtenants who already held 
land in Hallon. This system can be contrasted with selections by the community of tenants which 
determined the choice of reeve at Worfield, the messor and reeve at Downham and tasters at all 
three manors. The nature of these is far harder to reconstruct as they were not directly linked to 
holding land, and thus were less liable to be recorded in manorial documentation. At Worfield, the 
custumal for 1602 describes that ‘the homage ought yearly to choose a reive’ whilst the 1403 
custumal claims that the tenants yearly ought to choose from among themselves a reeve.40 The 
focus of both of these claims is a collective responsibility. From the seigneurial perspective, this is a 
crucial contrast with the rotational method. Whilst the lord looked to a specific individual or set of 
                                                          
35 SAC, P314/W/1/1/799, 27 Sep 1580; P314/W/1/1/831 16 Sep 1596. 
36 SAC, P314/W/1/1/804, 27 Sep 1582; P314/W/1/1/806, 3 Oct 1583; P314/W/1/1/818, 14 Oct 1590. 
37 J. Thirsk, English Peasant Farming: the Agrarian History of Lincolnshire from Tudor to Recent Times, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 14; S. Hipkin, ‘The Structure of Landownership and Land 
Occupation in the Romney Marsh Region, 1646-1834’, AgHR, 51:1, (2003), 69-94, 93-4; J. Rhodes, 
‘Subletting in Eighteenth Century England: a New Methodological Approach’, AgHR, 66:1, (2018), 67-92, 
85-7. 
38 SAC, P314/W/1/1/786, 1 Oct 1576. 
39 SAC, P314/W/1/1/765, 26 Jun 1567; P314/W/1/1/836, 27 Apr 1598; P314/W/1/1/783, 24 Apr 1575. 
40 SAC, 2028/1/5/8; SAC, 5586/2/1/42. 
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individuals to fill an office in the latter system, in the ‘free’ system, they delegated responsibility to 
their tenants, or a subgroup of these, collectively.41 From the perspective of the community of 
tenants, collective responsibility presumably allowed more freedom in choosing officers, allowing 
dynamics below the level of lord-tenant relationships to shape this decision, and possibly making it 
more ‘political’.  
The actual freedom of the community of tenants to choose officials varied over time. For much of 
the fourteenth century, the rolls of both Worfield and Downham indicate entirely unrestricted 
selection by tenants. At the Shropshire manor this was achieved via annual selections, with 
individuals chosen in one year, sworn, serving their term, and then being replaced the following 
year with a new individual. At pre-plague Downham, officers served far longer terms, with 
selections only being made when an officer was removed. Messors’ selections are noted eight times 
for 1316-1334; in six cases these men explicitly replaced the previous officer.42 The former messors 
had sometimes served multiple years and had to make a payment to be removed from office. In 
1325, Geoffrey Cardinal was selected to replace Simon Cardinal who was dismissed due to his 
infirmity, paying 2s to be allowed to withdraw.43 Similarly, in 1328, Simon Cardinal, who had 
served for three years, paid 40d to be removed, and in 1329 William Scut paid 6d to withdraw.44 
Reeve selections are recorded less frequently, with the only example in 1316.45 Account roll 
evidence reveals that this is not the only occasion the individual serving as reeve changed, with at 
least four different individuals serving for 1318-1336. However, longevity of service was again 
common, with William Stoneye likely serving five consecutive years and Simon Buk serving for 
six.46  
                                                          
41 The collective method of selection is outlined in contemporary estate literature: See D. Oschinsky (ed.), 
Walter of Henley and Other Treatises on Estate Management and Accounting, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 
274-7, 316-7.  
42 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.6, 27 Feb 1316; C11/1/1, m.6, 13 Dec 1323; C11/1/1, m.8, 24 Sep 1325; C11/1/2, 
m.2, 5 Dec 1328; C11/1/2, m.3, 13 Dec 1329; C11/1/1, m.5, 6 Dec 1330; C11/1/2, m.7, 25 Sep 1333. 
43 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.8, 24 Sep 1325. 
44 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.2, 5 Dec 1328; C11/1/2, m.3, 13 Dec 1329. 
45 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.6, 27 Feb 1316.  
46 Coleman, Downham, Table III, 115.  
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Changes occurred at both manors in the later fourteenth century, with apparently free choice being 
replaced by a two-stage system, in which the tenants would choose several candidates, and the lord, 
via the steward, would select one of these to be sworn and serve in office. At Worfield this system 
first appears in 1393, when two candidates were chosen, and one was sworn.47 It then became the 
more common form of choosing the reeve for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, although there 
continued to be occasional years where only one individual was named and then immediately 
sworn.48 At Downham, the system appears in the first surviving courts after the Black Death, with 
two candidates for the reeveship and messorship selected in 1364.49 This was replaced with a three 
candidate selection for both officers from 1378 onwards, a system largely maintained down to the 
1510s, and thus across the break in selections occasioned by the use of bailiffs in the mid-fifteenth 
century.50 It also heralded a change to an annual selection system.  
Unfortunately, whilst at Worfield the rolls in the vast majority of cases state which candidate was 
actually sworn, the Downham rolls often simply leave the word quibus with no explanation of who 
was chosen.51 The reason for the transition to a candidature system is never stated, although its 
obvious advantage to the lord was that it allowed more control over who was placed in office. 
Certainly at Downham the lord insisted on three candidates. When, in 1410, only two candidates for 
reeve and one candidate for messor were chosen, the whole homage was amerced 20s for refusing 
to choose three candidates for each office as they had been ordered.52  
The process by which these candidates were chosen was unfortunately outside of seigniorial 
control, or perhaps more accurately interest, and thus is largely absent from the records of the 
manor court. However, some information can be gleaned about the pool of potential candidates as 
well as the body that chose them. Tenants rather than any inhabitants were liable to be selected, as 
                                                          
47 SAC, P314/W/1/1/187, 29 Oct 1393.  
48 SAC, P314/W/1/1/187-837.  
49 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.11, 28 Sep 1364.  
50 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.2, 21 Sep 1378; C11/1/3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10.  
51 See, among many examples, CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.16, 10 Sep 1386; C11/2/5, m.5, 23 Sep 1415; C11/2/6, 
m.12, 26 Sep 1427. Page found this same failure to name which official was sworn for the manors of 
Crowland Abbey: Page, Crowland Abbey, 71.  
52 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.25, 22 Sep 1410.  
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is clearly stated in Worfield’s 1403 custumal.53 This is unsurprising as officeholding was a manorial 
obligation linked to tenure and seizure of land was utilised as a punishment against failure in 
official roles.54 Beyond this, Downham’s rolls reveal that serving as reeve and messor was confined 
to larger landholders. Three reeve selections for 1484-7 indicate that the obligation to be a candidate 
for reeve was linked to holding half and full virgates. In 1484, John Dunstable and Simon Jenny 
were selected ‘for one full virgate of land formally Colsens’ and Richard Tailour and Simon Jacob 
‘for one full virgate formally John Bateman’. In 1485 Robert Burdon, Richard Tailour and Simon 
Jacob were selected ‘for a full virgate of land called Bukkys’, along with John Jennys, with Burdon 
and Jennys sworn for two half virgates. The sole candidate in 1487, Clement Clidehowe, was 
selected ‘for one double customary virgate of land which he holds of the lord called Purdies 
Ground’.55 The names of two of the virgates reflect the surnames of former reeves. Thomas 
Colleson and John Colleson were selected frequently between 1385 and 1435 and Robert Buk and 
John Buk Bateman were selected between 1378 and 1435, suggesting a level of continuity between 
these virgate holdings and the selection of reeves.56 
A dispute over the selection of the messor in 1434 provides greater detail. On this occasion, rather 
than a blanket punishment over the whole homage, the rolls name 11 men who were tenants of full 
and half virgates who ‘out of antiquity did the office of lord’s messor’.57 They then decided that 
Robert Rote should be messor, explicitly because he held a full virgate formerly of ‘Kaillokkys’. 
That the reeveship and messorship were limited to half- and full-virgaters was related to tenurial 
practice. At Downham, a seigniorial policy of maintaining traditional half virgates and virgates 
seems to have led to a small pool of only 11 candidates in 1434.58 Clearly, some transformation had 
occurred by the 1484-7 selections.59 In 1484 four candidates were chosen as two pairs jointly 
holding shared virgates, in 1485 three candidates held one full virgate, with one being chosen for 
                                                          
53 SAC, 5586/2/1/42. 
54 SAC, P314/W/1/1/775, 25 Oct 1571; CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 9 Mar 1571.  
55 CUL, EDR, C11/3/8, m.1, 29 Jan 1484; C11/3/10, m.2, date indecipherable; C11/3/10, unfoliated, 24 Feb 
1487.  
56 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-6.  
57 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434.  
58 Coleman, Downham, 17.  




half of this holding, and in 1487 Clement Clidehowe was probably the only candidate because he 
held two virgates as one holding. However, this process still apparently kept the number of potential 
reeves and messors relatively small. This gives the selection of officials at Downham a more 
oligarchical appearance.  
The types of candidates chosen reveal informal limitations in access to office. This is most obvious 
in terms of gender. Whilst the rotational beadleship at Worfield meant that women served in office, 
no woman was ever chosen as reeve, and no women appear in any office at Downham. This must 
have been due to systematic exclusion as at Worfield free bench customary law meant that widows 
could be secure landholders.60 The non-rotational nature of office meant that ‘unsuitable’ candidates 
were not seen in selections as they were for the Worfield beadleship. Occasional payments were 
made not to serve at Downham, but these were governed by a lack of desire rather than another 
impediment.61 At Worfield, one deputisation did occur in 1527, when John Walker was chosen as 
the sole candidate for reeve. However, as John was the vicar at Worfield, Roger Catstre, the reeve 
for the preceding year, was chosen in his place.62 Why Walker was selected in the first place when 
he was clearly deemed unsuitable to serve is unclear, although it seems likely this was an attempt to 
ensure that the office circulated widely. 
That selection by tenants could have radically different effects on officeholding at these two manors 
is seen by analysing the pattern of those selected. At Worfield, 186 individuals can be identified as 
chosen as candidates to be reeve. Of these, 144 (77%) only appear once, a further 31 (17%) appear 
twice, 8 (4%) appear three times, with only two individuals appearing four times and one appearing 
six.63 Selections can also be analysed by ‘slots’: the total number of stated potential opportunities 
for candidacy or service in office. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the proportion of slots was heavily 
skewed towards singly and doubly appearing candidates. Of the individuals chosen four times, one 
was clearly due to longevity, with John Bradeney being selected in 1427 and 1429, and then again 
                                                          
60 SAC, 2028/1/5/8 
61 See p. 167. 
62 SAC, P314, W/1/1/629, 27 Sep 1528.  
63 SAC, P314/W/1/1/5-837. 
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in 1445 and 1447.64 The other frequent candidates were chosen in quick succession, with Thomas 
Golde being selected four times between 1481 and 1485, and William Bradeney six times between 
1577 and 1584.65 However, analysis of the subset of selections where it can be established who 
actually served as reeve, rather than being a candidate, suggests an even more dispersed picture. Of 
the 159 individuals who actually served as reeve, 150 (94%) served once, 8 served twice and one 
person served three times. The latter was John Bradeney, who served when selected in 1427 and 
1429, and then served in 1445, again suggesting longevity was significant in serving more than 
twice.66 Therefore serving as reeve appears to have been widely distributed among the population of 
tenants at Worfield, with no pattern of oligarchy in serving in this office. This contrast with the 
more restricted beadleship, suggests that a rotational system could have the effect of concentrating 











                                                          
64 SAC, P314/W/1/1/272, 3 Oct 1427; P314/W/1/1/275, 4 Oct 1429; P314/W/1/1/297, 9 Oct 1445, 
P314/W/1/1/299, 14 Oct 1447.  
65 SAC, P314/W/1/1/422, 25 Oct 1481; P314/W/1/1/428, 3 Oct 1482; P314/W/1/1/451, 30 Sep 1484; 
P314/W/1/1/459, 10 Oct 1485; P314/W/1/1/790, 7 Oct 1577; P314/W/1/1/794, 9 Oct 1578; P314/W/1/1/799, 
27 Sep 1580; P314/W/1/1/801, 5 Oct 1581; P314/W/1/1/803, 27 Sep 1582; P314/W/1/1/805, 24 Sep 1584.  
66 SAC, P314/W/1/1/272, 3 Oct 1427; P314/W/1/1/275, 4 Oct 1429; P314/W/1/1/297, 9 Oct 1445. 
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Figure 2.1 – Proportion of total selections to reeveship by number of times selected at 
Worfield 
 
N selections as candidate = 244, N selections as serving reeve = 169. SAC, P314/W/1/1/5-837. 
 
At Downham, a completely different pattern emerges. Of 57 individuals who can be identified as 
reeve candidates, 31 (54%), a small majority, were candidates once. However, they only made up 
16% of the total 197 slots. Another 20 (35%) were candidates 2-6 times, 5 (9%) were chosen 9-14 
times, whilst Thomas Colleson appeared an outlying 41 times as a candidate.67 The effects of this is 
revealed in an analysis of the proportion of slots held by different categories (figure 2.2). A group 
of frequently appearing individuals had significantly more appearances as candidates, with those 
9% in the 9-14 category taking up 28% of slots and Colleson alone appeared in 21% of slots, and 
thus more than the total of the 31 persons appearing once. Year-on-year selection of the same 
                                                          
67 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10. 
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individuals for the reeveship facilitated this pattern. For instance, John Lovechild was candidate 14 
times between 1376 and 1405, in 22 recorded selections, Simon Kede 11 times between 1412 and 
35, in 18 recorded selections, and Thomas Colleson 41 times between 1385 and 1435, in 44 
recorded selections.68 Thus for certain periods, the same candidates were chosen in an 
overwhelming majority of years. Unfortunately, the court rolls for Downham do not consistently 
record those who actually served as reeve in a given year. However, the combination of evidence 
from Downham’s surviving account rolls, along with the names of reeves in incidental entries 
within court rolls, suggest that frequent selection as a candidate often led to frequent actual service 
as reeve. Simon Kede served at least 5 times of his 11 candidate selections whilst Thomas Colleson 
served at least 11 times of his 41 selections.69 These are minimum figures, and the actual number of 













                                                          
68 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-6.  
69 Kede: CUL, EDR, D10/3 m.4, 1428-9; D10/3 m.5, 1429-30; D10/3 m.9, 1430-1; D10/3 m.10, 1431-2; 
D10/3 m.11, 1434-5; Colleson: C11/2/4, m.2,7 Jul 1400; C11/2/4, m.33, 27 Jun 1407; C11/2/4, m.23, 22 Nov 
1409; C11/2/4, m.26, 4 Dec 1410; D10/3 m.1, 1411-2; D10/3 m.2, 1412-3; D10/3 m.6, 1414-5; D10/3 m.7, 
1415-6; D10/3 m.8, 1418-9; D10/3 m.3, 1423-4. 
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Figure 2.2 – Proportion of total selections to reeveship and messorship as candidate by 
number of times selected at Little Downham 
 
N selections to reeveship = 197, N selections to messorship = 159. CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10. 
 
A similar concentration in candidature is seen in messor elections at Downham. Of 50 recoverable 
candidates, 29 (58%) were candidates once, whilst 14 (28%) appeared 2-6 times. Figure 2.2 shows 
the relatively small proportion of the total 159 recorded slots these groups held, at 18% and 28% 
respectively. The 5 (10%) individuals appearing as candidates 7-15 times held 30% of the slots, 
whilst the two most prominent individuals, Nicholas Wright and William Scut, were candidates 18 
and 19 times respectively.70 Thus there is no Colleson equivalent for the messorship, although again 
there is a drastic concentration of candidature among a few individuals. Again, frequent annual 
selection of the same individuals explains this; Wright was a candidate 18 times in 33 recorded 
selections between 1385 and 1421, and Scut was a candidate in every recorded selection for 1386-
                                                          
70 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10. 
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1407.71 Unfortunately, the names of messors are not recorded in Downham’s account rolls, meaning 
that reconstructing the identities of those who actually served is not possible. 
Whilst at Worfield the office of reeve was widely distributed among the population at ‘risk’ in a 
relatively even way, at Downham a system of filtration occurred which meant that certain parts of 
this population were chosen a disproportionate number of times, often through the annual selection 
of the same candidates. It is instructive to re-examine the 11 men mentioned in the 1434 
presentment, which gives a rare insight into the population ‘at risk’ of being messor in the selection 
of that year, although as men not on this list were selected as candidates in 1435 and 1439 this may 
not be a complete list of all potential messors.72 Table 2.2 shows the number of times each of these 
men is visible as a messor candidate through the surviving court rolls. This data must be treated 
carefully, however, as the rolls for 1435-38 are very fragmentary for Downham, meaning that the 
selection of messors is only recorded in 1435 and 1439, before the office of messor was removed in 
exchange for a bailiff. This means that some of the messor candidatures of these individuals may be 
missing, and others may never had the potential to serve, with the candidates recorded being biased 
towards those who had begun serving in office at an early date. However, even with this caveat, the 
pattern is striking, with 6 of these 11 men never being recorded as candidates for the messorship. 
These included individuals such as Henry Warrener and Thomas Stephenson, who first appear as 
officers in 1415 and 1426 respectively, and thus have a similar longevity to John Colleson jnr and 
John Buk jnr. The evidence hints at the possibility that even beyond suitable half- and full-virgaters 
appearing only once as candidates for office, there was an even larger group of these landholders 





                                                          
71 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-6. 
72 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434. 
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Table 2.2 - Reconstruction of careers as messors for individuals named in presentment of 1434 
at Little Downham 
Name Number of Times 
Chosen as Messor 
First Appearance in 
any office 
Last Appearance in 
any office 
John Buk Jnr 7 1423 1438 
John Jennnys 6 1423 1450 
John Colleson jnr 2 1422 1434 
Nicholas Bateman 2 1394 1434 
John Wright 1 1434 1474 
Thomas Stephenson 0 1426 1434 
Nicholas Colleson 0 1428 1434 
Henry Warrener 0 1415 1434 
Thomas Wright 0 1429 1450 
John Warener 0 1432 1444 
Robert Rote 0 1434 1434 
Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7. 
 
Unfortunately, the mechanisms of this filtration process at both Worfield and Downham are 
virtually invisible. The only evidence is provided by selections which record the body described as 
‘electing’ or ‘presenting’ candidates, named in about half of cases at each location. Both saw a shift 
towards a nominally more select franchise, with selections typically made by the homage or whole 
homage in the earlier period being replaced by choices decided by the jurors or capital pledges. At 
Worfield this transition occurred between the periods 1328-1407 and 1409-1599. At Downham it 
occurred between 1316-1440 and 1472-1574, although a paucity of information about selecting 
bodies after 1411 may have meant it started at an earlier date.73  
How far this change in recorded procedure matched a real contraction in the franchise selecting 
officials is impossible to measure. Statements that the ‘whole homage’ chose officials may have 
simply been used to give an impression of consent, legitimating decisions already made by a more 
influential subgroup of tenants. The change at Worfield from homage to jury is not seen in the 
                                                          
73 SAC, P314/W/1/1/5-837; CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11.  
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manor’s custumals; in 1602 selecting the reeve was still a matter for ‘the homage’.74 Equally, 
detailing the jury as the selecting body may simply have been giving a more official slant to a 
decision made communally prior to the court session. At Downham, there is perhaps some change: 
whilst the whole homage was punished for failing to select officials in 1410, by 1434 a select group 
was targeted, although this was explicitly the landholders responsible for providing the office rather 
than the jury.75 Attributing the choice to specific individuals may have been a seigniorial 
innovation, as it made it more possible to punish certain ringleaders in disputes. For Horstead’s 
nominal reeveship this is certainly the case, with jurors being amerced for failing to present which 
lands owed the fine for office.76 Moreover, the changing nomenclature of selecting bodies does not 
correlate with any statistical difference in the patterns of selection generated from court rolls and 
accounts.77 Therefore, even if the move from the homage to the jury as a selecting body reflected a 
real change, jurors do not seem to have used this new responsibility to monopolise these roles. 
Tasters were also selected via a free method, but the way this operated worked differently across all 
three manors. At Horstead, two tasters were chosen to serve annually from 1395 until the end of 
regular selection in 1491. The aim seems to have been to spread the office as widely as possible. Of 
the 138 individuals recorded, 117 (85%) only served once, whilst a further 16 (12%) served twice 
and 5 (4%) served three times. Figure 2.3 displays this information in terms of selections, with the 
overwhelming majority of services performed by the group who only served once.78 This was also 
the pattern seen in the selection of tasters at Worfield from 1409 to 1599, where of the 240 
individuals recorded, 215 (90%) served once, 23 (10%) served twice and one person served three 




                                                          
74 SAC, 2028/1/5/8 
75 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.25, 22 Sep 1410; C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434. 
76 See p. 169-71.  
77 SAC, P314/W/1/1/238-837; CUL, EDR, D10/3, m.52, 1487-8; m.55, 1488-9; m.58, 1494-5; m.59, 1495-6. 
78 KCA, HOR/26-41. 
79 SAC, P314/W/1/1/238-837. 
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Figure 2.3 – Proportion of total selections to tastership by number of times selected at 
Horstead and Worfield post 1409 
 
N Horstead = 164, N Worfield post-1409 = 268. Sources:  KCA, HOR/26-41; SAC, P314/W/1/1/238-837. 
 
However, pre-1409 the method of selection at Worfield was different. Tasters often served for long 
terms when chosen, meaning that only 50 individuals are recorded as serving between 1328 and 
1405.80 These men served in continuous blocks. For instance, Roger Hitchcocks and William 
Huggen served 1362-8 and it is probable that Adam Swancote and William Heyne did 1328-36.81 
This system of selection for multiple years is seen throughout the period 1311-1502 at Downham, 
again giving a continuously more concentrated office. Whilst selections are, unfortunately, poorly 
recorded, the evidence of tasters’ names provided by annual fines can provide a picture of who 
                                                          
80 SAC, P314/W/1/1/5-233. 
81 SAC, P314/W/1/1/52-68; P314/W/1/1/5-19.  
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served in any year.82 This provides a different picture to that seen at the other two manors, with only 
27 (32%) of the 84 total individuals recorded in this office being fined once. A further 18 (21%) 
were fined twice, 26 (31%) were fined 3-5 times, 12 (14%) were fined 6-8 times and one individual 
was fined 11 times. These fines, moreover, speak to continuous service in office, often being found 
year-on-year. For example, John Gysles’ 11 fines were divided between two near continuous sets of 
service, with 4 for 1409-14, and a further 8 for 1418-26.83 Similarly, Simon Cok served 1391-4 and 
1409-14, William Warren 1400-07, Geoffrey Garlek 1429-1440 and John Lovechild 1368-84.84 The 
office of ale taster reinforces the differences between Downham and the other two case-study 
manors, with the practice at Downham being to limit selection to a small group of individuals, 
whilst at Horstead, and Worfield after 1409, the practice was to spread office as widely as possible.  
Shifting attention to officials instituted by bylaws, a different pattern might be expected. Such 
officers were more focused on tenants’ requirements rather than that of the lord, and thus may have 
been subject to more inclusive selection practices. At Horstead, pig reeves were selected twice, for 
1595 and 1596, in the rolls examined.85 On the first occasion, they were chosen by the capital 
pledges and on the second by the jury baron, suggesting a limited franchise, although as already 
noted this cannot be seen elsewhere to have led to greater concentration in office. Different 
individuals were chosen at each selection.  
At Downham, fenreeves’ selections are only recorded 19 times across the whole period examined, 
with the only successive occasions being for 1484-5.86 The lack of recorded selections is 
undoubtedly in part due to record survival, but also reflects the fact that selections were likely on a 
requirement rather than an annual basis, and the evidence of fenreeves incidentally named in the 
rolls suggests long periods of service. For instance, John Duxham and Simon Jennys occupied this 
                                                          
82 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10.  
83 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4-6.  
84 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2-3, C11/2/4-6. 
85 KCA, HOR/54, m.1, 26 Mar 1595; m.2, 24 Mar 1596.  
86 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.8, 29 Apr 1326; C11/1/2, m.11, 16 Mar 1362; C11/1/2, m.22, 27 Jun 1373; 
C11/2/4, m.4, 29 Sep 1400; C11/2/6, m.16, 12 Jul 1429; C11/3/7, m.10, 21 May 1466; C11/3/7, m.15, 17 May 
1469; C11/3/8, m.2, 2 Jun 1484; C11/3/8, m.4, 18 May 1485; C11/3/10, m.9, 14 Sep 1494; C11/3/10, m.21, 4 
Apr 1506; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 10 Oct 1556; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 5 Mar 1558; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 24 
Mar 1574; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 24 Mar 1575; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 8 Oct 1579.  
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office throughout the late 1440s and much of the 1450s, suggesting they may have served 
consistently across this period for which few selections are recorded.87 Of the 13 cases where a 
selecting body is given, the jurors baron or capital pledges are described as choosing the officers all 
but once, when in 1400 the fenreeves were chosen by the homage.88 This suggests the formal 
franchise selecting these officers was not different to that choosing reeves and messors. However, 
an element of geographical representativeness was recorded in selections in 1466-85, at which 
separate fenreeves, or pairs of fenreeves, were chosen for Downham and Downhamhythe.89 These 
locative identifiers may only have referred to the zones for which each fenreeve was responsible, 
although it is possible that individuals were chosen from each settlement to fulfil this role.  
The record of 35 selections of bylawman for 1311-1414 provides a more stable basis for analysis of 
a community-focused office.90 Of the 19 occasions where a selecting body is given, in every 
instance bar the 1406 selection, the choice was made by the homage or whole homage, a pattern 
identical to the choice of reeves and messors before the transition to jury selection.91 Bylawmen 
were selected relatively frequently, and on an annual basis from 1385-1414. An examination of the 
87 individuals recorded as bylamen reveals a similar pattern of concentration in the hands of a few 
frequently serving individuals as Downham’s reeveship and messorship (figure 2.3). Whilst 77 
(89%) individuals were only selected once or twice, they represent less than half of all recorded 
slots (47%). A further group of 13 individuals (15%) who served 3-6 times make up 40% of slots, 
whilst John Rote, who served 9 times, made up 5% of slots alone. Again, this pattern was largely 
the result of repeated selections of the same individuals to office. John Rote was selected in 9 of 15 
selections for 1398-1414, and William Scut was chosen in 8 of 16 selections for 1376-1402.92 
Changes in the number of bylawmen operative also concentrated the office. Whilst between 1311 
and 1328, 8-12 bylawmen were chosen in selections, preventing extreme concentration, from 1334 
                                                          
87 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, C11/3/7.  
88 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.4, 29 Sep 1400.  
89 CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.10, 21 May 1466; C11/3/7, m.15, 17 May 1469; C11/3/8, m.1, 2 Jun 1484; 
C11/3/8, m.3, 18 May 1485.  
90 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-5. 
91 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.16, 15 Jun 1406.  
92 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, C11/2/4-5.  
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onwards this dropped to 2-6 bylawmen.93 In 1402, the whole jury were named as bylawmen, 
increasing the number to 12 but this was not a permanent change.94 
 
Figure 2.4 – Proportion of total selections to bylawman by number of times selected at Little 
Downham 
 
N = 180. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-5. 
 
An examination of selected officials suggests that local cultures of officeholding, rather than 
differences in the mechanisms of selection, or whether an officer more obviously served lord or 
tenants, determined how far office was concentrated in the hands of a few. Even though the 
beadleship at Worfield was rotational, this did not stop a process of engrossment and deputisation to 
subtenants concentrating service in this office, and moreover ensuring some individuals served 
                                                          
93 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-5. 
94 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.7, 25 Jul 1402.  
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more frequently than others. However, this pattern more likely reflects accidents of changing land 
tenure, rather than any sort of deliberate oligarchy. Selection by tenants had strikingly different 
effects between manors. Whilst at Worfield and Horstead, office was widely distributed among the 
candidate pool, at Downham office was disproportionately held by some individuals from the 
candidate pool over others. Changes in the nomenclature of those choosing officers had no obvious 
effect, suggesting that patterns of selection were deep-rooted, with no visible attempt to tighten 
officeholding seen at any point at either Downham or Worfield. Similarly, patterns were 
independent of whether any officer was a seignorial or community servant, with Downham’s 
bylawmen and fenreeves seeing the same pattern of concentration as its reeves, messors and tasters. 
The limited evidence for Downham shows that being chosen as reeve and messor was formally 
contingent upon being a half-virgater or full-virgater, although that within this group there were 
clear divisions in the ability to serve. Downham appears as the most oligarchical manor, with 
Worfield and Horstead seeing office more widely distributed among the pool of candidates, even if 
in the former case the beadleship was significantly more restricted. 
Impanelled Officials  
As argued in chapter one, impanelled officials’ role gave them significant power within the manor, 
through their ability to influence what offences they reported.95 Therefore, understanding how far 
jury service was monopolised, and how this changed over time, is vital in considering how far 
manorial offices display elements of oligarchy seen in the early modern period. Unfortunately, 
contemporary sources are reticent about how jurors were chosen.96 Larson has found some evidence 
of jury elections for late medieval Durham manors, but states that these were likely atypical 
responses to periods of crisis.97 It is clear that officers were impanelled in the session preceding that 
when they would present, so they could hear the set of articles to which they would respond and 
swear to report honestly, a system revealed in punishments for jurors not being present to hear the 
charge.98 In 1437 Nicholas Charles was punished as a capital pledge ‘of the last leet’, who did not 
                                                          
95 See pp. 31-3. 
96 Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’, 228 n.138; Mulholland, ‘The Jury’, 68.  
97 Larson, ‘Village Voice’, 685-6, n.33.  
98 See pp. 28-9; Beckerman, ‘Procedural Innovation’, 228-9. 
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come to render his verdict and had not done his perambulation, suggesting he had been selected in 
the previous session but then had failed to perform his role in the intervening term.99 An earlier case 
saw a capital pledge not coming with his fellows to render his verdict on the day fixed beforehand, 
again suggesting a system of empanelling officers for a specified future session.100 Contemporary 
guidance literature supports this interpretation. In the St Albans Modus Tenendi Curias, the first 
charge ordered the ‘presenters’ at the court leet to return ‘whether the presenters be all here as they 
should be’, suggesting a designated group was operative prior to the session.101  
This system of empanelment raises questions concerning the frequent delay of presentments that led 
to jurors and capital pledges asking to have until the next session to respond to a charge. If a new 
jury was impanelled each session, there must have been ways to ensure continuity of information 
between panels. Partly this was possible because whilst the entire set of jurors was not usually the 
same between sessions, many individuals did serve session-after-session meaning there was a core 
of continuous jurors. Sometimes jurors from a previous session presented specific cases even if they 
were not a member of the jury in the current session. Thus in 1477, Richard Billingsley, a juror of 
the previous leet, incurred a pain of 20d for not coming with his fellows to render a verdict 
verifying the presentment made by two vills, as they had been ordered in the last leet when they had 
made their presentments.102 Therefore, jurors may have had a role in making presentments in courts 
even where they are not mentioned in the jury list, suggesting a continuity in office that went 
beyond a single session. At Horstead, and less consistently Downham, for capital pledges this 
became the norm through the development of ‘residual’ leets, where the court baron session directly 
following the annual leet would include presentments made by capital pledges which they had not 
been able to present in the preceding ‘full’ leet. Whilst occasionally a second list of capital pledges 
would be given, on most occasions the rolls refer to capital pledges as those of the previous leet, 
suggesting a panel serving over two consecutive sessions.103  
                                                          
99 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1437.  
100 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 14 Sep 1424.  
101 Bailey, English Manor, 223. 
102 SAC, P314/W/1/1/384, 10 Apr 1477; P314/W/1/1/387, 7 Oct 1477.  
103 See, among many examples, KCA, HOR/32, unfoliated, 10 Aug 1405; HOR/37, unfoliated, 9 Sep 1427.  
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Thus, limited evidence suggests that impanelled officers were drawn from a distinct group. 
Continuity in the role played by jurors suggests an identity which stretched beyond any individual 
session. Unfortunately, details about what allowed one to be within this group are non-existent, with 
no explicit statements about property qualifications or locations from which they could be drawn. 
The only visible criterion is gender, with no women ever impanelled, mirroring their exclusion from 
juries in royal courts.104 
However, that impanelled officials were listed at the head of most sessions, combined with the fact 
that typically at least 12 were chosen per session means that they can be analysed statistically, in a 
way sensitive to change over time. Such an approach allows for an understanding of how far 
membership of panels was limited to a small coterie of individuals within relatively distinct 
chronological periods. It is important to remember that membership of a panel cannot be directly 
equated with influence, and that care is advisable in light of the absence of information about juries’ 
internal deliberations. For example, if juries had to unanimously approve presentments, each juror 
could potentially have significantly more authority than if only a majority was required, which 
would allow a smaller group to potentially dominate the body.105 Even in an unanimous system, 
some individuals may have been better respected due to age or longevity of service, or were able to 
exert social or cultural capital to ensure their fellow jurors supported their opinions. If jurors did use 
written materials, as discussed above, this may have favoured more literate officials.106  However, 
qualitative evidence emphasising that jurors were to keep their deliberations secret at least suggests 
the capacity of those outside panels to influence them was severely circumscribed.107 In 1500, two 
Downham men were amerced for eavesdropping on the jury, showing that this privacy from outside 
influence was monitored.108 Therefore, measuring the changing participation of individuals in juries 
                                                          
104 J. Masschaele, Jury, State and Society in Medieval England, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 128-
131.  
105 Mulholland suggests juries had to be unanimous in their verdicts but appears to suggest presentment and 
trial as two functions of the same jury body rather than functions performed by separate bodies as seen in the 
manor courts explored here: Mulholland, ‘The Jury’, 68, 70-2.  
106 See p. 30. 
107 See p. 177. 
108 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, m.15, 14 Jul 1500.  
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provides a good proxy to the capacity to influence these panels, even if this influence was likely 
unequal between individuals.  
Table 2.3 summarises for capital pledges at Horstead and Downham, and jurors leet at Worfield, the 
information available per decade about these offices. For the former two manors, typically, one full 
leet occurred per year in which a set of capital pledges were named. Sometimes a second list is also 
given for the following residual leet, these have been included in the analysis, as have lists which 
combine juries baron and capital pledges together. Thus at both manors, a full decade should 
include around 10 lists although sometimes a decade might exceed this due to the difference 
between the modern year and Michaelmas-to-Michaelmas year. Leets at Worfield were biannual, 
and a new jury was empanelled and listed for each leet. This meant that opportunities to serve were 
significantly higher than at the other manors, and that a full decade should include 20 lists. The 
completeness of information varies between manors. Whilst generally 70% or more of lists survive 
for Horstead (7 lists or greater per year) and Worfield after the 1370s (14 lists or greater per year), 
at Downham a combination of record survival deficiencies and a period when lists were not 
recorded, means that only 5 decades contain 7 or more lists.  
Table 2.4 summarises the information provided by jury baron lists at all three manors. 
Generalisations about what a complete set of lists should be for a decade are harder to make. 
Changing numbers of lists are informed not only by gaps in the roll series, but also by genuine 
differences in number of sessions per year (figures 0.1-0.3). However, broadly the information is 
more complete, with no systematic period of poor recording like that seen for Downham’s capital 
pledges. For both tables, the number of slots refers to the opportunities to serve in any decade, taken 
by combining all the lists together, whilst the ratio expresses the relationship between this and the 




Table 2.3 - Capital pledge and juror leet lists and numbers 
 
Ratios standardised out of 100 so if a different individual appeared in every different slot, the ratio would equal 100. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11; KCA, HOR/26-41, 
HOR/45, HOR/48-54, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-840. 






































out of 100 
1310s 5 64 25 39.06 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1320s 5 60 15 25 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 24 19 79.17 
1330s 4 48 17 35.42 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1340s N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 23 22 95.65 
1350s N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 37 23 62.16 
1360s 7 80 15 18.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1370s 4 48 15 31.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 48 20 41. 67 
1380s 1 12 12 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A 19 228 30 13.16 
1390s N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 48 15 31.25 15 180 31 17.22 
1400s N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 114 29 25.44 14 169 31 18.34 
1410s 1 12 12 100 8 96 22 22.92 15 180 31 17.22 
1420s 1 12 12 100 9 110 22 20 19 228 35 15.35 
1430s N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 81 28 34.57 20 240 38 15.83 
1440s 3 21 13 61.90 9 106 29 27.36 21 252 43 17.06 
1450s 2 21 12 57.14 9 109 27 24.77 18 215 40 18.60 
1460s 10 120 20 16.67 10 112 22 19.64 12 143 29 20.28 
1470s 4 41 14 34.15 11 134 24 17.91 13 155 39 25.16 
1480s 4 48 18 37.5 10 119 23 19.33 19 228 41 17.98 
1490s 9 108 19 17.59 5 61 14 22.95 19 236 53 22.46 
1500s 7 85 19 22.35 N/A N/A N/A N/A 14 178 57 32.02 
1510s N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 106 26 24.53 15 198 64 32.32 
1520s N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 102 27 26.47 20 275 64 23.27 
1530s N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 132 32 24.24 14 187 57 30.48 
1540s N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 115 28 24.35 6 83 49 59.04 
1550s 6 77 29 37.66 9 105 19 18.1 10 138 52 37.68 
1560s 5 62 35 56.45 5 59 27 45.76 14 186 52 27.96 
1570s 11 147 45 30.61 11 135 18 13.33 20 283 61 21.55 
1580s 3 40 19 47.5 7 68 22 32.35 17 244 59 24.18 





Table 2.4 – Juror baron lists and numbers 
 
 
Ratios standardised out of 100 so if a different individual appeared in every different slot, the ratio would equal 100. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/2-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11; KCA, HOR/26-41, 
HOR/45, HOR/48-54, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/186-837. 
  

































out of 100 
1360s 24 287 26 9.06 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1370s 16 187 30 16.04 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1380s 23 265 38 14.34 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1390s 22 252 31 12.30 3 39 23 58.97 31 368 57 15.49 
1400s 26 298 26 8.72 N/A N/A N/A N/A 37 443 51 11.51 
1410s 23 246 26 10.57 19 221 54 24.43 52 623 49 7.87 
1420s 16 191 22 11.52 22 260 44 16.92 35 408 46 11.27 
1430s 14 153 39 25.49 20 233 47 20.17 34 408 43 10.54 
1440s 12 131 40 30.53 15 182 48 26.37 32 384 47 12.24 
1450s 8 91 35 38.46 20 236 50 21.19 35 434 60 13.82 
1460s 16 190 43 22.63 29 344 45 13.08 28 336 52 15.48 
1470s 10 108 32 29.63 38 448 62 13.84 29 345 52 15.07 
1480s 11 134 32 23.88 28 333 51 15.32 41 490 56 11.43 
1490s 11 141 36 25.53 11 124 29 23.39 29 334 64 19.16 
1500s 13 154 40 25.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A 33 384 49 12.76 
1510s N/A N/A N/A N/A 20 219 43 19.63 49 592 56 9.46 
1520s N/A N/A N/A N/A 18 185 39 21.08 43 519 54 10.40 
1530s N/A N/A N/A N/A 22 297 47 15.82 58 700 57 8.14 
1540s N/A N/A N/A N/A 11 128 29 22.66 24 292 69 23.63 
1550s 9 112 45 40.18 8 83 21 25.30 48 577 61 10.57 
1560s 8 101 37 36.63 4 48 21 43.75 83 993 61 6.14 
1570s 15 192 58 30.21 7 80 32 40 102 1225 67 5.47 
1580s 7 74 28 37.84 4 48 24 50 81 957 62 6.48 
1590s N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 163 31 19.02 76 911 56 6.15 
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Analysis of this material reveals two contrasting chronological trends. The first, seen at Downham 
and Worfield, was an increase over the 300 years studied in the number of individuals involved in 
impanelled office. This is most prevalent at Downham, where serving both as a capital pledge and 
juror baron became more open, although the changes occurred at different times. For jurors baron, 
up to the 1420s, a range of 22-38 individuals served in c.24 lists per decade. From the 1430s 
onwards, however, numbers of individuals grew to a range of 32-43, even though the number of 
lists declined to c.12 per decade, a change that was the product of a real decline in sessions as well 
issues of record survival. The later sixteenth century decades show a similar pattern of high 
numbers of individuals to fewer lists (table 2.4). Increased participation in the capital pledge lists 
occurred later, with a relatively static range of 14-20 individuals serving per decade up to 1508.  
However, 1552-82 saw a greater range of 29-45 pledges per decade, suggesting a drastic change 
had occurred across the early sixteenth century (table 2.3).  
For Worfield, an increase occurred in terms of the jury leet. The 1490s was the key tipping point, 
whilst previously a range of 30-43 individuals served a decade, for the 1490s to 1590s this grew to 
49-64 (table 2.4). Contrarywise, the number of individuals serving in Worfield’s jury baron 
remained relatively static. There was a small increase in the later sixteenth century but this was 
caused by an increasing number of sessions driving more lists per decade rather than greater 
dispersal of service.  
Horstead, conversely, saw an overall decrease in the numbers of individuals impanelled. This is not 
true for capital pledges, for which the picture is generally static, ranging 20-29, and only falling 
significantly below this number for decades with 5 or fewer lists (table 2.3). Whilst there is 
fluctuation, no discernible trend towards either more dispersion or concentration of office among 
individuals is visible. However for jurors baron a clear decline can be seen. For the 1410s-1530s the 
number of individual jurors per decade ranged around 29-47, excepting the 1470s when 62 
individuals served in an atypically high 38 lists. From the 1540s, however, the number of 
individuals fell to a range of 21-31 (table 2.4). Therefore, during the period in which impanelled 
office at Worfield and Downham was involving more individuals, at Horstead it was becoming 
concentrated on a smaller group of men. This was correlated with a decrease in the number of lists, 
which fell from a mean of c.20 for the 1410s-1530s to c.10 for the 1540s-1590s. However, as this 
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reduction in lists was also true for Downham, where the numbers involved as jurors baron 
increased, this relationship cannot be seen as inevitable. 
The effects of these increases and reductions in individuals can be seen by exploring the distribution 
of service among empanelled offices in any given decade. Figure 2.5 examines the number of 
individuals in any decade who are named in below and above half of surviving lists of capital 
pledges or jurors leet, for all decades for which 40% or more lists survive. For decades with odd 
numbers of lists, the number of individuals in the middle category were distributed equally between 
both sections. Figure 2.6 shows the same information for juries baron. Both graphs highlight that 
increased numbers of individuals reduced the size of the group that appeared in a majority of lists 
and so could have a sustained influence over jury decisions. This is particularly noticeable for 
Downham in both offices. Whilst pre-1508, the majority of individuals serving as capital pledges at 
this manor appear in more than 50% of lists in nearly all decades, in the later sixteenth century, only 
a minority do so (figure 2.5). The change in jurors baron is similar, whilst from the 1360s to 1420s, 
individuals serving in more than 50% of lists were either in the majority or a significant minority, 
from the 1430s onwards this number was only a small minority (figure 2.6). At Worfield, the 
increases were less significant. Even before the 1490s, most individuals only appear in a minority of 
lists as jurors leet per decade, so the increase just reduced this proportion even further (figure 2.5). 
For jurors baron, there is no change (figure 2.6). Thus, at Worfield the shift is more an extension of 
a pre-existing pattern of wide dispersion of service, rather than a transition from a relatively 
concentrated to a relatively dispersed system as at Downham. 
For Horstead, this transition occurred in reverse. The pattern for capital pledges for all decades 
studied remained largely similar to Downham’s pre-1508 pattern, if slightly less concentrated, with 
the majority, or at least a significant minority of individuals appearing in more than 50% of lists in 
any decade. There was no sixteenth-century transition to dispersion as at Downham. The jury baron 
trend saw increased concentration. Whilst before the sixteenth century Horstead looks similar to 
Worfield and post-1430s Downham, and actually had the smallest proportions in more than 50% of 
lists, this increased to about a quarter of individuals appearing in more than 50% of lists in a decade. 
This shift, however, predated the fall in numbers of individuals, with 18-26% of individuals serving 
in more than half of lists in the 1520s and 1530s, despite 39 and 47 individuals being listed in these 
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decades. Thus, over the period as a whole, a switch occurred. Whilst in the fourteenth century, 
Downham looks like it had the most oligarchical empanelled officials, with a significant core of 
officers being seen in a majority of lists, by the later sixteenth century these offices appear to be far 
more open, with few individuals having this kind of dominance. At Horstead, however, a fifteenth-
century contrast of a relatively dispersed set of jurors baron but concentrated set of capital pledges, 
was replaced by a pattern of concentration in both types of empanelled offices. Whilst Worfield did 
see a change, it is hard to argue for a new pattern, instead the sixteenth century saw an 
intensification of a dispersed trend present in the fourteenth century. 
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Figure 2.5 – Number of individual capital pledges and jurors leet by proportion of list appearances by decade 
 





Figure 2.6 – Number of individual jurors baron by proportion of list appearances by decade 
 






The drivers of these patterns can be revealed through exploring lists of empanelled officers by 
cohort. Figure 2.7 places each individual capital pledge and juror leet in a cohort based on when 
they first appeared in office, and then compares the number of new capital pledges and jurors leet in 
a decade with the number of total services this cohort collectively performed. Figure 2.8 organises 
jurors baron in the same way. This data must be treated with caution; breaks in the roll series are 
significant, with over-enumeration of the size of cohorts in the first decade after a gap, as 
individuals who may have begun service in previous decades are clumped together, and under-
enumeration of total services performed in the last decades recorded before a gap, as later services 
by jurors go unrecorded. However, utilised with caution and focusing on the central decades of 
well-recorded periods, this method allows exploration of the balance between changing numbers of 
new officers and the total number of times they would serve.  
Such a pattern reveals that at Horstead, the decreasing number of those serving as jurors baron per 
decade was correlated with the fewer opportunities to serve in the later sixteenth century. Thus, as 
the total services performed by each cohort shrank from the 1520s onwards, so too did the number 
of new jurors (figure 2.8). Similarly, the number of new capital pledges at the Norfolk manor 
moved in line with the total services they performed, increasing in the 1510s and 1560s in tandem 
(figure 2.7). Partly, this pattern is explained by a greater intermixing of juries and business, 
meaning that capital pledges often presented baron business in the leet and residual leet, and thus 
that there were few opportunities for people to serve as jurors baron. However, that this change did 
not increase the participation rates of capital pledges means that there was a real decrease in 
participation in empanelled office as a whole. Therefore, the pattern suggests that at Horstead, as 
opportunities to serve in empanelled office grew smaller, this concentrated service on a small, and 
increasingly more dominant, group.  
Downham’s opposite trend can be explained by a different relationship between cohort numbers 
and services. As figure 2.8 demonstrates, from the 1430s onwards the size of cohorts of jurors baron 
grew even as the total number of services they performed remained at the same level as the 1400s 
onwards. These cohort sizes grew even more for 1552-82, whilst the number of services remained 
static. A similar pattern can be seen in the manor’s capital pledge cohorts. Whilst the size of cohorts 
had declined in line with decreased numbers of services in the fifteenth century, in the 1552-82 
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period, cohorts grew and remained high even as the numbers of services they performed remained 
similar to the preceding period (figure 2.7). The same trend can be seen in Worfield’s jurors leet for 
the 1490s onwards, where cohort sizes grew even as the services they performed remained similar 
or slightly declined (figure 2.7). Therefore, a change had occurred on both manors. As opportunities 
to serve remained static or even declined, the number of individuals serving grew, meaning that on 
average each individual was serving fewer times, a pattern that likely, in aggregate, lessened the 
potential influence of each individual serving in office. A man beginning empanelled service in the 
sixteenth century could overall expect to perform less work than his predecessors of the fourteenth 
and early fifteenth centuries. The same pattern did not occur for Worfield’s jurors baron (figure 
2.8). Even as the numbers of services each cohort performed increased in the 1540s, 1560s and 
1570s, the numbers of new officers did not increase greatly beyond fifteenth-century levels. Thus, 
these officers saw on average their number of services increase in the late sixteenth century, unlike 







Figure 2.7 – Number of New Capital Pledges and Jurors Leet compared to total services they performed by cohort 
 
Cohort study where every juror is assigned to a decade of first appearance. N Horstead capital pledges = 256, N Horstead services = 2049; N Little Downham capital pledges = 
239, N Little Downham services = 1132. N Worfield jurors leet = 573, N Worfield services = 4578. Sources: KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54, COL/376; CUL, EDR, 
C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-840. 
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Figure 2.8 – Number of New Jurors Baron compared to total services they performed by cohort 
 
Cohort study where every capital pledge is assigned to a decade of first appearance.  N Little Downham jurors = 343, N Little Downham services = 3365; N Horstead jurors = 420, 
N Horstead services = 3666; N Worfield jurors = 581, N Worfield services = 11435. Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/2-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11; KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, 
HOR/48-54, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/186-837.  
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Trends in the numbers of those serving in empanelled office reveals a difference between Downham 
and Worfield on the one hand, and Horstead on the other. However, further analysis of the careers 
of individual officers highlights a distinction between Downham and Horstead as opposed to 
Worfield. At the latter manor, individuals seem to have been both empanelled and not empanelled 
at various points across their careers as jurors leet, suggesting a very ‘permeable’ form of 
officeholding, and a relatively large group of potential officers. This contrasts with the picture seen 
at Downham and Horstead, where the status of capital pledge seems to have been relatively 
distinctive, in that individuals tended to serve session-on-session from beginning to end of their 
careers. This is demonstrated in table 2.5, which reconstructs a service rate for capital pledges and 
jurors leet, by comparing the number of times they served in their career with the potential number 
of times they could have served in the surviving lists, for all individuals who served more than 
once.109 The results reveal that most capital pledges at Downham and Horstead served near-
continuously, with more than two thirds of capital pledges present in above 80% of lists at both 
manors. By contrast only around a sixth of Worfield’s jurors leet were present in more than 80% of 










                                                          
109 The same methodology is used by Larson, ‘Village Voice’, Table 3, 694.  
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Table 2.5 – Rate of services of capital pledges and jurors leet 
 
Horstead Little Downham Worfield 




















0-<10 0 0 0 0 4 1.1 
10-<20 2 1.1 0 0 19 5.3 
20-<30 3 1.6 4 2.7 56 15.7 
30-<40 8 4.4 5 3.4 60 16.8 
40-<50 5 2.7 10 6.8 57 16 
50-<60 10 5.5 6 4.1 42 11.8 
60-<70 13 7.1 15 10.2 37 10.4 
70-<80 16 8.7 8 5.4 24 6.7 
80-<90 36 19.7 13 8.8 16 4.5 
90-<100 26 14.2 12 8.2 9 2.5 
100 64 35 74 50.3 33 9.2 
Total 183  147  357  
 
Rate of service calculated by dividing number of lists an individual served in by the number of lists existing between an 
individual’s first and last appearance. Individuals who served once are excluded. Sources: KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, 
HOR/48-54, COL/376; CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/3/7-11; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-837. 
 
The underlying cause of this was likely linked to the legacy of the capital pledge system as different 
to that of jurors leet. Whilst previous analysis has tended to equate these two offices, whose roles in 
the court were functionally the same, there are clear differences between the two bodies. Whilst a 
virtually free choice seems to have guided the selection of jurors leet at Worfield, capital pledges 
were part of the tithing system. This pre-existing system of law enforcement placed all males over 
twelve into groups of ten who were then collectively responsible for ensuring their members obeyed 
the law. The law-enforcement and surety aspect of this system was in abeyance in the late middle 
ages, but collective tithing payments were still being made and men were still being sworn into 
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tithings.110 Capital pledges were the heads of tithings, who had traditionally represented the other 
nine men in legal assemblies, and this system informed the way views of frankpledge had originally 
been set up.111 Thus the twelve capital pledges in any session should theoretically have been drawn 
from this subset of tithing heads.112 The qualitative evidence for this varies between Horstead and 
Downham. At the former, there is no indication that a system of tithing heads was being maintained 
from which this panel would be drawn. In fact, the distinction between this group and the jury baron 
began to disappear. In 1472, 1482 and 1484 the two juries were elided into one panel. This became 
the norm in leets from 1539 onwards, recognising the breakdown in the division between functions 
performed by both offices.113  
At Downham, the system appears to have been maintained more rigidly. For the period 1379 to 
1446, lists of capital pledges are rarely given in the rolls. However, the capital pledges are 
frequently described with the formula ‘whose names are put in the tithing rolls’, suggesting that this 
system of documents was still operational, meaning there was no need to record these officials in 
the court roll.114 It also suggests that those serving were formally capital pledges and thus a select, 
collective, group. By 1553, however, this system seems to have been breaking down, with a single 
list entitled ‘capital pledges and homage’ given instead of separate lists for each of these panels, a 
combination also seen in 1570 and 1579.115 A further change occurred from 1574 onwards, when 
the term capital pledge was replaced by ‘capital pledges and jury for the lady queen’, and from 1575 
onwards just ‘the jury for the lady queen’ suggesting an end date for the tithing system determining 
jury selection.116  
                                                          
110 P.R. Schofield, The Late Medieval View of Frankpledge and the Tithing System: An Essex Case Study’, in 
Z. Razi and R.M. Smith (eds.), Medieval Society and the Manor Court, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 408-449, 
408-9, 426-7; Schofield, Peasant and Community, 167.   
111 Schofield, ‘Late Medieval View’, 408; Bailey, English Manor¸178-9.  
112 L.R. Poos, ‘The Rural Population of Essex in the Later Middle Ages’, EcHR, 38, (1985), 515-30, 518-9.  
113 KCA, HOR/39, m.26, 4 Aug 1472; HOR/39, m.42, 11 Jun 1482; HOR/40, m.2, 3 Aug 1484; HOR/48-54, 
COL/376.  
114 See, among many examples, CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.14, 19 Dec 1385; C11/2/5, m.3, 7 Dec 1414. 
115 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, unfoliated, c.1553; C11/3/11, unfoliated 12 Apr 1570; C11/3/11, unfoliated, 21 Sep 
1579.  
116 CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 24 Mar 1574; C11/3/11.  
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The only direct evidence of the selection of any impanelled officer is for September 1465 at 
Downham when, on the day of the court, Richard Whitepayn was described as chosen and sworn as 
capital pledge in the place of Richard Cok.117 Richard Cok’s last appearance was as a capital pledge 
in the previous leet and he was deceased by April 1465.118 Thus possibly being a capital pledge was 
confined to a small group with positions only emerging upon the death of an officer, with another 
man from his tithing taking his place. Certainly, capital pledges at Downham appear to have been 
able to act as a collective, in a way that would seem difficult for a more disparate impanelled group. 
This is revealed in an arrangement of 1447, in which the twelve capital pledges, and those who 
would be capital pledges in future, collectively rented a watercourse from the lord for an annual rent 
of 12d, along with an agreement to clean and maintain this, a responsibility leading to a bylaw of 
1451 preventing obstruction of the channel.119 This lease presupposes significant longevity, 
suggesting a collective identity for capital pledges that existed beyond the panels given at the 
heading of any court. 
The combination of qualitative evidence with that of statistical rates reveals that when an individual 
became a capital pledge, he served near-continuously until he ‘retired’. Entry was presumably only 
possible when a previous pledge was removed.  As table 2.6 reveals, this trend towards 
impermeability was not true of Downham and Horstead’s jurors baron, where the distribution was 
skewed towards a 30-80% rate, giving a far more open form of officeholding. However, again 
Worfield’s empanelled officeholding looks to have been far more permeable, with fewer than 12% 
of individuals serving as jurors baron at a rate of more than 60%. Differences in permeability 
between all types of empanelled office occurred in a relatively similar context of career lengths 
(table 2.7). At all manors, there were a large number of individuals who only appeared once 
suggesting they were potentially stand-ins or lacked the ability to translate candidacy as an official 
into long careers in office. Other men served over remarkably long spans, with a few examples of 
over 40 years, and thus presumably the vast majority of these individuals’ adult lives. The impact of 
life expectancy on ability to exert a long-term influence as an empanelled official was probably 
                                                          
117 CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.8, 27 Sep 1465.  
118 CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.7, 16 May 1464; C11/3/7, m.9, 1 Apr 1465.  
119 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.39, 3 Jan 1447; C11/3/7, m.47, 9 Jun 1451.  
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paramount, with the similarity of career-length structures being due to similar age structures across 
the manors.  
Table 2.6 - Rate of services of jurors baron 




















0-<10 1 0.4 1 0.4 26 6.6 
10-<20 7 2.6 6 2.3 62 15.7 
20-<30 16 5.8 18 7 70 17.7 
30-<40 36 13.1 25 9.8 85 21.5 
40-<50 49 17.9 36 14.1 66 16.7 
50-<60 59 21.5 42 16.4 41 10.4 
60-<70 40 14.6 43 16.8 20 5.1 
70-<80 23 8.4 28 10.9 11 2.8 
80-<90 14 5.1 18 7 2 0.5 
90-<100 1 0.4 5 2 1 0.3 
100 28 10.2 34 13.3 10 2.5 
Total 274  256  394  
 
Rate of service calculated by dividing number of lists an individual served in by the number of lists existing between an 
individual’s first and last appearance. Individuals who served once are excluded. Sources: KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, 




Table 2.7 - Length of services of capital pledges, leet jurors and jurors baron 
 
Length of service calculated by difference between first and last appearance in list. Ignores period of poor capital pledge list recording at Downham. Sources: KCA, HOR/26-41, 






















































73 28.5 142 34.5 51 26 82 23.9 198 35.7 178 31.2 
1-<5 46 18 91 22.1 63 32.1 89 25.9 98 17.7 98 17.2 
5-<10 49 19.1 54 13.1 28 14.3 44 12.8 57 10.3 78 13.7 
10-<15 19 7.4 34 8.3 12 6.1 37 10.8 48 8.6 40 7 
15-<20 17 6.6 25 6.1 22 11.2 29 8.5 39 7 38 6.7 
20-<25 17 6.6 17 4.1 9 4.6 19 5.5 36 6.5 42 7.4 
25-<30 15 5.9 21 5.1 9 4.6 13 3.8 33 5.9 35 6.1 
30-<35 10 3.9 11 2.7 0 0 8 2.3 21 3.8 27 4.7 
35-<40 3 1.2 2 0.5 3 1.5 11 3.2 12 2.2 15 2.6 
40-<45 3 1.2 9 2.2 0 0 4 1.2 7 1.3 11 1.9 
45-<50 4 1.6 3 0.7 0 0 1 0.3 4 0.7 5 0.9 
50-<55 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 1 0.3 0 0 1 0.2 
55-<60 0 0 1 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 1 0.2 
60-<65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 1 0.2 
Total 256  412  197  338  555  570  
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Overall, the examination of empanelled officers reveals both expected and unexpected trends. The 
permeability of juror leet and baron service at Worfield matches the dispersed pattern seen for 
Worfield’s reeves and tasters. In both cases, officeholding was spread among a group of candidates 
who did not serve continuously in office. Similarly, the rigidity for Downham in capital pledge 
service matches the continuous and concentrated service seen for the manor’s selected offices. 
Horstead is less correlated, with the continuous service of capital pledges similar to Downham, 
contrasting with a dispersed pattern of service by tasters, although as this was the only selected 
office at the manor the picture of concentration provided by pledges is more significant. The more 
surprising finding is the changes over time seen across the manors. Horstead’s pattern towards 
greater concentration as opportunities to serve decreased in the sixteenth century is more expected, 
less service allowing a smaller group to have more dominance. However, that at Worfield, and 
especially Downham, more men were on aggregate performing less work each by the later sixteenth 
century certainly cannot support a picture of greater oligarchy on the early modern manor. This 
process, moreover, had deep roots at Downham, starting in the early fifteenth century. Therefore, 
across the 300 years examined, there seems to have been a move towards more participation in 
empanelled office. 
Overall Pattern  
Investigations so far have focused on the internal patterns of service within specific types of office. 
However, individuals tended to serve across multiple offices simultaneously and engaging with the 
question of ‘oligarchy’ means exploring the size of this whole group over time. Figure 2.9 presents 
the total number of individuals named as serving in any office in a year for all periods for which 
four or more consecutive years have at least one surviving session. This simple measure provides a 
general picture of the size of the officeholding class. The change between the period before the 
1390s at Worfield, and the 1410s at Horstead, and the following era, reflects different recording 
practices, with jury lists being regularly noted after this date, which alters the number of recorded 
officers in a year. Changes beyond this point reveal real differences in the number of individuals 
serving in office.  
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The trends at different manors largely match those seen in the examination of empanelled office, a 
fact unsurprising as panels provided the greatest opportunity to serve in a year due to their size and 
multiple lists per annum. Downham, in the 1360s-1430s had the most restricted set of officers, with 
most years seeing between 15 and 20 individuals serving. Worfield and Horstead were at higher 
levels, with the former manor seeing between 25 and 30 persons a year up to 1445 and Horstead, 
which fluctuated more widely, seeing anything between 20 to 40 persons up to 1494. By the end of 
the sixteenth century, these numbers had changed at all three manors. At Worfield, a sustained 
increase from 1435 to 1540 meant that the manor now saw between 35 and 45 individuals in office 
per year, a pattern maintained into the end of the sixteenth century. At Horstead, conversely, the 
officeholding body year-on-year decreased from 1510 onwards, a change that grew acute after 
1535, with numbers ranging between 15 and 25. Downham’s patchier record survival makes 
tracking later changes difficult, but by the 1460s the officeholding group had grown to a range of 
15-30, and then, for the later part of the sixteenth century, 20-30. This is despite a reduction in the 
number of different offices on the manor with the end of recorded selections for the reeve and 
messor (see table 0.2), again suggesting that more men were doing less work.  
Examining the number of new individuals per year nuances this trend (figure 2.9). The fact that 
nearly every recorded year saw at least some new blood in the officeholding class is indicative that 
office was never entirely closed off; an inevitable process when the number of offices, and 
especially jury positions remained constant, whilst demographic attrition was relatively high. Small 
increases can be seen at Downham and Worfield, and a converse decrease at Horstead, in line with 
the general trend in officers per year. However, despite the differences at all manors by the late 
sixteenth century in total officers, and particularly the increase in cohort size seen for empanelled 
officers for Downham and Worfield, the number of new individuals per year remains relatively 
stable. This speaks to a continuous but slow incorporation of new individuals into the officeholding 
group, which prevented them from displacing currently serving individuals. New individuals on 
average made up 13% of all the officers in a year at Downham and Horstead, and a slightly higher 
17% at Worfield, with this figure only exceeding 30% after periods of poor record survival. Thus 
whilst new individuals were a constant in officeholding, the ability for a collective new group to 
influence the officeholding structure was clearly very limited.  
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Figure 2.9 – Number of individuals serving across all offices per year (3 year moving average) 
 
Three-year moving averages calculated for all periods with four consecutive years with at least one session, with number for first court of any period excluded from measure of 
new individuals due to disproportionate number of new individuals. ‘New’ refers to any individuals not previously recorded as serving in manorial office. Sources: CUL, EDR, 





Changes in the size of the total group involved in officeholding reinforce the picture seen via 
examining empanelled officers. In absolute terms, both Worfield and Downham saw an increase in 
the number of individuals involved in officeholding, and on both occasions this began in the 
fifteenth century and levelled off by the late sixteenth century. At Horstead, conversely, the 
numbers declined from c.1480 onwards, and continued to fall until the end of the sixteenth century. 
This again follows trends seen in the manor’s jurors baron. The increases at Worfield and 
Downham were driven in part by a moderate growth in the number of ‘new’ persons acting as 
officers, matching the picture seen in the cohort studies. However, these new persons were 
seemingly only drip fed into officeholding, which, whether by accident or design, must have 
ensured a relatively stable set of experienced, and thus likely influential, officers served year-to-
year.  
Officeholding and Population 
Whilst data gathered from the court rolls alone can provide robust evidence for absolute changes in 
numbers involved in officeholding, these figures cannot alone explain these trends, or answer the 
question of how far manorial officeholding was oligarchical. This requires an understanding of the 
size of the community in which these officers acted, and how this changed over time. In national 
terms, the period of 1300-1600 saw drastic population change. The Black Death and subsequent 
outbreaks diminished a population of 3.9-5.25 million in c.1330 to c.2.8 million by the 1370s.120 
The fifteenth century unfortunately yields little demographic evidence, but was not a period of 
national change, with an estimate of c.2.3 million for the 1520s.121 The sixteenth century reversed 
these trends, with growth from c.2.8 million in 1541 to c.4.1 million by 1601.122 Within this 
                                                          
120 B.M.S. Campbell and K. Bartley, England on the Eve of the Black Death: an Atlas of Lay Lordship, Land 
and Wealth, 1300-49, (Manchester: Manchester Medieval Press, 2006), 329; M. Bailey ‘Demographic 
Decline in Late Medieval England: Some Thoughts on Recent Research’, EcHR, 49:1, (1996), 1-19, 1.  
121 Bailey, ‘Demographic Decline’, 1. 
122 Wrigley and Schofield, Population History, Table A3.1, 528. Recent new estimates for the medieval 
period by Broadberry et al. claim lower fourteenth-century figures but largely confirm the population trends: 
S. Broadberry, B.M.S. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen, British Economic Growth, 
1270-1870, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Table 1.06, 20.  
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changing demographic context, the question becomes how far the number of individuals involved in 
officeholding was responsive to changes in the population of the communities where they operated. 
Rather than using the general population estimates given in table 0.1, here an estimate of the 
number of adult males is made using the same sources (see appendix 2) and reproduced in table 2.8. 
The figure of adult males was arrived at as the best proxy for the total group that could potentially 
be officeholders. Children were clearly not suitable officeholders, and women were largely 
excluded from office. On the other hand, it is vital to remember that adult males and potential 
officers were not synonymous. Tenancy was the key criterion for officeholding, and these measures 
do not provide an accurate picture of this group. The units of taxpaying vill and parish used in these 
records applied to inhabitants, not manorial landholders. However, whilst non-tenant males were 
likely excluded from office, much of the work of officers, particularly through leets, affected the 
wider community, and therefore understanding how far an increase in males created an increase in 
individuals involved in officeholding is meaningful. 
Table 2.8 – Adult male population estimates 
 Little Downham Horstead Worfield 
Date 
Adult Male Population 
Estimate 
Adult Male Population 
Estimate 
Adult Male Population 
Estimate 
1327 133-177 N/A 257-342 
1377-9 56-61 55 N/A 
1524 105-142 28-38 116-156 
1563 114-120 N/A 191-201 
1603 N/A 46-60 N/A 
 
See appendix 2 for methodology and sources 
Table 2.9 calculates the mean numbers of individuals holding office per year for periods of 
relatively complete record survival close to population estimate years as a proportion of these 
estimates. Table 2.10 gives ratios comparing the number of individuals serving as capital pledges 
and jurors leet in a decade to the number of adult males. For Horstead, these numbers are adjusted 
by removing men who only served as Coltishall jurors, on the assumption that most of these men 
likely lived outside the vill and parish of Horstead and thus are not included in the population 
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estimates. This allows for the comparison of change in numbers serving and population estimates, 




Table 2.9 – Mean numbers of officers per year for select periods compared to reconstructed population estimates 
 
Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/3/10-11; KCA, HOR/33-35, HOR/37, HOR/45, HOR/53-54, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-4; P314/W/1/1/514-649; P314/W/1/1/725-799; 





























1327 1323-1334 12 6.78-9.02 N/A N/A N/A 1327 22 6.43-8.56 
1377-9 1373-1390 16 26.23-28.57 1412-1430 24 43.64 N/A N/A N/A 
1524 1491-1500 26 18.31-24.76 1515-1535 20 52.63-71.43 1514-1535 40 25.64-34.48 
1563 1569-1582 26 21.67-22.81 N/A N/A N/A 1559-1580 40 19.9-20.94 






Table 2.10 – Ratios of individuals serving as capital pledge, jurors leet and jurors baron per decade to reconstructed adult male populations 
 
 
All ratios have been standardised out of 100, thus if the total number of individuals serving in a decade was equal to the total adult male population the ratio would equal 100. Sources: CUL, EDR, 
C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4, C11/3/10-11; KCA, HOR/26-33, HOR/45-48, HOR/53-4, COL/376; SAC, P314/W/1/1/506-657, P314/W/1/1/672-797; table 2.9; appendix 2.




Ratio of capital 
pledges to adult 
males 
Ratio of jurors 
baron to adult 
males 
Ratio of capital 
pledges to adult 
males 
Ratio of jurors 
baron to adult 
males 
Ratio of jurors 
leet to adult 
males 
Ratio of jurors 




1310s 14.1-18.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1320s 8.5-11.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1330s 9.6-12.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1377-9 
 
1360s 24.6-26.8 42.6-46.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1370s 24.6-26.8 49.2-53.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1390s N/A N/A 27.3 41.8 N/A N/A 
1400s N/A N/A 52.7 N/A N/A N/A 
1410s N/A N/A 40 98.2 N/A N/A 
1524 
1500s 13.4-18.1 28.2-38.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1510s N/A N/A 68.4-92.9 113.2-153.6 41-55.2 35.9-48.3 
1520s N/A N/A 71.1-96.4 102.6-139.3 41-55.2 34.6-46.6 
1530s N/A N/A 84.2-114.3 123.7-167.9 36.5-49.1 36.5-49.1 
1563 
1550s 24.2-25.4 37.5-39.5 N/A N/A 25.9-27.2 30.3-31.9 
1560s 29.2-30.7 30.8-32.5 N/A N/A 25.9-27.2 30.3-31.9 
1570s 35-36.8 48.3-50.9 N/A N/A 30.3-31.9 33.3-35.1 
1603 1590s N/A N/A 48.3-63 51.7-67.4 N/A N/A 
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Analysis of the admittedly incomplete data suggests three distinct phases of change in the 
relationship between population and numbers involved in officeholding. Before the Black 
Death, the proportion of adult males involved in office was low at c.6-9% at both Downham, for 
the years 1323-34, and Worfield, for 1327, unfortunately the only year with complete enough 
rolls to give a reasonable estimate of the number of men serving across all offices (table 2.9). 
The first phase, stretching from c.1327 to c.1377-81 saw a sharp increase in the proportion of 
men serving at Downham. This was in part due to a modest increase in absolute numbers 
serving yearly from 12 for 1323-34 to 16 for 1373-90 but was mainly a de facto effect due to 
total population reduction caused by the plague. Whilst unfortunately the lack of poll tax returns 
for Worfield means it is impossible to estimate its post-Black Death population, it seems likely 
that here too the population fell dramatically, creating a similar increase in the proportion of 
men serving. This was likely combined with an increase in absolute numbers serving due to new 
opportunities to serve as jurors baron, who were recorded from the 1390s onwards (table 0.2). 
Horstead also saw a large estimated c.44% of its male population serving in office per year in 
c.1377-81.  
The second phase, stretching from c.1377-81 to c.1524, gives evidence that can support a model 
of population growth driving the increased numbers serving in office from the mid to late 
fifteenth century outlined above at both Downham and Worfield (figure 2.8). At Downham, 
there was a slight fall of 2-10% in the proportion of adult males serving between 1373-90 and 
1491-1500, whilst the ratio of capital pledges: adult males fell even more drastically between 
the 1360s-70s and 1500s (tables 2.9-2.10). However, considering the population may have 
doubled over the same period, only a small fall in participation is startling, and was achieved via 
a great increase in the absolute numbers of individuals serving in office. Unfortunately, the 
picture for Worfield is obscured by the lack of late fourteenth-century data, but it similarly 
seems likely that the increase in absolute numbers was caused by an increase in population 
across the fifteenth century. Thus, the increase in cohort sizes of empanelled officers from the 
1430s at Downham, and 1490s at Worfield, along with general increases in numbers of men 
serving per year at both manors in the mid-fifteenth century look like they were driven by 
population growth, presumably as this increased the numbers of men eligible for office.  
The decline in the absolute numbers of individuals empanelled and serving at Horstead from 
c.1510 may also be explained by population which fell at Horstead between c.1377-81 and 
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c.1524. This in fact increased both the proportion of adult males serving and the empanelled 
officer: adult male ratios on this manor in the second phase. This picture is reinforced by 
declining numbers of tenants in this period, which fealty lists demonstrate fell from 50 in 1461 
to 28 in 1511.123 This decline in tenants must have reduced the total pool of individuals from 
which officers could be drawn and explains why absolute numbers involved in office also 
dropped.  
Phase three, stretching from c.1524 to the later sixteenth century, saw absolute numbers 
involved in officeholding fail to keep up with increases in population. At Worfield, and 
especially Horstead, where population grew between 1524 and 1563, and 1524 and 1603, 
respectively, the numbers involved in officeholding did not keep up. This led to lower 
empanelled officer: adult male ratios, and for Worfield a fall in the proportion of adult males in 
office of c.4-14% and at Horstead a rather more significant c.18-45% (tables 2.9- 2.10). For 
Horstead, this pronounced pattern may again be due to changes in tenancy. Whilst the number 
of tenants remained stable, at 28 in 1511 and 29 in 1586, there was potentially an increase in 
non-resident tenants who may have chosen not to serve.124 Certainly, there does not appear to 
have been much scope by 1511 for non-participation by tenants. Whilst in 1461, 35 of 46 named 
male tenants can be identified as serving in office, suggesting 11 may never have had 
officeholding careers, by 1511 26 of the 27 named men served, a pattern that may not have been 
sustainable if tenant numbers later dropped. These changing tenant numbers may explain why 
Horstead’s officeholding numbers did not increase even initially in line with population unlike 
Downham and Worfield. The developed land market on the manor allowed for significant 
engrossment, enabling tenant numbers to move against the tide of population, and reducing the 
numbers who could serve in office. 
Less change is seen at Downham, where severe mid-Tudor mortality looks to have ensured 
population remained static or even fell slightly between 1524 and 1563. The absolute number of 
men involved in officeholding a year also remained static, leading to similar proportions of 
adult males in officeholding. Interestingly, numbers serving as jurors baron and capital pledges 
increased, leading to higher ratios of empanelled officers: adult males in the 1550s-70s, perhaps 
due to unobserved further population growth after 1563.   
                                                          
123 KCA, HOR/39, unfoliated, 19 Mar 1461; HOR/45, m.3, 25 Aug 1511. 
124 KCA, HOR/45, m.3, 25 Aug 1511; Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, Table 4, 15. 
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Overall, population does seem to be significant in explaining the growth in numbers serving in 
office seen in examinations of empanelled officers and the total number of individuals serving 
per annum. These increases, occurring from the fifteenth century onwards, seem likely to match 
recovery of population from post-Black Death nadirs at both Downham and Worfield, leading 
to office being spread between more eligible individuals, who in aggregate served fewer times 
each. This relationship, however, seems to have been the product of the post-plague period. The 
low absolute numbers and proportions of adult males serving in manorial office before 1349, a 
period of high population, suggest that thirteenth-century population growth had not created the 
same increase in absolute numbers of men involved in office. Most likely, an entitlement to 
manorial office had occurred in the post-Plague period, perhaps due to the difficulties in filling 
an inelastic set of offices after a severe population decline. This entitlement seems to have 
worked to ensure officeholding remained more widely dispersed as population again began to 
increase in the fifteenth century, meaning that each entitled man served fewer times each. 
However, by the later sixteenth century, population was again growing whilst numbers of 
officers remained static or only increased marginally, suggesting that entitlement was not 
extended further in this period of demographic growth. Thus, exclusion from office did increase 
in the second half of the sixteenth century. However, this was by no means a new phenomenon, 
and was marginal in comparison to the exclusiveness of office in the pre-Black Death period.  
Officeholding Elites 
The above measures are vital in understanding the entire size of the officeholding group, both as 
a totality and in particular roles, and how this changed over time. However, a different 
perspective is given by examining, rather than average officeholders, those individuals that 
seem particularly prominent. Here, the top 14 or 15 most prominent men have been studied at 
each manor for two time-frames, one a period of relatively high numbers involved in 
officeholding per year, and one a period of relatively low numbers. Through contrasting these 
specific periods, it is possible to examine how far a core group of men could monopolise 
officeholding, and how this changed between manors and in periods of low and high 
participation in office. 
Beginning with Downham, the periods 1373-1434 and 1552-82 have been examined. The 
former is an exceptionally well documented period, and also reflects an era of low annual 
participation in officeholding. Unfortunately, the second period is less complete, with six years 
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of missing data, but provides a comparator being in the era after the significant increase in 
number of individuals holding office annually. The picture for 1373-1434 is of domination by a 
small set of individuals of all offices excepting that of taster, with these 14 men taking more 
than half of services in every other role (figure 2.10). Interestingly, whilst men could serve 
across all offices, the reeveship and messorship seem to have been split up between two groups, 
with these prominent men specialising in one of these offices, although John Lovechild and 
Simon Kede do buck this trend. Unfortunately lists of capital pledges were made infrequently in 
this period, meaning that they cannot be included in this sample, yet the fact that 9 of these 14 
appear in this role suggests the possibility of monopolisation.  
The picture for 1552-82 is slightly different. Even though the number of offices to fill had 
reduced, meaning that even more concentration in the remaining offices might be expected, the 
most prominent 14 men in this period held a smaller 36% of the total juror baron slots, and an 
only moderately larger 38% of capital pledge slots (figure 2.11). More significantly, this group 
did not dominate the, admittedly slight, nine selections of fenreeves. However, this reduction in 
the number of slots held by the most prominent group is relatively minor, and in absolute terms 
it is arguable that despite increases in the total numbers per year the greatest-serving individuals 














Figure 2.10 – Proportion of slots held by 14 most prominent men at Little Downham, 
1373-1434 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N taster slots = 127; N bylawman slots = 119, N messor slots = 129, N reeve slots = 










Figure 2.11 – Proportion of slots held by 14 most prominent men at Little Downham, 
1552-1582 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N fenreeve slots = 9, N juror baron slots = 472, N capital pledge slots = 312. Sources: 
CUL, EDR, C11/3/10-11. 
 
For Worfield, the same exercise was performed for 1400-1440 and 1559-1600, again 
encompassing a period of lower and higher numbers of individuals per year in officeholding 
respectively. For 1400-1440 (figure 2.12), a similar pattern to Downham for 1373-1434 can be 
seen in terms of jury service, with the top 15 individuals again appearing in more than 50% of 
juror baron slots, and exactly 50% of juror leet slots. However, the pattern for the reeveship is 
very different with only five of the fifteen appearing, and only making up 10% of services, 
reflecting the contrast in the distribution of this office between the manors (figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
Furthermore, in the admittedly small sample of six selections to the beadleship, only William 




As at Downham, the growth of the number of officers does seem to have reduced the most 
prominent men’s share, with the top 14 for 1559-1600 holding 43% of jury baron slots and 33% 
of jury leet slots, a reduction on the previous period (figure 2.13). Conversely, however this 
group’s service as reeves and tasters is significantly higher, though still well below turn of the 
fifteenth-century Downham. Only one of the 14, Richard Rowlowe, served as beadle, however 
he did serve in nearly 30% of slots for this office. Thus, much like at Downham, the increase in 
the number of individuals appearing seems to have had a very modest effect in reducing the 
influence of a core group of officeholders.  
 
Figure 2.12 – Proportion of slots held by 15 most prominent men at Worfield, 1400-1440 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N taster slots = 49, N reeve slots = 71, N juror baron slots = 1922, N juror leet slots = 







Figure 2.13 – Proportion of slots held by 14 most prominent men at Worfield, 1559-1600 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N taster slots = 64, N beadle slots = 27, N reeve slots = 36, N juror baron slots = 4176, 
N juror leet slots = 942. Sources: SAC, P314/W/1/1/725-838. 
 
The two periods examined for Horstead, 1442-94 and 1510-61, provide a contrast as the former 
was the period of relatively high participation per year, and the latter the period of lower 
participation (figures 2.14-15). Both differ from the patterns seen for Worfield and Downham 
due to the lack of annually selected seigniorial officials such as a reeve, and, more strikingly, by 
the existence of the separate juries baron for the Horstead and Coltishall fees. No individual was 
able to dominate both juries in either period and the only man whose prominence was due to 
service across both was William Mowtyng.  
Contrasting the two periods, the same trend as at Downham and Worfield seems to have worked 
in reverse at Horstead, with a decrease in the total numbers serving per year, causing a greater 
proportion of slots to be held by the most prominent individuals. This increase is most drastic in 
terms of the jury for the Coltishall fee, rising from 29% to 37% suggesting that this office was 
becoming considerably more concentrated in a few hands. However, the picture for capital 
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pledges and Horstead jurors is again one of modest change, with increases in proportion of only 
a few percentage points. 
 
Figure 2.14 – Proportion of slots held by 14 most prominent men at Horstead, 1442-1494 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N taster slots = 85, N Coltishall juror slots = 754, N Juror baron slots = 1654, N capital 












Figure 2.15 – Proportion of slots held by 14 most prominent men at Horstead, 1510-1561 
 
Prominence defined by men appearing highest number of times across all offices and total numbers of times any 
person selected as an officer. N coltishall juror slots = 526, N juror baron slots = 904, N capital pledge slots = 569. 
Sources: KCA, HOR/45, HOR/48-51. 
 
The data presented here reinforces the clear difference between Downham, where, in the earlier 
period significant jury baron service was strongly correlated with monopolisation of other 
annually selected offices, and Worfield, where service as reeve by these elites was far more 
modest. However, in other ways it suggests commonalities. At all manors being a taster was a 
less attractive office, with the most prominent officeholders, even when they monopolised other 
positions, seeing relatively low service in this office.  
A more striking similarity provides a valuable corrective to some of the approaches seen above. 
At all three manors in all time periods, there was a core group who did serve a disproportionate 
number of times in office. The 14-15 most prominent individuals, who made up between 6% 
and 10% of all individuals serving in office in these periods, never held less than 30% of 
available slots as juror baron, juror leet or capital pledge. Increasing participation at Worfield 
and Downham did reduce the dominance of this group, which saw its share drop by 10-20%, but 
this seems to signal a potential moderate reduction in influence rather than a sea change. Whilst 
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the officeholding group’s size may have increased in the later period, the internal dynamics of 
this group retained a strongly unequal character.  
Conclusion 
Detailed examination has revealed that a single designation of ‘oligarchical’ or ‘open’ cannot be 
applied to manorial officeholding in the middle ages or early modern period. Local differences, 
such as the culture of service in empanelled office, could allow either a few individuals to serve 
continuously, as at Downham, or disperse office across a wide number of individuals ensuring 
few served multiple times, as at Worfield and Horstead. Changes over time, such as the growth 
of numbers serving in empanelled office, could mean that more people were serving fewer times 
c.1550 than c.1400, as can be seen at Worfield and Downham. Sometimes trends towards 
oligarchy were clearly related to other changes. Examples include the engrossment and 
subletting of lands which provided the beadleship at Worfield, or the legacy of the use of capital 
pledges at Horstead and Downham. Much like the complex trends seen in early modern 
officeholding, there is not one single story to manorial officeholding across time and space in 
the middle ages. 
This complexity aside, the data examined above does suggest that medievalists have been right 
to edge towards a comparison with the ‘oligarchy’ of the early modern parish, especially as this 
assessment for the period after c.1550 has become more nuanced rather than absolute and 
sensitive to geographical and chronological variation. That at all manors and in different 
periods, a group of 14-15 elite men could hold a disproportionate number of slots as capital 
pledges, jurors leet and jurors baron parallels the dominant men found by Wrightson and Levine 
at Terling.125 For Downham c.1400, this dominance combined with the tendency for selected 
office to be held by a few men, suggests a period when this oligarchy was acute. These patterns 
thoroughly reject the apologist attitude of the Toronto School and suggest that the early modern 
villager would not necessarily see increasing restriction in vestry and parochial office as a 
completely new phenomenon. 
Furthermore, in terms of manorial office, the later sixteenth century cannot be seen as a decisive 
period of novel transformation, when office increasingly became restricted to a few ‘chief 
inhabitants’. By 1600, at all three case-study manors, officeholding was likely de facto more 
                                                          
125 Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and Piety, 103-7. 
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oligarchical than any period since the Black Death, if one measures oligarchy in terms of the 
proportion of the total male population involved in officeholding. At Horstead, this was due to a 
reduction in numbers serving in office, combined with increasing population, but at Worfield 
and Downham absolute numbers in office remained static for 1550-1600, and it was only 
demographic growth that led to greater oligarchy. For these two manors, the years 1430-1550 
seem to be those of real change, with an actual increase in numbers serving, and even at 
Horstead the trend towards fewer numbers serving in office began c.1510. Such a picture may 
not apply to parochial officeholding, but it does fundamentally question the novelty of the 
sixteenth century as a period of great social stratification. For Downham and Worfield the pre-
Black Death era in terms of officeholding was likely the time of greatest exclusion of a bulk of 
the population from office. The period before c.1600 instead saw a growth in the absolute 
numbers of officeholding individuals and expansion in the numbers serving in panels, even as 
opportunities to serve diminished, suggesting that more people on average has less control over 
office. Of course, in real terms there were dominant groups in all periods, but even the greatest 
serving officers saw their share decrease as the numbers involved increased.  
From this perspective, the decades before 1600 do not necessarily appear as a time of increased 
restriction in officeholding, and indeed the period around 1400 could be claimed as the most 
oligarchical at Downham and Worfield since the Black Death. However, showing concentration 
in officeholding in of itself is not enough to show officeholding was to some extent oligarchical. 
It is necessary to now move beyond examining trends in participation and consider the ways 
officeholding was used, returning to ‘community’ and ‘nuisance’ presentments to explore how 





Chapter 3: Governing the Village   
The Concerns of Village Governors   
The first chapter established quantitatively that ‘community’ presentments were an important 
function of officeholders at Horstead and Little Downham across the period examined, and by 
the end of the sixteenth century were the most significant part of these officeholders’ role, 
surviving despite the fall in royal and seigniorial business. At Worfield, these presentments 
became an important, if short-lived, function for the mid-sixteenth century, before an overall 
sharp drop in presentments. The second chapter established that only a subset of the 
membership of these communities actually participated in manorial officeholding, and that this 
varied between manors, but also over time. This pattern suggests a capacity to govern, allowing 
for local officers to exert some element of management over their local community via 
community-focused presentments, and that officeholding was to some degree oligarchical, 
meaning that there was a distinct group of managers.  
However, in itself such evidence is not sufficient to prove governance, taking this to mean the 
exercising of power to order the local community in a political way. Key to examining this is to 
consider what concerns about their village communities would motivate a governing class 
controlling manorial office to utilise for their own ends a structure largely created to meet 
seignorial demands. 
Concerns creating incentives to govern are inherent in the historiography of the early modern 
community, which focuses on social difference and control. Two interrelated concerns have 
been put forward by this literature. The first is that of reducing and controlling poverty. This 
was fuelled in part by economic necessity. As villages increasingly took responsibility for the 
poor living within their community, a measure that became mandated by legislation from the 
reign of Edward VI, and the especially far-reaching poor law acts of 1597 and 1601, rate-payers 
became concerned to control costs.1 Having to pay relief not only created new formal structures 
                                                          
1 Wrightson, ‘Social Differentiation’, 44; Hindle On the Parish, 452-4; Hindle, State and Social Change, 
216-7, 237; Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and Piety, 175; C. Muldrew, ‘The “Middling Sort”: an 
Emergent Cultural Identity’ in K. Wrightson (ed.), A Social History of England, 1500-1700, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 290-309, 300-1.  
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to collect and distribute rates, but also to decide who was deserving of stretched resources.2 It 
led to other policies designed to reduce burdens, such as policing vagrancy, ensuring parishes 
were not burdened with children, and removing poor men to meet troop levies.3 Such policies 
lead to the second concern identified by early modernists. This is an increasing desire to control 
misbehaviour, in part driven by similar economic pressures, but also wider cultural changes 
including the spread of Puritanism. This made wealthier villagers more willing to cooperate 
with JPs in admonishing their poorer neighbours for behaviours which they previously deemed 
acceptable.4  
In Wrightson’s pioneering thesis, these concerns had an active role in forming governed 
communities and creating a new social structure. Increasing poverty and religious extremism, 
combined with greater literacy and the rise of the national market worked ‘to promote 
integration nationally, but differentiation locally’ as parochial elites disassociated themselves 
from the culture of the village.5 This led to a ‘decline of neighbourliness’ as communities were 
‘more sharply segmented’, creating a ‘middling sort’ of local village elites.6 Concerns around 
poverty and misbehaviour are seen to have created a new impulse to govern c.1600, and 
therefore helped create new governing structures controlled by an emergent elite group. 
However, more recently historians have asked whether such concerns were a purely early 
modern phenomenon. Partially, this has been achieved by demonstrating a longer history of 
                                                          
2 Braddick, State Formation, 116; French, Middle Sort of People, 252-3; A. Wood, The 1549 Rebellions 
and the Making of Early Modern England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 200-1; S. 
Hindle, ‘Exhortation and Entitlement: Negotiating Inequality in English Rural Communities, 1500-1650’ 
in M.J. Braddick and J. Walter (eds.), Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Order, Hierarchy and 
Subordination in Britain and Ireland, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 102-22, 121-2; S. 
Hindle and B. Kümin, ‘The Spatial Dynamics of Parish Politics: Topographies of Tension in English 
Communities, c.1350-1640’, in B. Kümin (ed.), Political Space in Pre-Industrial Europe, (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009), 151-173, 166.  
3 Wrightson, English Society, 130-1; Kent, ‘Rural “Middling Sort”’, 31-2; Wood, 1549 Rebellions, 201; 
Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and Community’, 850 [13]; A.L. Beier, Masterless Men: the Vagrancy Problem in 
England 1560-1640, (London: Meuthen, 1985), 32; Hindle and Kümin, ‘Spatial Dynamics’, 167-8, 172; 
Braddick, State Formation, 201; Gunn, English People at War, 103; N. Younger, War and Politics in the 
Elizabethan Counties, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 173.  
4 M. Ingram, ‘Reformation of Manners in Early Modern England’ in P. Griffiths, A. Fox and S. Hindle 
(eds.), The Experience of Authority in Early Modern England, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 47-88, 
55-6; Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and Piety, 173- 83, 198-211; French, Middle Sort of People, 252; 
Gaskill, ‘Little Commonwealths’, 92. 
5 Wrightson, ‘Aspects of Social Differentiation’, 34-45; Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and Piety, 174-
84; Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order’, 45-6; Wrightson, English Society, 222-7. 
6 Wrightson, ‘“Decline of Neighbourliness”’, 38-9.  
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poor relief stretching back into the Middle Ages, driven by local initiative but adopting similar 
rating systems to those seen in the sixteenth century. Local elites were utilising parochial and 
sub-parochial structures like fraternities before 1536 to control poverty.7 More significant when 
considering manorially-structured governance is the longer history of policing misbehaviour. 
Margaret Spufford first raised this argument, positing that increased presentation of leyrwite and 
childwite by elite manorial officers c.1300 was designed to reduce the population of the poor in 
a period of dearth. This led her to privilege economic climate over religious fervour as the cause 
of increased policing of misbehaviour in both the medieval and early modern periods.8 A more 
trailblazing approach has been taken by McIntosh who consciously adopts a new periodisation 
of 1349-1714 in order to explore social control.9 Through investigating manor courts, in 
conjunction with church and common-law jurisdictions, she reveals a broad focus by local 
communities on misbehaviour which began in the south-east soon after the Black Death but 
became a concern at a national level with the dramatic population increase of the sixteenth 
century. 10 This demonstrates that controlling misbehaviour was a concern that promoted 
governance long before the early modern period, and that this was achieved, at least in part, via 
the manor court.11  
McIntosh focuses on creating a national picture rather than local case studies. This means that 
she does not explore a potential wider implication of her finding, namely that a focus on 
misbehaviour changed the internal dynamic of village communities, and created something akin 
to the early modernists’ ‘middling sort’. This chapter aims to examine misbehaviour from this 
perspective but also to consider another potential concern that could lead local elites to use the 
manor court to govern the community. It is argued that usage of the local landscape provides the 
most obvious candidate. This is not a new idea. Late medieval economic history has long had a 
geographical focus, and Warren Ault long-ago noted the usage of bylaws made in manorial 
                                                          
7 C.C. Dyer, ‘Poverty and its Relief in Late Medieval England’, P&P, 216, (2012), 41-78, 73-8; Dyer, 
‘Political Life’, 153; Dyer, ‘Village Community’, 415-7; M.K. McIntosh, ‘Local Responses to the Poor in 
Late Medieval and Tudor England’, Continuity and Change, 3, (1998), 209-45, 219-25.  
8 Spufford, ‘Puritanism and Social Control’, 44-57. 
9 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 211-2; M.K. McIntosh, ‘Response’, JBS, 37:3, (1998), 291-305, 
291-2. 
10 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 1-18. 
11 Martin Ingram has recently argued that church courts remained far more important than manorial courts 
in policing misbehaviour in rural communities, although this is specifically in the realm of sexual 
regulation. M. Ingram, Carnal Knowledge: Regulating Sex in England, 1470-1600, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 117-8.  
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courts to control common-field agriculture and access to resources in the vill.12 Bailey has even 
suggested that this may have been performed by a village elite at the expense of their poorer 
neighbours.13 However, these insights have not been integrated into larger studies of village 
power structures. Stephen Mileson has recently noted that ‘in the absence of a well-developed 
spatial approach…sophisticated analyses of peasant society are conducted in the abstract realm 
of quantification and revolve around tenure of office, appearances in the manor court, and 
patterns of lending and borrowing’.14 This is despite the complex peasant conceptions of place 
uncovered by Susan Kilby in a recent analysis of trespass at Walsham-le-Willows.15 
 Thus here concern over both misbehaviour and landscape are examined through a detailed 
study of relevant ‘nuisance’ and ‘community’ presentments to see if manorial officeholding 
created a structure of village governance. Such analysis is further extended by a consideration of 
how far governance promoted ‘common’ concerns throughout the whole community, or instead 
promoted the desires of a few, creating something akin to a proto-middling sort.   
Nuisance 
As an established concern of manorial courts, it is important to begin by evaluating whether 
controlling misbehaviour alone can demonstrate the use of manorial officeholding to govern 
local communities. The quantitative pattern of ‘nuisance’ can be seen in figures 1.1-1.3. Such 
analysis reveals that these presentments were numerically insignificant compared to other types 
of business. However, nuisance typifies the problem of a crudely statistical approach in that 
presentments only targeted specific individuals to compel them to reform their behaviour. For 
example, in 1474 at Downham, two prostitutes, Johanna Freynere and Isabel Gyles were 
amerced 6s 8d each for having their doors open at illicit times. They were further ordered to 
abjure the vill by the Feast of St Andrew under pain.16 By its very nature such a presentment, if 
effective, would only appear once. However, the extremity of the punishment makes it unusual, 
                                                          
12 W.O. Ault, ‘Open-Field Husbandry and the Village Community: a Study of Agrarian By-Laws in 
Medieval England’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, 55:7, (1965), 1-102, 
41-54, 64; W.O. Ault, ‘Village By-Laws by Common Consent’, Speculum, 29:2, (1954), 378-94, 380-94; 
W.O. Ault, ‘The Vill in Medieval England’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 126, 
(1982), 188-211, 195-6. 
13 Bailey, ‘Rural Society’, 161. 
14 S. Mileson, ‘Openness and Closure in the Later Medieval Village’, P&P, 234, (2017), 3-37, 7.  
15 S. Kilby, ‘Mapping Peasant Discontent: Trespassing on Manorial Land in Fourteenth-Century 
Walsham-le-Willows’, Landscape History, 36:2, (2015), 69-88, 85-6.  
16 CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.2, 28 Sep 1474.  
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and shows the value of considering nuisance to see whether it could act as a concern driving a 
manorial governing structure. 
The term ‘nuisance’ has been used rather than ‘misbehaviour’, as the types of presentments 
included in this category differ from those seen in McIntosh’s work. Whilst she includes a 
‘poverty cluster’, which includes the offences of hedgebreaking and having illicit subtenants, for 
the purposes of this study these are designsed as ‘community’ presentments, with their focus on 
managing communal resources.17 The nuisance category explored in this section is slightly 
larger than that addressed in the overall categorisation in the statistical analysis, as it includes 
some presentments categorised as ‘royal’ in that they were explicitly against the King’s peace. 
These have been included as they speak to officers’ role in enforcing social control, even if 
there were theoretically performed as part of their responsibility to the crown. Sometimes, even 
the same offence could be justified in different ways. For example at Downham in 1391 two 
scolds were presented simply as scolds, whilst in 1468 a scold and gossip was presented 
specifically as a disturber of the king’s peace, showing the looseness of this division.18 
Before the Black Death, both Downham and Worfield saw presentments about misbehaviour, 
presumably related to the population pressure of this period. At Downham, five presentments 
were made against receiving and hosting strangers between 1311 and 1315, and it is probable 
the missing rolls for the rest of the 1310s would reveal even more concern about this issue, as 
the years of the Great Famine put pressure on communities concerned with extra population.19 
At Worfield, where rolls survive from 1327, jurors leet presented tenants for receiving 
malefactors in 1327 and 1332.20 A more far-reaching presentment was made in 1345, when the 
tavern keepers and tranters of Worfield were presented for hosting strangers who disturbed the 
common peace of the vill. This led to an order that all frequenters of taverns who were not 
inhabitants were to be removed and the possessions on their person seized for the lord, an order 
foreshadowing later concern about controlling alcohol consumption in the vill.21  
                                                          
17 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 9-10.  
18 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.29, 20 Dec 1391; C11/3/7, m.13, 1 Jun 1468.  
19 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.3, 9 Nov 1311; C11/1/1, m.4, 13 Dec 1313; C11/1/1, m.5, 17 Dec 1314; 
C11/1/1, m.6, 15 Dec 1315; R.M. Smith, ‘Dearth and Local Political Responses: 1280-1325 and 1580-
1596/97 Compared’, in M. Kowaleski, J. Langdon and P.R. Schofield (eds.), Peasants and Lords in the 
Medieval English Economy: Essays in Honour of Bruce Campbell, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 388-9. 
20 SAC, P314/W/1/1/4, 23 Nov 1327; P314/W/1/1/17, 13 Jun 1332. 
21 SAC, P314/W/1/1/25, 6 Jul 1345.  
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After the Black Death, Downham saw no nuisance presentments before the 1390s, whilst 
Worfield saw more persistent fourteenth-century monitoring at a relatively low level. In 1375, 
one stranger was presented for taking crops from the miller and in 1388 a man was presented for 
hosting men who attacked another against the peace, leading to him being fined 20s, and, along 
with another man, having to surrender a pain of 40s due to being mainpernors for the violent 
man he hosted.22 In 1393, Alice Baret was amerced for simply being a peddler, although this 
was likely connected to her theft of two cocks in the same year.23 Such concern, however, 
became considerably less frequent in the fifteenth century, with only two years seeing 
presentments. In 1418, the wives of Richard Walker and William Barrow were presented for 
being ‘common despisers’, whilst in 1447 the vill of Worfield presented a man for receiving 
suspect men in his house, who ‘transgressed against the tenants in the same place’.24  
More concern about the sale of alcohol was seen at Worfield in 1378, with a long complaint by 
jurors that tranters were coming into the liberty and preventing the tenants brewing and selling 
ale, by taking away the best ale of the tenants therefore stopping them selling it. This complaint 
is more economic than that seen in 1345, effectively concerning the problem of regrators, and 
was justified to the lady of the manor due to loss of profit. The jurors emphasised that by buying 
up ale and then selling elsewhere, the tranters were depriving the lady of both amercements due 
from fines for selling, presumably a reference to the profits of the assize of ale, as well as the 
toll of brewers for milling, a more indirect economic argument.25 This new concern is 
highlighted by the presentment of a tranter for breaking the new bylaw later in the same year as 
well as a further bylaw introduced in 1384 that banned regrators from seeking ale inside the 
manor for sale outside under pain of 40d.26 This bylaw was enforced in 1385 against all 
regrators who broke the assize of ale.27   
From the 1390s onwards nuisance presentments become a relatively regular feature of 
Downham’s court rolls, and were accompanied by a series of harsh punishments. In 1391, two 
scolds, Alice Page (who was also a common thief) and Beatrix Wysbech were ordered to abjure 
                                                          
22 SAC, P314/W/1/1/99, 14 Jun 1375; P314/W/1/1/178, 19 Oct 1388 
23 SAC, P314/W/1/1/187, 29 Oct 1393.  
24 SAC, P314/W/1/1/251, 30 Sep 1418; P314/W/1/1/298, 11 Apr 1447.  
25 SAC, P314/W/1/1/111, 7 Jan 1378.  
26 SAC, P314/W/1/1/114, 21 Jul 1378; P314/W/1/1/152, 30 Nov 1384. 
27 SAC, P314/W/1/1/155, 12 Jun 1385.  
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the vill.28 Ten years later, two related brothel owners were ordered out of the vill under pain, 
whilst Richard Swan was amerced 12d for receiving the same Alice Page in sustaining a brothel 
after she had been ordered to be abjured, showing that orders of eviction were maintained for 
long periods.29 Ale houses were also regulated, with offenders being presented in 1408 and 1428 
for frequenting the tavern, in the former case ‘beyond the assigned time’, hinting at a more 
systematic monitoring of taverns.30 Similarly in 1411, Thomas Stonesson was presented for 
openly saying a man was false and ‘of harlots’ whilst sitting in the tavern.31 Jurors similarly 
monitored violent behaviour; in 1417 John Veyse jnr was presented for drawing his knife in any 
contention between him and his neighbours, threatening these so that they dared not perform 
husbandry in the fen and fields, and his father was similarly presented for maintaining him.32 
Intriguingly, it was ordered to imprison him as a punishment, although this was clearly 
ineffective, as in 1418 he was again presented for frequently drawing his knife whilst playing 
football as well as following a man to his house.33 The 1420s also saw significant presentment 
of nuisances, with examples of eavesdroppers, scolds, malicious words, being a vicious man and 
violating the chaplain in church.34 After presentments for eavesdropping and maintaining a 
violent woman in 1432, presentments become far more infrequent, with only one for illicit 
gaming in 1444 and one for gossiping in 1461; moreover none of the presentments after 1417 
were punished using abjuration.35 The period 1468-91, however, again saw more frequent 
presentment, with jurors presenting offenders for hosting prostitutes, quarrelling, and acting as 
prostitutes, the last offenders being ordered to abjure the vill.36  
Horstead similarly saw misbehaviour presentments from the 1390s into the fifteenth century, 
although at a far lower rate, with the presentment of a scold in 1395, hosts of suspicious men in 
1436 and supporting a troublemaker in 1454.37 However, the 1490s and 1510s saw increased 
attention paid to social nuisance. In 1492-3, the capital pledges presented Stephen Love three 
                                                          
28 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.29, 20 Dec 1391 
29 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.6, 10 Nov 1401.  
30 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.20, 22 Nov 1408; C11/2/6, m.13, 13 Jan 1428.  
31 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.29, 14 Dec 1411. 
32 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.7, 12 Jan 1417.  
33 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.9, 18 Jan 1418.  
34 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.16, 4 Oct 1421; C11/2/6, m.1, 30 Jan 1423; C11/2/6, m.13, 31 Jan 1428; 
C11/2/6, m.15, 7 Dec 1428.  
35 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.21, 23 Jan 1432; C11/2/6, m.37, 20 Nov 1444; C11/3/7, m.4, 18 Jul 1461. 
36 CUL, EDR, C11/3/7, m.13, 10 Mar 1468; C11/3/7, m.13, 1 Jun 1468; C11/3/7, m.1, 2 Jun 1473; 
C11/3/7, m.2, 28 Sep 1474; C11/3/10, m.3, 5 Jun 1486.  
37 KCA, HOR/26, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1395; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Sep 1436; 20 Sep 1454.  
137 
 
times for maintaining a brothel within the precincts of the leet, placing him under a pain of 40d 
and then 5s to desist. Walter Dey was presented for maintaining his sister who was ‘of wicked 
condition against the form of the statute’.38 In 1514, two inhabitants were presented for 
sustaining suspect persons at illicit times, with an order to expel a suspect women under pains, 
whilst in 1515 Margery Hulver was presented for receiving suspicious people as well as 
breaking the assize, again being placed under pain not to do so again.39 Another particularly 
detailed case was given in 1515, when a certain Thomas was said to be on successive occasions 
hosting Agnes, the wife of the son of his wife (presumably his stepson’s wife), which created 
great conflict between Thomas and his wife to the disturbance of his neighbours.40 Significantly, 
despite the implication of illicit sexual behaviour, it was the public disturbance of neighbours 
that justified the presentment. 
Up to the sixteenth century, the presentment of nuisance fits the McIntosh model relatively well, 
with the two south-eastern manors seeing nuisance presentments throughout the fifteenth 
century as well as a hardening attitude displayed in punishments beyond amercements, whilst 
the West Midlands manor saw less engagement. Worfield, moreover, saw an uptake in policing 
nuisance in the sixteenth century, particularly at the level of vill presentments, reinforcing 
McIntosh’s concept of the ‘nationalisation’ of the monitoring of misbehaviour beyond the 
southeast in this period. 41 This began in 1507, with Joanna Ingram presented as a ‘common 
liar’, and ordered not to do this again under pain of 40d.42 A veritable campaign against liars, 
disturbers and scolds followed, with individuals of both sexes amerced in eleven different 
presentments from 1532 to 1571.43 Sexual behaviour was also targeted. In 1556 a man was 
presented for going to the house of man who had a suspicious daughter, as was the daughter’s 
father for guarding them.44 Offenders were punished for eavesdropping, with presentments in 
1551 and 1564, along with those who received specific or generally suspect persons in 1521-2, 
                                                          
38 KCA, HOR/41, m.7, 11 Jun 1492; HOR/41, m.9, 11 Jun 1493; HOR/41, m.11, 11 Sep 1493.  
39 KCA, HOR/45, m.7, 30 Oct 1514; HOR/45, m.8, 11 Jun 1515.  
40 KCA, HOR/45, m.9, 30 Oct 1515.  
41 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 1-18. 
42 SAC, P314/W/1/1/502, 16 Apr 1507.  
43 SAC, P314/W/1/1/642, 21 Nov 1532; P314/W/1/1/645, 8 May 1533; P314/W/1/1/670, 4 Oct 1548; 
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1538 and 1568, and a man of ‘bad company’ in 1552.45 Much as at fifteenth-century Downham, 
more systematic monitoring of particular individuals over time also occurred. In 1520, Eleanor 
Underhill was amerced for theft and prostitution, whilst two years later John Brown incurred a 
pain for receiving Eleanor, suggesting the manorial court was used to not only police Eleanor 
directly but also those who had contact with her.46 Similarly, Amica Walker was amerced in 
1548, 1549 and seventeen years later during her widowhood for various quarrelling offences.47  
Worfield also saw some stiffening of offences, with pains placed for reoffending of a kind not 
seen in the fifteenth century. These could be steep, with a pain of 20s placed on Amica in 1549 
not to scold again.48 However, some clemency seems to have been exercised; when Amica was 
presented again in 1566 she was amerced a more modest 8d, whilst the forfeit pain owed by 
Brown in 1522 was condoned by the lord’s receiver from 20s to 10s, although whether this had 
the approval of the local community is open to question.49 Moreover, abjuration was only 
recorded once, when Richard Dowelle, a vagabond, was presented for maintaining himself in 
the vill of Chesterton, and ordered to remain outside the vill, although not explicitly the manor, 
under pain of 20s.50 Yet, even if Worfield’s sixteenth-century monitoring of nuisance looks to 
have been less oppressive than that seen at fifteenth-century Downham, it still was an increase 
on what had come before, and therefore neatly fits the McIntosh thesis, especially as it is clear 
population grew across this period (table 1.1).    
However, the sixteenth century is more problematic for the other two manors as juries at both 
paid relatively little attention to misbehaviour despite there being population growth at both 
locales (table 1.1). This is partially due to the ‘poverty cluster’ being treated separately, but, as 
neither of these manors can be described as being moribund, it does question the extent to which 
growing concern about misbehaviour could act alone as a concern to encourage greater 
governance.51 At Downham, jurors made only two presentments in the period 1552-82, one for 
keeping bad governance in a household and the other for allowing illicit jesting in a house, both 
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51 See p. 134. 
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of which were punished by amercement.52 At Horstead three cases can be found, one for a 
couple sustaining a brothel ‘where diverse suspect people frequent…disturbing their 
neighbours’.53 The second is relatively unusual, with a couple being presented in 1528 for 
receiving a baker at illicit times and buying bread from him, after being ordered not to receive 
him under pain. 54 This looks more like economic control rather than truly concern about 
misbehaviour. The third saw the capital pledges present a man for consorting with another’s 
wife at illicit times, with both him and the wife’s husband being ordered not to allow this to 
happen again under pain of 10s each.55  
An exception to this pattern was concern about gaming, although this was expressed in new 
bylaws at both Worfield and more significantly Horstead rather than presentments, with no 
mention of gaming at sixteenth-century Downham outside of a statutory presentment in 1508. In 
1584, it was ordered at Horstead that ‘none play at football, tables, painted cards, any bowls or 
other illicit games on the lord’s days’ with offenders surrendering 40d for the first offence, 5s 
on the second, and 6s 8d for any further offence. Thus the legislation was relatively limited but 
perhaps religiously driven with the reference to saints’ days. The bylaw was described as ‘out of 
the provision of…doctor Gorde [Goad] lord of this manor’, which may suggest it was the 
concern of the provost, a relatively strict puritan and disciplinarian at King’s College, as much 
as that of local elites that led to the ordinance.56 However, as the bylaw was also made with ‘the 
assent…both of the capital pledges and tenants’, the invocation of the provost may have been 
more symbolic rather than reflecting a real impetus.57  
Worfield’s bylaws concerning gaming were made significantly earlier in 1520 and 1521. The 
earlier bylaw, ordained by the jurors and steward, ordered that ‘none from henceforth play at 
dice or at cards for money nor receive anyone playing dice out of the time of Christmas under 
pain of 6s 8d’. Interestingly, the vill of Chesterton also placed a pain against ‘le tenys’ in the 
same session, although this carried a far smaller forfeit of 40d.58 In 1521 the manorial bylaw 
was extended to include receiving gambling card-players as well as dice-players and the pain 
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raised to 10s, again excluding Christmas.59 Again, the bylaw is relatively limited, only being 
focused on gambling and not gaming generally. The more perplexing element to all these 
bylaws is that the court rolls of neither manor record officers presenting offences against them, 
which seems particularly strange for Worfield where the jurors clearly felt the need to tighten 
the bylaw in 1521. This may show a disconnect between the concerns of the tenants making 
bylaws and the actual reality of nuisance in their locality.  
The behaviour of village residents was an important concern for village elites in this period who 
used the official positions they held to control and punish those perceived as troublemakers. 
However, the chronology focuses nuisance presentments largely on the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries and a sustained campaign against misbehaviour in the sixteenth century can only be 
observed at Worfield. This suggests that misbehaviour as a concern cannot alone account for the 
use of manorial officeholding structures to govern the community, especially after 1500.  
Landscape and Community Cohesion  
Turning to landscape as an alternative concern, it is possible to look for elements of both 
community cohesion and differentiation. The former is largely what the Toronto School 
emphasised in their studies of manorial officeholding. Whilst they showed that officeholders 
were drawn from a certain group in the community, they presented this group as largely 
governing for the common interests of a tight-knit village community.60 Olson even claims that 
serving in manorial office was used to bind individuals to communal responsibilities after the 
Black Death.61 Partially, this draws on the notion that villages were largely inward looking, and 
officeholding was utilised to protect the rights of the community against external pressures.62 
This view is also inherent in Wrightson’s thesis of the development of the ‘middling sort’ in the 
early modern period. Drawing on Rodney Hilton’s description of the medieval peasantry, 
Wrightson’s model does not deny that there were social and economic distinctions within 
village communities, but that the concerns of these wealthier villagers were in tune with that of 
their poorer neighbours.63 Whilst Wrightson has more recently stated that his original thesis 
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60 Britton, Land and People, 240-1, Olson, Chronicle of All that Happens, 229; Olson, ‘Jurors of the 
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‘made many unwarranted assumptions about medieval society’ in assuming such a high level of 
cohesiveness, his view is that manorial institutions did promote a ‘collective identity’ at least 
among tenants by excluding strangers.64 Concern about the landscape seems an ideal topic 
through which to prove this claim, as much of the conflict over resources could come from the 
actions of individuals outside of the local community.  By examining the role of officials in 
protecting the boundaries of communities, it is possible to see evidence for this contention 
concerning manorial officeholding.  
There is significant evidence of concern at all three manors to establish what was within and 
outside the jurisdiction of officials both in terms of rights and customs, as well as physical 
boundaries. At times this seems to have been driven by seignorial pressures, with lords using 
local presentment juries to determine the extent of their rights within a lordship and reinforce 
their privileges. For example, in 1387, the jury at Worfield declared that the lord and his 
predecessors from time out of memory had been entitled to all escheats and forfeitures in the 
manor as well as within the bounds and limits of the forest of Morfe, thus stating the lord’s 
claim to royal forfeiture rights on the manor.65 This claim was presumably made in light of the 
fact that Morfe was a royal forest, and subject to separate royal Swainmote courts and 
jurisdiction, despite the fact that half the manor lay within the forest’s bounds. The jury was 
thus asserting the lord’s privileges within this distinct jurisdictional arena. Similarly, in 1392 the 
Coltishall jurors at Horstead stated the lord’s right to collect half the value of amercements 
made for baking and brewing paid by residents of his fee living within the neighbouring leet.66 
However, other presentments, although made in the lord’s name, look to have protected the 
interests of the community as a cohesive whole. At Downham in 1394, the capital pledges gave 
a long statement concerning the lord’s right to drive for strays in the Westmoor, giving the exact 
route of the drive as stated in a terrier of the bishop. This was occasioned by an incursion by 
Thomas Buk, bailiff of Manea, a manor in the hands of Richard Scrope. He led Manea’s tenants 
in performing the drive when the tenants of Downham had come to make it, and seized three 
strays which should have fallen to the bishop.67 This statement was preceded by the fact that 
Westmoor was a shared common between the tenants of Downham, Littleport and Ely. 
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Therefore, the illicit drive affected land in which the tenants also had a stake. The presentment 
fits into a longer conflict over fen commons with Scrope’s tenants. Eight years earlier, the 
capital pledges presented that the same Thomas Buk had come with his homage and worked in 
the Eyefen which was common of the bishop of Ely’s tenants.68 Similarly, in 1431 another 
conflict arose when inhabitants of Manea entered the Eyefen next to their vill and built a new 
ditch in the lord’s land, by which they enclosed a croft to themselves, an action done ‘to great 
nuisance of the lord and all tenants in the same place commoners’.69  
A similar connection is seen at Worfield in 1383, where the jury declared that all boundary 
marks and encircling lines of the manor fully appertained to the lord. Whilst this is clearly a 
statement of seigniorial power, it occurred in the context of concerns about common rights 
within the manor. In the same set of presentments, it was stated that the lord and his tenants had 
common in the forest of Morfe with their animals at all times of the year and had for time out of 
memory. These statements occurred, much like at Downham, in an attempt to exclude tenants of 
another manor, with the jury claiming the lord of neighbouring Pattingham and his tenants had 
no common pasture within the manor, a statement surely related to their rights over Morfe 
forest.70 
Officers were therefore invested in establishing and defending rights and boundaries within the 
landscape, suggesting a pressure to utilise officeholding to govern emanating from external 
pressures. However, the specific nature of this differed between the case-study manors due to 
variations in environment and structure. At Worfield, beyond that to neighbouring Pattingham, 
there are virtually no references at the level of the manorial juries to establishing boundaries 
with settlements beyond the manor. The one exception occurs in 1549, when tenants of 
neighbouring Stockton and Higford carried away the manor’s boundary marker at Stapulford.71 
Vills did see more examples of tensions with external settlements, particularly evidenced in a 
long running set of presentments from 1372 to 1400 made by the collective vills of Burcote, 
Ryndelford and Bromley against the commoners of Bridgnorth for enclosing part of the 
commons and waste of Bromley.72  
                                                          
68 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.16, 4 Dec 1386.  
69 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.21, c.1432.  
70 SAC, P314/W/1/1/138, 14 Dec 1383.  
71 SAC, P314/W/1/1/674, 11 Oct 1549.  
72 SAC, P314/W/1/1/87-216.  
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Worfield’s juries’ concerns over boundaries instead focused on the internal dynamics of the 
manor, caused by the manor’s division into around 25 different townships, each with their own 
common lands, which required using the overarching manor court to establish rights between 
them. This can be seen in terms of seigniorial jurisdiction. In 1532, for instance, the jury leet 
presented that the lord ought to have all pertinent to the leet in Ackleton, a hamlet and sub-
manor at the edge of the parish boundary, as had been the case from time immemorial, with the 
jury thus establishing the extent of the manor’s leet jurisdiction.73 In 1473 an even more directly 
seigniorial right was noted, when it was presented that four vills were accustomed to surrender a 
yearly sum for pasturing their animals in the lord’s wood of Sowdeley which they had withheld 
since George Neville had been lord.74 Moreover, vills on several occasions used the court to 
present other townships for encroachment on their lands and commons and diverting the 
Worfe.75 Therefore, it is hard to make a case that governance was a cohesive force at Worfield. 
Instead the existence of dispersed sub-units within the manor provided different loci around 
which communities could develop.  
At Horstead, conversely, officers and particularly capital pledges had a significant role in 
monitoring the external boundaries of the manor. This can be seen via references to a 
perambulation to mark boundaries performed by the capital pledges. Pledges were presented for 
not performing this task in 1433, 1437, 1583 and 1592 and tenants for not maintaining aspects 
of infrastructure necessary for its performance in 1485, 1491, 1530, 1572, 1577, 1590 and 
1595.76 This relatively frequent monitoring suggests a continuous duty of perambulation only 
visible in presentments for failure to perform it. This type of presentment is not seen at Worfield 
and Downham in the rolls investigated. Whilst it is possible that this is because of complete 
compliance, it seems more likely that this function was not performed with the same regularity 
at these two manors as opposed to Horstead, which was situated in a region of complex 
manorial and leet boundaries. The evidence of presentments made by jurors concerning 
infractions against manorial boundaries reinforces this argument. Whilst Horstead, excluding its 
                                                          
73 SAC, P314/W/1/1/642, 21 Nov 1532; see p. 18.  
74 SAC, P314/W/1/351, 19 Aug 1473.  
75 SAC, P314/W/1/1/34, 22 May 1352; P314/W/1/1/40 13 May 1357; P314/W/1/1/156, 5 Oct 1385; 
P314/W/1/1/202, 4 Jun 1397; P314/W/1/1/470, 27 Sep 1487; P314/W/1/1/503, 30 Sep 1507; 
P314/W/1/1/503, 19 Oct 1508; P314/W/1/1/687, 6 Oct 1552; P314/W/1/1/750, 1 Oct 1562.  
76 KCA, HOR/36, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1433; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1437; HOR/53, m.1, 2 Oct 1583; 
m.10, 21 Mar 1592; HOR/40, m.3, 11 Jun 1485; HOR/41 m.6, 11 Jun 1491; HOR/45 m.25, 11 Jun 1530; 
HOR/51 m.3, 23 Apr 1572; m.8, 24 Apr 1577; HOR/53 m.7, 30 Mar 1590; HOR/54 m.1, 26 Mar 1595.  
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detached Coltishall fee, was bounded on its eastern side by the natural barrier of the River Bure, 
divisions with the manors of Crostwick, Mayton and Fretenham were manmade and thus liable 
to be broken (map 3.1).77 This led to a constant stream of cases concerning boundaries on the 
manor, with presentments about refusing to show bounds, ploughing up divisions and uprooting 
boundary stones. Examples concerning the boundary with Crostwick are seen in 1570, with 
Mayton in 1405, 1407, 1465, 1570 and with Fretenham in 1408, 1409, 1443, 1456, 1474, 1516, 
1517, 1520, along with many less specific presentments.78 That these boundaries required 
interaction with tenants from other manors is hinted at in a session of 1413, when the capital 
pledges presented that the vill of Mayton had not come with the vills of Horstead and 












                                                          
77 A description of the boundaries of the leet from an unidentifiable manuscript of 1592 describes a series 
of dole-stones for Horstead’s southern and western bounds. See Millican, Horstead and Stanninghall, 
appendix III, 201-3.  
78 KCA, HOR/51 m.2, 13 Apr 1570; HOR/30 unfoliated, 11 Jun 1405; HOR/36 unfoliated, 11 Jun 1407; 
HOR/39 m.12, 11 Jun 1465; HOR/51 m.2, 13 Apr 1570; HOR/36 unfoliated, 11 Jun 1408; HOR/33 
unfoliated, 11 Jun 1409; HOR/36 unfoliated 11 Jun 1443; HOR/37 separate foliation m.5, 6 Aug 1456; 
HOR/39 m.27, 11 Jun 1474; HOR/45 m.9, 11 Jun 1516; HOR/45, m.12, 29 Oct 1517; HOR/45, m.15, 30 
Oct 1520.  
79 KCA, HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1413.  
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Figure 3.1 – Map of Horstead with villages mentioned in text 
 
Boundary data = 1831 hundreds. 
 
The reasons for the breaking of boundaries also differ from those seen in the other case studies. 
Collective action by neighbouring vills is seen; for instance, in 1427 nine men from Crostwick 
were amerced 3s 4d each for coming in force and arms within the precincts of the leet to make a 
new watercourse at the western edge of the lord’s mill, claiming the land to be within the 
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bounds of Crostwick.80 However, more typical are actions committed by individual tenants. The 
nature of landholding in Norfolk likely drove this, with many tenants holding land on multiple 
manors and thus seeking to cultivate engrossed holdings via breaking manorial boundaries. 
Bruce Campbell’s analysis of late sixteenth-century surveys reveals that many large holdings 
were made up of land held in different parishes, often in parcels adjacent to parochial 
boundaries. At least 37% of tenants at Horstead held land in more than one parish.81 That 
tenants broke manorial boundaries to create larger holdings is occasionally stated in the rolls. In 
1522, a tenant was ordered to put back the metes he had ploughed up between free land held of 
Horstead’s Coltishall fee and customary land held of Coltishall manor (presumably Hakeford 
hall).82 In 1556, the jury were ordered to inquire of an enclosure made by Robert Shreve, which 
included both leased and customary land held of the manor, combined with free lands held of 
both Fretenham and Mayton, delineated by means of an illicit ditch made in part of Horstead’s 
common pasture.83 
As well as breaking physical boundaries, Horstead’s location amidst other manorial 
jurisdcitions led, in the first half of the fifteenth century, to conflict over the rights of officers to 
exercise authority. Sometimes these involved capital pledges from other manors performing 
their perambulation within Horstead’s boundaries, as the capital pledges of Fretenham did in 
1423 and those of Spixforth did in 1427 to mark their bounds.84 The capital pledges of Meyton 
appear to have been particularly aggressive, being presented in 1407, 1409 and 1417. 85 On the 
first occasion they amerced the manor’s residents in their leet for business pertinent to 
Horstead’s leet, whilst in 1417 they levied pains after entering a place called ‘coppyngs’. These 
cases involved many of the same Meyton pledges, Richard Southfen appearing in all three 
cases, and Thomas Elys and Robert Bateman appearing in 1407 and 1409. Such offences were 
met with significant amercements; in the 1427 instance the ten Spixworth capital pledges were 
amerced a total of 33s 4d and in the 1407 instance the five Meyton pledges were amerced a total 
of 20s.  
                                                          
80 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1427.  
81 Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, 13.  
82 KCA, HOR/45, m.16, 3 Jul 1522.  
83 KCA, HOR/50, m.6, 21 Apr 1556.  
84 KCA, HOR/37, separate foliation m.2, 23 Sep 1423; HOR/37, unfoliated, 9 Sep 1427. 




The complex relationship with Coltishall’s leet also led to conflict. In 1439 four men were 
presented for usurping the lordship of the manor by amercing Alice Coupere for 3s in 
Coltishall’s leet for making kindling in her marsh held of Horstead manor and lying within the 
precincts of its leet. The presentment explicitly states that Coupere should have been amerced 
within Horstead’s leet rather than elsewhere, highlighting it was jurisdiction rather than the 
offence itself that was at issue.86 Coltishall leet’s royal status meant that its actions were 
performed by the bailiff of South Erpingham Hundred rather than a manorial officer. This is 
seen in 1453, when Oliver Holme as bailiff came in force inside the lordship and distrained 
William Tubby, a servile tenant, by two cows for money recuperated against William in the 
royal leet at Coltishall, driving them into the neighbouring manor.87 These presentments 
concerning officers from other manors impinging on the jurisdiction of officials, rather than just 
the physical landscape, are unique to Horstead in this period. 
Establishing boundaries was essential in limiting access to common resources from outsiders, 
and this may explain why officers continued to monitor boundaries even if bounds acted against 
potential benefits to local elites such as engrossment. At Horstead, an external threat throughout 
the fifteenth century was provided by the shepherds of the lords of Fretenham and Mayton, who 
regularly commoned their flocks within the manor.88 More generally there were regular 
presentments of strangers for commoning within the manor where they ought not. This 
monitoring of the appropriation of common rights by non-residents also directed the work of 
manorial officers at Downham. Sometimes, this was by tenants of manors held by lords other 
than the Bishop of Ely. For instance, the vill of Chatteris was presented frequently between 
1428 and 1502 for pasturing beasts in the common fens without licence. The amercements for 
this offence grew over time, rising from 20s in the early 1450s, to 40s in the late 1450s to 
1470s, and then to 100s in the 1480s and 1490s.89  
                                                          
86 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1439.  
87 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1453.  
88 KCA, HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Sep 1414; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1417; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1420; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1428; HOR/36, unfoliated, 10 Sep 1432; HOR/37, unfoliated, 6 Sep 
1434; HOR/36 unfoliated, 11 Jun 1443; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jul 1454; HOR/39, m.5, 2 Aug 1463; 
HOR/39, m.21, 11 Jun 1470; HOR/39, m.40, 27 Oct 1480; HOR/41, m.6, 11 Jun 1491.  
89 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.14, 12 Mar 1428; C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434; C11/2/6, m.49, 24 May 1452; 
C11/2/6, m.52, 10 May 1456; C11/2/6, m.54, 1 Jun 1457; C11/2/6, m.55, 16 Jun 1458; C11/2/6, m.56, 3 
Jan 1459; C11/3/7, m.4, 18 Jul 1461; C11/3/7, m.7, 16 May 1464; C11/3/7, m.8, 27 Sep 1465; C11/3/7, 
m.11, 13 May 1467; C11/3/7, m.19, 13 May 1472; C11/3/7, m.1, 2 Jun 1473; C11/3/10, unfoliated, 24 
Feb 1487; C11/3/10, m.1, 26 Sep 1488; C11/3/10, m.10, 29 Mar 1496; C11/3/10, m.19, 6 May 1502.  
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However, officers at Downham had a distinctive role in that the surrounding fen was 
intercommoned with neighbouring manors, meaning that establishing responsibilities over, and 
rights to, joint resources was more typical than monitoring definitive boundaries. For example 
in a bylaw of 1507 it was agreed between the tenants of the manor that the commoners of Ely 
were responsible for maintaining the common road leading into Westfen from the town in the 
east part of the lord’s park, whilst Downham’s inhabitants were responsible for a similar path in 
the west part of the park.90 This followed on from an ordinance previously made outside the 
court, a possible reference to an earlier agreement between inhabitants of Downham and Ely 
made in a cross-manorial meeting. The role of officers in monitoring intercommoned fens is 
seen in their presentments. An earlier session of 1487 saw the jury present that the town of Ely 
had not repaired a road at the east end of the lord’s park used to drive beasts out of the 
Westmore to the great damage of Downham’s tenants. This is likely the road mentioned in the 
bylaw of 1507. Ely’s commoners were amerced 20s and ordered to repair the road under pain of 
40s.91 In 1426, the jury stated that four named men with others unknown of Ely had 
overburdened the common, with the fact that the offence was for overstocking rather than illicit 
commoning suggesting the men were exceeding legitimately held rights. The justification again 
emphasises the damage done to both lord and tenants, with the jury claiming that the 
overstocking meant that the bishop could not have sedge for his kitchen and that the tenants 
could not have the same to repair their houses.92 
Concern over landscape provides evidence that when elites used officeholding to govern, they 
did so in a way that promoted community cohesiveness, and therefore worked against producing 
the social differentiation seen in the early modern period. This varied between communities, 
with little evidence at the manorial level at Worfield for the use of office in this way due to the 
dispersed nature of settlement. At Horstead, the picture is complex; considerable use was made 
of manorial officeholding to protect the leet’s jurisdictional boundaries and prevent the common 
being used by neighbouring lords’ officials, but at the same time presentments preventing the 
breaking of boundaries were targeted at tenants rather than outsiders. Downham has the most 
straightforwardly cohesive monitoring, with neighbouring villages targeted for impinging on 
Downham’s collective rights.  
                                                          
90 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, m.23, 24 Sep 1507.  
91 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, unfoliated, 24 Feb 1487.  
92 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m. 9, 19 Jul 1426.  
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Landscape and Community Differentiation  
How far could concern about the landscape have the opposite effect, creating a governing 
structure that focused on differentiation of the type found in English villages c.1600? Detailed 
examination reveals contrasts between the case studies in the way concern about landscape 
directed the role and exercise of manorial office, and especially the extent to which economic 
hierarchies were reinforced through village governance. 
Horstead saw continuous presentment of community issues linked to landscape but little 
variation in the make-up of these presentments. This is reflected in the fact that very few 
bylaws, which allowed tenants to focus officers’ attentions on new problems, were made in the 
period examined. Two of the few bylaws made concerned ringing pigs, made in 1511 and 1595, 
showing that even in the late sixteenth century tenants saw the utility of office to meet 
communal needs. The 1511 ordinance, made with the consent of all the homage but after a 
complaint by the jury, ordered all pigs to be ringed by Michaelmas under pain of 4d.93 The 1595 
bylaw, made nominally by both the capital pledges and tenants of the manor, went further by 
establishing a new office of pig reeve, whose holders were ordered to give notice that tenants 
should ring their pigs. Any offenders who had pigs unringed four days after this proclamation 
were to be fined 4d per animal.94 Yet this adaptation is exceptional, and generally Horstead’s 
officers appear to have made presentments according to the same list of offences as established 
by the 1390s. 
This contrasts with the significant changing use of landscape seen in eastern Norfolk in this 
period. The centuries before 1349 saw the increasing development of common fields in this 
region as population growth led to greater subdivision of land holdings, creating a structure of 
unenclosed strips held in large fields.95 However, the population drop and stagnation caused by 
the Black Death and subsequent epidemics allowed for greater engrossment of holdings as the 
land market became the dominant way in which land was transferred, providing a precondition 
for significant enclosure in the early modern period.96 Campbell has outlined this in detail for 
Horstead: by 1586 the average holding size at Horstead-with-Staninghall had reached 72.3a, 
                                                          
93 KCA, HOR/45, m.3, 25 Aug 1511.  
94 KCA, HOR/54, m.1, 26 Mar 1595.  
95 Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, 18-26.  
96 Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, 26-29.  
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with seven tenants having holdings of more than 80a.97 Closes accounted for around 42.4% of 
farmland in the parish, making it the most enclosed in terms of farmland of the six parishes he 
analysed.98 The move towards greater enclosure is seen in a court of 1566, when, in exchange 
for a collective rent increase, the lord agreed that all farmers and tenants could enclose both 
their free and customary land at will.99 This increasing move towards enclosure likely explains 
the reduction in the number of presentments for trespasses in the tenants’ collective crops at 
Horstead, with these falling from 3-12 per decade for the 1390s to 1480s, to 0-1 per decade for 
the 1490s and sixteenth century.100  
Common pasture at Horstead was enclosed far later. Whilst at neighbouring Coltishall by 1586 
only around 4% of the total acreage of the parish was common pasture, areas of infertile sand 
and gravel led to persistent areas of common pasture at Horstead.101 However, in 1599 an 
agreement made between King’s College and the tenants, after a petition of 1598, led to the 
complete extinguishing of common land and rights within the manor. Any precursor to this shift 
is not seen in ‘community’ presentments, with the manor court continuing to be used to monitor 
access to the common and overstocking down to 1599. Moreover, there was no dichotomy 
between officers monitoring common rights and enclosers. An examination of the eighteen 
representatives of the tenants in the enclosure petition of 1598 who either signed or marked the 
document reveals that twelve of these were prominent manorial officers who served as jurors 
and capital pledges monitoring common rights.102 This is not necessarily surprising; whilst 
agrarian history has sometimes presented a struggle between enclosers and commoners, it is 
important to remember that commoning was a carefully managed right with stints made 
according to the quantity of land held.103 Thus officers when presenting offenders for 
overstocking or utilising the commons without permission were defending a set of privately 
                                                          
97 Adapted from Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, Table 4, 15.  
98 Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, Table 1, 10.  
99 KCA, HOR/52 m.4, 19 Apr 1566.  
100 KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54.  
101 Campbell, ‘Commonfields’, 10-11.  
102 KCA, HOR/15, 8 Sep 1598; HOR/53-54.  
103 T. De Moor, ‘Avoiding Tragedies: a Flemish Common and its Commoners under the Pressure of 
Social and Economic Change during the Eighteenth century’, EcHR , 62, 2009, 1-22, 2-10; A.J.L. 
Winchester and E.A. Straughton, ‘Stints and Sustainability: Managing Stock Levels on Common Lands in 
England, c.1600-2006’ AgHR, 58, (2010), 30-48, 31-6; M. Bailey, ‘Beyond the Midland Field System: 
the Determinants of Common Rights over the Arable in Medieval England’, AgHR, 58, (2010), 153-71, 
157-8; C.C. Dyer, ‘Conflict in the Landscape: the Enclosure Movement in England, 1220-1349’, 
Landscape History, 28, (2006), 21-33, 21, 24, 31. 
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held use-rights as much as the rights of the community as a whole, and presumably saw the 
enclosure of 1599 as simply removing the role of policing of rights from the communal court to 
private individuals. Certainly, juries were seemingly diligent in presenting enclosure down to 
1599, with presentments for illicit enclosure and occupation of common lands peaking at 9 per 
decade for the 1580s as opposed to a mean of 2.6.104 However, the move towards enclosure may 
explain the lack of innovation in the use of officers for village governance, as elites preferred 
greater private rights to lands rather than attempts to monitor the community at large. The small 
size of the tenant community, with only 29 tenants in 1586, must also have accelerated this 
process.  
Worfield clearly saw greater innovation in the management of landscape via the manorial court, 
a fact inherent in the great increase of ‘community’ presentments in the sixteenth century. 
However, the decentralised leet structure meant that this was achieved through a growth in the 
use of the manor court by individual vills or clusters of vills to enforce collective requirements 
over pasturing, usage of commons and the maintenance of infrastructure decided on a township 
level. Paralleling northern England’s upland communities, townships made their own bylaws 
and pains at Worfield, which were recorded within the manor court setting.105 These, however, 
were confined to the turn of the sixteenth century, with all of the sixteen recorded instances 
made between 1481 and 1531, suggesting innovation in this period was driving the increase in 
‘community’ presentments in the sixteenth century.106 Sometimes these pains were aimed at 
alleviating a one-off problem, such as those that ordered tenants to make their closes before 
specific dates, or that placed by five vills in 1519 ordering that ‘each tenant…purge their own 
part of the watercourse and ditch next to the road before Christmas’.107 These mirror the specific 
pains placed on individuals presented for failing to maintain infrastructure seen at the manor.  
Other pains look to have enforced specific policies in perpetuity and were perhaps aimed at 
dealing with local concerns about resource allocation. Some were particularly targeted at poorer 
tenants, limiting their access to resources. In 1491, both Hallon and Wykyn made bylaws which 
ordered that tenants only pasture their livestock on their own lands, presumably limiting the 
                                                          
104 KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54. 
105 Winchester, ‘Upland Commons’, 41.  
106 SAC, P314/W/1/1/422-639. 
107 SAC, P314/W/1/1/505, 26 May 1511; P314/W/1/1/506, 9 Oct 1511; P314/W/1/1/547, 7 Oct 1519.  
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ability of smaller tenants to graze animals.108 A bylaw made at Sonde, again in 1491, targeted 
hedgebreakers, ordering that none of the tenants of the vill break the hedges of the same vill 
under pain of 3s 4d each time.109 This again likely targeted the poor, who broke hedges for 
fuel.110 This bylaw was not creating a new offence; vills had previously presented 
hedgebreaking in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by vills. Yet, there was definitely an 
increase in the later sixteenth century. Whilst in the period 1327-1498, 15 presentments are 
recorded in the rolls, 1507-71 saw 27 presentments made, with 18 of these concentrated in the 
period 1559-71.111 The bylaw is evidence of a larger phenomenon of the increasing use of 
manorial structures by vills at Worfield to deal with aspects of infrastructure linked to poverty. 
A similar concern may be seen in another Hallon bylaw of 1481, in which it was ordered that 
‘none occupy lands and pastures in the fields of the aforesaid vill under pain’ after a man had 
been presented in the same court for occupying and unjustly holding lands without licence.112 
This bylaw was potentially aimed at preventing squatter settlement.  
Thus, the growth of ‘community’ presentments does reflect an increase in the use of manorial 
officers, in terms of the vill presenting officials, to more intensely govern the local community. 
However, the nature of the manor as a dispersed settlement appears to have limited the 
coherence of this governance, with decisions largely being made at the township level. This is 
reflected in a lack of ‘community’ presentments at the level of the juries leet and baron, as well 
as the fact bylaws did not create new manorial officials or adapt the roles of pre-existing ones. 
Partially, this is probably because of differing priorities between the various vills. For example, 
of the ten vills that presented hedgebreakers, only two were recorded in 1582 as having access 
to common within the forest of Morfe, suggesting this offence was strongly linked to locations 
without alternative sources of firewood.113 In fact, it seems likely the records of the manor court 
are not revealing the entire picture, with it probable that decisions were made in local meetings 
at the township level which were never set down in writing, or maybe never enrolled.114 A hint 
is given in the details of the pain attached to a Hallon bylaw of 1481, which stated that half 
                                                          
108 SAC, P314/W/1/1/486, 6 Apr 1491; P314/W/1/1/488, 26 Oct 1491.  
109 SAC, P314/W/1/1/488, 26 Oct 1491.  
110 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 84-5.  
111 SAC, P314/W/1/1/4-775.  
112 SAC, P314/W/1/1/422, 25 Oct 1481.  
113 Smith, Worfield, Appendix 2.  
114 Winchester highlights the existence of these for certain upland northern manors: ‘Upland Commons’, 
41-2.   
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should go to the lord and half to the vill, suggesting some rudimentary structure to disperse the 
profits of the pain.115 The flurry of activity in the sixteenth century may not reflect a growth in 
governance, but an increasing use of the manor court to enforce pre-existing rules, taking 
advantage of the presentment system to enforce bylaws and lay down pains to prevent 
reoffending. Therefore, it is hard to argue that at Worfield manorial structures worked to create 
community differentiation on a manorial level. 
 The persistent but relatively static use of manorial officeholding to maintain infrastructure and 
control common pasturing at Horstead, and the uncoordinated use by vills at Worfield to 
maintain infrastructure but also restrict access to resources, can be contrasted with a more 
adaptive and coherent use at Downham. Here landscape differed significantly due to the 
existence of the fen commons around a largely nucleated settlement. These provided resources 
beyond common pastureland, with sedge and turves that were extracted to be used for fuel and 
thatching.116 Control and management of these resources make up a large proportion of 
Downham’s ‘community’ presentments and understanding their role allows for an appreciation 
of how the community of tenants, or at least part of that community, utilised officeholding for 
purposes beyond those imposed by lord and crown.  
The purposes to which officeholding was put by the community in this regard changed over 
time. Bylaws allowed for officers to be adapted to new functions and to police new offences. 
These occur far more frequently at Downham than at Horstead and Worfield, with 49 
ordinances (including some reissues) recorded in the surviving rolls.117 Unfortunately, little is 
provided in the text of bylaws to explain the process by which they were made. The language of 
consent is nearly always utilised; formulas include ‘the lord and his tenants both free and serf’ 
and ‘the whole homage’.118 However, as Ault has argued, these formulas likely do not reflect 
reality, and it shall be shown that several of Downham’s bylaws worked to privilege the 
wealthiest tenants.119 
                                                          
115 SAC, P314/W/1/1/422, 25 Oct 1481. 
116 Coleman, Downham¸ 20-21.  
117 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-11.  
118 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.22, 16 Oct 1388; C11/1/3, m.24, 27 Sep 1389; C11/2/5, m.2, 12 Jan 1417.  
119 Ault, ‘Open-field Husbandry’, 42; Ault, ‘Village By laws by Common Consent’, 194; Shaw-Taylor, 
‘Management of Common Lands’, 66.  
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A brief sketch of the chronology of control of common resources through bylaws reveals these 
trends, showing the continued use of manorial office to govern landscape. In the pre-Black 
Death sessions, during a period of high population, officers were utilised to monitor ‘bad’ 
gleaning, presenting 16 offenders between 1310 and 1331.120 In 1327, the five women presented 
had explicitly not harvested but gleaned, a focus on the supposed preference to take resources 
without labouring that would appear in later courts.121 No bylaws were made in this period, 
although the resource-policing function of manorial officers is seen in the clauses attached to the 
election of bylawmen. This type of officer, not seen in the other two case studies, shows how 
the tenants at Downham went as far as to create officers to enforce decisions made about 
common resources. In 1311, the bylawmen were ‘elected by the whole homage to guard the 
bylaws for the grain and meadows of the lord and others and of rushes and turves’, a statement 
recognising their dual nature of fulfilling seigniorial and communal functions.122 In 1326 a more 
restrictive function is suggested with guardians of the marsh sworn to present ‘the names of 
those who take anything in [the fen] more than they should have through housebote or heybote 
or firbote. And to…present all cattle of strangers and those who do not hold land of 
the…vill’.123 The latter statement aims to exclude outsiders, but the former shows that officials 
were also used to preserve hierarchies of access within the community of tenants. The 1251 
Coucher Book gives no detail of differing rights, simply stating ‘that all the vill at Downham, 
the lesser as well as the greater folk, shall have common rights’, suggesting that these 
restrictions may have been developed due to increasing population pressure in the late thirteenth 
century.124 By the early fourteenth century, manorial officeholding was being used to monitor 
stratified common rights.  
The relaxation of population pressure after the Black Death did not lead to any lessening of 
restrictions, and in fact saw a flurry of bylaws passed from 1381 onwards, which modified the 
functions of officials to meet new problems. For example, in 1386, 1389, 1420, 1433 and 1503 
bylaws were passed concerning the ringing of pigs, in 1388 a bylaw was made ordering tenants 
to bind sedge they mowed between Hokeday and Michaelmas, and restrictions on the times 
                                                          
120 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.1 24 Nov 1310; C11/1/1, m.6, 15 Dec 1315; C11/1/1, m.9, 25 Sep 1327; 
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121 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.9, 25 Sep 1327.  
122 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.2, 1 Jul 1311.  
123 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.8, 29 Apr 1326.  
124 Miller et al., Coucher Book, 46.  
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when sedge and turves could be collected were made in 1388, 1392 and 1404.125 These bylaws 
were enforced by manorial jurors as well as bylawmen, and engendered relatively quick 
responses. Whilst in the 1360s-1380s only 2-3 presentments concerning leaving sedge unbound 
were made a decade, officers made 4-8 presentments from the 1390s to 1450s. Reports of taking 
sedge and turves after the assigned day also grew in the 1380s to 1420s. Rules around ringing 
pigs were seemingly less effectively enforced, with presentments in the years following bylaws 
in the 1380s and 1420s but little beyond these points, although this could suggest relative 
conformity as well as lack of interest.126  
Many of these bylaws were applied in the same way to all inhabitants and look to have been 
beneficial to the community at large by avoiding having livestock trampling fields and ensuring 
all worked in the fen at the same time. On one occasion such a statement is even made; in a 
bylaw of 1409 it was ordered that tenants should not dig more than 20,000 turves a year from 
the marsh ‘because by the injury of the excessive digging of turves year on year the marsh…is 
devastated’.127 Bylaws could thus be seen as a tool in governing for a cohesive community.  
On the other hand, bylaws concerning the amount of resources and the control of labourers on 
the manor seem to have been deliberately targeted to aid the wealthier tenants. In 1381 ‘the 
whole homage’ ordered that virgaters were entitled to 20,000 turves, half-virgaters 10,000 
turves and cottagers 5,000 turves, whilst inhabitants of Downhamhythe were allowed 5,000 
turves for sale and specified amounts for their own use.128 In 1441 an even more complex bylaw 
was made, this time with the consent of the jury, suggesting a more officially directed bylaw. 
This excluded tenants and residents who did not hold a cottage or land of the lord from any 
profit from the common of Newbykynk, including of fish, turves, wood or sedge. Cottagers 
without land were allowed estovers to sustain themselves but none to sell, whilst half-virgaters 
and virgaters were allowed ‘reasonable’ estovers and could sell turves according to their tenure, 
with the cap for full-virgaters being 14,000.129 These bylaws were largely aimed at sale of 
resources, preventing smaller tenants from exploiting the fen as an economic resource. The 
                                                          
125 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.16, 10 Sep 1386; C11/1/3, m.24, 27 Sep 1389; C11/2/5, m.14, 22 Sep 1419; 
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126 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2-3, C11/2/4-6. 
127 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4 m.21, 21 Jun 1409.  
128 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3 m.9, c.1381.   
129 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.33 4 Sep 1441 
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mechanics of sale are explored below, but it is difficult, unfortunately, to explore the operation 
of this bylaw in presentments as they often do not explain why taking a resource was illicit. 
More easily investigated is the response through bylaws to problems concerning harvest labour 
in this period of demographic decline. These repeat the theme of labourers failing to work but 
then reaping the rewards of the harvest and common resources seen in the early fourteenth-
century gleaning presentments. In 1388 it was declared that none should glean in autumn if he 
could collect a penny and midday meal a day under pain of 6d, whilst in 1411 it was ordered 
that none go into the fen or leave the lordship for another vill in autumn after a time declared in 
church under pain of 40d.130 This bylaw was restated in 1426 but also ordered that a labourer 
must come from the fen to the field if required.131 These rules led to routine if small numbers of 
presentments from the 1370s to 1440s along with continuous gleaning presentments. In 1375, 
1391, 1394, 1406 and 1429 individuals were presented for refusing to labour but still fishing 
and taking turves from the common. 132 Men were also presented for leaving the manor to seek 
employment elsewhere: in 1378 John Haukyn was amerced 40d for leaving with his cart to go 
to diverse other vills outside the lordship to seek better wages, whilst in 1444 a man travelled to 
Witcham in autumn against the ordinance.133 These ordinances can only have benefitted 
wealthier tenants who had enough land to require hired labour, clearly those with excess labour 
to sell saw the advantage of leaving the manor for better remuneration elsewhere. Whilst the 
success of labour control as exercised through manorial office is open to doubt, it clearly shows 
a refocusing of office to achieve the aims of wealthier tenants. 
The surviving courts after 1552 demonstrate that officeholding continued to be utilised to serve 
the interests of manorial elites in the late sixteenth century. Again there are examples of 
seemingly community-minded presentments, such as a series of bylaws delineating areas to 
pasture sheep in 1554-5.134 However, other bylaws look like they were designed again to protect 
the fen from non-tenants, but this time occurring in a period of increasing population. In 1552 a 
bylaw was made ordering that no tenants, whether free or customary, have more than one scythe 
on the first day they entered the common to cut reeds, under pain of 6s for each extra scythe. 
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131 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.9, 19 Jul 1426.  
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C11/2/3, m.16, 24 Sep 1406; C11/2/6, m.17, 23 Dec 1429. 
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134 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, unfoliated, 22 Oct 1554; C11/3/10, unfoliated, 2 May 1555.  
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This bylaw seems fairly equitable, but was followed by another aimed specifically at subtenants 
which ordered that none have more than one scythe, even if there were many living in one 
tenement, under the stiffer pain of 6s 8d a scythe.135 Offenders were presented under this bylaw 
in 1562 and 1575.136 This general concern about a burgeoning population is seen in a 
presentment by the jury of 1554 about 11 tenants who had erected cottages inside the manor 
within the last ten years. It was ordered to discuss with the lord if common should resultantly be 
apportioned to the cottages. In the same court a ban on non-familial lodgers was made, with an 
order that none cohabit inside one tenement unless they were part of a nuclear family under pain 
of 40s.137 Four offenders were amerced by jurors in 1571 for receiving subtenants, though at the 
significantly smaller sum of 6d each.138 These new rules show the flexibility of manorial 
officeholding which allowed it to meet the changing needs of the local elite. Whilst in the 
depopulated fifteenth century juries could present those leaving the manor, in the reverse 
conditions of the sixteenth century they could try to reduce the number of residents in the 
village.  
Bylaws impacted on officeholding beyond providing new articles under which jurors and 
bylawmen could present offenders. They conferred new duties upon pre-existing seigniorial 
officers, giving them functions that helped in regulating the community. For instance, in the 
1411 bylaw preventing labourers leaving in autumn, the beginning of the precluded time was to 
be announced by the reeve in the church, and in the 1388 order about binding sedge the messor 
was to collect the profit of the sedge unbound by offenders.139 Bylawmen were last elected in 
1414, eight years after their last recorded presentments in 1406 but a new set of officers 
increasingly took responsibility for enforcing rules concerning the fen.140 Fenreeves first appear 
as guardians of the marsh in 1326. After a break in the records they then appear in the 1360s, 
before regularly being recorded in selections and making presentments in the fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries, then after the gap in the records, being noted as chosen in the mid-1550s 
and 1570s even though they made no presentments. The patchiness in recording selections, and 
the fact that fenreeves sometimes presented separately and sometimes through the jury means 
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tracking their role is difficult. A bylaw made in 1429 gave them the role of delineating the area 
in which tenants were allowed to dig turves, although a later bylaw of 1440 gave this role to the 
lord and his council, whilst ordinances made in 1554-5 concerning sheep pasturing tasked them 
with removing sheep from the fen at times when they were not allowed to be pastured.141  
The majority of fenreeves’ presentments concern the sale of sedge and turves, making up 99 of 
151 presentments, as part of a larger corpus of 249 presentments concerning sales made by all 
officers in the period examined.142 These nominally punished tenants for selling sedge and 
turves outside the vill against the bylaw, although the frequency of presentment means that this 
may have been viewed more as a licensing system, allowing the lord to profit from extra-
manorial sales rather than necessarily an attempt to actually curb this behaviour. Presentments 
claimed that the lord should receive 3d per 1000 turves and 6d per 1000 sedge, which Coleman, 
comparing this to turves valued at 1s per 1000 in 1325, suggests meant that the trade could be 
profitable even after paying amercements, again a hint at a licensing system.143 On the other 
hand, these licences occurred in a context of control of sales. Whilst some bylaws limited the 
amount of resources tenants of various types could take to sell, others focused on the method of 
selling. In 1426, it was ordered that tenants and residents could only sell the amount of sedge 
and turves they could carry with their own cart or boat to strangers outside the lordship, and that 
strangers were not allowed to enter the common and carry away resources. This was under pain 
of 20s, significantly more than the sale amercements seen above.144 A similar bylaw made in 
1554 seems to have banned the sale of turves to strangers completely under pain of 6s 8d.145 
Whilst sales were monitored partially to generate seigniorial revenue, there were also real 
efforts to control to whom fenland resources were sold.  
The contrasts between Horstead, Worfield and Downham reveal that whilst at all manors 
officeholding was clearly used for managing landed resources, this was mediated by the nature 
of different landscapes and how they were utilised, creating very different roles for officers. At 
Horstead the role of juries remained vital in policing common rights, but this occurred in a 
context of increasing enclosure which reached its conclusion in 1599, replacing official 
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monitoring with private ownership. The set of offences officers monitored was maintained but 
not extended, meaning that they were not used to intensely govern the community in response to 
new problems. 
The dispersed structure of Worfield, a product of its size but also of its wood-pasture landscape 
leading to multiple townships, meant that the manor was used as a unit of governance, but 
largely to enforce specific concerns of local settlements. Bylaws were directed against poorer 
tenants, but there is no evidence of a more universal aim which crossed the various vills and 
could create a manorial elite. Moreover, these concerns only ever impinged on the presentments 
of individual townships, rather than the work of both juries and the various selected officials.  
Downham is the inverse of both these pictures. The community was intensely governed through 
manorial officeholding, with bylaws used to extend, or refocus authority, on issues including 
labour, fenland resources and subtenancy. This intense governing, moreover, was stratified, 
with bylaws used to meet the labour requirements of larger tenants, and to ensure their 
privileged access to the resources of the fen. These laws were not only used to create new 
articles for jurors to present in the court, but even created new officers and redefined the role of 
existing ones created to serve the lord. 
Conclusion  
An examination of the concerns which could inculcate the use of manorial office to promote the 
aims of an elite group, and so create something approaching a middling sort, reveals a mixed 
picture. At all three communities, the governance achieved through manorial officeholding, in 
terms of landscape, was to some degree community-minded. Pressure from without, facilitated 
in part by the lord’s desire to protect his jurisdiction from neighbouring institutions, led officers 
to champion the rights of the village community as a whole, suggesting a common interest in 
manorial officeholding. This chimes well with both the contentions of the Toronto school and 
the conception of the medieval manor seen in the work of early modernists. 
Yet, alongside this common interest, manorial officeholding could be used to intensely govern 
communities in a way akin to that described for the early modern village. This is exemplified 
for Downham, where concern about misbehaviour, now long-identified as a concern for 
medieval elites, was combined with a concern to control access to common lands according to 
landholding size as well as harvest labour. Perhaps what is most compelling is this coincidence 
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of concerns, which combined to promote a wider context of control, much like the confluence of 
factors identified by Wrightson in creating a middling sort. The way misbehaviour and a 
concern to ensure a supply of labour could work together is well illustrated in a presentment of 
1491. Simon Jacob was amerced 2d for governing his house poorly by hosting the servants of 
the lord’s tenants at night, which caused these servants to withdraw their service from their 
masters to the damage of the tenants. Whilst the punishment was relatively minor, a significant 
pain of 10s was also put not only on Simon but any others who did similarly, effectively 
creating a bylaw aimed at controlling the labour force.146 Thus a combination of interests was 
working together in this period to distance the subset of tenants who held office from those they 
governed, leading them to utilise manorial office to control the wider community. Andy Wood, 
discussing changes to common rights and enclosure in the late sixteenth century, has argued that 
‘in many respects, the “better sort” were better placed to push through changes to the village 
economy than were the gentry’ as ‘wealthier villagers were not only the employers of poor 
labourers’ but ‘also acted as village constables, overseers of the poor rates and as vestrymen’.147 
The evidence suggests that at Downham, the larger tenants had realised this almost 200 years 
earlier, and were able to use manorial office to effect change. This was, however, tempered with 
policies that protected the community of tenants at large, which likely meant that this subset still 
identified with their fellow villagers in a way perhaps less true of later periods.  
Of course, Downham is only one of the three case studies examined. Worfield and Horstead do 
not display, at least at the level of the whole manor, all of the same trends towards more 
intensive governance, although both saw monitoring of misbehaviour. Whilst from three studies 
it is hard to generalise, this seems likely to be due to underlying differences in the settlements. 
At Worfield, the manor’s authority over dispersed settlements may have prevented the court’s 
use as a tool of governance by a combined elite. At Horstead, the complexity of jurisdictions, 
combined with increasing engrossment over multiple manors, may have disincentivised elites 
who may not have identified with a particular community, or may have seen little need to 
enforce their authority over a decreasing number of tenants. This does not invalidate the 
arguments made for Downham, however. Early modernists arguing for the rise of the village 
middling sort, including Wrightson, have been eager to point out that this process did not occur 
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uniformly.148 Jan Pitman emphasises traditions of ‘participation and inclusion’ in parochial 
officeholding, suggesting that the middling sort could vary across time and space, whilst John 
Broad shows that a strong landowner could curtail the creation of a local elite.149 Healey 
emphasises that in Lancashire the magistracy retained significant control over the 
implementation of the poor law rather than this being in the hands of an independent parochial 
elite.150 Therefore, in the particular case of Downham, it is possible to identify something like a 
proto-middling sort. This crucially reinforces the argument that those holding manorial 
officeholding had desires outside of meeting a seignorial requirement in serving in office and 
suggests the officeholding system may have been perceived as beneficial by the group of tenants 
who held these positions. In the next chapter, this contention will be faced head on.  
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Chapter 4: Attitudes to Officeholding 
The Mediating Officer 
An underlying assumption runs through the previous three chapters, namely that medieval and 
early modern communities, or at least the subset of their members who held office, were 
broadly supportive of the manorial officeholding system. This assumption is vital to the 
contention that officeholding had a life outside of meeting a seignorial requirement, explaining 
its persistence after the mid-sixteenth century, why it would be held by a more elite group, and 
how it could become a tool used by a set of ‘chief inhabitants’ for governing local communities. 
At the crux of the contention is that officeholding was not purely, or perhaps even mainly, a 
seignorial imposition from above, and that its participants had motivations to serve beyond the 
need to meet an obligation of their tenure.  
Analyses of manorial officeholding vary in how far they can support such a contention. The 
position of the Toronto School is most clearly in support of such a view; for them officials 
worked primarily for the community of tenants, and thus those holding office supported the 
system on benevolent, community-minded grounds.1 However, as discussed above, such a view 
has been comprehensively challenged, partially because it imposes far too positive a view of the 
community-mindedness of medieval villagers, but also due to its complete removal of the lord 
from the picture.2  
Contemporary estate literature gives the opposite impression of the lord’s role. The detailed 
guidance of works such as the Seneshaucy and Walter of Henley displays how lords, or at least 
their stewards, were keenly aware of the need to closely monitor officials to prevent illicit 
profiting and corruption.3 Stone has demonstrated that lords took a significant interest in 
monitoring their reeves’ performances, replacing those who failed to meet expectations.4 He 
suggests, however, that during the high point of direct demesne management in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries local reeves were competent managers and able to meet 
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seignorial expectations.5 Officers also benefitted from the opportunity to cream off significant 
perquisites for themselves, as is vividly revealed by the formulary of Robert le Carpenter, which 
details methods which allowed officials to utilise their position for illicit profit.6 However, the 
changes wrought by the Black Death are seen to have reversed this picture. Reeves came under 
increased pressure as lords attempted to maintain revenues in the face of falling prices and 
rising wages. At the same time officials were required to enforce aspects of serfdom, including 
labour services designed to replace expensive waged labour, in a time when a reduced 
population meant it was easier to resist servile obligations.7 Officers and officeholding became 
subject to attack from their fellow tenants, with Larson detailing a litany of assaults on officers 
and refusals to serve as officials on manors held by the Bishop of Durham.8 In such straightened 
times, the officeholding system looks to have been increasingly undesirable for those serving, 
especially as the post-Black Death world offered opportunities for skilled agriculturalists 
beyond their home manor.9  
Such an argument sees officeholders as caught in a vice between the lord, exerting power from 
above, and the community of tenants, exerting power from below. This model has become the 
standard way in which to think about the position of officers. The crucial theme is of negotiation 
and flexibility, with officers having to tread a difficult line between the desires of the lord and 
their fellow villagers. By the same token they could variously ally with either side in order to 
further their own ends and utilise office to improve their standing, perhaps giving them a 
measure of control over their fellow tenants.10 They could alternatively seek to lessen the 
burdens on their fellows through overlooking non-performance of labour services and 
                                                          
5 Stone, Decision-Making, 189-203; Stone ‘Farm Management’, 634. .  
6 Harvey, Manorial Records, 6; Harvey, Oxfordshire Village, 69-71; Briggs, ‘Monitoring Demesne 
Managers’, 180; Dyer, Lords and Peasants, 114; S. Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 228-9; M. Carlin, ‘Cheating the Boss: Robert 
Carpenter’s Embezzlement Instructions (1261x1268) and employee fraud in medieval England’ in B. 
Dodds and C.D. Liddy (eds.), Commercial Activity, Markets and Entrepreneurs in the Middle Ages: 
Essays in Honour of Richard Britnell, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011), 183-98, 184-190.  
7 Hilton, Serfdom in Medieval England, 44; Stone, Decision-Making, 221-4; Dyer ‘Village Community’, 
416-7, 427-8.  
8 Larson, Conflict and Compromise, 136-8, 217-21. 
9 Stone, Decision-Making, 105, 168, 224; Stone, ‘The Reeve’, 413-6. 
10 Dyer, ‘Political Life’, 141; Larson, Conflict and Compromise, 22-7, 58; M. Müller, ‘A Divided Class? 
Peasants and Peasant Communities in Later Medieval England’, in P.R. Coss and C. Wickham (eds.), 
Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages: an Exploration of Historical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford Journals, 2007), 
115–31, 117-8; P.R. Schofield, ‘England: the Family and the Village Community’, in S.H. Rigby (ed.), A 
Companion to Britain in the Late Middle Ages, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 26-46, 42.  
164 
 
concealing heriots.11 Mutability was key and various factors could make an officer, in Mike 
Thornton’s categories, either ‘lord’s man’, or ‘community servant’ across various times and 
places.12 Historians have emphasised a variety of factors as determining this relationship. 
Evans’ investigation into pre-plague Thorncroft found a complex chain of officials used by the 
lord, Merton College, to ensure loyalty, with officers drawn from smallholders who might be 
installed in small tenements and given remuneration directly from the college.13 Chris Briggs, 
alternatively, emphasises the role of tenants in controlling officers, highlighting their role in 
answering inquests by the lord about the performance of his officials. He suggests that tenants 
could choose to either present or not-present official corruption due to their own interests.14 
Thornton points to more structural differences delineating a correlation between types of lord 
and the loyalty of haywards. Monastic and gentry-held manors, especially with resident lords, 
tended to have haywards whose service was primarily owed to the lord, whilst royal manors, 
which had far more remote lordship, saw the local elite use the official framework to the benefit 
of the tenants.15 
All these approaches are sensitive to flexibility in attitudes to office, suggesting that 
officeholding was not a system used entirely to subjugate a tenantry nor entirely used by tenants 
to meet their own needs. However, they all adopt a similar model of a continuum with the lord’s 
desires at one end and the tenants’ desires at the other (figure 4.1). The officers explored are 
invariably reeves and beadles, and their role in collecting rents, entry fines and servile dues, and 
organising works on the demesne, thus effectively extracting cash and labour from the tenants to 
benefit the lord. It was through not exercising such elements of extraction, typically via 
concealment, that officers could side with their fellow tenants.16  
Here, the aim is to take a more complex approach, in line with the view of office being utilised 
by a governing class within the village, and to look at jurors and capital pledges alongside 
selected officials. It will examine what evidence there is for the aspects of office that tenants, or 
at least those holding office, wanted to be performed correctly, and how these might at times 
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concur with the desires of the lord. The gap between the capacity to resist officeholding and 
actual examples of resistance will be explored, along with the motivations underpinning them. 
Examining these questions by its nature necessitates a careful approach. It relies upon 
examining the qualitative evidence of incidents of disagreement. These required an individual to 
break the norms of the officeholding system in a way that was recorded through a primarily 
seignorial apparatus. They represent atypical incidents and are less chronologically sensitive. 
However, with care it is still possible to paint a picture of attitudes to the officeholding system 
and see how far officeholding was primarily a seignorial imposition.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Established model of attitudes to manorial officeholding 
 
 
Choosing Officials  
One way in which tenants both collectively and individually could challenge the officeholding 
system was at the point of selection. Officers were generally selected by a manor’s tenants, or at 
least a subset of these, allowing this group to disrupt the officeholding system by refusing to put 
a candidate forward. Similarly, individuals could refuse to serve or be sworn into office when 
chosen. At the three case-study manors there are few examples of this type of action taken 
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against officeholding, with only a handful of cases of refusing to select officials or individuals 
refusing to serve. The only recorded case at Worfield occurred in 1353, when Roger of 
Kingslowe and John of Rowley withdrew when selected as taxers, leading to an order to amerce 
them but no recorded fine.17 This was clearly an isolated case, with taxers selected in the 
preceding and following sessions, and Roger is seen serving as taxer over the next six years.18 
At Downham, there are more cases. As already noted, in 1410 the homage was collectively 
amerced 40s for failing to choose all three candidates for the reeveship and messorship, instead 
only choosing two candidates and one candidate for each office respectively.19 However, the 
fact that they still selected some candidates suggests that this was not an attack on having to 
serve in itself, but rather one based on the process of selection, plausibly seeking to reduce the 
lord’s scope to choose among several candidates. Again this refusal to select three candidates 
was not repeated in the following selections of these officials.  
In 1434, eleven named full- and half-virgaters choose Robert Rote for the messorship, who then 
refused to serve.20 The punishment for this refusal was that ‘all the lands and tenements in the 
tenure’ of Rote be seized into the lord’s hand.21 The severity of this punishment may in part 
explain the lack of outright refusals by individuals to serve. However, Rote appears to have 
remained firm. The record of the following session states that whilst he had been ‘selected by 
the whole homage to do office’ and that the preceding tenants holding the same land had 
performed the office, Rote refused ‘in the presence of Walter Grene steward and…the 
supervisor of the lord and others of the lord’s council’ to perform the office. Clearly, significant 
pressure was being brought to bear on Rote. The following punishment, however, was a more 
detailed restatement of the aforementioned seizure, with an order to seize Rote’s customary 
lands and provide the lord with a new tenant, in the meantime responding for its issue.22 The 
following session reiterated the demand to find a new tenant for the land held by Rote who had 
‘refused to do the office...just as he was chosen by the homage’. This session also saw the 
                                                          
17 SAC, P314/W/1/1/34, 7 May 1353.  
18 SAC, P314/W/1/1/34, 4 Mar 1353, 21 May 1353; P314/W/1/1/37, 8 Dec 1354; P314/W/1/1/43, 6 Aug 
1358; P314/W/1/1/45, 6 May 1359.  
19 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.25, 22 Sep 1410; also see p. 75. 
20 See p. 76. 
21 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434.  
22 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.25, 7 Apr 1434.  
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selection of a new messor.23 The same statement was repeated in the following session but then 
was dropped in the following two recorded sessions.24  
It is possible that the following silence is due to original punishment being carried out, with the 
land transferred to new tenant. However, a Robert Rote who seems likely to be the same 
individual continued to appear in officeholding positions as capital pledge, affeeror and juror 
baron down to 1472, suggesting he continued to hold land within the manor and that his refusal 
had not damaged his officeholding career.25 This suggests that either the punishment was 
unsuccessful, or that the lord and Rote reached some form of compromise, perhaps an option 
made possible by the replacement of elected officials with a bailiff from 1440 onwards. This 
possibility suggests that despite significant pressure being brought to bear on a tenant who 
refused to serve, it was possible to avoid serving in office and maintain one’s tenancy. In the 
mid-1360s, tenants at Downham had paid not to serve, with Nicholas son of Simon paying 40d 
in 1367 to be relieved as reeve and messor.26 Whether this was not an option in the later period, 
or Rote took a stand against paying to be excused, is not clear, but the evidence suggests that it 
was hard to compel individuals to serve as officers, suggesting that the general smooth running 
of the system was in part due to collaboration by those selected to serve as well as fear of 
punishment.  
The evidence suggests that the steps taken against Rote were as much enforcing the decision of 
the community acting as a franchise rather than the lord’s will. That the orders recorded in the 
successive sessions explicitly state that Rote had been chosen by ‘the homage’, suggests that his 
punishment was equally due to his refusal to follow the role given to him by the tenants as his 
failure to serve the lord. Certainly, there is no record of him serving in an annually selected 
office again, whilst previously he had served as both reeve and fenreeve, although whether this 
was a punishment by the wider community or an acknowledgement of the fact he did not want 
to serve as evidenced by his protest is open to debate.27  
                                                          
23 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.26, 30 Sep 1434 
24 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.27, 13 Jan 1435; C11/2/6, m.27, 5 May 1435; C11/2/6, m.28, 4 Oct 1435. 
Unfortunately the following records are lost until a session in 1438.  
25 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, C11/3/7.  
26 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.16, 7 Oct 1367.  
27 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.16, 12 Jul 1429; C11/2/6, m.20, 20 Sep 1431.  
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Collective refusals to serve are more prominent at Horstead, allowing for a greater 
understanding of the attitudes of the tenants as a group, or at least their elites, to officeholding. 
In 1428, all seven men selected to be jurors for Coltishall, along with ‘other divers men of the 
same vill’ refused to be sworn or to present in their office. This led to a swift reaction by the 
lord, who ordered the bailiff to seize their lands.28 In the following session, a Coltishall jury was 
successfully formed. This included three men who had not been mentioned in the original list of 
strikers, but also three individuals, Nicholas Downing, John Drayton and John Wacy who had 
refused to serve in the preceding session, suggesting they had now abandoned their strike.29 
Evidence that the strike was breaking is seen in the next session, where three strikers, including 
Wacy, paid fines for the return of their land. However, orders concerning the other four rebels, 
including Downing and Drayton called for the lord to retain their lands.30 The next court saw the 
three strikers who had paid their fines serving in the jury. Downing and another rebel, Philip 
Atte Wode, also paid fines to recover their land.31 Drayton remained without his land for a 
further session, before paying a fine of 7s for recovery in August 1429.32 In fact, the only rebel 
who is not recorded as paying a fine, Thomas Radbode, seems to have been deceased by July 
1429 with the seized land passing to his wife, although remaining in the lord’s hand.33 Thus all 
the surviving rebels eventually paid a fine to recover their lands, and all bar one of these served 
as a Coltishall juror in a later session.34  
Clearly seigniorial pressure looks to have played a role in forcing tenants to serve as officers in 
this case, suggesting that these individuals may have been holding office against their will. On 
the other hand, this picture is complicated by the fact that three rebels served as jurors despite 
not yet having their lands regranted, indicating that they were not serving purely due to wanting 
their lands returned. Of course, the chronology must be treated with care: plausibly, these three 
rebels had already given up the ‘strike’ and bowed to seigniorial pressure, but could not yet 
                                                          
28 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 21 Sep 1428.  
29 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 2 Dec 1428.  
30 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 7 Apr 1429.  
31 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1429.  
32 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 27 Jul 1429; HOR/37, unfoliated, 25 Oct 1429.  
33 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 27 Jul 1429.  
34 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 2 Dec 1428; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1429; HOR/36, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1432; HOR/37, unfoliated, 17 Dec 1432; HOR/36, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1433.  
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afford to pay the fines necessary to regain their lands. Certainly, the fines could be substantial, 
ranging from 14d to 32s.35  
However, detail from the initial description reveals that service in the jury in of itself was not 
seemingly the impetus behind the strike, explaining why many of these rebels returned to 
frequent jury service. The rebels denied that they held their bondage holdings ‘from the King 
through his manor of Horstead’ but instead said they were beneficiaries of the ‘divers privileges 
and franchises from these divers Kings of England and other divers men conceded to the men of 
Coltshall’.36 This dispute apparently centred on the jurisdictional abnormalities of the manor’s 
separate Coltishall portion. Henry III, by letters patent of 1231, had granted the tenants of 
Coltishall vill considerable privileges, including freedom from villeinage, market tolls and 
access to the directly-held royal leet. This charter was confirmed by Henry IV in 1407.37 It 
seems likely that in 1428 the tenants refusing to serve as jurors were attempting to claim these 
privileges and rejected their tenure via Horstead manor in order to do so. Serving as jurors not 
only confirmed that they held their land through this manor, but the charter also guaranteed the 
Coltishall villagers that ‘they should not be forced to serve any offices for anyone’ and therefore 
by refusing to be sworn, the strikers were perhaps trying to assert their entitlement to this right. 
It seems that whilst officeholding may have been a grievance for the strike, it was part of a 
larger claim to a wider set of privileges, perhaps explaining why those involved later reappear in 
service as Coltishall jurors.  
A more successful campaign, this time against a pseudo-office, occurred between 1473 and 
1481. This was directed at the ‘nominal’ reeveship. This system saw the jury baron choose the 
tenants of three portions of land to be candidates as reeve. Originally it is likely that one of these 
men actually served, whilst the other two paid to be forgiven, as is seen at Hevingham 
Bishops.38 However by the late fourteenth century this had mutated into a system simply to 
extract revenue for the lord, with the tenants of all three portions chosen paying 2s 8d each to 
not serve, making a total profit of 8s for the lord. Thus a system had developed where a form of 
‘officeholding’ was entirely disadvantageous to the tenants, effectively acting as a targeted 
tallage. The first refusal to select the reeve candidates is noted in June 1474, when it is stated 
                                                          
35 KCA, HOR/37.  
36 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 21 Sep 1428. 
37 Blomefield, Topographical History, 303-10.  
38 Whittle, Agrarian Capitalism, 51; Forrest, ‘Women Manorial Officeholders’, 51-2. 
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that a group of 18 servile tenants and frequent jurors had been directed by the steward in a 
session of October 1473 to choose the candidates in the following court of March 1474. They 
had, however, refused to do so and similarly refused in June, leading to small amercements of 3-
6d each but also a pain of 3s 9d each to choose by the following session. 39 In this session the 
rebels again refused to pay, forfeiting their pains, and being placed under a fresh pain of 6s 8d 
each.40 This led to a series of amercements and pains, which encompassed individuals who 
served as jurors beyond the original 18, with the last recorded incident occurring in 1481, when 
the jury were each amerced 3d for failing to select the candidates, and placed under pain of 6s 
each.41 The following sessions post-1481 do not mention the reeveship, meaning it is impossible 
to know if any sort of agreement was reached. However, it is clear that no further reeve 
candidates were chosen, suggesting the tenants were successful in their long-term goal.  
This example reveals that tenants liable for officeholding, or at least a fine derived from 
officeholding, could collectively resist and ultimately remove the obligation. Partially this may 
have been achieved due to the less drastic punishment applied; at no point were the rebellious 
tenants’ lands seized. Yet, the listings of those amerced reveal significant coordination, with 24 
different individuals refusing to select the reeve, which was a substantial part of the 50 total 
tenants recorded in 1461.42 Partially this unity may have been achieved because the obligation to 
pay the reeve fine was dispersed among a significant number of persons, creating a shared 
interest in removing this obligation. The impact of subdivision of the holdings providing the 
reeve, presumably occasioned by the land market and the morcellation of holdings in the pre-
Black Death period, was to often make multiple persons responsible for the fine attached to a 
single holding.43  
Explaining the timing of the revolt is more difficult. One might expect protest to match an 
increase in the financial burden of the fine. However, the opposite trend occurred, with the 
average value of the fines received by the lord decreasing over the fifteenth century, from a 
mean of 8s per year in the 1390s to 2s 8d for the 1460s-70s.44 By the period of the protest, the 
                                                          
39 KCA, HOR/39, m.27, 11 Jun 1474.  
40 KCA, HOR/39, m.31, 29 Oct 1474.  
41 KCA, HOR/39, m.33, 11 Jun 1476; HOR/39, m.26, 29 Oct 1477; HOR/39, m.41, 27 Oct 1481.  
42 For tenant list see p. 119. 
43 B.M.S. Campbell, ‘The Agrarian Problem in the Early Fourteenth Century’, P&P, 188, (2005), 3-70, 
51, 66-7.  
44 KCA, HOR/26-39.  
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lord was only receiving a third of the total potential fine. This was presumably a product of the 
lord’s difficulties in finding tenants for liable lands meaning that they remained in the lord’s 
hand and thus provided no fine. Moreover, the wide dispersal of lands on which the fines were 
levied means that only 22% of those fined across the period 1392-1473 paid more than twice in 
their lifetime.45 Even more startlingly, of the 24 individuals who refused to select the reeve 
candidates, 17 are never recorded as paying a fine for their lands, although of course they could 
have been concerned about a later fine.46 Therefore, it is hard to understand what in 1473 
triggered this reaction to a nominal reeveship which the tenants had dutifully administered from 
at least 1392. 
An examination of resistance to selecting officials reveals little evidence that being chosen for 
office, or having to choose individuals for office, was considered particularly burdensome. Few 
examples could be found of outright refusals to serve or select officials. The evidence from 
Rote’s case suggests that individuals who chose not to serve when selected by the community, 
were punished as much for refusing to meet the expectations of their fellow tenants selecting 
them as resisting the lord. When selecting officers was resisted, as at Horstead in 1428, it seems 
that this was due to other background issues, with officeholding simply providing a way to 
frustrate the seigniorial administration. The case of the nominal reeveship cautions against an 
argument that would suggest an inability by tenants to resist seigniorially-imposed officeholding 
structures. In this case a vestige of officeholding, which clearly only benefitted the lord, was 
successfully removed by a coordinated set of tenants. Of course, it is imperative to be careful in 
making an argument from absence, but the evidence of resistance to selection suggests that a far 
from impotent tenantry were at least willing to acquiesce to officeholding structures.  
Monitoring and Corruption 
Cases of corruption by officials allow insight into the illicit profits of officeholding. Illicit 
profits reveal a key incentive individuals had for acting in office, and potentially maintaining 
the officeholding system more generally, if one assumes that the officers reported for corruption 
are a subset of those successfully profiteering from office. Illicitness is of course relative here, 
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presumably some degree of profiteering was expected, although the evidence of estate literature 
suggests that lords strove to reduce this as far as possible.47  
However, beyond understanding the possible perks of office, the actual process of monitoring 
abuse of office gives an insight into attitudes to officeholding. Whilst accounts and the 
supervision of the steward provided some form of monitoring, the vast majority of corruption 
accusations recorded in court rolls were made either via presentments by manorial juries or 
more general inquests to the whole homage, in response to charges posed by the steward.48 
Much like with general presentments, tenants and jurors had significant latitude in what they 
chose to present. As Briggs has demonstrated, this monitoring role was far from neutral, tenants 
could choose to make more presentments against officials they found objectionable.49 Thus, 
reports of corruption allow for exploration of abuses that the wider community found more 
unacceptable, as well as revealing instances of community hostility to office.  
There are many examples at Worfield and Downham of officers garnering illicit profits at the 
lord’s expense. These were intimately linked with the extent of seignorial rights, as officers 
exploited these for their own gain. For instance, at Worfield in the mid-fourteenth century both 
beadles and reeves were on several occasions amerced for illicitly taking wood from the lord’s 
forest.50 At Downham in 1432, it was ordered to distrain John Jennys, a former messor, who had 
not declared moneys received from the owner of a stray in his account, whilst a reeve at 
Worfield in 1406 was amerced for taking and delivering a stray without presenting it in court.51 
In 1410 Thomas Colleson as reeve was punished for concealing strays and selling them at the 
market at Ely as well as delivering others without reporting this.52 Such presentments reveal the 
potential profits open via utilising seignorial rights for an officers’ own ends. Following the 
assumption that generally other tenants had little motivation to report such corruption, it seems 
likely that these represent a few reports of more general practices. 
This begs the question why any corruption would be reported. Partially this was due to the same 
reason presentments against the tenants’ interests were made generally, fear of being punished 
                                                          
47 Oschinsky, Walter of Henley, 274-281 [c.35-49], 317 [c.33-5]. 
48 Harvey, Oxfordshire Village, 66 n.1; Briggs, ‘Monitoring Demesne Managers’, 184-5.  
49 Briggs, ‘Monitoring Demesne Managers’, 190, 194-5. 
50 SAC, P314/W/1/1/20, 22 Feb 1340; P314/W/1/1/33, 11 May 1351; P314/W/1/1/41, 30 Nov 1357; 
P314/W/1/1/49, 25 May 1360; P314/W/1/1/105, 6 Mar 1377.  
51 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.23, 8 Nov 1432; SAC, P314/W/1/1/234, 27 Sep 1406. 
52 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.26, 4 Dec 1410.  
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for concealment if corruption was made known to the steward.53 However, another key aspect of 
coercion was the fact that officials could be made liable for each other’s failings and corruption 
in their accounts. This both affected individuals serving successively in the same role, as well as 
different officers who worked in tandem. An example of the former is seen in a Worfield 
session of c.1393.54 The jury made a series of presentments concerning Thomas de Rugge, a 
former reeve who had ended his service in 1392.55 These stated that Rugge had not delivered the 
profit of two horses and 26s 6d in money forfeited by a felon, failed to pay 46s 8d of rent from 
the leasing of a mill and only supplied part of the value of a heriot and stray. The fact that 
Rugge only had to supply the balance of the account, with no additional punishment, suggests 
that this was not outright corruption but rather not yet fully accounting for the year. However, 
more intriguing is that these charges were specifically made because Thomas was charged in the 
account of Roger Broke, his successor as reeve. This would seem evidence of Broke’s need to 
monitor Rugge’s actions in office to avoid being made liable for any financial discrepancies.56  
Chains of responsibility also incentivised officers to monitor the behaviour of their fellows.57 In 
1416, William Gerbod complained that when he had been reeve three years earlier Henry 
Barker had served under him as beadle ‘to levy and collect rents, fines, amercements and 
services as was customary’. However, whilst William had ‘repeatedly requested the aforesaid 
Henry to account with him’, he had ‘always refused to do this’, making William liable for the 
money Henry owed. Henry came to defend himself, and the court ordered that the two men 
account to two auditors assigned by the steward.58 Whilst unfortunately the resolution of this 
case is not stated, it reveals how the lord’s accounting system made senior officials responsible 
for the behaviour of subordinate officials, and that disagreements could actually lead the former 
to seek more seigniorial oversight of their roles.59 A less explicit case is seen in 1412 at 
Downham, where the messor was amerced 40d for refusing to sow the lord’s seeds when he was 
                                                          
53 See pp. 31-2. 
54 SAC, P314/W/1/1/212, c.1393. Unfortunately heading of this roll is damaged, but the identity of Roger 
Broke as reeve suggests a date of c.1393.  
55 SAC, P314/W/1/1/184, 2 Dec 1392.  
56 Harvey notes the common practice of charging reeves with the debts of their predecessors: Harvey, 
Oxfordshire Village, 67 n.8.   
57 Briggs notes the overall responsibility of demesne managers for their subordinates: Briggs, ‘Monitoring 
Demesne Managers’, 183.  
58 SAC, P314/W/1/1/244, 14 May 1416.  
59 Dyer notes the joint accounting practices of beadles with reeves on manors of the Bishop of Worcester: 
Dyer, Lords and Peasants, 114.  
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required to by the reeve, meaning the latter had to utilise hired labour instead. Plausibly, in this 
instance the jury presented the case to ensure the reeve was not punished for his subordinate’s 
failures.60 
Beyond these coercive pressures on officials to report misbehaviour, one can find hints of juries 
and the wider homage presenting illicit profits of officials as a form of control in the manner 
described by Briggs. In a detailed set of presentments of 1316, the Downham jury outlined a 
series of illicit profits made by William Personn as reeve, totalling 25s 10d in damage to the 
lord.61 These mainly involved utilising the lord’s resources for his own ends, including using the 
lord’s workhorses, cart and even famuli to carry his crops and sedge, pasturing his beasts on the 
lord’s land and taking the lord’s timber. The jury’s accusations even extended to failure to 
perform tasks, with them stating ‘that the plough-team of the lord laid idle through three 
successive weeks in Summer and Autumn’. However, the steward stated this was due to work 
required for the bishop’s kitchen and did not cause loss to the lord. Why the jury chose to 
present such a comprehensive list of abuses against Personn cannot be established for certain, 
although an intriguing possibility is provided by a presentment in the same list stating that 
Personn had committed adultery with the wife of Robert Maurice. Was this violation of a moral 
norm behind the presentment? One of the cases Briggs identified for nearby Landbeach 
concerned John Frer sending peat turves to his ‘concubine’, a remarkably similar situation, 
although as Frer was a salaried outsider attributing a ‘moral’ explanation is more tenuous.62 
Furthermore, Maurice’s wife was mentioned separately in a later presentment, when it was 
stated that Personn had allowed her servants to forage in the manor’s fen. Thus, it was perhaps 
as much that Personn had allowed his mistress to benefit from illicit profits, rather than his 
taking of illicit profits himself, which had angered the wider officeholding community. This 
argument could potentially be extended to Frer.  
However, beyond cases of presentment of illicit profits as an indirect punishment for other 
transgressions, a significant incentive for officials, and tenants more generally, to monitor the 
behaviour of officers is that roles performed incorrectly could also negatively impact tenants. In 
a landscape where seignorial and tenants’ land lay intermingled, poor management of the former 
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61 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.6, 27 Feb 1316.  
62 Briggs, ‘Monitoring Demesne Managers’, 18.  
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could negatively impact the latter.63 At Downham, reeves were presented for mismanaging 
seigneurial livestock which led to damage in the tenant’s crops and failing to scour ditches and 
maintain watercourses leading to the flooding of common roads.64  
The detailed case of Thomas Jenkins reveals how concerns about corruption could affect both 
lord and tenants, leading the jury to be incentivised to report abuse in office. Jenkins served as 
reeve 1402-4, but concerns about his conduct emerged in the following year. In July 1405, the 
jury presented that Jenkins should respond for 2s he received for selling escheated pigs, 
although this entry gives no suggestion of dishonesty. More importantly, in the same session 
men who had acted as mainpernors of the farmer of the lord’s mill paid for an inquisition into 
Jenkins. They had been ‘greatly damaged’ by the fact that this farmer had unexpectedly fled out 
of the region and asked if Jenkins ‘did in any way…help and council in contriving the 
withdrawal’ of the farmer. The inquisition returned a negative verdict, as they ‘could not find 
that [Thomas] had awareness of the withdrawal of the…farmer nor was council to the same 
party’.65  
The following session saw an inquisition to examine Jenkins’ management of ‘divers heriots, 
escheats and strays…valued by the [jury]’ which had come to the reeve ‘in the time of the 
pestilence…as is put in the record of the court rolls’ but in his account had only rendered 3s 1d 
of profit to the lord.66 Following sessions saw this suspicion confirmed, but also other forms of 
systematic fraud.67 This concerned land transfers. Jenkins, whilst he was ‘guard of the…rolls of 
the courts under the seal of…the clerk of the lord’ had ‘fraudulently and deceitfully without the 
notice of the steward [and clerk] unsealed the same and to enrich himself…took the rolls of the 
court held…11 October [1402] after…the auditing of the account’. He then recorded an 
intervivos transfer with a fine of 3s, ‘although…the steward and clerk…exist completely in 
ignorance [of the transfer]’ and ‘of the aforesaid fine nothing was given to the lord’. Jenkins had 
committed the same fraud with another land transfer as well as an amercement levied for a hue 
and cry raised against him as reeve. The implication of the fraud is that Jenkins had used the 
role of reeves at Worfield, in whose presence all valid extra-curial transfers of land had to be 
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made unless on a tenant’s deathbed, to claim legitimate transfers and take the recorded fines. 68 
He had then concealed these transfers from the following court session and in his account, 
before returning to the roll for the previous session and adding an entry about the transfer to 
cover up the fraud.  
This case demonstrates the way a rogue official could be problematic for both lord and tenants 
alike. Corruption concerning underpayment of seigniorial dues such as escheats, heriots and 
strays was largely a problem for the lord. However, embezzling fines for land transfers through 
doctoring records was a concern for both lord and those making the transfer, whilst the former 
was similarly financially defrauded, the latter’s land transfer was not officially recorded and 
hence not valid. It seems unlikely that the tenants involved in the transfer were complicit in the 
deception as there is no obvious reason why they would want their fine to go to Jenkins rather 
than the lord. The earlier concern over the miller, if unfounded, reveals a similar phenomenon. 
Whilst the miller leaving at the reeve’s behest would be a problem for the lord left without the 
miller, the system of economic ties provided by mainpernors, who presumably had agreed to 
swear for the miller in exchange for a fee or other financial incentive, shows how again 
concerns of lord and tenants’ over official misbehaviour could be connected. 
Outside of the lord’s direct concern, officials were often punished for failure to perform 
activities rather than being overzealous in failing to help tenants prosecute interpersonal cases, 
showing how tenants and communities utilised the system of officials. At Worfield and 
Downham c.1400, reeves, beadles and messors were amerced for failing to attach and distrain 
tenants to respond to civil pleas, showing how tenants relied on efficient officials to maintain an 
effective local legal system.69 In 1418, Worfield’s beadle was placed under pain of 40d to levy 
the money owed in several interpersonal complaints.70 Sometimes, individuals even brought 
interpersonal suits against officials for failure to perform tasks. In 1324, Clement the Brewer 
complained that John le Eyr ‘who was chosen in public as messor through the assent of all the 
community of Downham to guard the crops in the fields’ had allowed animals of several tenants 
to consume half of an acre of his peas to damage of 40d. The case ended with the parties being 
                                                          
68 A statement of the reeve’s role in legitimating intervivos transfers is seen in an inquiry of 1404: SAC, 
P314/W/1/1/232, 6 Apr 1404.  
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granted licence to agree and John placing himself in mercy.71 A similar attempt was made at 
Worfield in 1353, when Thomas Eche brought a trespass plea against William Bullock, alleging 
that when the latter was reeve he had failed to levy 10s owed to Thomas by William de Ewyke 
which he had recuperated in court in the presence of the steward, and demanding 2s in damages 
for this failure. Bullock’s response was that due to Ewyke’s ‘destruction’ he had exercised 
clemency and had accounted this previously, a response that led to Thomas being amerced.72 
Beyond the need for effective officials to meet the requirements of individuals as litigants and 
conveyers of land, officials needed to meet standards of behaviour in order for them to 
effectively govern the manor. This is particularly evident for jurors and at all manors there were 
presentments against individuals for failure to fulfil the expectations of this office. Thomas 
Rugge was amerced 2s in 1396 at Worfield ‘for doing contempt in court and concealing a 
certain presentment’ as a juror, significantly more than the 8d Thomas Jenkins had to pay for 
advising this action.73 Beyond preventing simple corruption, a key aim was to keep both the 
deliberations of juries and dissension between officials private, presumably in order not to 
damage the reputation of the jury and the authority of their decisions. In 1411, John Veyse ‘after 
he was sworn into the jury…was ordered that he conceal their deliberations…but revealed these 
deliberations openly’. Veyse then said all the jurors were false, and was amerced 6d. 74 
Similarly, in 1455, John Buxham was amerced 3d for not only withdrawing from his fellow 
jurors and refusing to come to render his verdict, but also exposing the jury’s deliberations.75 At 
Horstead, in 1429, John Reve, a capital pledge, was amerced 3s 4d for disputing ‘openly in full 
court the decision of his fellows in the last leet in contempt of court and as a malicious example 
to others’.76  
Evidence of cases of monitoring and ‘corruption’ reveals two important points about attitudes to 
officeholding. The hints it allows of a potentially larger body of illicit profits made at the lord’s 
expense reveals that officeholding could potentially be lucrative for individuals serving, 
explaining why those able to serve might have been incentivised to keep the system. Lords 
successfully attempted to prevent such profiteering, both by making officials responsible for 
                                                          
71 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.8, 28 Jan 1326.  
72 SAC, P314/W/1/1/34, 5 Aug 1353.  
73 SAC, P314/W/1/1/199, 6 Sep 1396.  
74 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.29, 14 Dec 1411.  
75 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.50, 20 Jun 1455.  
76 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 25 Aug 1429.  
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shortfalls in their accounts and creating chains of responsibility which meant future officers, and 
more senior officers, could be made responsible for other officials’ debts. More important, 
however, is that a close reading of the types of ‘corruption’ reported reveal that the community 
of tenants were heavily invested in efficient officeholders, who did not enrich themselves in 
ways that perverted land transactions and were diligent in enforcing aspects of interpersonal 
suits. Jurors that maintained the authority of their office were vital if this organ was to be used 
to govern the community, especially as their presentments served to monitor the actions of all 
other manorial officials.   
Resistance to the lord 
As well as fulfilling roles beneficial to the community, leading to an investment in monitoring 
their performance, officials could also be important in protecting the tenants from aspects of the 
seigniorial administration. Resistance was sometimes illicit, with juries concealing presentments 
concerning seigniorial rights. For instance, at Horstead in 1439 and Worfield in 1485 the jury 
failed to present marriages without licence.77 Plausibly this is the tip of a larger iceberg of 
successfully concealed marriage fines, suggesting that juries exercised discretion in making 
presentments concerning servile incidents. At Downham in 1332 and 1404, the messor also 
concealed presentments, although it is not clear for what reason.78 In 1408, the jurors for 
Coltishall ‘concealed and would not present’ both that William Ode had damaged the lord’s 
pastures and reed beds next to Horstead mill and that two men had stolen fish from the nets of 
the miller of Horstead, for which they were together amerced 26s 8d.79 The reasons for this 
concealment are not made explicit but potentially could be due to tensions with the miller, with 
the whole homage of Coltishall being amerced in 1402 for failing to present men of Coltishall 
who had damaged the mill.80 
Other forms of resistance were more active than concealment. An intriguing example can be 
seen at Downham in an order to seize the lands of Thomas Overyng, a former reeve, in 1571. 
This action was justified by both Thomas’ failure to surrender his rent and because he was 
negligent in performing his office, both standard reasons for seizure. However, a third reason 
given was that Thomas ‘alleged in full court that the lord would not allocate in his account to 
                                                          
77 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1439; SAC, P314/W/1/1/459, 10 Oct 1485.  
78 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.7, 2 Dec 1332; C11/2/4, m.12, 23 Sep 1404.  
79 KCA, HOR/36, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1408.  
80 KCA, HOR/31, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1402.  
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the tenants of the manor for their transport services in great insult to the lord and in an evil 
example to others’.81 It is impossible to know whether there was any truth in Thomas’ allegation 
that the lord was presumably not going to record payments made in lieu of labour services. 
Certainly, there is no indication in the surviving rolls of connected discontent over labour 
services, which still appear to have been owed in payments or actual labour at Downham by this 
point. However, the outburst does reveal the role reeves could potentially take, through their 
work in managing the lord’s estate and compiling its accounts, in ensuring that tenants were 
treated customarily by the seigniorial regime and reporting perceived abuses. Thomas was not 
apparently adversely affected in the longer term by his protest, continuing to appear as a juror 
down to 1578.82 A variation on this theme can be seen at Worfield, when in 1528 the jury 
claimed that when William Guldon and William Bradeney had been reeves (in c.1470 and 1500-
01 respectively) ‘they repaired…a bridge next to the mill…from the undertakings and expenses 
of the lord’ being allowed these expenses at the audit of their accounts.83 Whilst the context of 
this presentment is unclear, the outcome seems to have been aimed at ensuring the cost of 
repairing the bridge fell on the lord, and thus plausibly not on the tenants, an argument that the 
tenants could make due to their collective past integration into seignorial management through 
service as reeves. Whilst Guldon was almost certainly deceased by 1528, Bradeney was still 
alive and present on the jury leet, if not the jury baron making the presentment, in the leet of 
1528.84 The ability of former officials to pass on their knowledge of service in office could 
provide a way to resist seigniorial exactions in the future. 
Jurors could also take a role in ensuring the lord and his higher officials met expectations. Jean 
Birrell has recently emphasised that custumals were a key defence for tenants to constrain the 
demands of their lords, and this can certainly be claimed for Worfield’s 1403 custumal, which 
was effectively purchased by the tenants as a collective through a payment of £66 13s 4d for 
William Beauchamp’s ‘good lordship’.85 This custumal enshrined that tenants owed mill suit 
but made clear that this was ‘provided that the measures on our…mills be lawful and 
                                                          
81 CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 9 Mar 1571.  
82 CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 12 Mar 1578.  
83 SAC, P314/W/1/1/630, 3 Dec 1528; P314/W/1/1/499, 10 Aug 1500. Unfortunately, William Gyldon is 
described in the entry as having served 25 years before Bradeney and thus likely sometime in the gap in 
the rolls between 1466 and 1472.   
84 SAC, P314/W/1/1/630, 3 Dec 1528 




approved…according to what it shall be necessary to…take and the miller who shall be guilty of 
any…departure from upright dealing shall be punished’.86 Manorial juries acted to defend these 
rights, presenting millers both for unjust milling and not keeping the mill in good repair, the 
latter concern presumably due to concerns over their liability for repair works as well as need to 
mill. These presentments could be extensive, as well as explicit fraud in measures, millers were 
also presented in 1409 and 1518 for keeping livestock in the mill which ate the tenants’ grain.87 
Analogous practice can be seen at Horstead, and to a lesser extent at Downham, for much of the 
fifteenth century, where the lord and his bailiff were frequently presented for not maintaining 
infrastructure in the lord’s hands or performing the work owed in the common watercourse.88 A 
further unusual case is seen at Downham, in a series of presentments concerning rabbits from 
the lord’s warren. In 1431, the jury presented that ‘the lord’s rabbits continue to do damage in 
the crops of the tenants…[they] yearly destroy all the harvested crops inside a furlong around 
the vill’, bringing attention to a seigniorial activity damaging the community of tenants. Even 
more striking is that they also said ‘that unless speedily…a remedy is found they wish to 
abandon their lands lying there into the lord’s hand’.89 In a period when tenants were in short 
supply, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest an implicit threat in this statement. The 
complaint was made in a subsequent session, with it being noted that the rabbits had been 
destroying the grain ‘for divers years gone’ and that therefore the tenants ‘cannot…work their 
lands…held of the lord’.90 It was ordered to discuss this with the lord, and, as the presentment 
does not appear again, this policy of raising attention to an issue in seigniorial management, and 
plausibly implying some pressure, may have been successful.  
                                                          
86 SAC, 5586/2/1/42. 
87 SAC, P314/W/1/1/37, 21 May 1355; P314/W/1/1/200, 28 Oct 1396; P314/W/1/1/238, 29 Oct 1409; 
P314/W/1/1/544, 31 May 1518.  
88 KCA, HOR/33, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1410; HOR/33, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1412; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1413; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1414; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1415; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1420; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1421; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1423; HOR/37, unfoliated, 14 Sep 
1424; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1427; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1428; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1429; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1430; HOR/34, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1433; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1436; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1437; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1438; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 
1439; HOR/36, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1444; HOR/37, unfoliated, 18 Jun 1446; HOR/37, unfoliated, 25 Jul 
1450; HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1452; HOR/37, unfoliated, 31 Jul 1458; HOR/39, m.6, 11 Jun 1463; 
HOR/39, m.32, 3 Aug 1475; CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.19, 20 Mar 1431; C11/2/6, m.29, 4 Dec 1439; 
C11/3/7, m.20, 13 May 1472.  
89 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.19, 20 Mar 1431.  
90 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.20, 20 Sep 1431. 
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Therefore jurors used their position as presenting officials to highlight seignorial practices 
which were damaging their community. They could also utilise their vital function in 
administering the manor court to pressure the lord to address tenants’ concerns. This is seen in 
1513, when the capital pledges at Horstead refused to ‘render their verdict until the lord 
demonstrates settlements between him and the residents of the lord’.91 Whilst no detail is 
provided of the outcome of this protest, or even what these ‘settlements’ were about, a marginal 
note orders for it to be inquired of the lord’s council, and at the next leet session the capital 
pledges made presentments, suggesting a relatively quick resolution.92 A Downham jury, for 
reasons unfortunately left unstated, also refused to render their verdict in 1380, and were thus 
placed under pain, although that they then agreed to present suggests a less successful protest.93 
The engagement of tenants via officeholding in the governing structure of the manor provided a 
route for tenants to soften seigneurial exactions and protest seigneurial policies. Concealment, 
verbal protests, presentments and even modest strikes allowed tenants, or at least those holding 
office, to mediate the effects of seignorial policies on the local community.  
Resistance to Officers 
Up to this point, this chapter has concentrated mainly on attitudes to officeholding in relation to 
the lord, finding that the officeholding system was not purely a seigneurial imposition, and 
served a vital purpose for tenants in terms of meeting crucial needs of governance and providing 
a way to temper and challenge seigniorial policies. There is however a chronological element to 
this argument. Most of the examples above are drawn from before 1475, suggesting the 
argument may not hold so well for the later period. On one level this is a problem of relying on 
qualitative evidence; as a rule the earlier rolls give more detail about the types of offences 
committed by officials, allowing for a close reading to understand motivations, whilst later 
records are more summary. For instance, at turn of the sixteenth-century Downham, both 
messors and fenreeves were presented as they had ‘not done [their] office’ with the nature of 
this failure left unexplained.94 For Horstead’s resistance to the reeveship, the timing is of course 
                                                          
91 KCA, HOR/45, m.5, 11 Jun 1513.  
92 KCA, HOR/45, m.7, 4 May 1514.  
93 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.6, 3 Aug 1380.  
94 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, m.9, 14 Sep 1494; C11/3/10, m.13, 23 Aug 1498; C11/3/10, m.17, 1 Jan 1501; 
C11/3/10, m.24, 20 Sep 1508.  
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path-dependant, the tenants could not successfully remove the obligation to pay the reeveship 
fine twice.  
Beyond these caveats, the largely fourteenth- and fifteenth-century chronology probably does 
reflect real changes. As lords increasingly moved away from direct cultivation towards leasing 
land and the more passive profits of lordship, there was simply less scope for corruption and 
mismanagement by officers that could negatively impact other officials, lords and tenants, or 
opportunities for tension between lord and tenants in which officeholding could be used for 
resistance.95 Similarly, interpersonal litigation is normally argued to have been in decline in the 
manorial setting from the mid-fifteenth century, a trend partially explained by the rise of the 
presentment as a procedure.96 This would remove an aspect of officials’ roles that tenants as 
litigants were keen to ensure ran smoothly. Thus, it could be argued that tenants were invested 
in an effective officeholding system, but investment saw decline in line with waning lordship 
and interpersonal justice through the manor court.  
However, little focus has as yet been given to the way officers were treated by their fellow 
tenants, or indeed how officers maintained their authority against external resistance, aspects of 
their roles that should be less sensitive to the shifting nature of seignorial profits from manors or 
their use for civil litigation. The rolls are littered with presentments for resisting officers in their 
work, or questioning their decisions, allowing a picture of attitudes to office from those 
governed by, but not currently serving as, officers to be analysed. Obviously, these incidences 
are problematic in that they may only represent a proportion of resistance. Other forms may 
have been covert and so not uncovered; considered justifiable and thus not reported; or the 
perpetrator may have been able to actively or passively coerce officials into not censuring them. 
However, even this partial evidence at least allows a glimpse into the way officeholding was 
perceived by tenants more widely, and how officers responded to challenges to their authority.  
 
 
                                                          
95 See chapter 1.  
96 C.D. Briggs, ‘Seigniorial Control of Villagers’ Litigation Beyond the Manor in Later Medieval 




Table 4.1 – Number of ‘resistance actions’ and mean amercement per offender by decade 
at Little Downham and Worfield 
Decade Little Downham Worfield 












1310s 0 N/A N/A N/A 
1320s 0 N/A 0 N/A 
1330s 0 N/A 1 3d 
1340s N/A N/A 0 N/A 
1350s N/A N/A 2 1s 2d 
1360s 1 4d 1 6d 
1370s 0 N/A 3 6d 
1380s 1 3d 3 2s 5d 
1390s 1 6d 2 6d 
1400s 8 8d 0 N/A 
1410s 4 2s 5d 4 9d 
1420s 3 6d 0 N/A 
1430s 3 6d 3 7d 
1440s 1 3d 1 1s 
1450s 0 N/A 0 N/A 
1460s 0 N/A 0 N/A 
1470s 0 N/A 0 N/A 
1480s 2 4d 0 N/A 
1490s 2 3d 2 10d 
1500s 2 6d 3 10s 3d 
1510s N/A N/A 0 N/A 
1520s N/A N/A 3 7d 
1530s N/A N/A 0 N/A 
1540s N/A N/A 2 8d 
1550s 2 6d 3 8d 
1560s 0 N/A 2 2s 
1570s 0 N/A 1 6d 
1580s 0 N/A 0 N/A 
1590s N/A N/A 0 N/A 
Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6, C11/3/7-10; SAC, P314/W/1/1/1-840. 
 
Table 4.2 summarises the number of ‘resistance actions’ seen against reeves, messors, beadles 
and constables per decade for Worfield and Downham where these officers were present. 
Resistance actions have been taken to encompass any record of resistance to an official 
including ignoring orders, resisting arrest, resisting distraint, poundbreaking (when an official is 
explicitly mentioned) and assault. The most striking feature at both manors is the overall lack of 
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evidence of resistance to officers performing their duties. Whilst clearly there were always 
incidents of resistance, there were also multiple and sometimes consecutive decades of no 
recorded instances. These figures seem low even in comparison to McIntosh’s for assaults at the 
manor of Havering, where she suggested an average of 0.5 per year for much of the fifteenth 
century showed that ‘the level of physical aggression against court officials was low’.97 This is 
even more striking when it is considered that McIntosh only includes assault in her calculation 
rather than all ‘resistance actions’. There is, furthermore, no particularly distinct chronological 
pattern, and the period after the Black Death does not stand out as an era of tensions, although 
there was an increase in both manors in the late fourteenth to early fifteenth century. This 
suggests that officers did not face an unduly difficult position in the economic changes after the 
Plague, questioning the notion of these individuals as caught in the vice between lord and their 
fellow tenants, and suggesting resistance to officers cannot simply be thought of in terms of this 
relationship. 
On the other hand, that attacks were presented reveals that officeholders, both when serving 
themselves and as jurors responsible for presentment, wanted to protect officers and ensure they 
could perform their role. As table 4.1 shows, generally punishments were under a shilling, 
putting them with the typical range of amercements for most offences on the manor, and 
suggesting they were not treated dissimilarly to these other offences. However, in four decades 
the average was significantly raised, in all cases occurring due to one unusually high payment. 
By looking at these instances, it is possible to consider challenges to officials that were 
perceived to be particularly egregious. For 1352 when Thomas de le Hethe was amerced 2s for 
rescue against the reeve, it is hard to understand the reason for this stricter punishment.98 
Thomas had committed other offences for which he was amerced separately, perhaps explaining 
this increased severity, although on similar occasions at Worfield offenders were not amerced 
more. In two other instances, the reason for severity is more obvious, and indicates that the 
court system continued to protect officials against attacks, allowing them to perform their work. 
At Downham in 1411, the amercement of 10s imposed on John Clement for abducting livestock 
out of the reeve’s custody was likely due to his status as an outsider of Ely and that he had taken 
three stray animals which were of significant value to the lord.99 The violence used against the 
                                                          
97 McIntosh, Autonomy and Community, table 13, 211-5.   
98 SAC, P314/W/1/1/34, 22 May 1352.  
99 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.27, 1 Apr 1411.  
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reeve was likely at issue when William Bulwardyn was amerced 20s in 1501 at Worfield. 
Whilst William was likely also an outsider, being ‘formerly of Claverley’, the presentment 
details how he, along with his associates, came ‘in force and arms namely staffs and knives’ to 
assault the reeve and take an horse which the official had distrained ‘for diverse offences and 
amercements previously made’.100 This unusual level of detail is evidence of the severity of this 
incident, explaining the unusually large amercement.  
A final incident involving an exceptionally high amercement occurred in 1387 at Worfield, 
when John Bradeney was amerced 3s 4d. This occurrence reveals a different form of severity. 
Bradeney insulted both the reeve and beadle ‘in open court in the presence of the steward and 
the whole homage’.101 The public nature of a direct challenge to officials was at issue here, the 
action was not simply resistance to them carrying out their duty in the moment, but a 
questioning of their status and authority more generally. This kind of resistance is more 
commonly evidenced in attacks on the position of jurors and capital pledges, which were seen at 
all three manors. Occasionally, the detail available only suggests a public insult to the jury; in 
1565 Humphrey Russell was amerced 12d for ‘badly treating, scolding and calling the jury 
infamous’, a rather inexplicable act in that the jury had just presented another tenant for unjustly 
drawing blood against the same Humphrey.102 However, more typically the presentments 
specifically detail that the jurors were called ‘false’ or ‘perjurers’ or that their deliberations were 
disputed, with this language being used across all the case studies.103 These attacks are 
qualitatively different to those above committed against officials in the course of these duties. 
Whilst the former prevented officers carrying out their role, calling jurors false was a direct 
attack on their ability to govern the community and consequently met with an immediate 
punishment. On one occasion the potentially seditious nature of disputing the jury’s decision is 
explicitly stated: in 1447, three tenants at Horstead were each amerced 12d for calling the jury 
false ‘in a bad example to others’.104 Similarly, at Downham an entry of 1413 details how 
Robert Walsham had made accusations ‘openly in court’, whilst a presentment of 1439 details 
                                                          
100 SAC, P314/W/1/1/500, 13 Oct 1501.  
101 SAC, P314/W/1/1/162, 15 Jul 1387. 
102 SAC, P314/W/1/1/758, 16 Oct 1565.  
103 SAC, P314/W/1/1/199, 6 Sep 1396; KCA, HOR/33, unfoliated, 2 Aug 1409; HOR/37, unfoliated, 6 
Jan 1447; HOR/40, m.1, 4 Nov 1483; CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.7, 7 Mar 1402; C11/2/5, m.1, 22 Dec 1413; 
C11/2/5, m.7, 12 Jan 1417; C11/2/6, m.4, 14 Jan 1424; C11/2/6, m.29, 4 Dec 1439; C11/2/6, m.32, 13 
Dec 1440; C11/3/10, unfoliated, 7 Jan 1562.   
104 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 6 Jan 1447.  
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how Thomas Son of Stephen violated the jurors ‘calling the same false publicly’.105 Presentment 
of these offences went beyond simply punishing the individual offender, they worked to protect 
views contrary to the jurors’ decisions from gaining any public circulation, and thus played an 
important role in maintaining the authority of jurors.  
This authority extended outside of the court itself, with offences occurring outside this context 
being reported and punished. In 1409, an unknown individual described as ‘one of the fellows 
of Walter de Swanton’ was presented for ‘disputing the decision of the capital pledges’ at 
Horstead, the lack of a name suggesting that this dispute had not occurred in court.106 At 
Downham, this is seen clearly in a presentment of 1444. John More, who is described explicitly 
as ‘a serf of the lord’, had ‘openly in the tavern insulted, with divers malicious words the tenants 
and capital pledges that presented the same for divers defects’.107 Clearly, More’s actions were 
still a public act, but took place in a different public arena of the tavern, displaying how officers 
worked to maintain their authority in the community even outside of court sessions. This 1444 
presentment also connects an attack on the capital pledges and an attack on the tenants more 
widely, suggesting that an action which challenged the credit of the former had a similar effect 
on the latter. A similar connection is seen in 1483 at Horstead, when Nicholas and Thomas 
Aleyn ‘made contempt both of the lord and tenants…criticising and calling false and calling 
these said tenants knaves and harlots for their verdict made in court of diverse transgressions’ 
made by the same. The Aleyns had also made threats against the tenants ‘both in open court and 
outside the court’ at various places and times.108 The reference to a ‘verdict made in court’ 
suggests that the insult was potentially aimed specifically at jurors, however the entry utilises 
the language of the general community of ‘tenants’ to give an impression of damage to the 
community as a whole.  
These presentments reveal an active role by officials in maintaining their authority and suggest a 
far cry from a system that was either in decay, or placing individuals in an awkward vice 
between lord and fellow tenants. Those holding office responded decisively to attacks on the 
credit of their presentments and judgements, and thus challenges to their ability to govern, 
defending the legitimacy of the officeholding system. However, it is also important to consider 
                                                          
105 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.1, 22 Dec 1413; C11/2/6, m.29, 4 Dec 1439.  
106 KCA, HOR/33, unfoliated, 2 Aug 1409.  
107 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.37, 20 Nov 1444.  
108 KCA, HOR/40, m.1, 4 Nov 1483.  
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the motivations and status of those who were making these attacks, especially in the light of the 
above evidence that office was utilised by a something approaching a ‘middling sort’ to govern 
the community. How far can presentments of abuse against officials be seen as resistance by an 
excluded group to a governing group, and largely independent of the lord? Such a possibility is 
intriguing, especially since the manor that saw the most frequent protestations, Downham, was 
that with the greatest use of manorial office to meet the needs of a tenant-elite. Unfortunately 
direct statements of motivation are rarely recorded in these type of entries. In the case of John 
More, the accusation of falsehood, according to the entry, directly flowed from presentments 
made against the offender in court, as did that of the Aleyns.109 These presentments do seem to 
have resulted from a perception of unjust treatment by the officer group, although it is unclear 
whether these were the actions of aggrieved individuals or symptomatic of a more general 
undercurrent of hostility from a governed group.  
In a 1393 presentment at Worfield, a glimpse is caught of the tension caused by the multiple 
levels of authority engendered by a decentralised leet with separately presenting vills. Thomas 
Heyne ‘did contempt and rebellion and accused the 12...sworn of false judgement for a certain 
presentment [at] the last view of 1 forestalling [which] was concealed by the vill of Wyke’.110 
Heyne’s protest does not appear to be linked to the original forestalling, being neither the victim 
nor the perpetrator, but instead disputed the jury’s presentment of Wyke for concealment of the 
forestalment.111 He was seemingly challenging the jury leet’s role as a body of final 
presentment, revealing an objection to their governance over the smaller communities making 
up the manor. The reasoning behind this protest is again hard to understand; the jury 
consistently monitored the work of the hamlets, in every leet affirming whether the vills had 
presented honestly, and frequently presenting amercements for concealment down to 1425.112 
Interestingly, after 1425, whilst the jurors leet continued to affirm that the vills ‘had presented 
                                                          
109 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.37, 20 Nov 1444; KCA, HOR/40, m.1, 4 Nov 1483. 
110 SAC, W/1/1/199, 6 Sep 1396.  
111 SAC, W/1/1/198, 8 Jul 1396. 
112 See SAC, P314/W/1/1/33, 11 May 1351; P314/W/1/1/34, 22 May 1352; P314/W/1/1/37, 21 May 
1355; P314/W/1/1/41, 30 Nov 1357; P314/W/1/1/50, 20 May 1361; P314/W/1/1/54, 20 Apr 1363; 
P314/W/1/1/57, 18 Apr 1364; P314/W/1/1/68, 8 May 1368; P314/W/1/1/100, 19 Nov 1375; 
P314/W/1/1/103, 9 Oct 1376; P314/W/1/1/106, 20 Apr 1377; P314/W/1/1/112, 22 Apr 1378; 
P314/W/1/1/119, 18 Oct 1379; P314/W/1/1/122, 15 Oct 1380; P314/W/1/1/175, 6 Apr 1388; 
P314/W/1/1/184, 2 Dec 1392; P314/W/1/1/190, 1 Dec 1394; P314/W/1/1/202, 4 Jun 1397; 
P314/W/1/1/217, 25 Oct 1400; P314/W/1/1/223, 18 Apr 1402; P314/W/1/1/226, 25 Apr 1404; 
P314/W/1/1/233, 5 May 1405; P314/W/1/1/234, 28 Oct 1405; P314/W/1/1/234, 30 Apr 1406; 
P314/W/1/1/243, 8 Apr 1415; P314/W/1/1/264, 10 Apr 1425; P314/W/1/1/267, 1 Oct 1425.  
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well’, there are no cases of concealment. It seems unlikely that vills suddenly became unwilling 
to hide presentments, and this may reveal a break-point in the jury’s authority over the manor. 
However, this should not be taken too far; as demonstrated above the jury leet continued to 
exert a governing authority well into the sixteenth century. The only other example of a more 
structured objection occurred at Downham, when Robert Walsham was amerced 40d for 
complaining that the jury had ‘made false bylaws and customs’.113 Walsham made this protest in 
the midst of the period detailed above, when bylaws were increasingly used to govern the 
community, limiting access to fenland resources and instigating labour controls, and therefore 
he could plausibly have been attacking this increasingly potent use of officeholding for 
governance.114 
One source of evidence to examine how far objections were the protests of an excluded group is 
to look at the identities of those protesting, to see if they were outside of the officeholding 
group. At Worfield, there is some evidence to support this position. Of 36 individuals identified 
as making a protest against officers, including both jurors and ‘selected officers’, 78% cannot be 
found serving in any office. This does, however, leave a large minority who both served in 
office and protested. At Downham, the figures are less convincing, of 33 individuals, only 45% 
cannot be found serving in office, thus the majority of protests were made by figures who were 
somehow ‘insiders’. Similarly, of the 5 men reported at Horstead, 4 held office. It is therefore 
hard to interpret protests against officeholders at these manors as objections by a subjugated to a 
dominant group. This cannot disprove stratification. The evidence of court rolls may simply not 
record the protests of a subjugated group, which if covert, may have been designed to avoid 
presentment and punishment. However, it does suggest that the aim of officeholders in 
monitoring and presentment of resistance was to maintain their authority against protesting 
individuals generally drawn from the same group as those currently in office. Much like with 
the monitoring of abuse by serving officers, it aimed to preserve the authority of the 
officeholding system from damage by its own participants.  
Conclusion 
An analysis of attitudes to office has revealed that the privileged group who served in these 
positions were strongly invested in the officeholding system. They sought to ensure those 
                                                          
113 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.1, 22 Dec 1413. 
114 See p. 155-6. 
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selected actually served in office, that officials performed many aspects of their role efficiently 
and to an accepted standard, and that the authority of officers was maintained in the face of 
physical and verbal dissent. This reinforces the arguments made in previous chapters showing 
the use of officeholding by a small group of prominent tenants, but complicates models that 
have seen officers as solely mediating between lord and tenants, or that they could either by 
‘lord’s men’ or ‘community servants’. Undoubtedly, officers could be caught between two 
countervailing pressures from above and below, and after the Black Death on certain estates like 
that of the Bishop of Durham this would seem the most accurate picture to adopt. However, 
over a longer period, and focusing on aspects of officials’ roles beyond demesne management 
by examining jurors and capital pledges alongside reeves and haywards, to see the lord and a 
greater body of tenants as poles apart gives a one-dimensional picture of a more complex 
phenomenon. Whilst tenants and juries may have lacked the motivation to report illicit profits 
using seignorial resources or rights, failure and abuse in many other aspects of officials’ work, 
such as maintaining seignorial banks and ditches, corruption in recording intervivos transfers 
and failing to enforce interpersonal suits could also negatively impact on the tenants. The 
authority of officers was maintained, a vital aspect in using them to govern local communities, 
and the integration of tenants into the lord’s management of the manor allowed protests against 
certain aspects of seignorial government. This perspective explains why there were so few 
overall attacks on the officeholding system, in terms of abuse against officers, or refusals to 
select officers, with the only successful and sustained example from the case studies being 
aimed at removing a ‘reeveship’ which had effectively become a purely financial due.  
This is not a call to return to the rosy Toronto School picture of attitudes to office. The lord still 
exerted significant pressure on officeholders, and created structures such as the accounting 
system, and the chains of responsibility between officers, to ensure that officers were motivated 
to police each other. From the other direction, to suggest that officers faithfully served all 
members of a wider and relatively unified community is similarly inaccurate. Unfortunately, 
evidence of the attitudes of the governed is not forthcoming in the sources available, with most 
protests seemingly from those already part of the officeholding group. However, it does not 
follow that a marginalised group did not exist, and it seems more likely that they simply could 
not vocalise their protests.  
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The ‘political’ culture of manorial officeholding seen in this chapter again has direct parallels to 
that described for the parochial officeholding structures of the early modern period. The 
attention to keeping the deliberations of the jury secret and the punishment of public dissension 
by jurors mirrors the attention to secrecy and strategies to avoid conflict in the early modern 
vestry.115 The association of attacks against the jury and attacks against the tenants at large 
adopts a similar rhetorical strategy as vestries who made their decisions stand for their whole 
communities.116 That these were combined with a position of responsibility to an outside 
authority in the form of the lord, leading to officials exercising their powers both to control but 
also to protect the community, again is strikingly similar to analyses of early modern officers as 
between their community and more senior royal officials.117 That manorial officeholding can be 
attributed some of the complex political aspects of early modern officeholding suggests a more 
sophisticated ‘politics’ than has previously been allowed, advocating for a significant 
inheritance into the early modern period. The next chapter will ask the logical following 
question: how did this ‘medieval’ governing structure interact with the development of the state 
in the early modern era?  
 
                                                          
115 Hindle, ‘Political Culture of the Middling Sort’; Hindle, State and Social Change, 211-2, 217-8.  
116 Hindle, State and Social Change, 218-9.  
117 Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order’, 21-6, 29- 33; Braddick, State Formation, 72-82; T. Harris, 
‘Introduction’, in T. Harris (ed.), The Politics of the Excluded, c.1500-1850, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001), 1-29, 14; Goldie, ‘Unacknowledged Republic’, 166; J.S. Craig, ‘Cooperation and Initiatives: 
Elizabethan Churchwardens and the Parish Accounts of Mildenhall’, Social History, 18:3, (1993), 357-80, 
359-70; Kent, Village Constable, 21-3. 
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Chapter 5: Manorial Officeholding and the State 
State ‘Incorporation’ 
Comparisons between the manorial officeholding structure of medieval England and the state-
focused parochial officeholding of early modern England have been made in all previous chapters. 
However, here the aim is to go beyond comparison to consider interaction between manorial 
officeholding structures and the state, and particularly what effect the increase in interaction 
between locality and central government had on the governmental structures created by manorial 
officeholding. 
That the Tudor period saw a radical increase in state authority can be traced to Geoffrey Elton’s 
argument about a ‘Tudor Revolution in Government’ in the reign of Henry VIII.1 Wrightson, 
however, was the first to analyse this phenomenon at the village level, in his examination of the 
transition from medieval unstratified communities to a nationwide culture of gentle and tenant-
farmer elites.2 He highlighted office as a core mechanism of the incorporation of this ‘middling 
sort’ into a national polite political culture. It provided village elites with an opportunity to identify 
with this culture, regulating the behaviour of the poor whose attitudes offended their polite 
sensibilities, and perhaps their puritan beliefs, as well as draining their pockets with the beginning 
of the assessment of poor rates. Fear of the growing poor and religious extremism led to officers 
becoming far more ‘of the state’ rather than ‘of the community’ normally after a struggle within the 
community’s elite. They were increasingly willing to cooperate through presenting offenders to JPs 
and enforcing statute law in the localities.3  
This initial model has been expanded by Hindle who has emphasised parochial officeholding as key 
to the creation of the early modern state. He sees the impetus for the growth of the state to be as 
much about local elites seeking to advance their power through the use of royal authority, as central 
government actively reaching out to incorporate the provinces, arguing that ‘order and authority did 
                                                          
1 G.R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government: a Study of Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry 
VIII¸ (Cambridge, 1953), 1-9.  
2 Wrightson, ‘Social Differentiation’, 33-4; Braddick, State Formation, 2-3.  
3 Wrightson, ‘Social Differentiation’ 38-9, 42-5; Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and Piety, 175-84; 
Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order’, 39-44; Wrightson, English Society, 225-7. 
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not merely “trickle down” but “welled up” within society itself’.4 A vital stage in this process is 
seen as the shift towards the formal charity of the Poor Law; although scholars disagree over the 
size and exact chronology of this change.5 Steven Gunn has posited that the need to meet increased 
Tudor military requirements was also significant, as ‘the “better sort” of parishioners…had to 
manage…new systems and send their younger, poorer, less secure neighbours to an uncertain fate in 
Elizabeth’s wars’.6 Wood has argued that incorporation changed the notion of popular protest in 
England, with the 1549 rebellions marking ‘the end of a long tradition of medieval popular revolt’.7 
As the local elites who held office were ‘incorporated’, they became invested in the status quo, and 
no longer fulfilled their previous function as the leaders of revolts, working against rather than in 
alliance with their poorer neighbours.8 Recently, Richard Hoyle has restated the longevity of the 
Wrightson thesis within early modern historiography, although he places the emphasis on the 
redefinition of protest against the crown as illegitimate meaning that ‘the village 
yeomanry…cleaved towards the gentry…because there was nowhere else for it to go’.9 
This interpretation has been modified in work which has emphasised the limits of the authority of 
officers, and how they were restrained by the expectations of their local communities, performing a 
balancing act akin to that of manorial officers between lord and fellow tenants.10 They thus 
mediated between state and local community. Furthermore, Hindle has emphasised that many 
parishes did not assess poor rates until after the Civil War, whilst Reformation historians have 
                                                          
4 Hindle, State and Social Change, 2-35, 115, 227-237; Hindle and Kümin, ‘Spatial Dynamics’, 168. 
5 Hindle, ‘Political Culture of the Middling Sort’, 127; Wood, 1549 Rebellions, 200-1; Kümin, Shaping of a 
Community, 247-8; W.O. Ault, ‘Manor Court and Parish Church in Fifteenth-Century England: a study of 
village by-laws’, Speculum, 42:1, (1967), 53-67, 67; McIntosh, Poor Relief in England, 2-4. 
6 Gunn, English People at War, 52, 115.  
7 Wood, 1549 Rebellions, 1.  
8 Wood, 1549 Rebellions, 187-8, 197-8, 203, 207; A. Wood, Riot, Rebellion and Popular Politics in Early 
Modern England, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 88; J. Walter, ‘Authority and Protest’, in K. 
Wrightson (ed.), A Social History of England, 1500-1700, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
221-41, 228.  
9 R.W. Hoyle, ‘“Wrightsonian Incorporation” and the Public Rhetoric of Mid-Tudor England’, History, 101, 
(2016), 20-41, 21-2, 40-1.  
10 Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order’, 21-6, 29- 33; Braddick, State Formation, 72-82; Harris, 
‘Introduction’, 14; Goldie, ‘Unacknowledged Republic’, 166; Craig, ‘Cooperation and Initiatives’, 359-70; 
Kent, Village Constable, 21-3. 
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questioned the effectiveness of central government religious policy.11 From the opposite direction, 
Smith led the charge in questioning a picture of early modern ‘incorporation’, criticising a 
conception of the change from local to state communities as a ‘for once and all affair’. He argued 
instead for an approach that saw the balance between community and state change in ‘intensity and 
degree’ rather than a ‘major transformation in structure’. He reinforced this view by showing that 
the state and local communities had always been interrelated in legal terms, with regulations such as 
the Statute of Labourers being supported by village notables as well as landlords, and information 
and personnel flowing between royal and manorial courts.12 Smith’s arguments have been bolstered 
by empirical and theoretical developments. Investigations into the vill as a unit of government have 
emphasised that medieval communities always had obligations to the crown including to attend 
royal courts, pay fines, undertake public works, set watches, contribute to armies and pay taxes.13 
Furthermore, historians have increasingly adopted a more nuanced sense of community 
membership, acknowledging that this was fluid and insecure. They have observed that it was 
possible for villagers to belong to the communities of family, village, manor, parish and state 
simultaneously, questioning the idea of a local-community to state-community sea change.14 David 
Rollison even suggests that ‘the incorporation of “middles” had been a strategy of the…state, since 
the reign of Henry II’.15  
                                                          
11 Hindle, ‘Political Culture of the Middling Sort’, 127; Carlson, ‘Office of Churchwarden’, 170-80; Kümin, 
Shaping of a Community, 243-5. 
12 Smith, ‘‘Modernization’’, 161-77.  
13 Dyer, ‘Power and Conflict’, 4; Dyer, ‘Village Community’, 412; C.C. Dyer, ‘Taxation and Communities in 
Late Medieval England’ in R.H. Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), Progress and Problems in Medieval England: 
Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 168-90, 171; Dyer, 
‘Political Life’, 140; Dyer, ‘Poverty and Its Relief’, 55; C.C. Dyer, ‘Were Medieval English Villages “Self 
Contained”?’, in C.C. Dyer (ed.), The Self-Contained Village?: the Social History of Rural Communities, 
1250-1900, (Hatfield: Hertfordshire University Press, 2006), 6-27, 25-6; R.S. Schofield, Taxation under the 
Early Tudors, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 35-45; R.B. Goheen, ‘Peasant Politics? Village Community and the 
Crown in Fifteenth-Century England’, The American Historical Review, 96:1, (1991), 42–62, 45-7; Hoyle, 
‘“Wrightsonian Incorporation”’, 26-7; Schofield, ‘Village Community’, 41; Schofield, Peasants and 
Historians, 203-4; Masschaele, Jury, State and Society, 6.  
14 S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1997), 1-3; Schofield, Peasant and Community, 5-6; Müller, ‘A Divided Class’, 119. 
15 D. Rollison, A Commonwealth of the People: Popular Politics and England’s Long Social Revolution, 
1066-1649, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 425.  
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The role of manorial officeholding, as providing a locus of authority and governance in villages, has 
been largely ignored in this complex story of interaction between state and locality. Paul Harvey has 
noted that the office of reeve developed on the behalf of both the vill and of the lord, as in the 
period before direct management the two roles were largely the same, allowing the reeve to 
represent the vill in interactions with the royal law.16 The reeve retained a legal role, representing 
villages in royal courts.17 He could act politically, and occasionally operated as mainpernor to his 
lord if the latter became a Member of Parliament.18 Medievalists have also noted that manorial 
officials were used informally to meet vills’ obligations to the crown, such as assessing taxation and 
raising military levies.19 The fact that village constables continued to be chosen by, and present in, 
leets into the early modern period has been emphasised by early modern historians, as evidence of 
the control of state office by local notables.20 Several studies have noted that the village elites who 
served as churchwardens, taxers and constables also served in manorial office.21 
                                                          
16 P.D.A. Harvey, ‘The Manorial Reeve in Twelfth-Century England’, in R. Evans (ed.), Lordship and 
Learning: Studies in Memory of Trevor Aston, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004), 125–38, 126-38. 
17 H.M. Cam, ‘The Community of the Vill’, in V. Ruffer and A.J. Taylor (eds.), Medieval Studies Presented 
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Life’, 140; W.M. Ormrod., ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, in G. Dodd (ed.), Henry V: New 
Interpretations, (Woodbridge: York Medieval Press in association with Boydell, 2013), 187-216, 198. 
20 Dyer, ‘Political Life’, 140; D.A. Crowley Frankpledge and Leet Jurisdiction in Later Medieval Essex, 
(Unpublished University of Sheffield PHD Thesis, 1971), 220-43, 281-90; King, ‘Early Stuart Courts Leet’, 
285-7; Kent, Village Constable, 59-61; J.L. Cruickshank, ‘Courts Leet, Constables and the Township 
Structure in the West Riding, 1540-1842’, Northern History, 54:1, (2017), 59-78, 78.  
21 Smith, ‘Dearth and Local Political Responses’, 385-7; Dyer, ‘Power and Conflict’, 6-7, 10; Dyer, ‘English 
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Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 90; J. S. Craig, ‘Cooperation and Initiatives’, 365; E. Clark, ‘Social Welfare and 
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However, beyond these individual examples, the main narrative is replacement of the manor court 
by the parish as a step in early modern state formation. Medievalists often see the civil parish as 
displacing the manor and vill.22 Hindle has developed the most explicit argument. He sees the parish 
as ultimately replacing the manor court in the form of the oligarchical vestry. These bodies were 
similar in that vestrymen and manorial jurors were of broadly similar status and both institutions 
had a de facto tendency to oligarchy. However, he acknowledges that the process of replacement 
was complex, noting that although the late sixteenth century was the period of the development of 
the secular parish, it was also a time of a flourishing of leet courts which were being given new 
powers by Tudor legislation. He perceives the relative strength of the two institutions as largely 
locally specific; parishes fragmented between multiple manors might not see a vestry becoming 
dominant until the eighteenth century, whilst where manor and parish boundaries were coterminous 
the vestry could flourish a lot earlier. Similarly, where manor courts were weak due to enclosure 
removing the need to regulate communal agriculture the vestry might rise in prominence far 
quicker.23  
Hindle further suggests that the two institutions were qualitatively different, as manorial courts 
express an ascending concept of political authority with jurors having standing independent of the 
demands made by their lords, whilst vestrymen’s status was derived from above, as they wielded 
authority on behalf of the state which they had little influence over. This led to vestries being more 
oligarchical than manor courts as state incorporation made parochial-elite vestrymen more self-
conscious of their special status, reflecting a trend emphasised by other parish historians that 
vestries became more exclusive over time. This in turn restricted the possession of parochial office 
to the middling sort, allowing them to become invested in the early modern state.24  
                                                          
22 Ault, ‘The Vill in Medieval England’, 211; Bainbridge, Gilds in the Medieval Countryside, 123-4; P.D.A. 
Harvey, ‘Initiative and Authority in Settlement Change’, in M. Aston, D. Austin and C.C. Dyer (eds.), The 
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23 Hindle, ‘Political Culture of the Middling Sort’, 126-8; Griffiths, ‘Kirtlington Manor Court’, 281. 
24 Hindle, ‘Political Culture of the Middling Sort’, 128-47; Kümin, Shaping of a Community, 258. 
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French similarly presents the two bodies as adversarial, suggesting that middling tenants sought to 
shift authority away from court leets to parochial structures in order to reduce gentry interference 
through manorial lordship. He notes however that the two bodies could act more harmoniously 
when lords were non-resident.25 For Earl’s Colne, French and Hoyle suggest the court leet was 
replaced by parochial institutions that did not rely on common consent, and better allowed a narrow 
elite including the lord to carry out moral reform.26  
This chapter seeks to reinterpret this narrative of replacement in light of the continued importance 
of manorial officeholding in governing the village community demonstrated in chapters one and 
three, its role in creating an officeholding elite seen in chapter two and the investment of local elites 
in officeholding shown in chapter four. Demonstrating the robust role of manorial officeholding in 
creating a governing structure, requires a reassessment of how it was impacted by, and impacted on, 
state building via officeholding, and adds a different dimension to the consideration of the local 
mediation of state authority in village communities.  
Legislation 
Firstly, it is vital to establish how far manorial officeholding was directly affected by the developing 
state, in that the role of officeholders changed to enforce centralising policies. This can be gauged 
by detailing how far jurors leet and capital pledges enforced new statutes placed on them by royal 
lawmakers. Such an approach requires some flexibility, as whilst court rolls do record some 
presentments as explicitly ‘against the statute’, they do not do so consistently, even for the same 
offences, and thus sometimes it is necessary to infer that an offence was triggered by a response to a 
statute rather than relying on an explicit link.  
To begin with legislation that did inculcate a change, officers at both Downham and Worfield 
presented offenders against the Act for the Making of Caps of 1571 in 1579 and 1581-4 
respectively.27 This relatively minor piece of legislation, ostensibly an economic measure designed 
                                                          
25 French, Middle Sort of People, 229-34.  
26 French and Hoyle, Earls Colne, 163-74.  
27 13 Elizabeth I c.19, SR v.4, p.1, 555 (Act for the making of caps); CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 8 Oct 
1579; SAC, P314/W/1/1/801, 5 Oct 1581; P314/W/1/1/803, 27 Sep 1582; P314/W/1/1/804, 21 Mar 1583; 
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to help sustain the ‘laudable Science and Trade of Cappynge’, demanded the wearing of caps by all 
persons over six on Sundays and Holy Days. The text of the act explicitly states that it was 
enforceable by stewards in leets as well as by assize judges, JPs and sheriffs. The way the offence 
was reported differs between the two courts. At Downham, two offenders were presented and 
amerced at the statutory rate of 3s 4d, whilst at Worfield summaries are provided simply of the 
amount of money forfeited to the lord which ranged from 9s-12s 4d. The latter example perhaps 
hints at why this legislation saw wider enforcement than other statutes, it clearly generated 
relatively high revenues. The statute ordered these to be split between the lord as owner of the leet, 
and the ‘Rulers and Cheefe Governors of every such…Hamlet where the Trespas shalbe tried’ to be 
distributed ‘among the Poore inhabiting within the same’, providing a way of easing the burden of 
poor relief among manorial tenants. Therefore, both lord and jurors leet may have seen an 
advantage in pursuing this statute in their leet. On the other hand, in both communities, enforcement 
long post-dated the enactment of the statute, and was seemingly short lived, suggesting any 
enthusiasm for the legislation was brief.  
Other responses to statutory legislation show contrasts between different manors. At Worfield, 
references to statutes were made in 1499 when the lord’s millers were presented for occupying mills 
against the form of the statute and taking an excessive toll, and in 1510 when George Rowley was 
presented for hunting rabbits without the lord’s licence.28 Both of these presentments were not 
covering new offences, one being a familiar attack on seigniorial property and the other being a 
presentment about millers commonly seen at Worfield, and the ‘statutes’ referred to may in fact be 
local bylaws. Enforcement against a verifiable royal statute can be seen in a single session of 1566, 
when ten men, including the vicar, were presented by the vill of Worfield for being common 
bowlers and playing ‘illegitimate games against the statute’, presumably a reference to the gaming 
legislation of 1541-2.29  
                                                          
P314/W/1/1/806, 7 Apr 1584; Griffiths also saw this legislation enforced at Kirtlington: Griffiths, ‘Kirtlington 
Manor Court’, 276.  
28 SAC, P314/W/1/1/499, 5 Nov 1499; P314/W/1/1/506, 24 Apr 1510.  
29 SAC, P314/W/1/1/763, 26 Sep 1566; 33 Henry VIII, c.11, SR., v3, 840.  
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Similarly, at Horstead references to new statutory legislation are sparse. In 1572 the capital pledges 
presented three men for killing the lord’s hares. Whilst analogous presentments were frequent on 
the manor, this was unusual in specifying that the hunt was committed in the snow during winter 
‘against the statute’, a reference to hunting legislation of 1523 banning the tracing of hares in 
snow.30 The only other reference is to the significantly older Statute of Mortmain of 1279, which 
was seen in 1527 in connection to a bequest of land held commonly by the vill of Horstead. This 
presentment by jurors seems to have been part of a renegotiation with the lord however, the land 
being regranted to a group of tenants acting as feofees, a process which occurred again in 1590. 31 
Thus it is hard to claim this is a presentment directly against a statute. 
This contrasts with Downham, where a greater range of statutory legislation was enforced, even if 
this was again normally in only one court session. In 1556, the capital pledges presented three men, 
two of whom were gentlemen, for guarding guns inside their lands in contravention of a statute of 
1541 banning any person with an income of less than £100 from keeping guns on their property.32 A 
similar one-off can be seen in 1508, when Robert Leche was amerced 2d as a common gamer at 
cards and tables, presumably under legislation of 1495, although the loss of the court rolls from this 
date to 1552 may mean that this legislation and that of 1541-2 was enforced for a longer period.33 
On the other hand, gaming laws were not being enforced from 1552 onwards, suggesting if any 
change did occur in this aspect of business, it again was short lived. In 1571, a gentleman was 
amerced the significant sum of 40s for being in default three times in common works ‘against the 
form of the statue’, following the reissuing of the Marian statute for the repairing of highways in 
1562. 34 However, no more presentments were made concerning this legislation. 
The only two statutes that were prosecuted with any regularity, even at Downham, were the Statute 
of Winchester’s provisions about keeping watch and the Statute of Labourers. The former of these, 
which was promulgated in 1285, demanded nightly watches to arrest strangers. This was incumbent 
                                                          
30 KCA, HOR/51, m.3, 23 Apr 1572; 14-15 Henry VIII, c.10, SR. v3, 217.  
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32 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, unfoliated, 10 Oct 1556; 33 Henry VII, c.5, SR. v3, 832-5.  
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upon the vill rather than the manor, which may explain why it is only seen at Downham where 
manor and vill were roughly the same unit.35 The watch is only visible through presentments of 
individual watchmen for default of their duties or assaults on watchmen, giving a very incomplete 
picture, although as these range from 1364 to 1507, it seems likely that the manor was used as the 
organising unit to meet this royal demand, or at least to ensure it was met via supervision by 
manorial jurors, up until at least the beginning of the sixteenth century.36 That this duty was 
specifically linked to the statute of Winchester is seen in the presentment of John Swift in 1376 for 
not doing vigil according to the ‘stat’ Wynton’.37  
Offences against the labour legislation were presented at Downham in 1420, 1434, 1450, 1456, 
1459 and 1508, thus over a long period of time but again intermittently.38 Earlier presentment 
according to this legislation can be seen at Worfield, when in a single session of April 1384 several 
vills presented day labourers for taking ‘more than ordered by the Statute’.39 This spate of 
enforcement was never repeated, however, and at both manors prosecution according to the Statute 
was relatively unusual. Part of this pattern is explained by the fact that manor courts were not the 
principal forum for prosecution, with the various iterations of the labour legislation being enforced 
by county commissions.40 Interestingly, the prosecution of the labour legislation in these manorial 
courts differs from that identified by Elaine Clark concerning the 1349 ordinance, as she found that 
whilst in towns many labourers were presented simply for ‘trespass against the statute’, in rural 
courts the statute was largely utilised by employers bringing interpersonal cases of breaking of 
covenant.41 The labour legislation was also enforced temporarily at Horstead in the mid-sixteenth 
                                                          
35 13 Edward I, Statute of Winchester c.4, SR v.1, 97.  
36 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.14, 3 Dec 1364; C11/1/2, m.23, 1 Dec 1373; C11/3/10, m.13, 23 Aug 1498; 
C11/3/10, m.23, 24 Sep 1507.  
37 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.25, 12 Dec 1376.  
38 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5, m.13, 16 Jan 1420; C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan 1434; C11/2/6, m.46, c.10 Jan 1450; 
C11/2/6, m.52, 10 May 1456; C11/2/6, m.56, 3 Jan 1459; C11/3/10, m.24, 20 Mar 1508.  
39 SAC, P314/W/1/1/142, 24 Apr 1384. 
40 B. H. Putnam, The Enforcement of the Statutes of Labourers During the First Decade after the Black 
Death, 1349-1359, (New York, 1908), 220-2.  
41 E. Clark, ‘Medieval Labor Law and English Local Courts’, American Journal of Legal History, 27:4, 
(1983), 330-53, 335-6.  
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century, although this was achieved through special petty sessions where servants were retained for 
a year, and day labourers were admitted to work within the lordship.42 
The variety of legislation seen in presentments at Downham suggests that the general lack of 
enforcement of new statutory requirements was not due to the ignorance of jurors about these acts. 
Whilst delays between promulgation and presentments may not suggest immediate awareness, the 
sheer range of legislation seen indicates relatively effective transmission into local courts.43 Lack of 
enforcement was in some measure presumably due to lack of offenders, with acts relatively narrow 
in scope compared to the general presentments made by manorial juries. Beyond this, the fact that 
Downham enforced a wider range of legislation, and in some cases for longer, must still be 
explained. Partially, this was likely due to the manorial court at Downham, with its relatively 
coterminous boundaries of manor and vill, taking on the requirements of the state in a way not 
possible at the other two case-study manors where these boundaries did not overlap neatly. As well 
as through setting the watch, this is seen in taxation, with three men in 1324 bringing unsuccessful 
suits against Simon Buk as ‘agister of the pence of arms’, suggesting military requirements were 
organised at the manorial level.44 The integration of state and manorial authorities, due to the 
Bishop of Ely’s powers within the liberty of the Isle, must also have been significant, with 
legislation that may elsewhere have been enforced by other courts being instead monitored through 
the bishop’s leets.45  
Beyond structural differences, the other main reason behind enforcement must have been a 
willingness by manorial jurors to present offenders under this legislation. As has been emphasised 
for both the medieval and early modern periods in varyingly complex formulations, the key to 
enforcement of government policy at the local level was willingness by local elites to comply with 
legislation, largely because they saw it in their own interest to do so.46 Unfortunately, measuring 
                                                          
42 KCA, HOR/49, m.8, 21 Apr 1552; HOR/50, m.1, 21 Apr 1553; HOR/50, m.2, 7 Apr 1554.  
43 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 40.  
44 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1, m.7, 19 Dec 1324.  
45 See p. 10. 
46 Goheen, ‘Peasant Politics’, 42-3, 49-56; Braddick, State Formation, 433-4; Hindle, State and Social 
Change, 236-8; J.R. Kent, ‘The Centre and the Localities: State Formation and Parish Government in 
England, circa 1640-1740’, The Historical Journal, 38, (1995), 363-404, 399.  
201 
 
this in the records available is difficult, although some evidence can be seen in bylaws. There was 
concern about labour at Downham at the same time the statute was being enforced, a pattern seen in 
the passing of bylaws in 1388, 1411 and 1426 to control agricultural workers at harvest time.47 
However, of the men presented for breaking the labour legislation, only two, Richard Iegill and 
Hugh Aileff were described as labourers.48 The other men are better described as skilled, including 
roofers, thatchers, weavers and a plowright, suggesting a different type of worker was being 
targeted, making it hard to draw a straight line between local concern and statutory enforcement. 
Bylaws can conversely be interpreted as evidence of why central legislation was not enforced in leet 
courts: if a structure already existed for monitoring illicit behaviour, this may have been preferred 
over new or existing statutes. Thus, whilst jurors at Horstead did not present anybody under gaming 
statutes, they did introduce bylaws concerning gambling suggesting they were concerned about this 
aspect of misbehaviour.49  
Whilst there were local variations, the general pattern, even when a broad net is cast, is that officers 
did not respond in a sustained way to new statutes, and that new laws did not drastically change 
their work. No aspect of legislation became a regular feature of juror presentments and innovations 
are drowned out by the more traditional ‘royal’ presentments concerning the assize of ale and 
violence which were regular presentments in 1300. Village elites acting as manorial officials were 
no more officers of the state in 1600 than they were in the late middle ages. This is due to lack of 
investment in statutory enforcement through leets from both officials and the crown. McIntosh has 
emphasised that parliamentary legislation concerning misbehaviour largely followed local initiative, 
explaining why jurors may have felt little compulsion to govern through adherence to statute rather 
than local custom and bylaws.50  
From the perspective of the crown, it is hard to argue that there was significant effort to incorporate 
leets into royal governance. Whilst several new statutes were promulgated in the sixteenth century 
that could explicitly be enforced by stewards in leets, these were normally named alongside other 
                                                          
47 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.21, 27 Jul 1388; C11/2/4, m.27, 15 Jul 1411; C11/2/6, 19 Jul 1426. 
48 CUL, EDR, C11/2/6, m.25, 14 Jan, 1434. 
49 KCA, HOR/53, m.2, 1 Oct 1584.  
50 McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, 39-40. For the control of mobility specifically see: Watson, ‘“Towne 
Harmles”’, 124, 128, 133.  
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jurisdictions such as the tourn, assizes and, more significantly, the quarter session.51 Thus a 
relatively wide net was cast, incorporating both royally-appointed and seigniorially-appointed 
officials, allowing either structure to be used. In fact two acts of Elizabeth I’s reign removed 
statutory powers from leets in the responsibility for the destruction of vermin and the enforcement 
of highway repairs, although leets were given powers to enforce the latter in later Elizabethan 
legislation.52 One act which did direct how royal law was to be enforced in leets in some detail was 
the 1559 act laid out to preserve the spawn of fish.53 This legislation detailed that if juries leet were 
suspected of not making presentments about the act, the steward should empanel a second jury to 
enquire if the first jury were concealing anything. However, this level of detail was exceptional, and 
largely it was stewards who could be prosecuted in royal courts for not enforcing legislation. This 
presumably was part of the reason leets were not attractive forums to Tudor governments for the 
enforcement of statutes; using them required relying on the mediating role not only of local jurors 
themselves, but the steward as a non-royally commissioned presider over the court. Thus, the 
deepening of involvement of localities with the crown occurred outside manorial structures, and it is 
through examining these that the impact of state incorporation on manorial officeholding can be 
assessed.  
Worfield’s Churchwardens  
Churchwardens have long been stressed as a vital office in the incorporation of local community 
elites into the state, and thus the rise of the civil parish, during the sixteenth century. Investigations 
                                                          
51 For example, 14-15 Henry VIII c.10, SR v.3, 217, (Act against tracing of hares); 24 Henry VIII c.13, SR 
v.3, 430-2, (Act for reformation of excess in apparel); 33 Henry VIII c.6, SR v.3 (Act concerning crossbows 
and handguns);  33 Henry VIII c.9, SR v.3, (Act for Maintenance and Debarring of Unlawful Games); 2-3 
Edward VI c.10, SR v.4, p.1, 51-2 (Act for true making of malt); 2-3 Edward VI c.5, SR v.4, p.1, 58-9, (Act 
touching victuallers and handycraft men); 7 Edward VI c.5, SR v.4, p.1, 168-70 (Act to avoid the great price 
and excess of wines); 2-3 Philip and Mary c.8, SR v.4, p.1, 320-22, (Act for the taking of musters); 13 
Elizabeth I c.19, SR v.4, p.1, 555 (Act for the making of caps); 23 Elizabeth I c.10, SR v.4, p.1, 672-3 (Act for 
preservation of pheasants and partridges); 31 Elizabeth c.7, SR v.4, p.2, 804-5, (Act against erecting and 
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52 24 Henry VIII c.10, SR v.3, 425-6 (Act made and ordered to destroy choughs, crows and rooks); 8 
Elizabeth I c.15, SR v.4, p.1, 555 (Act for the preservation of grain); 2-3 Philip and Mary c.8, SR v.4, p.1, 
284-5 (Act for the amending of highways); 5 Elizabeth I c.13, SR v.4, p.1, (Act for the repairing of highways); 
18 Elizabeth I, c.10, SR v.4, p.1, 620-1, (Act of addition unto the former acts of amending and repairing of 
highways).  
53 1 Elizabeth I c.17, SR v.4, p.1, 378-9.  
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of churchwardens before the Reformation have emphasised the importance of these men in the 
medieval period, seeing this as a key correlate of the rise of the parish as a unit of local identity and 
organisation.54 Over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, churchwardens in many communities 
became responsible for managing increasingly large bequests in property and cash, using this 
income to coordinate significant building projects, maintain communal infrastructure and distribute 
local charity.55 Before 1500, however, churchwardens were undeniably officers of the locality rather 
than the crown; whilst they might be used by communities to meet state requirements such as 
raising taxation, this was not mandated by royal government.56  
Change occurred in the sixteenth century, as churchwardens, along with the parish, were 
increasingly delegated roles by the crown, and thus received local authority as organs of the state. 
The Reformation played a key part in this. As local religion was increasingly subject to monitoring 
for conformity, churchwardens became, whether willingly or otherwise, agents in this process, 
representing the parish before commissioners and visitations, and presenting non-conformity in 
archdeacons’ courts.57 Beyond religious policy, the increasing concern about managing poverty led 
to the pre-existing poor relief functions of wardens being extended and formalised by new 
legislation, and subject to oversight by county magistrates, although the creation of collectors and 
later overseers of the poor could lead to this role being performed by other officials.58 This was 
combined with a variety of other secular functions imposed by successive Tudor governments, 
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which increasingly changed churchwardens from important officials locally, to important officials 
for the exercise of state authority.59  
How did these new functions of churchwardens affect manorial officeholding? As churchwardens 
increasingly gained state authority, one might expect their power to increase in local communities, 
and thus make manorial officeholding less relevant as a governing structure and reduce its 
attractiveness to local elites. Here, this question is explored by using the churchwardens’ accounts 
for Worfield, which allow for the reconstruction of both the roles performed by wardens and the 
identities of those serving in office. These accounts survive for almost the entire sixteenth century, 
with only small gaps for longer than a year for 1537-40 and 1563-5. The fact that these records 
survive alongside the manorial court rolls for Worfield allows for comparison of both parish and 
manorial office in terms of what these types of officers did and who held these offices, to see how 
manorial officeholding may have been impacted by the rise of the state.  
Internally, Worfield’s churchwardens’ accounts reveal that the functions of this office drastically 
changed across the sixteenth century due to the increasing intervention of monarchs. This process 
can be seen in three phases in the surviving accounts. The first phase, stretching from the first 
surviving account in 1500 to the last surviving pre-Reformation account in 1536, reveals an active 
parochial community, which is typical of many late medieval parishes.60 The parish and an attached 
Chapel of the Virgin Mary managed large annual expenses which were met typically by bequests of 
money and land.61 The churchwardens on two separate occasions also levied a rate, or ‘lewn’, on 
land within the parish, at 4d and then 8d a virgate, but these were for the specifically named 
purposes of repairing the churchyard walls and bell tower respectively.62 They were expressly made 
by common assent of the parish. The majority of expenditure was spent on the church fabric. This 
                                                          
59 Webb and Webb, English Local Government, 21; Slack, Poverty and Policy, 131; Wrightson, ‘Politics of 
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60 Worfield CWAs, Parts I-IV.  
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created commercial exchanges which meant churchwardens engaged in networks which extended 
well beyond the parish.63 However, Worfield’s churchwardens seem to have been subjected to little 
external oversight, with no outlays recorded for attending visitations, and only two for citations in 
1500 and 1522.64 Similarly, churchwardens themselves seem to have provided no relief for the poor, 
although the chantry did manage almshouses which appear in virtually all accounts down to 1533. 
The second phase dates from 1541 to 1552, covering the beginning of the Reformation under Henry 
VIII and its continuation under Edward VI. The first sign of the break from Rome occurs in 1541 
when a Bible, presumably the Authorised version of 1539, was purchased.65 However, following the 
norm outlined in other local studies, the real changes occur after the far-reaching Royal Injunctions 
of 1547.66 In this year and 1549, the churchwardens and other parishioners were called before the 
King’s commissioners, in the latter case to make an inventory of church goods and lands.67 This 
was followed by the purchase of a number of new religious books, the whitewashing of walls, and 
the pulling down and defacing of images. The chantry was dissolved and turned into a school in 
1549.68 The Reformation also changed the role of the churchwardens in their extra-parochial 
network. Whilst commercial requirements linked to the church fabric connected wardens to 
Bridgnorth and Lichfield in this period, annual visitations from 1549 onwards saw churchwardens 
attend at Lapley and Bushbury.69 Yet, secular royal requirements are only seen in an outlay of 
between 8s and 15s 3d for the lay subsidy recorded in every surviving account for 1541 to 1547. A 
hint that some poor relief was being organized by the parish in this period, and perhaps before, is 
revealed by a payment of 4d in 1551 ‘for the mendynge of the lockes of the power menes box’, 
although no records of the alms collected or distributed from this box are made in the accounts.70 
The final phase, dating from 1553 until the last account examined in 1600, sees churchwardens 
become officers of the secular Tudor state. Trends continued from the second stage, with the 
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65 Worfield CWAs, Part IV, 228.  
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religious policies of the Reformation, and briefly Marian Reformation, present in the 
churchwardens’ accounts.71 Similarly, monitoring of conformity continued to place churchwardens 
in a greater extra-parochial network. Worfield’s churchwardens attended commissions at 
Bridgnorth, Lichfield and Wellington, and visitations took them to 17 different named places across 
the archdeaconry.72 However, a clear contrast with earlier periods was the secular responsibilities 
placed on parishes in a raft of new legislation. The earliest example was a payment of 7d ‘for the 
makynge a booke for the provycyon for the poore’ made in 1553, a response to a statute of 1552 
which called for parishes to make registers for the poor.73 Poor relief beyond this point seems to 
have been intermittent however, although payments for raising children, an activity which grew in 
the sixteenth century, can be seen.74  Provision was made in 1575 to a widow, whilst in 1578-9 
Richard Felton was paid for keeping a ‘base child’, and in 1587 a poor woman was paid 12s to 
discharge the parish of a child abandoned there.75 The Poor Law of 1598 triggered more structural 
change: in 1599 4s 2d was laid out when the churchwardens and four men of the parish went before 
the justices at Bridgnorth concerning ‘the reliefe of the poore’ whilst 4s 10d was expended when the 
churchwardens again were at Bridgnorth with the overseers of the poor.76  
Other, less historically significant legislation also changed the role of the churchwardens at 
Worfield. From 1579 onwards, churchwardens annually surrendered 6s 6d to the High Constables at 
Bridgnorth for the relief of prisoners, presumably as a response to poor relief legislation in 1572, 
whilst from 1595 onwards they paid a further 13s yearly for maimed soldiers according to an act of 
1593.77 From 1569 to 1592, churchwardens paid out sums ranging between 1s and 5s 4d for the 
destruction of vermin following a 1566 act for the preservation of grain.78 These new outlays 
affected the income generation of the parish. Whilst in 1556 a rate was still made through ‘above 
agreement of the parochaunce at the same acoptes’ and specifically for ‘the use of the reparacion of 
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the said churche’, rates from 1572 onwards were annually levied at 1s to 3s a yardland, a 
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Figure 5.1 – Map showing places mentioned in Worfield’s churchwardens’ accounts by phase 
first mentioned 
 
Source: Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI.  
 
The sixteenth century saw the transformation of churchwardens at Worfield from being local 
officers for managing lay religious bequests and the church fabric, to being officers enforcing both 
religious and secular royal legislation, as well as raising wealth from the parish to spend locally and 
to transfer to royal officials. As can be seen in figure 5.1, this drastically reconfigured the 
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geography of being a churchwarden. Whilst commercial requirements had always meant wardens 
had business beyond the parish, the sheer number of visitations and appearances before 
commissions placed wardens in a far greater regional network by the end of the sixteenth century 
and made them accountable to authorities far beyond the parish, putting them at the forefront of 
interactions between state and locality.  
How far this transformation was willingly accepted by the pool of men who served as 
churchwardens, or a response to pressure from above, cannot easily be explored through the neutral 
accounts. Only twice can amercements for failing to follow royal requirements be observed. The 
first is in 1579, when the wardens accounted 2s 11d ‘in mercements and our charges at Stafforde for 
desfaulte of homelyes’, presumably being fined by the archdeacon for this failure. This punishment 
seems to have elicited a response, with the same account recording the purchase of two tomes of the 
homilies.80 A more detailed, and secular, case occurs in 1577 when the wardens were amerced 30s 
10d by the Commissioners at Bridgnorth for ‘not destroyinge foules and varmynt accordinge to the 
Statute in that behalf’, a sum far in excess of any annual payment for this work, but well below the 
£5 named in the royal legislation for every defaulting warden.81 This punishment again led to an 
immediate response, with the accounts including a separate section specifically for destroying 
vermin, recording 34 separate payments totaling 15s 1d.82 Whether these censures reveal resistance 
or broad compliance does not affect the fact that the transformation of the office of churchwarden is 
in stark contrast to the pattern of little legislation-driven change delineated for manorial offices. 
This could suggest a narrative of replacement, with manorial office becoming increasingly less 
important as it was not adapted to new political requirements. However, the impact of the 
development of parochial office cannot be seen in such simplistic terms, which ignore the 
interaction of parochial and manorial office both in terms of the men serving and their duties. 
The strong relationship between manorial office and serving as churchwarden can be seen through 
linking the individuals named as churchwardens in the surviving accounts to individuals recorded as 
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81 Worfield CWAs, Part VI, 63; 8 Elizabeth c.15, SR, vol.4, 499. 
82 Worfield CWAs, Part VI, 64-66.  
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manorial officeholders in the surviving court rolls.83 Of the 77 individual churchwardens, 67 (87%) 
could be matched to a unique individual who served in manorial office. Of the 10 unmatched 
individuals, two seem to have never served in manorial office. One of these men could not be 
identified in any officeholding capacity, whilst the other, John Wannerton, who served as 
churchwarden for 1534-5, in 1557 was liable to serve as beadle.84 Interestingly, whilst Wannerton’s 
status as a gentleman seems to have precluded him serving as beadle, or in any other manorial 
office, his service as churchwarden suggests a different attitude to parochial office, suggesting it 
may have held a higher status, perhaps because it was not linked directly to being one of the lord’s 
tenants. However, his son-in-law and grandson, the Bromleys, did not serve as churchwarden 
suggesting that they were viewed, or viewed themselves, as having too high status due to their 
service in regional and national office.85 The other 8 unmatched individuals were men who from 
their names could be identified with 2 or more individuals who served in manorial office, making a 
one-to-one match impossible. However, it therefore is probable that of the 77 churchwardens, 75 or 
97.4%, served as manorial officers, showing that serving in both types of office was strongly linked. 
Table 5.1 breaks these connections down by types of office and by the three phases of transition 
from purely-parochial to state office. Only a very small percentage of churchwardens served as 
beadles, a situation undoubtedly caused by the fact that beadles were only drawn from the township 
of Hallon. Other patterns seem to have been linked to the status of offices, with fewer 
churchwardens acting as tasters due to it being less related to higher-status offices like juror baron, 
juror leet, constable and reeve.86 These latter four offices were the most commonly held by 
churchwardens, a pattern particularly strong for jurors baron, with 85% of churchwardens serving in 
this office, and especially for jurors leet, with every single churchwarden serving in this office. 
More surprising than the general correlation between manorial officeholding and being a 
churchwarden is the lack of change over time. Whilst the responsibilities of churchwardens and 
their interaction with state officials was transformed in this century, this did not drastically change 
the identity of the people holding this office, or indeed their service as manorial officeholders. 
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Whilst the percentage of churchwardens who also served as reeve and affeeror did drop between the 
first and third phase, at the same time the percentage of tasters rose. Similarly, the proportion who 
served as constable, whilst always high, did not rise between the first and third stage, even though 
this office was similarly becoming more ‘state-focused’ in the sixteenth century.87 This suggests 
that there was no separation of an elite of parochial officeholders from manorial officeholders. 
Instead the two types of officeholding were held in tandem, as seen in the totality of juror leet 
service in the sixteenth century.  
It is clear that churchwardens exercised power through manorial office even after being a warden 
became an important state office. Looking before 1500, the available information allows for the 
identification of two fifteenth-century churchwardens. These men, Roger Gerbod and John Jannes, 
are seen in 5 courts in 1419-1420, in which they brought a plea of debt against the executors of 
William and Agnes Toward for a coverlet left by the deceased to the fabric of the church.88 
Therefore the evidence is slight and skewed, as these churchwardens may have brought this case 
precisely because they were prominent tenants who were thus likely to be successful in the manor 
court. Such concerns aside, Gerbod and Jannes were manorial officers much like later 
churchwardens, with both serving as jurors baron and leet, Gerbod serving as beadle and taster, 
whilst Jannes served as affeeror, reeve and constable.89 Thus the connection between manorial 
officeholding and being a churchwarden seems to have been a largely unchanging trend over both 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that did not shift with the changing role of the wardens. This 
suggests that manorial officeholding was no less attractive to the men who served as churchwarden 
in 1600 than in 1500 or even 1420, evidencing that they still saw the value in serving in manorial 
office. 
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Table 5.1 - Reconstruction of the careers of churchwardens holding manorial office at Worfield 
 Phase I  
(1500-1536) 
Phase II  
(1541-1552) 
Phase III  
(1553-1600) 
All Phases 
15th Century  
(1419-1420) 
Total Churchwardens 21 9 37 67 2 
Beadle 2 0 3 5 1 
Beadle (%) 9.53 0 8.11 7.46 50 
Taster 5 0 16 21 1 
Taster (%) 23.81 0 43.24 31.34 50 
Reeve 10 3 14 27 1 
Reeve (%) 47.62 33.33 37.84 40.3 50 
Affeeror 11 5 15 31 1 
Affeeror (%) 52.38 55.56 40.54 46.27 50 
Constable 15 4 25 44 1 
Constable (%) 71.43 44.44 67.57 65.67 50 
Juror Baron 14 9 34 57 2 
Juror Baron (%) 66.67 100 91.89 85.07 100 
Juror Leet 21 9 37 67 2 
Juror Leet (%) 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI; SAC, P314/W/1/1/253-255, 499-838
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The similarity of personnel between churchwardens and manorial officers has been noted in 
several studies.90 However, here the reconstruction of manorial officeholding careers allows for 
a greater consideration of the kinds of officeholder who would also serve as churchwarden. This 
was necessarily a subset of all the tenants who served in manorial office, with 481 individuals 
being recorded as serving in at least one office in the sixteenth century, but only 75 of these also 
serving as churchwarden, an inevitability as there were simply not enough openings for all to 
serve in the latter office.91 Table 5.2 compares the mean and median cohort number of services 
as jurors leet and baron by the subset of those men who were also churchwardens with the total 
body of men serving as jurors. These show overwhelmingly that churchwardens tended to be the 
greater serving among the bodies of jurors generally, with every cohort, bar the 1590s for jurors 
leet, seeing the churchwarden subset having greater mean and median service values than the 
full cohort. The limited evidence for the two churchwardens named from the 1410s is more 
variable, with both being above average in their cohorts as jurors baron, but being below the 
mean as jurors leet, although it is likely many of the other prominent jurors of this decade served 
as unrecorded churchwardens thus presenting to a misleading picture. Generally, this suggests 
that not only were churchwardens overwhelmingly manorial officeholders, but they also tended 
to be the greatest serving, and so presumably most influential manorial officeholders.  
This trend is not perfect however, and it is important not to overstate this pattern, seeing greater 
service in manorial office and particularly as a juror, as a prerequisite for serving as 
churchwarden. Whilst the top two greatest-serving jurors leet of the cohorts examined, 
Humphrey Barrett and Richard Haselwood, who served 63 and 53 times respectively, accounted 
as churchwardens, another 5 churchwardens only acted as jurors leet once. Similarly, the third, 
fourth and one of the joint-fifth highest-serving jurors leet never served as churchwardens. An 
analogous pattern is seen in juror baron service, with four churchwardens only serving 1-2 times 
in this office, and the second and joint-fourth highest serving as jurors baron in these cohorts not 
serving as wardens. It is worth noting, however, how far the men who served as churchwardens, 
                                                          
90 French, People of the Parish, 90; Byng, Church Building, 160, 163; Hindle and Kümin, ‘Spatial 
Dynamics’, 158; Ingram, Carnal Knowledge, 84.  
91 SAC, P314/W/1/1/499-838.  
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provided a large proportion of those who served in other manorial offices. Looking just at those 
who served in the sixteenth century, churchwardens accounted for 42 (37.5%) of the 112 men 
selected as constables and 21 (32.8%) of the 64 men selected as reeves.92 Whilst these numbers 
do not suggest domination of these offices, this is in part due to the very low instance of repeat 
service. This is a picture of correlation rather than causation; whilst serving as a manorial officer 
or churchwarden was not necessary to serve in the other office, similar factors seem to have been 
in play in determining who served in each type of offices.   
                                                          
92 SAC, W/1/1/499-838. 
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Table 5.2 – Comparison of service of impaneled officers who served as churchwardens to their general cohorts of impaneled officers at 
Worfield 
 
Cohort study where all jurors leet and jurors baron were placed into a decade of first appearance. Source: Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI; SAC, P314/W/1/1/405-838. 
  








































1480-89 2 15 16 7.8 16 4 2 25 61.5 14.32 61.5 5 
1490-99 8 27 16.38 8.52 11 3 8 37 54.63 18.81 49.5 3 
1500-09 5 28 20 7.18 22 3 4 18 36.75 24.61 25.5 9 
1510-19 7 37 17.43 6.84 18 2 4 22 66.5 33.14 60 23 
1520-29 7 31 10.29 5.45 9 3 1 20 104 19.5 104 10.5 
1530-39 2 24 5 2.96 5 1.5 6 24 32.33 16.71 35 8.5 
1540-49 10 24 20.6 12.5 17 5 9 31 89.89 39.65 65 16 
1550-59 3 20 12.33 9.75 14 3 1 27 51 18.07 51 1 
1560-69 7 28 13.86 7.14 14 5 7 34 98.86 33.56 98 2 
1570-79 4 27 12.5 5.63 14.5 3 9 34 63.22 28.53 64 7 
1580-89 8 26 8.5 5.88 8 5 4 20 55.75 24.1 60 5.5 
1590-99 4 15 2.75 3.2 2 2 2 21 8.5 6.38 8.5 5 
1390-99 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 47 78 17.43 78 4 
1400-09 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 21 49 30.14 49 13 
1410-19 2 15 17 22 17 13 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Unfortunately, Worfield’s churchwardens’ accounts give little indication about how these 
officers were chosen.93 Most of the recorded selections provide no detail, although in the account 
of 1532, describing those chosen for the following year, it is said that ‘the paryshe hayth chosyn 
ffor the churche wardens’.94 A similar formula is seen in 1533 and 1534, suggesting a degree of 
popular selection.95 However, the language of consensus cannot be taken at face value. Figure 
5.2 examines the distribution of names in the accounts along the same lines as the selection of 
reeves and tasters at Worfield in figures 2.9 and 2.11. This reveals a greater degree of 
concentration in serving as churchwarden among an eligible group than for these manorial 
offices, as whilst only 15 (19%) of the 77 total individuals served as churchwarden more than 
twice, they appear in 38% of the total wardens’ accounts. However, this aside the pattern adopts 
some features similar to the wide distribution of office seen for manorial officers. Individuals 
who accounted twice, the modal number of times and who make up 57% of those who served, 
accounted for around half of all wardens’ accounts.  
Whilst Roger Haselwood and William Walker served 7 of 12 years between 1499 and 1511, this 
almost continuous service disappeared in later decades, with men who did serve for multiple 
years tending to do so in terms frequently more than ten years apart, echoing the pattern 
observed for manorial offices, suggesting that being a churchwarden was not dominated by a 
few individuals. There was a tendency for men to serve in consistent pairings down to 1586, 
although this was not always the case, with churchwardens sometimes serving with a different 
partner. Between 1586 and 1598 a more formal system looks to have been in operation, with the 
second churchwarden for a given year, appearing as the first churchwarden for the following 
year.96 Katherine French has suggested this system shows the distinction between a senior, 
experienced warden, and a junior warden, with the latter becoming the former after gaining the 
relevant skill-set through being in the more junior position.97 This could be what is being 
                                                          
93 This is a common deficiency of churchwardens’ accounts: Kümin, Shaping of a Community, 28-9.  
94 Worfield CWAs, Part III, 24 
95 Worfield CWAs, Part IV, 220, 222.  
96 Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI. 
97 French, People of the Parish, 76-77.  
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observed in this case although the short lifetime of this system, which was replaced by less strict 
pairings in 1599 and beyond, undermines such an interpretation.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Proportion of total accounts as churchwarden by number of times accounted 
at Worfield 
 
N = 171. Source: Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI. 
 
Another possible interpretation of the pattern is rotation, which might explain the loose pairings 
and long gaps between services, particularly in later periods, as men appeared twice in a cycle. 
This again has been observed in other cases.98 On the other hand, the fact that churchwardens 
generally were from a prominent subset of manorial officeholders mitigates against such a view 
of rotation, certainly in the formal sense on the basis of land seen in the election of the beadle.99 
                                                          
98 French, People of the Parish, 77-78 Kümin, Shaping of a Community, 28.  
99 See pp. 68-73. 
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The most convincing interpretation of this selection pattern is of a more elite group among 
which the office of churchwarden was in some way distributed. These men were chosen on 
similar grounds as manorial officers and perhaps having served in manorial office was a marker 
of suitability for parochial office. For this investigation, more important than the exact method of 
selection, is the fact that these men still served in manorial office, and thus in no way replaced 
this manorial service with being churchwarden, even as this office presumably increased in its 
authority with growing engagement with state governance. It is striking that the two longest 
serving churchwardens were at the very start of the period, and that as this office increasingly 
became incorporated into the state, its selection pattern looks more like that of manorial officers.  
The relative economic status of those who served as churchwardens as opposed to other 
manorial officers can be explored by comparing the sixteenth-century lay subsidy assessments 
with the names of churchwardens and manorial officers. Of the 112 taxpayers recorded for 
Worfield in the 1524 subsidy, supplemented by another 3 individuals recorded in 1525, 72 could 
be matched with manorial officers, churchwardens or both.100 This method, however, should be 
treated with caution as it cannot account for the changing wealth of individuals, and only 
includes a small proportion of officers observed on the manor. As table 5.3 demonstrates, this 
evidence does suggest an higher economic status for churchwardens than for manorial 
officeholders, with their mean assessment of £5 11s 2d just less than a £1 higher than the next 
highest mean for the office of affeeror, and almost £2 higher than the average paid by all 
taxpayers identified as officers. This seems largely due to an underrepresentation of the lowest 
assessed taxpayers who were more likely to serve in manorial office, with only 19% of wardens 
coming from the £1-2 group, whilst an exceptional 33% of wardens were assessed at £7 or more. 
Thus churchwardens seem to have been a more economically elite group than manorial officers. 
However, whilst lower taxpayers may have been excluded from being churchwardens, the 
economic elites who did serve as churchwardens also held many manorial offices. Three £9-10 
taxpayers served as churchwardens, but also three of this bracket served as jurors leet and 
                                                          
100 See appendix 1 for methodology.  
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constables, whilst two even served as tasters, though interestingly none served as jurors baron. 
Similar numbers of those assessed at £5-8 served as churchwardens and in manorial office.  
For 1544-5, 59 individuals could be matched using both assessments. The picture is slightly 
flatter due to very small numbers of individuals being assessed in the £5-6 bracket, and none in 
the £7-8 bracket. Nevertheless, churchwardens still have the highest mean assessment of £3 16s 
2d, more than £0.5 higher than the next mean for jurors leet, and around £1 higher than the 
average paid by all taxpayers who held office. This again is largely due to over representation by 
the highest assessed, with 14% being drawn from the £9-10 bracket. The pattern of offices below 
the churchwardens’ assessment is quite different however, affeeror now being the lowest 
assessed office, with no individual assessed at more than £4 serving in this role. However, there 
is again evidence that the wealthiest taxpayers did serve in other offices, with three £9-10 
taxpayers serving as jurors leet, and two as jurors baron, again suggesting little stratification 











Table 5.3 – Comparison of lay subsidy assessments of manorial officers and churchwardens at Worfield 
 
 
Sources: SAC, P314/W/1/1/449-838; Worfield CWAs, Parts I-VI; Faraday, M.A. (ed.), Shropshire Taxes in the Reign of Henry VIII: the Lay Subsidy of 1524-7, the Lay Subsidy of 
1543-5 and the Benevolence of 1545, (Walton on Thames, 2015), 78-81, 196-8, 405-8, 571-5.   
Subsidy Office £1-2 £1-2 % £3-4 £3-4 % £5-6 £5-6 % £7-8 £7-8 % £9-10 £9-10 % Total Mean  
1524-5 
Taster 13 54.2 5 20.8 2 8.3 2 8.3 2 8.3 24 £3 10s 4d 
Juror Baron 17 38.6 15 34.1 6 13.6 6 13.6 0 0 44 £3 12s 3d 
Juror Leet 19 33.9 20 35.7 7 12.5 7 12.5 3 5.4 56 £4 0s 0d 
Constable 11 32.4 12 35.3 4 11.8 4 11.8 3 8.8 34 £4 5s 10d 
Reeve 4 25 4 25 4 25 4 25 0 0 16 £4 9s 7d 
Beadle 1 20 1 20 2 40 1 20 0 0 5 £4 16s 0d 
Affeeror 5 27.8 3 16.7 6 33.3 3 16.7 1 5.6 18 £4 14s 4d 
Churchwarden 4 19.1 6 28.6 4 19.1 4 19.1 3 14.3 21 £5 11s 2d 
All taxpaying officers 27 37.5 27 37.5 7 9.7 7 9.7 4 5.6 72 £3 15s 5d 
1544-5 
Affeeror 7 63.6 4 36.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 £1 18s 0d 
Constable 13 54.2 10 41.7 1 4.2 0 0 0 0 24 £2 9s 1d 
Juror Baron 24 51.1 19 40.4 2 4.3 0 0 2 4.3 47 £2 14s 10d 
Taster 10 58.8 5 29.4 1 5.9 0 0 1 5.9 17 £2 16s 5d 
Reeve 7 43.8 8 50 0 0 0 0 1 6.3 16 £3 0s 0d 
Beadle 1 33.3 2 66.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 £3 0s 0d 
Juror Leet 20 43.5 20 43.5 3 6.5 0 0 3 6.5 46 £3 3s 0d 
Churchwarden 8 38.1 9 42.9 1 4.8 0 0 3 14.3 21 £3 16s 2d 
All taxpaying officers 29 49.2 23 39 3 5.1 0 0 4 6.8 59 £2 19s 4d 
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Thus, this wealth differential was a one-way relationship. Lesser taxpayers were less likely to act 
as churchwardens but provided a relatively high proportion of manorial officers, whilst the 
greater taxpayers who were more likely to act as churchwardens still frequently served in 
manorial office. The low status of being taster is again borne out, reinforcing the explanation of 
the low correspondence between holding this office and being churchwarden.  
It has been shown that at Worfield the office of churchwarden and manorial office went hand in 
hand, with the men who served as churchwardens continuing to be the most dominant manorial 
officers. However, this still does not explain how these individuals could blend their 
responsibilities and powers or indeed if churchwardens increasingly took on responsibilities 
once held by manorial officers. In terms of the latter, there is only slight evidence of a process of 
replacement. In 1549 the wardens’ accounts report 2s 2d paid to William Billingsley and 
Thomas Garbot ‘for the stockes’, which suggests a shift since 1393, when the reeve was ordered 
to make a new set of stocks, cuckingstool and tumbrel from the lord’s timber and at the lord’s 
cost.101 This perhaps represents prominent members of the community taking more 
responsibility for monitoring behavior, although the two references to these punishment devices 
in both sources across the whole 300 years studied seem unlikely to be giving the full picture. 
Even if this does represent a shift from manorial to parochial office, there is a slight possibility 
that whilst the parish rather than lord was taking on the cost, the devices were still being made 
via a manorial office, as William Billingsley was serving as beadle for the 1548-9 year.102  
The only other evidence of replacement is seen in a bylaw made through the parish in 1535, 
when ‘at yis accowntes it is agreyd by alle the hole paresche that no persun shalle bring no owt 
cummer no go with them in the churche nor in the peresche to gether nother corne nor money a 
pon the peyne of 10s to the churche as oftyn as he so doys’, a measure designed to ban 
mendicants from outside the parish seeking charity within the community.103 This bylaw does 
not directly relate to the churchwardens themselves, but does suggest a shift away from using the 
manor to create policies of social control, where jurors had issued ordinances against gaming in 
                                                          
101 Worfield CWAs, Part V, 114; SAC, P314/W/1/1/187, 29 Oct 1393.  
102 SAC, P314/W/1/1/670, 4 Oct 1548.  
103 Worfield CWAs, Part IV, 222.  
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the 1520s.104 On the other hand, bylaws had never been particularly prevalent at Worfield, 
especially as regards misbehavior, and it may simply have been the parish’s increasing role in 
caring for the poor that saw a bylaw created through this institution.  
A more profitable way of thinking about the relationship between churchwardens and manorial 
officers is in terms of interaction and joint responses to problems, an approach that better reflects 
the fact that whilst these were different types of offices broadly the same individuals served in 
them. There is one possible example of manorial officers, and specifically the vills and jury leet, 
meeting the needs of churchwardens, or at least being triggered to act at their instigation. This is 
in their limited enforcement of the legislation in 1581-4 about caps discussed above. This burst 
of enforcement of a statute issued 10 years previously was preceded by entries in the 
churchwardens’ accounts of 1580, when the wardens spent money at Shifnal and Tong before 
the ‘commissioners about cappes’.105 It seems likely that this was a direct response to the caps 
legislation of 1571, which had given both JPs and stewards in leets the authority to determine 
this offence.106 The calling of the churchwardens before the justices thus may have been a trigger 
to enforce this legislation locally, either due to concern about being punished by justices for 
failure, or because of the attractive prospect for the lord and community for profit. Further 
evidence for this is given in the identity of the jurors leet who prosecuted these offences. 
Thomas Guldon, one of the 1579-80 churchwardens, served as a juror leet in the first caps 
prosecuting jury of 1582, whilst Richard Yate, the other churchwarden, served in all three juries 
leet that prosecuted these cases.107  
There is more evidence of churchwardens meeting the needs of manorial officers, or at least 
those of the manorial tenants. In 1562 the churchwardens accounted for a bottle of wine for the 
lord’s officers, whilst in 1574 they paid 3s 8d to make a book of customs and for wine for its 
scribe, although it is hard to conclusively link these to the manor.108 A far stronger connection is 
                                                          
104 SAC, P314/W/1/1/549, 26 Apr 1520; SAC P314/W/1/1/550, 17 Apr 1521.  
105 Worfield CWAs, Part V, 68.  
106 13 Elizabeth c.19, SR, vol. 4, 555.  
107 SAC, P314/W/1/1/803, 27 Sep 1582; SAC P314/W/1/1/803, 23 Mar 1583; SAC P314/W/1/1/806, 7 
Apr 1584.  
108 Worfield CWAs, Part V, 134; Part VI, 61.  
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seen in an order to the churchwardens recorded in a court of 1579. In this instance the jury 
presented ‘that the house in which the court of the lord is held ought to be repaired and sustained 
by the parishioners of Worfield. Thus it is ordered to the churchwardens that they immediately 
amend and repair the aforesaid house now ruined in accordance with their liability.’109 The 
response to this order can be seen in the wardens’ accounts. In 1582 an outlay of 12s was 
recorded for three tonnes of timber to board the court house, with further expense for bricks to 
make its hearth, whilst another 2s 4d was spent on timber in 1583.110 Why the parish was 
responsible for the court house is not clear, although as parish and manor at Worfield were 
basically coterminous, the jury may simply have been utilising the churchwardens’ ability to 
levy a rate to collect this money, with parishioners and tenants being effectively the same 
individuals. Jane Smith suggests that the parish’s grammar school and court house were held in 
the same timber-framed building, suggesting an even closer connection between parochial and 
manorial resources.111 Again Richard Yate appears both in this jury and as a churchwarden for 
1581-2 when the timber and bricks were purchased.112  
The manorial jury also had a role in monitoring the work and powers of churchwardens. This is 
revealed in a presentment by the jury leet in 1533 in which it was described that ‘Roger Catstre 
assumed to himself to guard the key or acoffer kei in which the rolls of the lord are guarded 
and… Roger at the time he guarded the key… was not churchwarden and at the same time he 
was retired the o lokon…and…the lock pertinent to the same key were broken and certain rolls 
were interlined and diverse rolls removed, the twelve are ignorant of who did this’.113 This again 
shows that the duties of churchwardens were linked to the manor. Presumably the coffer being 
referred to was the parish chest in which it seems the manorial court rolls were kept at Worfield, 
thus making the wardens responsible for the documents. It also reveals why the wardens were 
being monitored by the manorial jury; the lapse that had allowed the documents to be damaged 
affected both the lord and tenants rather than only the parish, as far as these identities can be 
                                                          
109 SAC, P314/W/1/1/794, 8 Jan 1579.  
110 Worfield CWAs, Part VI, 69-71.  
111 Smith, Worfield, 24.  
112 SAC, P314/W/1/1/794, 8 Jan 1579. 
113 SAC, P314/W/1/1/645, 8 May 1533.  
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separated. Connections between personnel suggest this was an example of churchwardens 
monitoring their own office through manorial structures. Whilst Roger, the censured former 
churchwarden for 1531-2 was not on the jury leet making this presentment, of the two 
churchwardens for 1533-4, and thus when this presentment was made, one, Roger Barker, was 
certainly a juror leet, whilst the other William Rowley, may well have been.114 This again 
highlights the interrelations between churchwardens and manorial officeholders, showing that 
these offices cannot be treated as distinct.  
A final example of the interaction between manorial officers and churchwardens is revealed in 
another set of jury presentments made in 1465, long pre-dating the surviving churchwardens’ 
accounts. The steward and jury issued a pain ordering that three sets of former constables 
‘should come into the presence of the guardians of the church of Worfield before the next feast 
of All Saints and render appropriate accounts of the money by…each of them received…by 
virtue of their office’.115 The information this supplies about constables is explored below, but 
again this presentment reveals the important role of churchwardens in monitoring manorial 
officeholders, in this case the constables, but also how manorial juries could utilise them for this 
purpose. Again, it seems likely that the reason churchwardens were used to monitor the making 
of the constables’ accounts was due to their role in controlling the documents utilised by the 
manor. The other intriguing aspect about this presentment, and the one made in 1533, is that they 
predate the secular use to which the crown put churchwardens in the post-Reformation period. 
They reveal that local elites were using parochial officers for responsibilities outside of 
maintaining parish property long before the state systematically put them to this task. 116  
Examination of the relationship between churchwardens and manorial officers at Worfield 
reveals a picture of interaction rather than replacement. Whilst the sixteenth century undoubtedly 
saw drastic change in the role of churchwardens, allowing the extension of the state into local 
life in a way that was never true of manorial office, the elites involved in this change were 
                                                          
114 SAC, P314/W/1/1/645, 8 May 1533, unfortunately there are two William Rowleys serving as manorial 
officers in the year 1533-4, making it impossible to identify this churchwarden with a single individual.  
115 SAC, P314/W/1/1/326, 15 Oct 1465. 
116 Evidence of the interaction of parochial and manorial office is given by Kümin, Shaping of a 
Community, 53-4; Ault, Manor Court and Parish Church, 61-4, 66-7.  
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largely the exact same people who had been serving as manorial officers, and meeting their local 
needs through manorial office, in the medieval period. This early stage of transformation, 
moreover, does not seem to have drastically affected the personnel of manorial office, or how 
the elites who served as churchwardens viewed manorial office, with the connection between 
serving as a manorial officer and a churchwarden remaining broadly similar across the sixteenth 
century and perhaps even back into the fifteenth century. There was no move among prominent 
local tenants away from manorial to parochial office.  
A smattering of evidence suggests how manorial and parochial office were used in conjunction, 
often by the same people who served in both, to achieve aims linked to their responsibilities to 
state and lord, and to help monitor both types of office. The manorial court, staffed by local 
elites as jurors could be utilised to censure churchwardens who failed to perform their office, 
whilst manorial officials could use the fund raising and accounting structure offered by the 
wardens to maintain the infrastructure where the court was held and monitor the behavior of 
other officials like the constable. Neither the powers of parish officials or manorial officials were 
alone sufficient to meet the needs of local government; it was through combination that an 
effective structure, at least in the sixteenth century, could be maintained.  
The interaction of parochial and manorial officials drew on a long history visible in the court 
rolls of using the coercive power of the manor court presentment to maintain parochial 
infrastructure. For instance, in 1482 Thomas Prystes was amerced 8d for ringing the church bell 
of Worfield at night ‘in affray of the parishioners’ and in 1494 another offender was placed 
under pain not to disturb the tenants with ‘le pangys’ of his beasts in the cemetery of the parish 
church.117 Unfortunately, the lack of evidence about churchwardens for both Downham and 
Horstead prevents a comparative perspective, and how far Worfield’s characteristics as a 
dispersed manor with coterminous parochial and manorial boundaries made this interaction 
possible remains an unanswerable question.118 Yet, much like at Worfield, officials at Horstead 
were used to protect parochial property hinting at similar relationships between manor and 
                                                          
117 SAC, P314/W/1/1/427, 10 Apr 1482; P314/W/1/1/492, 2 Oct 1494.  
118 Hindle emphasises the importance of a coterminous manor and parish in the early development of 
vestries, State and Social Change, 208. 
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parish. In 1490, the jury presented the rector for cutting down trees near the church of Horstead 
for his own use, ‘without the license of his parishioners and against the ancient custom of the 
vill’.119 At Worfield, the connection between manor and parish appears to have remained intact 
into the great growth in responsibilities of churchwardens to the state after 1500, probably in 
large part because the same individuals staffed manor and parish office. The office of 
churchwarden, even as it was incorporated into the state, worked within a system of governance 
which also included substantial use of the manorial officeholding structure.  
Constables  
Constables provide a window onto the relationship between manorial officeholding and the state 
due to their unusual position within the governmental structures of medieval and early modern 
England. Medievalists have long stressed this office as a crucial link between state and locality, 
due to its role in organising the vill, as the smallest unit of government in medieval England, to 
meet the king’s demands for military and policing purposes.120 In Helen Cam’s eyes, the 
constable ‘is the embodiment of community responsibility; but he is also the embodiment of 
royal authority’.121 However the selection of constables was governed via court leets where these 
were held, with the suitors or jury choosing the office, meaning that they were inevitably 
connected to the manor. Thus whilst constables were not technically manorial officers, the 
manor court had significant influence over the office, meaning that changes in the role and 
identity of constables are vital in considering changes to manorial officeholding generally.  
Their unusual position between vill and manor is also significant in thinking about for whom 
constables worked in this period. Early modernists have long emphasised that constables had a 
relatively ambiguous role in serving both crown and local community.122 Wrightson first 
                                                          
119 KCA, HOR/41, m.5, 10 Sep 1490.  
120 H.M. Cam, ‘Shire Officials: Coroners, Constables and Bailiffs’, in J.F. Wilard, W.A. Morris and W.H. 
Dunham (eds.), The English Government at Work, 1327-36, vol. 3, (Cambridge MA.: Mediaeval Academy 
of America, 1950), 185-217, 169-71.  
121 H.M. Cam, The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls: an Outline of Local Government in Medieval 
England, (London: Methuen, 1930), 192-3 
122 Hindle, State and Social Change, 183; Sharpe, Crime, 76-7; A. Fletcher, Reform in the Provinces: the 
Government of Stuart England, (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1986), 65-66; Goldie, 
227 
 
suggested this in his observation that the village constables of seventeenth-century England had 
a ‘mediating position between their communities and the law’, emphasising their role in 
managing the differing ‘concepts of order’ held by village communities and JPs at the county 
level.123 Joan Kent adopted a similar position but with a slightly more positive take. Whilst still 
emphasising that constables could be subjected to local pressures, which became acute in the 
1630s with Charles I’s attempts to levy Ship-Money, she suggested constables were generally 
effective crown servants, an achievement made possible by the generally high level of local 
cooperation they received from communities in exercising office.124 For Kent, the connection of 
constables to the manor was intrinsically part of this phenomenon. Even as the constable’s role 
become progressively associated with the work of JPs, magistrates continued to respect local 
custom in choosing these officials until at least the 1630s.125 This limited the extent to which 
constables could become servants of state alone, but also allowed them to carry out their duties 
effectively, as it meant that men with local standing, and thus the ability to mobilise the wider 
community, were selected for office.  
Medievalists have similarly emphasised that constables could resist the direction of royal 
officials in late medieval England.126 Larry Poos has highlighted their role in choosing to either 
enforce or soften labour legislation in the late fourteenth century as directed by the increasingly 
powerful commissioners of the peace, emphasising how this could place them ‘in an impossible 
situation akin to that of…constables of later centuries’.127 Yet, much like the incorporated 
officers of early modern England, constables as wealthier manorial tenants and employers were 
                                                          
‘Unacknowledged Republic’, 166; Younger, War and Politics, 173; Kent, ‘State Formation and Parish 
Government’, 399-401; Gaskill, ‘Little Commonwealths’, 93.  
123 Wrightson, ‘Two Concepts of Order’, 21-32.  
124 Kent, Village Constable, 282-305.  
125 Kent, Village Constable, 57-72.  
126 Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, 93; E. Powell Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Justice in the 
Reign of Henry V, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 272. 
127 L.R. Poos, ‘The Social Context of Statute of Labourers Enforcement’, Law and History Review, 1, 
(1983), 27-52, 34-5. 
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likely incentivised to enforce labour legislation for their own ends as well as to serve the 
crown.128  
Parallels can be drawn between the medieval and early modern constable in balancing demands 
of community and state and using local standing to enforce royal policy when it suited the 
privileged group serving in office. The main difference between these periods is therefore in 
degree and intensity. The fourteenth-century labour legislation represented the departure point 
for an increasing number of responsibilities placed on constables by new statutes over the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This process had reached new heights c.1600 leading to Rab 
Houston’s analysis that ‘the Tudors transformed constables from executive legal officers of the 
manor into local parish administrators for Justices of the Peace’.129 This begs the question: how 
far did this increasing responsibility of the constable to the state change the identity and role of 
this office in relation to the local officeholding structure of the manor?  
At all three case studies, the leet had the right to appoint constables, and they appear in their 
records, allowing a more comparative approach than for Worfield’s churchwardens. However, 
the negative side of this approach is that whilst constables were associated with leets, manorial 
court rolls cannot accurately reveal the full extent of their work, and particularly how this related 
to the developing state. This is because court rolls do not effectively record the work of these 
officials beyond the manorial boundary, whilst it was outside the village that saw the majority of 
a constable’s more state-focused work. This fact is revealed in Worfield’s six constables’ 
accounts which survive for the last decade explored here, 1589-1599.130 As figures 5.3 and 5.4 
show, constables were involved in activities that engaged them in geographical frameworks 
beyond the manor, with two obvious horizons appearing. The first was a local horizon, centred 
around Worfield’s neighbouring parishes, and concerned constables’ role in enacting elements of 
the Elizabethan regulation of poverty. Poor and disabled individuals were transported to adjacent 
localities, presumably as part of a process of conveyance to a House of Correction or their home 
                                                          
128 Poos, ‘Social Context’, 52; Dyer, ‘Village Community’, 423.  
129 Kent, Village Constable, 16-19, 28-56; Gunn, English People at War, 51-2; Houston, ‘People, Space 
and Law’, 68. 
130 SAC, P314/M/1/1-6.  
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parish, as mandated by a 1576 statute.131 Much like Worfield’s churchwardens, constables 
responded quickly to changes in royal legislation concerning poverty. Whilst before 1598 there 
is no mention of corporal punishment being applied to the poor, the 1598 account records a 
payment of 6s 6d for ‘whippinge of Roges & beggers & food bestowed upon them this yeare’, a 



















                                                          
131 Kent, Village Constable, 30; 18 Eliz I, c.3, SR 4.2, 610.  
132 SAC, P314/M/1/5; Kent, Village Constable, 30. 
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Figure 5.3 - Map showing local horizon of locations visited by Worfield’s constables 
 
Source – SAC, P314/M/1/1-6. Boundaries: 1851 parish boundaries.  
 
A more distant horizon saw constables, again like churchwardens, travel to county towns within 
Shropshire to meet royal requirements (figure 5.4). Constables travelled to Bridgnorth and 
Shrewsbury to go before the commissioners of the subsidy, JPs, water bailiffs, high constables, 
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and coroner, meeting a mixture of military, policing and administrative obligations.133 They also 
interacted with other constables, for example to arrange the transport of soldiers and in 
responding to hue and cries made in neighbouring villages.134 Sums were spent holding and 
conveying suspected criminals, as well as on military equipment and sending soldiers to 
musters.135   
The accounts reveal a pattern of significant overlap with the work of the churchwardens and the 
body of the parish. This highlights that whilst constables were technically connected to the vill, 
their role increasingly associated them with the civil parish, a state of affairs made simpler at 
Worfield by the coterminous boundaries of parish and manor.136 In 1594 and 1599, payments 
were made for prisoners of the Marshalsea, matching the churchwardens’ regular payments for 
the relief of prisoners.137 More significantly, the lewns used to reimburse the constables followed 
the format of those for the churchwardens, with a sum being paid per yardland. In 1592, the two 
lewns were explicitly ‘layd by consent of the p(ar)yshsheons’, suggesting that the constables 










                                                          
133 SAC, P314/M/1/1-6.  
134 SAC, P314/M/1/4, P314/M/1/6.  
135 SAC, P314/M/1/1-6.  
136 Kent, Village Constable, 46-48.  
137 SAC, P314/M/1/3; P314/M/1/6. 
138 SAC, P314/M/1/2. 
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Figure 5.4 - Map showing county horizon of locations visited by Worfield’s constables 
 
Sources: SAC, P314/M/1/1-6. Boundaries: 1831 county boundaries.  
 
Analysis of Worfield’s admittedly limited sixteenth-century constables’ accounts reveals these 
officers, much like the parish’s churchwardens, were serving the needs of the Tudor crown. How 
far they were willing participants, or being subjected to pressure from above, cannot be 
answered through accounts. A more critical concern is that this picture of an active role for 
constables beyond the manor cannot be seen in the surviving court rolls, which do not mention 
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the constables outside of their selection for the 1590s at Worfield.139 Therefore, for Downham 
and Horstead, it is impossible to know how far constables were performing similar state-related 
tasks as accounts do not survive. Even for Worfield, the accounts cannot provide the same detail 
as those for churchwardens, which survive for a longer period, and consequently reveal the 
nature and timing of the churchwardens’ transition from being largely managers of local 
religious bequests to becoming officers of the crown. Constables’ accounts were almost certainly 
regularly created before 1589; in this year the constables expended over £11 and visited seven 
locations, suggesting they were already active officers meeting demands beyond the manor.140  
However, despite these evidentiary problems, it is possible to use the court rolls of all three 
manors to examine the development of the constable as a state office, and the effects of this 
process on manorial office, as long as the paucity of evidence is borne in mind. Table 5.3 
examines the manorial officeholding careers of every individual who can be identified as a 
constable. Worfield provides by far the best data, with routine selection beginning in 1406. 
Downham’s rolls only reveal 22 selections despite a constableship in existence from at least 
1329 to 1579, and Horstead’s rolls only 29 selections despite constables being mentioned from 
1439 to 1599. It is difficult to understand why selection should be so poorly recorded compared 
to other types of office, apart from the fact that constables were not directly seigniorial officers, 
so it was of less interest to the lord’s steward to keep a record. Numbers of identifiable 
constables have been increased by adding those incidentally named in presentments, but it must 
be borne in mind that the table represents a far from complete list.  
                                                          
139 SAC, P314/W/1/1/818-838. 
140 SAC, P314/M/1/1.  
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Table 5.4 – Reconstruction of the careers of constables in holding manorial office 
 
Sources: CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3; C11/2/4-6; C11/3/7-11; KCA, HOR/26-41, HOR/45, HOR/48-54; SAC, P314/W/1/1/158-838.  
Office 




















Total Constables 2 15 9 26 5 24 29 2 103 111 216 
Messor 0 3 0 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Messor (%) 0 20 0 11.54 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Taster 1 5 0 6 1 0 1 1 17 41 59 
Taster (%) 50 33.33 0 23.08 20 0 3.45 50 16.50 36.94 27.31 
Reeve 0 2 2 4 NA NA NA 1 40 36 77 
Reeve (%) 0 13.33 22.22 15.38 NA NA NA 50 38.83 32.43 35.65 
Affeeror 1 9 3 13 2 1 3 2 42 41 85 
Affeeror (%) 50 60 33.33 50 40 4.17 10.34 100 40.78 36.94 39.35 
Juror baron 1 15 9 25 4 23 27 2 68 81 151 
Juror baron (%) 50 100 100 96.15 80 95.83 93.10 100 66.02 72.97 69.91 
Capital Pledge/juror leet 1 14 7 22 4 23 27 2 69 96 167 
Capital Pledge/juror leet (%) 50 93.33 77.78 84.62 80 95.83 93.10 100 67 86.49 77.31 
Bylawman/fenreeve 1 7 2 10 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Bylawman/fenreeve (%) 50 46.67 22.22 38.46 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Beadle NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 7 15 22 
Beadle (%) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 6.80 13.51 10.19 
Coltishall juror NA NA NA NA 1 0 1 NA NA NA NA 
Coltishall juror (%) NA NA NA NA 20 0 3.45 NA NA NA NA 
No recorded office 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 24 8 32 
No recorded office (%) 0 0 0 0 20 4.17 6.90 0 23.30 7.21 14.81 
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The patterns reveal that the individuals serving as constables were drawn from a similar pool as 
manorial officers, with little change over time. This is most striking for Downham where every 
individual bar one who served as constable was also a juror baron, and a large majority were 
also capital pledges. Other offices saw less correlation, although this could be as much down to 
the lack of identifiable constables, and periods where other officials cannot be identified, as a 
real disconnect. At Horstead, again the vast majority of constables recorded in both decades 
served as capital pledges and jurors baron, although this did not extend to being taster or 
affeeror. Unsurprisingly, being a Coltishall juror was far less common, as this fee was part of a 
neighbouring hundred and thus part of a different leet structure. The only individual who served 
in this jury as well as being a constable was William Moutyng, who also served as a Horstead 
fee juror and capital pledge.141 The only individuals who served as constable without being a 
juror baron and capital pledge served in no manorial offices, suggesting that the franchise for 
the two types of official were not synonymous. This may reveal the difference between being an 
inhabitant of the leet, and being a tenant of the lord, which meant one could serve as constable 
but not in other offices.  
For Worfield, for which the most data is available, the connection with being a juror baron and 
juror leet is weaker, with only 67% of individuals serving as a juror leet in the fifteenth century 
and 86% in the sixteenth century. This is particularly striking when compared to the fact that 
nearly all sixteenth-century churchwardens served as jurors leet, suggesting a closer connection 
for this office chosen via the parish than the constableship which was selected via the manor 
court. The explanation for this weaker relationship seems to partially lie in a number of 
individuals who only appeared as constables, with almost a quarter being in this category for the 
fifteenth century, echoing the pattern seen at Horstead. The pattern, however, suggests the 
converse of divorce from manorial office over time. The sixteenth century, when constables 
were to a greater extent officers of the state than previously, actually saw more overlap between 
constables and manorial officers, with only 7% of constables in this century not serving in any 
manorial office. Certainly, of the ten constables identifiable in the surviving accounts, nine 
served as jurors leet.142 For other offices, greater overlap is seen at Worfield than the other two 
manors for both centuries, a fact likely driven by the wide dispersal of these offices.143 Rates of 
                                                          
141 KCA, HOR/41, m.7, 11 Jun 1492; HOR/37-41. 
142 SAC, P314/M/1/1-6.  
143 See p. 89. 
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overlap with selected offices in the sixteenth century are very similar between churchwardens 
and constables.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that constables were largely drawn from the same pool of 
individuals who served in manorial office, although the pool does not seem to have been 
identical. This is unsurprising: selection via the court leet meant that the same individuals who 
controlled the process of selecting constables controlled that for manorial offices. They 
presumably applied similar criteria of selection in both cases. In 38 (28%) of 137 constable 
selections at Worfield where the choosing body is recorded, the jury leet are noted 35 times and 
the jury baron the other three.144 At Horstead, where 26 (96%) of the 27 constable selections 
noted a choosing body, all were capital pledges bar two choices that were made by the jury 
baron.145 Similarly, at Downham of the 18 (82%) of 22 selections where this information is 
recorded, 12 were made by capital pledges and six by jurors baron.146 That similar processes to 
other manorial offices underlay selection is suggested by figure 5.5, which for Worfield displays  
the number of slots held by individuals serving as constable various numbers of times. Much 
like the manor’s reeveship (figure 2.9), office seems to have been dispersed relatively equally 
among the franchise, with a large majority of services being performed by persons who served 









                                                          
144 SAC, P314/W/1/1/158-835. 
145 KCA, HOR/37, HOR/41, HOR/45, HOR/48, HOR/51-4, COL/376.  
146 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-2. C11/2/4, C11/2/6, C11/3/7-11.  
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Figure 5.5 – Proportion of total selections to constableship by number of times selected at 
Worfield 
 
N = 273. Sources: SAC, P314/W/1/1/158-835. 
 
If manorial juries had strong control over who they selected as constables, the machinery of the 
manor court, much like for other officials, could also compel jurors’ candidates to serve. As 
with manorial officials, refusals to serve were rare, with none reported for Worfield. At 
Horstead only one instance is recorded in 1568, when Richard Pytelyng was chosen to serve for 
the year and refused.147 The scene described is relatively dramatic, with Richard present in 
court, called by the steward and then refusing to take oath, replying with ‘strong words to the 
bad example of others’. The punishment was explicitly decided by the steward, who amerced 
Richard 3s 4d. Henry Shreve was chosen as constable at the same session, although it is 
impossible to know whether this was as a replacement or whether he was meant to serve 
alongside Pytelyng. It is hard to understand the rationale for Richard’s refusal: he was capital 
pledge in the same court and had, and continued to have, an officeholding career as a pledge and 
juror baron. If his refusal was specifically linked to being constable, he had either changed his 
                                                          
147 KCA, HOR/52, m.5, 6 May 1568.  
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mind or decided the fine was not worth being free of the burden two years later as he was 
selected, and served, in 1570, and again in 1579.148  
At Downham, refusals were recorded in 1562 and 1571. The 1571 example is the least detailed, 
noting William Lyntley ‘contemptuously refused to serve the Lady Queen’ as constable.149 The 
1562 instance reads far more like the 1568 Horstead example, with the oath being central.150 
After Richard Gibson had been elected, the steward asked him to receive the oath to serve the 
‘Lady Queen faithfully as he ought’, he instead contradicted ‘failing completely his obedience 
and office in full court, undermining the said office of constable in contempt of the…court and 
in poor example to others’. The amercements levied on both occasions, at 3s 4d, were identical 
to that at Horstead, although in 1562 ‘the court’ made the assessment not the steward as at the 
Norfolk manor. Again, the rationale is difficult to explain. Neither Lyntley nor Gibson ever 
served as constable, but both refused within longer officeholding careers as capital pledges and 
jurors baron. The references to the oath reveal that constables at both manors were still being 
sworn locally rather than by justices in the mid-sixteenth century, a pattern again identified by 
Kent.151 The focus at both manors on the public example set by refusing to serve, and how this 
affected the authority of the office, mirrors the attitudes towards misbehaviour in manorial 
office seen in chapter four, suggesting a similar political culture surrounded both offices in their 
local communities.152 
Identifying that the constableship and other manorial offices were largely filled by the same 
individuals, with this remaining relatively consistent across time and between manors, and 
displaying the importance of manorial courts to the selection process, cannot reveal if there was 
a transition in the function of this office from manor to state. However, scattered evidence from 
the manors reveals that constables had long been used to meet royal requirements, reinforcing 
the view that any changes in the sixteenth century were part of a more continuous process. In 
1496, William Thompson was amerced for committing rescue against the constable when he 
was playing football against the statute, demonstrating the constable was enforcing statutory 
legislation at this manor, reflecting the role of presentment jurors at Downham.153 At Horstead, 
                                                          
148 KCA, HOR/51, m.2, 13 Apr 1570; HOR/51, m.10, 5 Oct 1579.  
149 CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 9 Mar 1571.  
150 CUL, EDR, C11/3/11, unfoliated, 18 Jun 1562.  
151 Kent, Village Constable, 66-7.  
152 See p. 188-9. 
153 CUL, EDR, C11/3/10, m.10, 29 Mar 1496.  
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in 1439, an offender was presented for breaking the sequester of the constable of the vill.154 This 
sequester was explicitly made for the King’s fifteenth, which may reflect a longer history of the 
use of constables in tax collecting, as these officials are listed in the vill’s 1377 poll tax 
return.155 Similarly, at Downham in 1432, John Buxham committed rescue against the constable 
when he was collecting the King’s fifteenth.156 These early fifteenth-century examples show the 
role of constables in collecting taxation within local communities even before they officially 
took on this role in the sixteenth century, and echoes their role in other communities explored 
by Dyer.157 Whilst manorial documents reveal no information about the assessing or levying of 
taxation, presumably as this was delegated by the vill, presentments reveal that manorial juries 
used their status to punish those hindering the constable and thus indirectly helped meet taxation 
requirements. 
At Worfield, the lord’s right to the goods of felons reveals incidental information about the 
constable’s role in transporting suspected felons to royal authorities. In 1424, John atte Yate 
was captured by the constables, Stephen Stanlowe and John Bromley, on suspicion of felony.158 
He then remained in their custody for three days and nights before being delivered to the 
sheriff’s gaol at Shrewsbury, a description that is similar to payments for keeping and 
transporting prisoners in the accounts for 1590-99.159 Constables had a role more connected to 
the manor in 1420, when, in a unique case in the records, the lord exercised his right to 
infangthief, trying and hanging a prisoner in the manor court.160 The constables, explicitly 
described as ‘of the lord King’ and thus clearly being seen as performing an action on behalf of 
the crown, brought the accused to this trial.161 A further case is seen in 1405, where the steward 
gave the constables and the whole vill of Hallon the goods of John Child, a thief, for capturing 
and arresting the felon.162 Why the officials should have been rewarded in this way is unclear, 
although it does reveal a way officials could benefit from the exercise of this seigniorial right. 
                                                          
154 KCA, HOR/37, unfoliated, 11 Jun 1439.  
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Oxford University Press, 2001), 155. 
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The fact that they made the arrest with the vill of Hallon also shows how constables were 
integrated into a greater communal responsibility for law enforcement, mirroring the picture 
found by Kent for the turn of the sixteenth century.163  
That constables are visible aiding in the arrest of felons at Worfield, but not at the other two 
manors, is likely due to differences in the records, rather than a structural dissimilarity between 
the locations. However, a clear structural difference is present at Downham where constables 
were far more integrated into the mechanisms of the manor than at the other localities. This 
mirrors the picture found for the enforcement of statute legislation and seems likely to be due to 
the same cause of the special status of the bishop’s liberty. This manor court’s role in 
monitoring the watch made it responsible for supervising the constable’s attention to this duty 
and ensuring that tenants followed his orders. When three men were presented for not keeping 
the watch in 1363, it was explicitly when they had been summoned by the constable, showing 
the manor court bolstering this office’s authority.164 In 1398, it was the constable who was 
amerced 6d because he had not supervised the watchmen keeping the vigil as he had been 
charged.165 
An even more striking structural difference was in the use of constables in the pledging system. 
At all manors, official pledging had largely disappeared by the beginning of the fifteenth 
century, meaning it is not recorded by the point from which Horstead’s rolls survive.166 
However, for Worfield and Downham pledging records survive in abundance for the fourteenth 
century and reveal a strong contrast between the two manors in terms of pledging of petty 
peace-breaking. Of 41 official pledges connected with bloodshed, levying the hue and cry, 
regrating, and forestalling at Worfield, all were either the beadle, reeve or both officials, 
reflecting these officers’ roles in the larger pledging culture on the manor.167 At Downham, 
conversely, in 102 similar cases the constable was pledge on all but 8 occasions.168 One possible 
explanation is that the office of constable did not exist for much of the fourteenth century at 
Worfield, with the first reference to it being in 1384, after which pledging for peace-breaking is 
                                                          
163 Kent, Village Constable, 26-7.  
164 CUL, EDR, C11/1/2, m.13, 30 Nov 1363.  
165 CUL, EDR, C11/1/3, m.42, 2 Sep 1398.  
166 Harvey, Manorial Records, 49.  
167 SAC, P314/1/1/4-178.  
168 CUL, EDR, C11/1/1-3, C11/2/4-6.  
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unrecorded at this manor.169 However even this suggests the office of constable was vital to the 
functioning of the leet at Downham for much of the fourteenth century, speaking to a far more 
integrated structure than at Worfield where a constable was not required. 
Another difference is seen in the use of constables to monitor punishment equipment, such as 
stocks and cucking stools. Whilst at Worfield, monitoring of punishment equipment was a 
seigniorial right performed via the reeve, at Downham this role was performed by the 
constables. This is revealed in a presentment of 1412, in which William Walsham and Nicholas 
Bateman as constables were amerced 12d each as they had collected money ‘of the whole vill’ 
to provide for stocks but had then not made these but instead kept the money for their own 
profit ‘to the grave damage of the whole vill’. They were ordered to make the stocks by the next 
court under pain.170 Vill and manor here appear as having different identities, it was explicitly 
the vill that provided money for the stocks, and thus the collection suggests that the constables 
in performing their duties were serving, and indeed defrauding, the vill. The distinction 
concerning the stocks is seen in both 1391 and 1467, when the vill was ordered via the manor 
court, and in the later case explicitly by the capital pledges, to make new stocks under pain, 
showing a formal distinction could be drawn between the two bodies.171 The use of constables 
to meet vills’ requirements to maintain punishment equipment is also found for the turn of the 
sixteenth century.172 
However, whilst constables were officials of the vill as a distinct entity, they were integrated 
into the manorial system through the role of the manor court and its juries in monitoring their 
work. Presumably, in a case of corruption like the one above, the manorial court was an 
attractive setting to the vill’s governors as its ability to levy amercements and impose pains 
allowed it to formally punish and control constables when any informal sanctions via the vill 
failed. This was also true at Worfield where vill and manor were less well integrated, and 
constables had less of an obvious role in the manorial structure. Returning to the pain made in 
1465 ordering constables to render their accounts to churchwardens, a similar mechanism of 
using the manor to enforce a requirement not strictly manorial can be seen.173 The picture here is 
                                                          
169 SAC, P314/W/1/1/142, 25 Apr 1384.  
170 CUL, EDR, C11/2/4, m.30, 28 Sep 1412.  
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172 Kent, Village Constable, 25, 27.  
173 SAC, P314/W/1/1/326, 15 Oct 1465. 
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more complex, the jury were not monitoring the officials themselves, but instead ensuring that 
they accounted to the churchwardens as parochial officials, a role they repeated in the following 
court by allowing the constables a stay on their pain but reissuing it, as the deadline of All 
Saints had passed.174 That constables accounted to the churchwardens is in part explained by the 
latter’s role in guarding manorial documents but may also be because the parish was the unit by 
which the sums the constables had ‘received by virtue of their office’ were paid, reflecting the 
later lewns recorded in the 1592 account.175 Reconstruction via the names of the constables 
recorded, suggests accounts were wanted for 1458-9, 1459-60 and 1462-3, missing out Stephen 
Bradeney, who served 1460-1.176 The fact that several years’ constables were ordered to account 
suggests the potential of an annual lewn as early as the mid-fifteenth century and therefore that 
constables were increasingly parochial officers by this point. However, the constables were also 
subjected to manorial office through the power of presentment juries to impose penalties in 
order to ensure correct performance of office, thus allowing the legally separate but largely 
corresponding community of the vill to monitor their role.  
Equally, manorial presentment juries could be used to backstop constables when their authority 
was challenged. This is most obvious in the relatively common presentment at all manors for 
assaulting, breaking the arrest of, and committing rescue against, the constable, often explicitly 
‘against the peace of the lord King’.177 Again Downham is slightly different, with one 
presentment noting that the constable had seized a boat ‘to serve the lord’ before this seizure 
was broken suggesting a more seigniorially-focused role for the official.178 Even beyond 
ensuring the constable could make arrests during incidents of peace-breaking, constables’ 
authority was enforced through presentment juries in punishments of persons for more shadowy 
actions of disobedience. For example, when Marion Hulver was presented for receiving 
suspicious people and quarrelling with her neighbours in 1515, it was noted that she was 
                                                          
174 SAC, P314/W/1/1/327, 5 Dec 1465.  
175 SAC, P314/M/1/2. 
176 SAC, P314/W/1/1/313, 27 Sep 1458 (William Barker and William Stafford); P314/W/1/1/315, 8 Nov 
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disobedient to the constables of the vill.179 This hints that the constables may have tried to make 
Marion modify her behaviour before the capital pledges, presumably through the application of 
an informal verbal censure, but as she had disobeyed them stronger action was taken via 
presentment. One of the two individuals who were likely serving as constables in 1515, John 
Salle, served as capital pledge in the jury that presented Marion, suggesting some degree of 
crossover or information sharing.180 Similar presentments were made at Downham in 1448 for 
rebelling against the constable and in 1498 for not obeying the constable’s orders.181 In 1428 
Richard Castowe was amerced for violating his neighbours, making great affrays and not 
justifying himself to the constable of the vill.182 
It is even possible to see the constable being directed by the manorial jury to perform an action. 
In 1384, the jury leet at Worfield presented Alice de Castel, Juliana Lawen and her husband 
William for stealing, then ordered that they withdraw from the manor and that none host them 
under pain of 40s, in a rare case of abjuration from the manor recorded in Worfield’s rolls. The 
constable, along with the reeve, were ordered to ensure the offenders complied with this 
punishment, suggesting this officer could be directed by the jury in the same way as the 
manorial reeve.183 Worfield’s constables’ account for 1598 states a payment of 5s 2d for wine 
and bell ringers when the Lord of Abergavenny came to the manor, showing that much like the 
churchwardens, constables could be utilised by the tenants to meet their obligations to their 
lord.184  
To what extent constables supplanted the role of other manorial officers is hard to interrogate 
with the limited information available. One possibility is that constables had taken the role of 
ale tasters in monitoring brewers at Worfield by the 1590s. The last presentment by tasters on 
the manor was in 1568. However they were presented for failing to do their office in 1571, 
suggesting there was some expectation of performance three years later, remembering that at 
Worfield there was no custom of regular presentment of ‘poor performance’ as there was at 
other manors.185 Meanwhile, the constables’ accounts for 1597 and 1599 reveal charges claimed 
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by the officials for bringing the ‘alebruers’ and ‘ale men’ before the Justices at Bridgenorth.186 
This must have been under the Edwardian legislation of 1552, which only required alehouse 
keepers to be licenced initially, rather than the regular relicensing introduced under James I, 
which led to routine payments for this task in many constables’ accounts.187 Thus it is hard to 
see how constables could have completely replaced the annualised role of the tasters by the 
1590s, and it is notable that whilst presentments may have stopped, tasters were still selected 
annually until 1597, for which the last leet examined survives.188 One possibility is that the 
tasters worked alongside constables in providing the names of brewers for the justices and it is 
notable that legislation made in 1624 allowed ale tasters along with constables to present illegal 
alehouse keepers both to leets and justices.189 
The pattern of interaction seen between churchwardens and manorial officials at Worfield also 
applies to constables at all three manors. The selection process, via the court leet, meant that the 
constableship was always related to the manorial structure. Whilst the evidence does hint at a 
franchise including several people, most likely inhabitants within the leet but non-tenants, who 
were not eligible to be manorial officers, largely it is a picture of the same men serving as both 
constables and manorial officials. There is no obvious change in the sixteenth century, when 
historiographical consensus suggests constables were becoming more focused on meeting the 
demands of the state, and at Worfield, where the evidence is richest, there is in fact greater 
overlap between individuals. Moreover, at Horstead and Downham, presentment juries were 
responsible for punishing those who refused to serve, with sanctions applied in the same way as 
to other manorial offices. Scattered manorial evidence reveals constables’ roles in the fifteenth 
century in enforcing statutes, raising taxes and apprehending and transporting felons. Structural 
differences are visible for Downham, with pledging revealing the extent to which the constable 
was integrated into the manorial courts’ work.  Yet for both Downham and Worfield, there is 
some evidence that the vill, with its peacekeeping responsibilities, used manorial structures to 
monitor the revenues collected by constables. Similarly, constables’ authority was reinforced 
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via presentment juries in the manor court, and at Worfield it is possible to see this process in 
reverse.  
Of course, it is likely, that constables were increasingly detached from the manor in the 
sixteenth century, and undeniably nearly all the scattered examples date to before 1500. 
Constables’ authority may have increasingly been enforced by JPs rather than presentment 
jurors, and village communities may have looked to outside authority to censure corrupt 
constables. However, the pattern revealed here at least suggests that many tasks of the constable 
had long been related to the manor, even though the office was technically one of the vill, and 
therefore that the rise of this office does not automatically imply the demise of manorial 
officeholding as a local source of authority. Constables and manorial offices were combined, by 
the same local elite, to meet the demands of state and control behaviour within the manor.  
Conclusion 
The relationship between manorial officeholding and the state was largely indirect. Whilst some 
new legislation was enforced via courts leet, application was simply too infrequent and partial to 
drastically change the business of manor courts, with this legislation more readily enforced at 
the county level via quarter and petty sessions. However, the relationship between the 
increasingly state-focused offices of constable and churchwarden and manorial officeholding 
reveals a different picture. The considerations which governed the selection of manorial officers 
were seemingly applied directly to these offices, to the extent that not only were the same sorts 
of persons chosen for these offices, but exactly the same individuals in the case-study manors. 
Moreover, even the limited evidence available here shows significant interaction between the 
work performed by manorial and state offices. Manorial juries helped to monitor and enforce 
the authority of constables as officers of the vill and churchwardens were utilised to meet the 
requirements of the manor court.  
Noting that similar individuals filled manorial and parochial office is not a revelatory 
breakthrough. Historians have long argued offices were occupied by similar groups, as is 
revealed in the celebrated commonplace book of Robert Reynes, which contains information 
relevant to manorial, parish and state office.190 However, this study has demonstrated that these 
groups were more than similar, they were virtually identical, and this did not change, at least at 
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Worfield, with the increasing incorporation of constables and churchwardens into county 
government via the innovations of the crown. It also reveals interaction in functions stretching 
back to the fifteenth century, reinforcing the revisionist position raised by Smith about the level 
of incorporation of late medieval villages into the state.191 The manor provided the vital ‘real 
power’ over villages which Hoyle suggests the middling sort lacked.192 The ability of jurors to 
control presentments, amercements and the placing of pains provided the ability to coerce other 
members of the community outside of reporting offenders to royal commissioners or church 
authorities. Therefore, even with the expansion of state authority via the offices of 
churchwarden and constable, local elites were surely reluctant to abandon manorial office which 
allowed them direct authority over their fellows.  
The consequence of these insights is to extend but also challenge recent formulations of early 
modern state formation. The focus on how local standing and authority conditioned the position 
of local officials, creating a complex relationship between state and village elites, is reinforced. 
As such, the study endorses the view of state formation as occurring through a decentralised 
process of development in English localities. However, the data explored here reveals that local 
authority was, for the sixteenth century, exercised via the more formal structures of the manor 
as well as informal, though intimately connected, conditions of social standing and credit. It 
questions models that see manor and parish government as somehow different, or that the latter 
replaced the former. The social structures which early modernists often associate with the 
incorporation of parochial and village officeholding into the state, look to have been formed 
through the selection of manorial officeholders, which helped create a set of chief inhabitants 
who slid relatively neatly into service to the state via parochial offices they had also long held.  
Of course, contentions that have seen the Civil War as marking a point of departure cannot be 
challenged by an analysis that ends in 1600, and thus does not engage with the long-term 
development of the poor relief system which radically changed the relationship between rate-
payers, beneficiaries, and the state.193 Similarly, the growth of subtenancy in the seventeenth 
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century may have led to an increasing separation of tenants who could serve in manorial office 
but were largely non-resident, and ratepaying-occupiers who could serve in the vestry and 
parochial office but were excluded from manorial institutions.194  However, an exploration of 
the relationship between manorial officeholding and state reveals a further complexity in the 
transition from medieval to early modern before 1600. The local political elite that the 
developing state is often seen to have created appears to have been deeply rooted in the 





                                                          




Over the last five chapters, this thesis has explored manorial officeholding using a 
comprehensive examination of the available evidence for three case-study manors. The first 
chapter categorised presentments, revealing that a transition occurred in the mid-sixteenth 
century from a pattern of officials serving community, lord and crown in the period c.1400-
c.1500 to officers being focused on community and land presentments alone c.1550-c.1600. The 
succeeding chapter examined the identity of officers, noting a consistent pattern of 
concentration, but that Downham saw greater repeat service among a small set of individuals in 
selected offices such as reeve, messor and taster, as opposed to Horstead and Worfield where 
office was dispersed among a wider group of individuals. Over time, Worfield and Downham 
saw greater dispersion of service in empanelled office, perhaps linked to growing population in 
the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries, suggesting that the decades before 1600 did not 
see a new growth in officeholding exclusiveness.  
Chapter three demonstrated that local elites had a stake in manorial officeholding to help control 
their local community, centred around a combination of monitoring misbehaviour and access to 
natural resources, and achieved via creating new roles for officers through manorial bylaws. 
This led to manorial officials governing for both the local community as a whole against 
external threats but also on behalf of more prominent tenants against their humbler neighbours. 
The following chapter illustrated that tenants were compliant in maintaining the manorial 
officeholding system, because they were reliant on effective officeholders who met their needs 
in transferring land, creating an efficient system for interpersonal litigation, and allowing them 
influence over seigniorial management. The final chapter compared evidence for manorial 
officers, churchwardens and constables. This revealed that the new responsibilities placed on 
local communities by Tudor governments, largely via the parish, did not cause a decline in those 
serving in manorial roles, with the same local elites combining manorial and parochial office 
together to both meet external requirements to the state and the needs of local community.  
Drawing on these chapters, four interrelated conclusions can be made about manorial 
officeholding between 1300 and 1600. Firstly, manorial officeholding remained a vital 
institution within the countryside across this period. Officers continued to make large numbers 
of community-focused presentments down to 1600 at two of the manors, whilst royal and 
seigniorial requirements were met through manorial office until the mid-sixteenth century. 
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Officeholding positions continued to be filled by large numbers of tenants, and selection 
processes continued to function effectively. The flexibility of the officeholding system allowed 
for offices to be put to new purposes in an age of significant legal, economic and social change.  
Secondly, this vitality was achieved not primarily via pressure from above by lords or the 
crown, but by the collaboration of the community of tenants who remained invested in office 
across this 300-year period. They continued to use office to present and manage community 
issues, protecting common rights and maintaining infrastructure, and also to allow tenants to 
inherit and transfer land. Officials were monitored to ensure the officeholding system continued 
to function in the community’s interests, and protests against officeholding were rare. This is 
not to suggest manors were independent of lordship, but to simply suggest that tenants were 
willing to work within the governing structures created by the manorial system.  
Thirdly, this village government through manorial office cannot be seen as an entirely equitable 
process among villagers but worked to create hierarchies within the local community. A degree 
of oligarchy within office was omnipresent, and could become acute in periods of high 
population, although there always appears to have been an effort to ensure a fairly large number 
of individuals served. Officers also utilised bylaws to control access to resources and worked to 
manage misbehaviour, helping to create a degree of stratification.  
Fourthly, this system was robust enough to survive greater state intervention in local 
communities via the alternative offices of churchwarden and constable in the sixteenth century. 
Manorial office continued to be held by the same individuals who served in these newly 
influential offices, and both types of office continued to be used in conjunction to meet local 
problems, as can be seen in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.  
These conclusions are significant as they speak to wider themes within the literature concerning 
the economy and society of the late middle ages and early modern era. The first key point is that 
the investigation of officeholding reinforces the importance of local variation in manorial and 
village structures in England.1 Whilst generally similar trends can be seen at all three case 
studies, the more detailed analysis becomes, the more idiosyncratic these patterns appear at the 
level of the individual manor. This is not to say that these differences are random, but that the 
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sample, which aimed to select a variety of manors differing by region, degree of lordship, 
settlement-type and local landscape, has shown that these factors did have significant effects on 
how these places were governed within manorial structures. Lordship sets Downham and 
Horstead apart from Worfield in terms of the enforcement by officials of servile incidents and 
aspects of direct management, as does the fact of the Shropshire manor’s dispersed structure, 
which led to a different use of officeholding to meet the needs of individual hamlets rather than 
the community of the manor as a whole. Horstead’s existence within an area of a developed 
land market saw officeholders presenting intervivos, deathbed and illicit transfers with greater 
frequency. The ease of land transfers allowed for significant engrossment on the manor, and a 
seeming reduction of tenant numbers, which in turn reduced the number of individuals serving 
in office even in a period of population expansion. Downham’s situation within an area of fen 
commons saw greater focus on controlling labour and natural resources via bylaws, leading to 
officeholding being placed more overtly into service by wealthier tenants to preserve their own 
interests. These differences reveal that the history of manorial officeholding, and the local 
governing systems it could provide, are not monolithic. However, by the same token 
differentiation is a testament to the flexibility of manorial officeholding as an institution that 
allowed it to be adapted to varied circumstances and local conditions by the community elites 
who served as and chose officers.  
A second point is that the investment of tenants within the manorial officeholding system, even 
during the period before c.1550 when it remained an important aspect of seigniorial power, 
reinforces the revisionist view of the more positive relationship between lord and tenants in the 
middle ages. A traditional historiography, especially that drawing on a Marxist tradition, has 
long argued that relations between lord and tenants, and particularly unfree tenants, were 
fundamentally exploitative due to a process of ‘surplus extraction’.2 More recently, this view 
has been challenged. It has been suggested that serfdom, even at its height before the Black 
Death, was constrained by custom, which allowed unfree tenants a privileged economic position 
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during a period of land-hunger with high rents and prices.3 Moreover, Bailey has recently 
argued that during the drastic changes caused by the demographic reversal after 1349, serfdom 
disappeared rapidly with lords largely acquiescing to their tenants’ demands rather than 
engaging in a ‘feudal reaction’, suggesting that serfdom was ‘not as terrible a condition as it has 
conventionally been perceived’.4 Campbell states that even before the Plague ‘prudent lords 
recognised that they benefitted from a prosperous and co-operative tenantry’ and that after 1349 
‘co-operation was cheaper for lords than coercion’.5  
The evidence of manorial officeholding adds a new perspective to this interpretation, giving 
weight to Campbell’s argument that substantial tenants who served as officeholders ‘in 
maintaining the manorial status quo…served their own interests as well as those of lords’.6 Both 
lord and tenants were invested in an effective officeholding system, as is evidenced in the data 
of presentments and the role of tenants in monitoring officers seen above, which in turn 
suggests officeholding acted as a common interest binding these two groups together. Whilst 
lords are often presented as having to govern through local notables as officers, suggesting a 
pre-existing status for these elites, it can also be argued that these elites were invested in a 
manorial system that bolstered their authority.7 Office transformed a status accrued through 
factors such as wealth, acting as an employer, age and longevity of a family in the community, 
into power that was to some extent political, and allowed elites to monitor the behaviour of their 
neighbours. Far from resenting the manorial system, or engaging with it reluctantly, by this 
token local elite tenants were beneficiaries of it, and therefore may have seen the lord as a key 
ally in maintaining their authority locally. There were of course occasions were this relationship 
could break down, as is evidenced on a limited scale in resistance acts such as concealment or 
failure to make presentments, or on a larger scale by the number of manorial officials seen in the 
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1381 risings.8 However, typically the commonality of objective between lord and elite tenants 
was strengthened by the institution of manorial officeholding, at least until the exercise of 
lordship via presentment declined in the mid-sixteenth century. Elite tenants largely did not 
resist limited seigniorial exactions, because they indirectly gained status and authority through 
the exercise of lordship via office.  
A third larger point is the importance of taking a longer view across the medieval/early modern 
divide, in order to examine what phenomena mark a break between these two periods, and 
particularly applying this to the notion of the ‘middling sort’. Historians working on a variety of 
topics have shown the importance of a cross-boundary approach, revealing how it can shed new 
light on continuities in the policing of misbehaviour, path-dependent constraints on 
management policies, and more general aspects of regional social and economic change.9 
Margaret Yates has highlighted the contingency which led to the periodisation adopted by 
professional historians, and instead argues for a ‘discontinuous process’ of social and economic 
change where there was no ‘end of the middle ages’.10  
The arguments expressed here demonstrate that a similar approach is vital in considering 
oligarchy and social differentiation in the early modern village. Whilst studies that have begun 
in c.1550 or later have argued for this period as seeing a new social differentiation, leading to 
the creation of a new middling sort and thus dramatic social change, the evidence of manorial 
officeholding demonstrates that these trends are visible in the medieval period.11 However, this 
was not static, but varied across place as seen in the differing uses of manorial officeholding to 
control access to natural resources and govern misbehaviour in medieval villages. More 
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significant is the change across time. Before the Black Death low levels of absolute numbers 
serving in office combined with a high population, led to a very acute sense of oligarchy. After 
the Black Death, numbers serving remained static or even grew slightly, whilst population was 
significantly smaller, leading to a more dispersed structure. More surprisingly, from the mid-
fifteenth century numbers involved in office grew as did population, although Horstead was 
exceptional in showing the opposite trend. Finally, numbers involved in office were static or did 
continue to grow marginally in the later sixteenth century but did not keep pace with growing 
population.  
From this perspective, the phenomenon of the rise of a middling sort, could potentially be part 
of a longer story of the interaction of governing structures, and their exercise through manorial 
and parochial office, with aspects of population change. This argument is not necessarily to 
question that the ‘incorporation’ of local elites into the state was a novel shift that may have 
created a new degree of ‘integration nationally’.12 The England of c.1600 was not the same as 
that of c.1300, and the emergence of the civil parish, connected to the Tudor state via the growth 
of county justices, created a new impetus for resource redistribution. Institutional change 
allowed for an escape from high famine mortality for south-east England in the late sixteenth 
century in a way not possible in the Great Famine of 1315-21.13 Furthermore, factors outside 
officeholding put forward as key to the rise of the middling sort, such as ‘participation in a 
literate culture’, the ‘language of sorts’ or identification with the ‘concept of gentility’ and 
‘ideology of profit’ are either unobservable or inappropriate for medieval England.14 However, 
that such changes created hitherto unseen levels of ‘differentiation locally’ within villages 
underestimates the significance of pre-existing manorial structures, demonstrating that the 
trends of the later sixteenth century can only be fully understood if contextualised in a longer, 
medieval time-frame. Thus, the arguments made here restate the notions of a medieval version 
of something akin to the ‘middling sort’, and suggest that further work is needed to understand 
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how medieval local elites were similar to, and differed from, their later counterparts.15 In 1984, 
Smith argued that in examining ‘the relations between community and State over the 
centuries…we are dealing with changes in intensity and degree rather than with a major 
transformation in structure.’16 A similar point can be made for the related topic of a ‘middling 
sort’ which existed from at least c.1300, but varied in its exclusiveness and authority across time 
and space.  
Further light can be shed on English manorial officeholding by examining other governing 
structures which were either contemporaneous to the period 1300-1600 or were present in other 
manorial systems. For England itself, the complex politics of towns, established and probed in a 
substantial literature, reveal similarities and contrasts. Urban historians have long noted an 
element of exclusiveness in the governance of medieval towns, and have frequently used the 
word ‘oligarchy’ to delineate this, although several have noted the slipperiness of this term and 
questioned its appropriateness, with Christian Liddy suggesting that instead considering an 
inherently contested politics of citizenship is a more useful approach.17 Yet, to whatever degree 
they accept the term ‘oligarchy’, a range of historians have suggested that the fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries, and especially the decades around 1500, saw new tensions emerge over 
urban governance. Steven Rigby states that whilst urban governments had never been ‘popular’ 
in the modern sense, the late middle ages saw a ‘shift from informal plutocracy towards a more 
formal oligarchy’ achieved through restrictions on who could stand for mayor, replacement of 
burgesses’ assemblies with town councils, appointment of officers from above rather than by 
election, and the introduction of office for life.18 Liddy’s less institutional approach similarly 
highlights this phenomenon, noting a change in urban constitutions which had previously ‘been 
crafted as peace settlements’ and ‘agreed between parties’ becoming ‘partial, uncompromising, 
and dependent upon royal intervention’.19 The reasons for this shift are ascribed to both 
economic and political factors, with Rigby and Liddy stating that strains on urban economies 
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drove greater restrictions, whilst James Lee emphasises Henry VII’s policy of devolving power 
to urban elites in order to preserve order and stability.20  
What perspective can this growth of the ‘close corporation’ lend to the changes in manorial 
officeholding outlined above? Clearly urban officeholding institutions and political structures 
differed greatly from the manor. They were far more complex and could more easily be changed 
by officers themselves who were free from seignorial interference, and so direct comparison is 
difficult. Increased ‘closedness’ in urban office was achieved through redefinition and far more 
explicit ‘policies’, whilst for manorial office it is only evidenced by examining changes in 
numbers serving in office. However, a clear dissimilarity between manorial and urban patterns 
is the relative chronology of a growth in oligarchy. Medieval urban historians have emphasised 
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as the era of restriction. Such a pattern is the 
inverse of the quantitative data gathered here for Downham and Worfield, where the same 
period saw increases in numbers serving in office, achieved via a growth in the number of 
individuals serving on average fewer times. In these locales a growth apparently occurred in the 
numbers involved in officeholding, although admittedly this was in part driven by changes in 
the base population. Horstead seems to have been more similar to the urban cases, as a drop in 
the number of tenants was related to a fall in the number of those serving in office, a process 
akin to the exclusion of parts of the population from the potential to serve in office seen in 
towns.  
Several medieval urban historians have made much of Walter Ullmann’s conception of 
‘descending’ and ‘ascending’ sources of authority in the Middle Ages.21 Rigby states that towns 
had ‘an ascending concept of authority through their councils, elections and common purses’ 
but that the proliferation of royal charters of incorporation around 1500 marked ‘a shift in the 
source of authority exercised by borough officers away from the community and towards central 
government, i.e. towards a descending rather than an ascending concept of authority and 
legitimacy’.22 Such a model of authority has also been applied to manorial officeholding by 
Hindle, who suggests that manorial jurors drew on an ascending form of authority, whilst 
                                                          
20 Rigby, ‘Urban ‘Oligarchy’’, 77-8; Liddy, Contesting Citizenship, 212-3; J. Lee, ‘Urban Policy and 
Urban Political Culture: Henry VII and his Towns’, Historical Research, 82:217, (2009), 493-510, 494, 
506.  
21 W. Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 12-3.  
22 Rigby, ‘Urban ‘Oligarchy’’, 65, 80.  
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vestries expressed a descending form of authority, exercising power on behalf of the state.23 
However, this conception has been recently challenged by Liddy, who highlights ‘that it is too 
neat and too rigid a formulation of the roots of governmental power’ and that using it for towns 
assumes that contemporaries conceived of power working in similar ways no matter the 
location.24 The evidence of manorial officeholding outlined here further supports this criticism 
in a political sphere outside the English town.25 As has been demonstrated, manorial officers did 
govern to protect local communities from external issues and to monitor common problems, 
which suggests an ascending basis for authority as Hindle suggests. However, manorial officials 
also gained authority via the delegation of authority from crown and lord, suggesting a 
descending concept of authority, challenging Hindle’s conception and the analytical value of the 
Ullmann model which contrasts these two sources of power.    
How does English manorial officeholding compare with European equivalents? For post-
medieval periods, Bohemia and Russia can provide appropriate case studies for assessment. 
Tracey Dennison and Sheilagh Ogilvie’s examination of the co-dependency of communal social 
networks and hierarchical serfdom at the estates of early modern Friedland and eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Voshchazhinikovo, reveals significant parallels with the case of English 
manorial officeholding.26 The picture of a serf elite who utilised their position to enforce 
seigniorial authority, but also to enrich themselves via exercising this power, is akin to the 
investment of local elites in manorial governance supporting the authors’ contention that ‘this 
parasitic collaboration…was systematic rather than incidental’.27 
However, if the overarching theme of collaboration is similar, the structures underlying it were 
different. Partially, this was due to the more indirect exercise of lordship on the European 
continent. The large size of estates in these two cases, which meant that the lord’s central 
                                                          
23 See p. 195. 
24 Liddy, Contesting the City, 179-80.  
25 See also S. Reynolds, ‘Secular Power and Authority in the Middle Ages’ in H. Pryce and J. Watts 
(eds.), Power and Identity in the Middle Ages: Essays in Memory of Rees Davies, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 11-22, 21-2.  
26 T. Dennison and S. Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital in Bohemia and Russia’, EcHR, 60:3, (2007), 
513-44, 516-7.  
27 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital’, 521-40; T. Dennison, The Institutional 
Framework of Russian Serfdom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 129-30; S. Ogilvie, 
‘Communities and the ‘Second Serfdom’ in Early Modern Bohemia’, P&P, 187, (2005), 69-119, 113-4, 
118-9; S. Ogilvie, ‘Village Community and Village Headman in Early Modern Bohemia’, Bohemia, 46:2, 
(2005), 402-51, 431-33, 439-41.  
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officials ‘were too few, too costly, and too distant’ to perform much direct monitoring of village 
officers, contrasts with the English cases where seigniorial stewards, auditors and bailiffs were 
able to examine subordinate officials more closely.28 Instead, at Friedland local villages were 
organised as communes with their own courts and officials, which had extensive jurisdictions 
and powers of coercion.29 At Voshchazhinikovo, village communes were significantly weaker, 
with the estate commune being the dominant body, but lords seem to have been less interested 
in interfering with the work of officials.30 This seigniorial indifference was due to the fact that 
servile obligations at Friedland and Voshchazhinikovo were largely collective, which contrasts 
with England, where individual tenants, even as serfs, were typically responsible to the lord, and 
collective punishment was more unusual.31 Communal officials had an independent identity 
outside of the estate in these cases, and represented their villages collectively to the seigniorial 
administration, with lords having relatively little interest in their activities as long as estates 
remained profitable and in fact were reliant on effective headmen.32 Their position vis-à-vis 
their fellow tenants was significantly more powerful; in Bohemia the office of village headman 
was attached to an heritable holding, meaning that lords could eject the officer but tenants could 
not easily punish officials.33 In England, conversely, manor and village were more closely 
identified, and manorial officials were more closely monitored as individuals by both the lord 
and their fellow tenants.   
The motivations of the officeholding elite to work within the system were also different. The 
power of Russian and Bohemian lords and the lack of legal protection for the unfree meant that 
elite serfs were reliant on the manorial system for economic security and the upholding of their 
privileges.34 This is a contrast with England where even unfree tenants were only treated as 
villeins in relations with their lord, and had some access to royal law in relation to persons 
beyond the manor.35 In the sixteenth century, this protection was extended as copyhold tenure 
                                                          
28 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital’, 529.  
29 Ogilvie, ‘Communities’, 78, 84-90; Ogilvie, ‘Village Headman’, 404-5, 420-26.  
30 Dennison, Institutional Framework, 100-3. 
31 Dennison, Institutional Framework, 107-9; Ogilvie, ‘Village Headman’, 428-30.  
32 Ogilvie, ‘Village Headman’, 413-4. 
33 Ogilvie, ‘Village Headman’, 408.  
34 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital’, 541; Ogilvie, ‘Village Headman’, 403-4, 413-20; 
Dennison Institutional Framework, 43-6.  
35 Hyams, King, Lords and Peasants, 107, 150-1; Briggs, ‘Seigniorial Control’, 421-2.  
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became defensible in royal courts.36 Moreover, even within the manorial system, the strength of 
custom provided security of rights outside of seigniorial favour.37 This distinction becomes 
pronounced for England after c.1550, where it has been demonstrated that manorial 
officeholding continued to be utilised by a tenant elite for governance even though the lord had 
little demonstrable interest in its maintenance. This provides a major point of departure from 
Dennison and Ogilvie’s conclusions. Whilst they see the manipulation of social capital by 
village elites as a European-wide phenomenon, which a manorial system simply made more 
coercive in eastern Europe as lords bolted their own interests to it, here it is argued that in 
England the manorial system potentially created new social divisions, allowing for the 
delineation of a formal oligarchy and creating opportunities for governance of commons and 
misbehaviour that became ultimately separate from the direct objectives of lords. This process 
allowed for the manor to become a body akin to that of communal courts in early modern 
Bohemia and Russia.38 This desire for governance by a local elite is what allowed the manorial 
system to remain vital in England even after the decline of serfdom and withdrawal of more 
coercive aspects of lordship. Thus whilst in Russia, Bohemia and England universally, peasant 
elites were invested in officeholding for their own ends, in the English case this moved beyond 
a ‘mutually parasitic relationship’ between lord and elites, to providing a separate governing 
structure.39  
Narrowing the focus back to England, as a last substantive point it is important to consider how 
far the patterns observed for Horstead, Downham and Worfield are representative of England as 
a whole. Whilst these case studies were specifically chosen to encompass a variety of regions, 
landscape types, and both nucleated and dispersed settlement patterns, there are three key 
weaknesses with the sample. Firstly, all three manors held both courts leet and baron.40 Whilst 
leets were not an exceptional franchise, they were certainly held at only a minority of manors, 
and before the Black Death were typical of the Midlands and East Anglia but more unusual in 
                                                          
36 H. Garrett-Goodyear, ‘Common Law and Manor Courts: Lords, Copyholders and Doing Justice in 
Early Tudor England’ in J. Whittle (ed.), Landlords and Tenants in Britain, 1440-1660: Tawney’s 
agrarian problem revisited, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013), 35-51, 45-51; R.W. Hoyle, ‘Tenure and the 
Land Market in Early Modern England: or a Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate’, EcHR, 43:1, 
(1990), 1-20, 3-5; Bailey, ‘Customary Tenures’, 213. 
37 See p. 25. 
38 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital’, 542.  
39 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital’, 542.  
40 Here no distinction is made between the leet and the view of frankpledge as these were commonly 
combined in practice. See Harvey, Manorial Records, 45.  
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the southwest and north of England.41 The more typical manor with court baron alone led to a 
more circumscribed role for its officials. Some aspects of business, such as the ‘royal’ 
presentments, would be absent, and the opportunities to serve provided by the offices of capital 
pledge and ale taster would not exist. These obligations were instead met by officers within 
other jurisdictions such as the leets of different lords or sheriffs’ tourns.42 This lack of 
jurisdiction may have affected the usefulness of manor courts to tenants and community elites, 
as courts baron were restricted to largely seigniorial and landholding business, the use of 
manorial officeholding as a governing structure was potentially diminished. Manor courts with 
leets are often seen as having a longer history into the sixteenth century due to their criminal 
jurisdiction, and thus court barons may have seen a more curtailed chronology.43  
The second weakness with the sample manors is that they were all held by greater landlords, as 
part of larger estates comprising several manors. This again makes these manors exceptional, 
with an estimated 19,600 of a total 20,593 English landlords instead being drawn from the 
gentry and lesser clergy in the early fourteenth century. It also means that these lords were not 
permanently or even frequently resident on the manors examined.44 Such an imbalance is 
unfortunately a by-product of the approach adopted. Investigating manors over the longue-durée 
using the most complete records possible necessitated focusing on greater landlords whose court 
rolls generally survived better due to centralised estate administrations and recordkeeping.45 
However, manors with lesser resident lords may have seen different trends, with officials 
perhaps having less latitude due to the more watchful eye of an ever-present lord.46 Moreover, 
officeholding structures may simply have been less developed, with resident lords relying on a 
single official to perform the work necessary to generate revenues, leading to limited official 
structures for communities to utilise.47 Alternatively, such manors may have seen an even more 
                                                          
41 Campbell and Bartley, Atlas, 275-6, Map 15.3.  
42 T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., (London: Butterworths, 1956), 89-90, 
97-8.   
43 Bailey, English Manor, 188-9.  
44 Campbell, ‘Agrarian Problem’, 13-4, Table 1.  
45 Bailey, Marginal Economy, 37; Harvey, Manorial Records, 9-10; Waddell, ‘Governing England’, 284.  
46 Thornton, ‘Lord’s Man or Community Servant’, 213–24. 
47 R.H. Britnell, ‘The Pastons and their Norfolk’, AgHR, 36, (1998), 132-44, 143-4; R.H. Britnell, ‘Minor 
Landlords in England and Medieval Agrarian Capitalism’, P&P, 89, (1980), 3-22, 7-9.  
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community-focused role for officers, with smaller landlords generally being less concerned with 
enforcing aspects of coercive lordship such as serfdom.48  
A third weakness is that all three manors saw a continuity in the use of heritable tenures across 
the 300-year period, with unfree tenures transforming into customary heritable holdings. Such a 
succession was only one avenue of change, with other manors seeing a transformation to less-
secure life tenancies and leasehold tenure, which whilst potentially advantageous for tenants as 
a release from serfdom in the land-rich fifteenth century, became an unplanned boon to lords 
with demographic increase after 1550.49 A potential effect of a shift to life tenancies or 
leasehold may have had the impact of reducing the importance of manorial officeholding, as a 
lack of stability in tenure meant that officeholding group was less of a cohesive elite with a 
long-term investment in governing the manor. Moreover, leasehold tenure especially may have 
hastened the decline of manor courts more broadly, as they did not require this institution to 
provide title to landholdings.50 On the other hand, Jane Whittle has argued that manors with 
non-heritable tenure had dampened land markets, with a greater tendency for land to remain 
within families as it was harder for tenants to sell, which could have created an even tighter-knit 
elite group and thus made officeholding even more important in governing the local 
community.51  
The only way to address these concerns about the representativeness of the manors studied here 
would be with more examples, piecing together more limited runs of rolls for the court barons 
of smaller landlords to see if similar patterns can be established, and examining the records of 
midland and south-western manors with alternative types of tenure. Thus the conclusions made 
here act as a call to further work, to examine the phenomenon of manorial officeholding for a 
greater range of contexts, and focus on a finer grained analysis of the patterns established above.  
The introduction to this thesis began by detailing the celebrated Swallowfield Articles, and the 
references therein to the governing structure provided by the manorial leet and tithings even in 
1596. This thesis has revealed the reasons why the ‘chief inhabitants’ of Swallowfield, 
                                                          
48 Bailey, ‘Villeinage in England’, 432, 452; Bailey, Decline of Serfdom, 286-7. 
49 Bailey, ‘Customary Tenures’, 217-26, 228-30; Harvey, ‘Conclusion’, 330-34; Hoyle, ‘Tenure and the 
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struggling with concerns over the reformation of manners and dispensing charity in a period of 
rising population, looked to the manor and its officeholding structures as part of the solution to 
meet their concerns. Manorial officeholding had long provided a way to govern local 
communities, partially stimulated by the external authorities of lord and crown, but also to meet 
both the needs of the community as a whole and the narrow needs of an elite, which, even if 
office was spread relatively widely, could still wield a disproportionate influence on the manor 
through the concentration of office in the hands of a few. If the ‘politics of the parish’ are an 
essential facet of the social history of early modern England, then the ‘politics of the manor’ 




Appendix 1: Identifying Individuals 
Much of the statistical analysis of officeholding in chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis relies on 
identifying individuals holding office within the same set of court rolls across time or between 
different sets of records such as churchwardens’ accounts and lay subsidies. Identifying 
individuals within manorial records is not straightforward, due to the difficulties posed by the 
same individual either being recorded under different surnames, or two individuals sharing the 
same name.1 Fortunately, the first problem largely is confined to the pre-Black Death period, 
with surnames generally becoming more fixed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.2 The 
second problem is more pertinent, especially if one assumes that families with shared surnames 
often provided multiple officers. Here, it is assumed, following the secondary literature, that 
court clerks did try to distinguish between individuals using descriptions, the veracity of which 
Briggs has demonstrated through analysis of suitor lists and extents.3 In the three case studies, 
devices used as ‘secondary identifiers’ included occupational identifiers (such as John Buk 
(active 1416-1450) and John Buk Bateman (active 1423-1438)); locative identifiers (such as 
William Rowley of Wyke (active 1508-1540) and William Rowley of Newton (active 1524-
1541)); and most ubiquitously, junior and senior (such as John Atte Lane snr (active 1462-1472) 
and John Atte Lane jnr (active 1468-1488)).4  
The methodology to identify individuals for each case study followed a three-stage process. 
Firstly, all names of officers were extracted from records of selections, lists of impanelled 
officials, and chance mentions in other entries and placed in a Microsoft Access database. 
Secondly, the names were standardised to account for various spellings but with any secondary 
identifiers retained. Thirdly, names were turned into individuals identified by a unique ‘officer 
number’. This last process was performed chronologically and worked on the assumption that 
any names, either unmodified or with the same secondary identifiers, appearing within a space 
of 5 years denoted the same individual. This rule was suspended for long breaks of over 5 years 
in the record, for which it was assumed that a name appearing in the final year of records before 
the break, and the first year of records after the break, could potentially be the same individual, 
                                                          
1 Briggs, Credit, 229; Razi, Life, Marriage and Death, 11-12.  
2 Razi, Life, Marriage and Death, 11; J.M. Bennett, ‘Spouses, Siblings and Surnames: Reconstructing 
Families from Medieval Village Court Rolls’, JBS, 23:1, (1983), 26-46,’, 37, 39.  
3 Bennett, ‘Spouses, Siblings’, 38-9; Briggs, Credit, 230.  
4 CUL, EDR, C11/2/5-6; SAC, P314/W/1/1/503-661; KCA, HOR/37, HOR/39-41.  
263 
 
subject to checks explored below. Individuals with the same name and different secondary 
identifiers were assumed to be different individuals when they appeared in the same session. 
Occasionally, one individual appears to have initially appeared with their name unmodified, 
then appeared with a secondary identification, and then later appeared again without 
modification. If no session could be found where both the unmodified and modified name 
served in office simultaneously, it was assumed that this was the same individual, both with and 
without secondary modifier. This phenomenon was largely confined to Worfield, where 
occasionally an individual seems to have been ascribed a locative identifier by his township 
when he normally was not.  
The most difficult issue arose with the use of seniors and juniors with the same name who 
served simultaneously, as such relational identifiers changed over time. Thus, at Worfield one 
man named John Baker served between 1548 and 1579. However, from 1580 onwards there are 
two John Bakers, referred to as senior and junior. Then, from 1585 until 1599 the designators 
again disappear, with a single John Baker appearing.5 In these cases, it has been assumed that 
emergence of the use of snr and jnr as secondary identifiers refer to a period of crossover 
between an older and younger individual with the same name, whilst the disappearance of 
identifiers represents the withdrawal, most likely through death, of the senior, and thus older 
individual. So in this scenario, it is assumed John Baker I served 1548-1584, whilst John Baker 
II served 1580-1598. Whilst undoubtedly it is possible that a senior man may have outlived a 
younger individual, in the absence of more concrete information this was used as the safest 
assumption.  
A final check was performed by examining the length of officeholding career of individuals. A 
65-year maximum length was assumed, with any apparently longer careers assumed to be the 
conflation of two men. In these cases, two individuals were created by splitting the names at the 
longest gap between appearances of the name. Throughout all the rules outlined above, each 
name was treated on a case-by-case basis, especially if there was other evidence to help identify 
distinguish individuals, such as the clerk eliding two surnames.  
In identifying individuals serving as manorial officers at Worfield with men serving as 
churchwardens and assessed in the 1524-5 and 1544-5 lay subsidies, a similar approach was 
                                                          
5 SAC, P314/W/1/1/676-836.  
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used. The names of men in these extra-manorial records were compared with the lists of 
individuals serving in manorial office. Any identical name that appeared in both lists at dates 
within 5 years of one another were assumed to be the same person.  
The methodology used to identify individuals in this thesis is therefore far from foolproof, and 
certainly falls short of a family reconstitution. It seems likely that at least a few names are 
misattributed, and thus a few officeholding careers either lengthened or shortened. However, for 
the macro-analysis performed here, drawing on averages of large numbers of data points, it is 
sufficient. Investigating individuals involved in officeholding also is particularly suited to such 
a methodology. As discussed in the thesis, officers were named routinely and often 
simultaneously in lists, allowing relatively precise dating and the ability to see names in relation 




Appendix 2: Population Estimates 
The estimates of total population and the population of adult males given for the three case studies 
in tables 0.1 and 2.9 are based on a series of national taxation records that survive between 1327 
and 1603. These consist of the 1327 lay subsidy, the 1377-81 poll taxes, the 1524 lay subsidy, and 
the 1563 and 1603 diocesan population returns, although the records do not universally survive for 
each return for all the case studies. In each case, the records only account for a varying proportion 
of the actual population of the communities surveyed, and thus various multipliers were applied to 
the numbers given in the documents to achieve estimated ranges of population. These multipliers 
were based on those found in relevant secondary literature.  
Table A2.1 summarises the actual returns and multipliers applied, whilst the footnotes detail the 
sources of both the returns and the multipliers used. As a final set of caveats, it is vital to remember 
that these are very imprecise estimates of population, and likely reflect trends better than absolute 
levels of population. It is further important to remember that none of the returns used the manor as a 
basis for assessment, but rather the vill for the lay subsidies and poll tax, and the parish for the 
diocesan population returns. This means that these estimates are not necessarily related to the 
number of tenants, with inhabitants included who may not have held land in the manor, and non-
resident manorial landholders excluded. This point is particularly relevant for Horstead, which had 





Table A2: Methodology of population estimates 
                                                          
1 J.J. Muskett (trans.) and C.H. Evelyn White (ed.), Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely: Lay Subsidy for the Year 1327, Names of the Tax-Payers in every 
Parish, (London: Public Record Office, 1900). 
2 Following Campbell and Bartley, Atlas, 329. 
3 Following B.M.S. Campbell, ‘The Population of Early Tudor England: a Re-Evaluation of the 1522 Muster Returns and 1524 and 1525 Lay Subsidies’, 
Journal of Historical Geography, 7, (1981), 145-54, 152. 
4 C.C. Fenwick (ed.), Poll Taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1381, Part 1, Bedfordshire-Lincolnshire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 
1998): Little Downham, 73; C.C. Fenwick (ed.), Poll Taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1381, Part 2 Lincolnshire-Westmorland, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001): Horstead, 155. 
5 Unfortunately the returns of the Isle of Ely were given together in the tax (excluding the City of Ely), thus putting Downham and Littleport together. 
This methodology assumes population decline was similar in these neighbouring communities due to their proximity. Pleasingly, the ratio between the 
140 estimate for 1377 and the 31 taxpayers in 1327 of 1:4.52 is very close to that of 1:4.47 calculated for Cambridgeshire as a whole, suggesting a 
number that is at least plausible.   
6 Following Poos, Rural Society, 299.  
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1998): Little Downham, 30, Horstead, 231.   
8 Following Campbell, ‘Population of Early Tudor England’, 152.  
9 Following Campbell, ‘Population of Early Tudor England’, 152. 
10 Dyer and Palliser, Diocesan Population Returns: Little Downham, 152, Worfield, 134, Horstead, 411.   
11 Following Tompkins, Peasant Society in a Midlands Manor, 190. 
12 This excludes Stanninghall which was part of the civil but not ecclesiastical parish of Horstead: Dyer and Palliser, Diocesan Population Returns, 411 
n.111.  
13 Unfortunately, the census only states that the number of communicants were ‘the like nomber’ to Coltishall, where a number of 100 communicants is 
given. Therefore these figures are very much estimates: Dyer and Palliser, Diocesan Population Returns, 442 n.112.  
14 Following Tompkins, Peasant Society in a Midlands Manor, 190. 
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